Another post over on Intellectual Defenestration has caught my attention again. This one is a critique of the position that the sixth command, "Thou shalt not kill," is to be taken at face value. There is never a reason to take human life. Whether it be self-defense, defense of another, just war, capital punishment, whatever, the command is still the same, "Do not kill-ever." While agreeing with the desire to uphold life at all costs, Nathan homes in on the fatal flaw of this reading, "Pacifism fails, I think, because it ultimately becomes a commitment to the principle of upholding life, rather than a commitment to actually upholding life." I think he's right. I also believe that there is a deeper dichotomy to consider.
The commitment to preserve human life is ultimately based upon the creation of that life in the imago dei. It does not follow from this, however, that the only or even the primary means of honoring this image will be found in the preservation of a human life or even of human lives. To put it another way, simply being alive is not all there is to being made in the image of God. If it were, then the Bible itself has severely complicated the picture with all of its divinely sanctioned wars and death penalties and slaughterings. And, though it is true that no one today has any sort of a mandate for Joshua like conquest, this is not a thing relegated entirely to the barbaric OT. "The one in authority," says Paul, "does not bear the sword in vain."
Leading into this, Paul had just said, "Let every person be subject to the governing authorities." This is not, as may be supposed, mere pragmatic advice for model citizenship. It does not fit neatly into that outline of Romans whereby 1-11 are theological and 12-16 are practical. The book does follow a structure that divides it up like this, but the split is not between the sacred and the secular, or between faith and practice. It is between the already and the not yet. It is a book of the covenant and of Covenant, i.e., Federal Heads. It is written to the church, which is already in Christ, but not yet loosed from Adam. The first part of the book is a soteriological contrast between the first and second Adams. For now, I am more interested in the second part. This section is also centered around the covenant. In this case, however, Paul is concerned with what unites us with the rest of world. It isn't simply that they're people too. Paul is still thinking covenantally and, this time, he expresses this with allusions to the imago dei and creation mandates.
The imago dei is not a passive descriptor of each living individual. It is rather a covenantal concept whereby mankind, living in community, upholds and displays the communicable attributes of God. Still considering the topic of human government, Paul writes, "For there is no authority except from God, and those that exist have been instituted by God." In particular, the attribute that defines the essence of governing authorities functioning within the parameters of their ordination is justice. The preservation of of the imago dei is found in a corresponding preservation of human life. Yet, even more so, it is found in the practice of justice. "He does not bear the sword in vain."
The first scriptural record of God's institution of government is found in the post-flood covenant. This should not be taken as the first time government itself is instituted by God. The institution thereof is a part of the creation covenant, of which that following the flood is a republication. The specific inscripturation of government's institution is found in Genesis 9:6, "Whoever sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed, for God made man in his own image." The explanation concerning the imago dei is not given so much in connection with the first clause as it is with the second. The command, "Thou shalt not kill, " is upheld, not in pacifism, but in the exercise of justice. When a life is unjustly taken, the fulfillment of the law is not that another life be unjustly spared, but that justice take it as well. Capital punishment and just war theory exist because of the sixth commandment, not in disregard to it.
What about taking another life either in self-defense or in defense of another? This, too, is a matter of justice. If person A is about to murder person B then I am complicit in that murder if I could have stopped it, even if this includes taking the life of person A. Justice is served both in preserving the innocent life and, if need be, in taking the life of the guilty. On the other hand, I am not justified in taking the life of someone who has already taken a life. There is a difference between justified self-defense and vigilantism. Vengeance belongs to the Lord and is justly exercised only by those to whom it is given. These are the ones appointed by God, who do not bear the sword in vain.
Over on Intellectual Defenestration, Nathan Maphet points out an article by David Gelernter, the thesis of which is, "Puritanism did not drop out of history. It transformed itself into Americanism." Even though I'm not prepared, just yet, to jump on board with Gelernter's idea, I don't agree with Nathan's stated reason for rejecting it. He writes, "at the heart of Puritanism lay not only a broad political worldview, but also an intense desire for and focus on personal piety. Inasmuch as Americanism does not also have this element, it is not the same as Puritanism." He goes on to give a possible argument to his objection- "that the focus on Christian living was an ancillary element of Puritanism, that the personal flowed from the political and therefore Americanism is still fundamentally the inheritor of Puritanism, only modifying the non-essentials." There may be another alternative.
Personal piety was a core belief of the Puritans and, most likely, would not have been the case if they had not been Puritans; however, it does not follow from this that it was a core aspect of Puritanism per se. Gelernter states that Puritanism is "not a separate type of Christianity but a certain approach to Protestantism." As such, it was found in a wide range of Protestant churches. It starts out among Anglicans, Congregationalists, and Presbyterians only to broaden out into Quakers and Unitarians. I submit that the Puritan concern for personal piety was not a secondary issue derived from some aspect of Puritanism, nor was it a primary issue for them but having little to do with their Puritanism. They were Purtian to the core; this approach informed everything about them. Rather, it was a primary issue necessarily brought about by the union of Puritanism with orthodox Protestantism. When the religious orthodoxy went, this piety either vanished altogether or turned into legalism.
As far as the connection itself between Puritanism and Americanism, it isn't just a matter of the core ideals of freedom, equality, and democracy. The French have these ideals, yet no one is accusing them of Americanistic tendencies. Americanism is not so much that Americans want these ideals for themselves but that everyone, everywehere is entitled to what these ideals represent- and it's our duty to make sure that they get them. Gelernter lists these ideal as conclusions of two premises: "first, every member of the American community has his own individual dignity, insofar as he deals individually with God; second, the community has a divine mission to all mankind." These, in turn, derive from the fundamental fact that the Bible is God's Word. The fundamental fact along with the premises explain how Americansim reached its conclusions. Today, I'm not so sure that holding to the missionary zeal for the conclusions need imply that one also hold to the premises, much less to the fundamental fact. There is a tendency in the history of a belief system to retain hold on particular tenets even while abandoning the reason for reaching them. We find the same sort of thing in much of American Christianitry- evangelize the central gospel truths while failing to emphasize or, perhaps, even to mention, why they are so important. When one generation is unable to defend the faith, the next will be unable, or unwilling to hold it.
I suppose I'm gettimg off track here, but not quite. The same sort of phenomenon acounts for the liberalizing tendency within Protestantism into which Puritnanism fell before vanishing or, if you agree with Gelernter's thesis, before it transmited itself into Americanism. Like I said, I'm not sure if I buy his thesis; however, this is more due to wanting to know what other factors may be involved than it is to a fundamental diagreement with the elements of his argument as presented. For the sake of argument, then, I'm going to assume that he is correct. If so, what accounts for the big differences that one finds betwen Puritanism and Americanism? Differences that go quite a bit beyond the existence of personal piety. I've already mentioned one reason: the evolution of a belief system caused by divorcing present core beliefs from an historically based apology for those beliefs. A product of the sin nature in general or maybe just plain laziness. But the transformation of Puritanism, from orthodox to liberal Protestantism and then to a nationalistic religion, was relatively rapid. I'm inclined to think that something other than natural development was driving it.
Two possibilities present themselves for consideration. The first is the influence within Puritanism of a faulty view of the millennium, or of the nature of the Kingdom of God. Gelernter speaks of the second main element of Purtitanism as a political doctrine, the goal of which was to "to reach back to the pure Christianity of the New Testament—and then even farther back. Puritans spoke of themselves as God’s new chosen people, living in God’s new promised land—in short, as God’s new Israel." There is nothing wrong with the view- in fact, it is correct that Israel, that is, the visible Kingdom of God, finds its fulfillment in the church: if this is as far as it goes. And, at least among one prominent faction of ealry Puritans, this was confessed to be the case. The WCF XXV.I identifies the visible church, which is not confined to one nation, as "the kingdom of the Lord Jesus Christ." Still, it is hard to maintain such a distinction when the document in question was born in the context of the English Civil Wars, wars in which the crown and Parliament took decidedly different religious stances and fought from these religious motivations. The temptation to make the kingdom a fusion of church and state was too great. This would be magnified with American Puritanism, in which everyone who migrated over at that time was a Puritan and, for a while, all who were members of the church were, by definition, also members of the state (state here being defined as the most immediate political unit to which they belonged). This view of the kingdom combind with the first element of Puritanism, which was "the Calvinist belief in predestination with associated religious doctrines" to form a kind of manifest destiny that would survive in the political realm long after religious orthodoxy, including the Calvinism, had been abandoned.
So much then for why the religious and political realms were combined. The second possible explanation for the rapid transmutation of Puritanism goes to the virtual irrelevance of supernatural religion in Americanism. Why was religious orthodoxy abandoned? To be sure, many of this ideology still invoke the deity in support of their cause. Nevertheless, there is no need to. The combination of the core ideals with religion is not nearly as prominent as it was at the inception of Puritanism. Where religion is brought in as justification for Americanism, it is personalized. I do not doubt that President Bush has the sincere religious conviction that all men are entitled by their creator with the right to freedom, equality, and democracy. However, he's not going to quibble with someone else's religious motivations, be they Christian, Hindu, Atheist, or even Islamic- just so long as these ideals of Americanism are supported. I can't see the Puritans being able to maintain this distinction between religious motivation and personal conviction. The second possible explanation is, namely, the influence upon the society at large of Enlightenment thinking.
I notice many things getting blamed, injustly in my opinion, on the Enlightenment. Along with modernism, it is cited as the evil fountainhead of all things logical and of belief in objective truth. But this is too shallow a dismissal. Modernism and the Enlightenment may have incorporated these elements, but it did not give birth to them. That part of the WCF I.VI, which states, "The whole counsel of God concerning all things necessary for his own glory, man's salvation, faith and life, is either expressly set down in Scripture, or by good and necessary consequence may be deduced from Scripture," is not a product of Enlightenment or foundationalist corruption, but is a safeguard of orthodoxy. The fault of the Enlightenment lay, not in reason, but in rationalism, in the attempt to dethrone God and replace him with the goddess Reason. Assign God to his corner and see how many things can be explained without him. The freedom to worship God as he has commanded turns into the more broadly defined subjugation of the king. And while, to an extent, this may be a good thing, insofar as it is derived from the creation of all human beings in the imago dei, soon, there arises a shift in thinking. No longer man in the image of God, but man endowed by his creator (defined deistically) with certain inalienable rights. But then, doesn't it just stand to reason that people inherently deserve freedom and equality? Why bother God at all?
If Gelernter's thesis is right, Calvinistic post-millennielsim was transmogriphied into imperialistic democratization. Yet, wherever it came from, I cannot subscribe to what he has called "Americanism." This is not an argument against the current war in Iraq. Nor is it, necessarily an argument against democratizing the Middle East- if this is truly in the best interest of our own national security. No, what I object to is the idea that God wants everyone to be free, equal, and democratic. Democracy is not a bad thing; however (and this may be overly simplistic), I don't recall in those cases where God does get directly involved in the affairs of state, such as ancient Israel, that there was a duly elected President David. My point is not to argue the merits of a monarchy, but to say that the diginity due to all individuals from their creation in God's image does not need to manifest itself in their being free, equal, and registered voters. Nor, unless it be for our own national security reasons or for a foreign power's blatant abuse of its citizens, should we take lightly the overthrow of another government just so we can share our democratic good fortune. Most of all, I do not support Americanism because it thrives by making religious motivation, even if publically stated, a matter of private conviction. The gospel, the imperative to make disciples of all nations, is subordinated to making all nations politically free.
The best answer to the problem of abortion is the same as with any other sin. It is found in the preaching of the gospel. Still, legal strategies are not entirely out of the question when it comes to simply curbing a practice and I would like to address those here. In my last related post, which was about the reversal of a ban on a specific type of abortion, I concluded that these kinds of bans would never work unless they first addressed the fundamental rights involved. There are three: 1) The right of the state to protect the lives of its present or potential citizens; 2) The right to privacy (under which file the right to choose); 3) The right of all persons to life (unless forfeited for a capital crime and under due process of law). Current abortion law, as outlined in Roe v. Wade, is a balancing act between the first two. The third right remains intact but is made moot by the fact that the unborn are not legally recognized as persons. If they were, then the interplay between the first two would be moot, for abortion would be illegal except in the case of clear and present danger to the life of the mother. This much is admitted in Roe v. Wade section IX: The appellee and certain amici argue that the fetus is a "person" within the language and meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. In support of this, they outline at length and in detail the well-known facts of fetal development. If this suggestion of personhood is established, the appellant's case, of course, collapses, for the fetus' right to life would then be guaranteed specifically by the Amendment. [Emphasis mine]
For the moment, though, and in order to understand the balance between the first two rights, please agree that the unborn are not persons. The right to privacy is never actually stated in so many words; consequently, many abortion opponents try to argue that it does not, in fact, exist. There is a misunderstanding here to the effect that this right entails the right to murder. It does not. The right to privacy is a matter of common law. In its simplest form, it is the right to be left alone. It is the right to be free from state intereference in one's private life. Be careful not to limit the concept of privacy to things that would be embarrassing if any one else witnessed them. This right coveres such things as personal medical decisions, family relationships, child rearing and education, etc. Any attempt to toss this one out will have some undesired consequences. The right is not absolute. The right to raise your children as you see fit does not include the right to abuse them. The state can and should step in. Similarly, the right to an abortion is balanced (at least in theory) against the state's interest in its present and potential citizens.
Roe v. Wade divides pregnancy into trimesters (we will leave aside the question of whether in so doing they intruded into legislative ground- it is de facto the law of the land). Stipulating to the facts as understood by the court, first trimester abortions are equally or less dangerous to the life and health of the mother than is natural birth. The state, therefore, has no compelling interest in restricting the woman's right to privacy. Second trimester abortions are more dangerous to the life of the mother; consequently, the state has the right to regulate how these abortions are done. Two factors are present in the third trimester: 1) Greater risk to the life of the mother and, with that, more restrictive regulations; and 2) the immenent potential for the state to gain a citizen. This last point means that the state can proscribe third trimester abortions altogether. But only in theory. While the states interest can override the woman's right to a personal decision, it cannot override something like a claim to physical or mental distress. Some of these claims may be legitimate, others are just loopholes. The bottom line in practice is that if a woman wants an abortion, she gets an abortion. And so it should be; that is, if the unborn are not persons.
The court considered a combination of factors in its determination of pre-natal nonpersonhood; some more legitimate than others. 1) It noted the lack of a agreement within philosophical and religious circles. 2) It noted certain legal precedent for not affording the unborn the same civil rights (e.g., inheritance rights). 3) It noted the history of abortion within common law. 4) It looked at the word "person" as it is used in the Constitution. The first is not quite to the point. While lawmakers would certainly want to consult various opinions on the matter, the final determination of legal personhood is a matter of legislation. On the second, the court overlooks the distinction between the rights of citizens and the rights of persons. It may be the case that the unborn have a history of fewer rights because they are not seen as persons, but it is not necessarily so. It is more likely that the intents of the lawmakers were diverse.
The third factor, abortion within common law, notes that the relatively stringent abortion laws found in the United States are of comparitively recent origin; not much over 100 years at the time of the ruling. They note that abortion was rarely, if ever, illegal before the first "quickening," that is, the first detectible movement in the womb. After this, the punishment was still less than was that for causing a post-natal death. Nonetheless, the facts in evidence are insufficient to warrant the court in concluding that the reason for this lesser punishment had anything to do with the personal status of the fetus.
As previously noted, it had been argued that a fetus is person within the meaning of the 14th Amendment. However, the amendment does not state this in so many words, nor are there any cases that state this. The court looked at the use of the word elsewhere in the Constitution, noting: "Person" is used in other places in the Constitution: in the listing of qualifications for Representatives and Senators, Art. I, 2, cl. 2, and 3, cl. 3; in the Apportionment Clause, Art. I, 2, cl. 3; 53 in the Migration and Importation provision, Art. I, 9, cl. 1; in the Emolument Clause, Art. I, 9, cl. 8; in the Electors provisions, Art. II, 1, cl. 2, and the superseded cl. 3; in the provision outlining qualifications for the office of President, Art. II, 1, cl. 5; in the Extradition provisions, Art. IV, 2, cl. 2, and the superseded Fugitive Slave Clause 3; and in the Fifth, Twelfth, and Twenty-second Amendments, as well as in 2 and 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The very next line is as obvious as it is irrelevant: But in nearly all these instances, the use of the word is such that it has application only postnatally.
Why, yes Mr. Justice Blackmun, very few 30 year old fetuses ever run for Senate. There is no need to count 3/5 or any fifths of them for tax purposes. They are unlikely to commit any crimes worthy of extradition. They make very inefficient slaves, but, at least, they never run away. And the jury is still out on their effectiveness as Electors.
While the intelligent conclusion would have been that none of these are applicable to the question of pre-natal personhood, the court, instead, writes: All this, together with our observation, supra, that throughout the major portion of the 19th century prevailing legal abortion practices were far freer than they are today, persuades us that the word "person," as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn.
This misses entirely the point of the objection.
This same section of the Fourteenth Amendment that protects the rights of persons also provides the constitutional basis for the right to privacy. It reads: All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Justice Rehnquist, in his dissenting opinion, failing to draw the distinction between the right to privacy and the denial of the right to life, argues against the former. Nevertheless, he does make a good point against the Fourteenth Amendment as a whole being used in favor of so -called abortion rights. He writes: By the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, there were at least 36 laws enacted by state or territorial legislatures limiting abortion. While many States have amended or updated their laws, 21 of the laws on the books in 1868 remain in effect today. Indeed, the Texas statute struck down today was, as the majority notes, first enacted in 1857 and "has remained substantially unchanged to the present time."
If there really were a right to an abortion contained and intended in this amendment, it would not have taken over 100 years to notice that something was amiss. Furthermore, the framers of this amendment could not have been unaware of the implied status of person found in these several laws.
It is up to the court to prove, if it wants to draw this conclusion, that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment specifically meant to exclude the unborn. If it were a simple matter of not thinking about them, then the guarantee of life would apply whenever any legislature within the United States decided to recognize them as persons. This was implicitly done when Texas passed the anti-abortion law in question. The court acknowledges this intent: Texas urges that, apart from the Fourteenth Amendment, life begins at conception and is present throughout pregnancy, and that, therefore, the State has a compelling interest in protecting that life from and after conception. We need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins. When those trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the development of man's knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to the answer.
But the legislature is. Nevertheless, the court denies them this right and substitutes its own speculation anyway. It begins section X of its decision: In view of all this, we do not agree that, by adopting one theory of life, Texas may override the rights of the pregnant woman that are at stake.
This resides among the worst cases of judicatory legislation. By denying Texas the right to its own theory, the court substitutes its own, which is that this life cannot be pre-natal.
If there are to be any effective challenges to Roe v. Wade, they need to address the fundamental rights involved. The best option, as I see it, is to challenge the court's legislative usurpation by passing laws that explicitly define when personhood begins. This is where it would be possible to take a gradualist approach. We can compromise at some point other than conception. The definition needs to be reasonably demonstrable. I believe that personal life begins at conception, but I would have a hard time demonstrating this, much less proving it. A far more plausible objective is for legislation to connect the beginning of personal life with viability defined with or without life support. The actual age of the fetus would decrease as the technology advanced. I would not, however, advocate a challenge to the right to privacy. Not only does this right protect women who choose not to have an abortion, but it is not possible to open a significant dialogue by proposing to take away someone's rights. We need to protect those rights while at the same time making a convincing case that they don't always apply.
I don't know how feasible this would be or how many details I'm overlooking; nevertheless, in the middle of the night, while trying to sleep, I have suddenly found myself wondering why we have to pay taxes. Federal taxes, that is. I'm curious about this and so would like to argue the following point: In an advanced capitalistic economic system such as ours, federal taxes are unnecessary. Note that this does not mean that government spending or the government itself is unnecessary. The government needs to exist and it must spend money in order to function. So the question is not whether the government should have some spending money, but what it should do to get it. Someone already may have thought of this and I'd be interested in some literature on the subject, but why can't the government just legislate it's budget into existence and then deal with the economic consequences by adjusting the interest rate? I'm not proposing phantom money here (at least, I don't think I am). To see why, though, we need to consider where money comes from in the first place.
All of the wealth in a society is ultimately derived from raw product; namely, mining and agriculture. If any society is to function at all, it needs these. If it does not have them for itself, then it has economic ties with a society that does. Consider the most primitive society. Everyone spends the bulk of his time obtaining the means to survive. It's not really a society. Advance it slightly through some specialization, and you have the basis for trade. There is no currency, only a barter system. If the society is large enough, there will have to be a magistrate who cannot spend time growing food. Therefore, taxes. Feed the chief. The potential for a great deal of wealth is locked up in such a society and will remain so as long as the entirety of the people's effort is spent getting the earth to produce.
And then, streamline the process a bit so that it takes fewer people to supply the raw material for the population. One night, a farmer decides to stay up and invent a plow. He increases his produce and has more than he needs. A neighbor notices and the two strike a deal. The farmer will give his neighbor the plow in exchange for a portion of the increase in his crops. The neighbor accepts the plow and the farmer retires to become a full time plow maker. A layer of artisans have been added to the economic mix and more of the wealth of the raw product is extracted. Next, the artisans become more efficient at what they do and there is room for a merchant class. At some point in the process, barter as been replaced with currency. It is in the form of coins, the value of which is inherent in the material. Eventually, the coins will be replaced by paper currency. For the time, however, this will all be backed by some valuable product, such as gold. Taxes are still required.
The basic idea is that, as each layer of society becomes more efficient, another can be added and more wealth can be extracted from the raw product. It goes further. Now add an industrial revolution: artisans on a macro-scale. After this, there is the service industry, information age, and so on. Interspersed throughout all of these layers are employees with incomes. The government stands outside of this economic structure, but it needs the structure in order to exist; consequently, it must ensure the viability of the structure. The government is responsible to ensure fair trade. It sets uniform standards for weights and measures and it controls the money supply. The more money there is floating around in relation to actual wealth, the less valuable it is, and vice-versa with less money. The way in which this control takes place has changed.
Consider the gold standard, which was in existence until well into the last century. In this system, the real money supply is fixed. The pieces of paper represent various amounts of gold. If more paper is pumped into the system, prices will go up, but only on paper. The actual value will settle down to what it was. X amount of cheese will still be worth x amount of gold. The gold will simply be represented by a greater printed number. Still, sudden money can cause some chaos. Counterfeiting is frowned on. Generally, the government is not going to want to throw more paper into the system. At least, not until the value of the economy has increased. This, however, does not devalue the currency. The assumption is that not all of the gold is being used. As the economy grows, more gold is put into play. All of which works just fine for a moderately sized economy. But what happens when the value of the economy outstrips the value of the gold? Either the economy stalls, or the gold loses value.
The purpose of having a gold standard was to give the government a credible means of regulating trade. There was no reason, though, to maintain this means. With the government firmly in place, it retains this power along with the exclusive right to print money. Yet now, the money does not represent the value of the gold, but the value of the economy. Since the value of the economy is not fixed, neither is the value of the money. Too much money representing the economy and there is inflation; too little, and there is stagnation. [It's also possible to have both. Inflation would be relatively harmless if it happened evenly across the board. For instance, if when I noticed that prices at the gas pump had gone up I could be assured that my wages had also risen in equal measure, I wouldn't care. But since it doesn't happen so evenly, I might stop spending my money and stall the economy.] In order to maintain things, the government will print more or less money. But it doesn't just dump the money. It injects it into the economy by lowering interest rates and removes it by raising them. Nor does the economy have to be cash based. It could be all credit and debit cards with electronic banking and the money supply would still be controlled by the interest rates.
Concerning taxes: Suppose that I, your average American, am in one of the economic layers earning wages. Assume that these wages are a fair representation of my work. And then the government taxes me. I no longer have everything I worked for. If we add everbody together, taxes alter the economy. This is inescapable. The government must exist and the economy will just have to absorb the burden. But why must it do so at this particular point? Consider the wages again. It isn't necessary to think of income taxes in terms of having been cheated. This can certainly be the case; I submit, however, that this is more do to the unevenness and social engineering in our current tax system. It is conceivable for an income tax to be fair.
Trade is subjective. If it is to be successful, each party must leave with the better part of the bargain. I am not going to buy a book unless the value of the book is worth more to me than its price. You are not going to sell me a book unless the price is worth more to you than the value of the book. Apply this to a good work situation. For the sake of round numbers, let's say that I get paid $10 and hour and get taxed $2. What is the net difference between this and getting paid $8 with zero taxes? If I'm happy with these wages, what does it matter if my paystub has an inflated number? If I am to be dissatisfied, it must be because the value of my work is worth more to me than the money I actually get to keep. It cannot be a psychological reaction to my so-called gross pay. If I have been smart in my job search, my subjective rewards will be more than I put in. My employer is happy to pay me $10; $2 more than I am content to receive. This is only because my work causes the company's profits to increase more than I am paid. Both my employer and I are getting full value out of my work. So where did the $2 in taxes come from? For all practical purposes, the government created it. Remember what lies behind the value of money: the economy as a whole. It is no longer barter, nor is it a gold standard. Essentially, the government determines the value of the economy and then assigns it a number of credits. The idea is for the credits to consistently represent value within the economy. As the value of the whole goes up or down, so should the number of credits available.
Assuming a strong capitalistic system, in which any tax-based intereference with the value in the economy is kept at a minimum, taxes are nothing more than the incremental unveiling of extra credits at various points of economic exchange. The government creates them and stores them outside of the economy. Some credits may escape into the economy and other credits that belong there may be locked away all due to too great or too little withholding. It all evens out on April 15. The real effect on the economy comes when the government decides to spend the taxes. Suddenly, a number of credits, which were not a part of the economy's original assessed value, are released into it. The net result is the same as if the government had lowered interest rates. Because there are now more credits, each one lessens in value. Interest rates must be raised to maintain the right balance. [Not necessarily at that time. I don't mean to suggest that they keep fluttering up and down. It is possible to adjust them to a level that would retain some stability throughout the process.]
Back to my original question. Why can't the government just legislate its budget into existence? Why can't it just declare that it has money, spend that money, and then raise interest rates to compensate for any imbalance to the economy? If I'm understanding the basics of a free-market tax system correctly (feel free to question this), the government is already legislating its budget into existence. It just makes it jump through a bunch of hoops before spending it. Here's how: The base value of the economy is determined and the credits are assigned. The legislation of the budget comes at the point where interest rates are kept lower than required to achieve the proper number of credits. The additional credits created are gradually removed after being identified as taxes during various economic exchanges. The subsequent spending process and results are the same. As I'm seeing it, aside from a massive reduction in paperwork and the sudden inability to resdistribute wealth, the only tangible effect of simply declaring government money into existence would be higher interest rates. But since the rates are artificially low in the first place in order to create the necessary tax revenue, this shouldn't be that big of a problem.
I'm tired.
List among those concepts or activities that tolerate no indifferent opinion "partial-birth abortion." When the Congressional ban on the procedure was recently overturned by a US District Court in California, many pro-lifers were dissapointed; some, probably outraged. Nor was the presiding judge too popular. An obvious ideologue, what could she have been thinking? Media coverage only serves to solidify opinions on either side. So I decided to read the decision. What I found suprised me: the decision was valid. Judge Phyllis J. Hamilton has demonstrated, successfuly as I see it, that the ban on partial-birth abortion is just bad law.
Three reasons are given for overturning the law. It 1) poses an undue burden on a woman's right to choose a second trimester abortion; 2) is unconstitutionally vague; and 3) requires a health exception. I'd like to focus on the first two reasons. The first seems almost ridiculous. Isn't this the very issue in the abortion debate? We pro-lifers don't believe that a woman should have the right to make such a choice. However, our position is entirely irrelevant to the case. Both the plaintiff and the defendant agree, as a matter of law, that such a right does exist. The very law that was struck down presupposes this right. Consequently, the trial cannot be the appropriate forum for challenging it. The question of being unconstitutionally vague, which is related to the due process clause, has to do with the rights of the doctors. The reasons work together. To see why, we need to look at the nature of an abortion.
The rarest forms of abortion are hysterotomy (abortion by caesarean) or hysterectomy. Because the consequences are so drastic (especially in the latter, which involves the inability to conceive), it is usually a last resort. Both are surgical procedures, which makes them inherently more dangerous for the woman than other forms of abortion. In addition, hysterotomies run the risk of leaving scar tissue that can cause the uterus to rupture during any subsequent onset of labor. Induction, or medical abortion, involves the use of drugs to kill the fetus after which it is expelled from the body. [Note: Please do not infer from my use of the word "fetus" that I don't believe we're talking about persons] The drugs can either be injected into the amniotic fluid or directly into the fetus. The first method doesn't always work, which can cause an undue health risk to the mother. The second works by stopping the fetus' heart. However, it is a more difficult procedure that cannot be performed in every abortion facility. Furthermore, in the event that the drug accidentally enters the mother's bloodsteam, it is dangerous to her own heart. Then there is the fact that, once the fetus is dead, the mother will go into labor, which, in some cases, may be the very thing that needs to be avoided.
Partial-birth abortions belong to a class called D&E, or dialation and evacuation. The cervix is first dialated and then the fetus is surgically removed. In a standard D&E, the fetus comes out in bits and pieces. Partial-birth abortion is technically called an intact D&E: the fetus is removed in one piece. It is extracted feet first. The head remains inside. Scissors are inserted into the back of the skull and the brains are sucked out causing it to collapse to the point that it can be extracted from the uterus. An intact D&E is usually not feasible if the fetus is too underdeveloped; nevertheless, when it is an option, it is safer for the mother than a standard D&E, which requires several passes of the surgical instruments as opposed to one. There is also the risk in a standard D&E that the mother could be perforated with fetal bones or that the doctor could miss some pieces.
There are cases in which an intact D&E is the safest form of abortion for the mother. To deny it does pose "an undue burden on a woman's right to choose." If she does decide to abort, she is forced to choose a procedure with potential complications she would not have had to face. Furthermore, she may find herself limited to induction or hysterotomy/hysterectomy because the doctor would refuse to do any kind of D&E. Evidentally, it is possible for a fetus in an intended standard D&E to come out in one piece and show signs of being alive on the way out. Under the wording of the law, a doctor could be prosecuted for a violation thereof even though he had no intention of doing so. Due process requires that laws not be vague. A person has the right to know the legal status of whatever he may be doing.
Whether or not we believe that a woman should have the right to choose an abortion, legally, she does. Questions of constitutionality must rest on this fact. Banning intact D&E forces the woman to choose potentially more risky options and it puts the doctors in a position of inadvertantly violating the law. The partial-birth abortion ban does violate the constitutional rights of both doctor and patient.
What would motivate Congress to pass an unconstitutional law? I don't think we can ascribe just one reason. Some were genuinely concerned with the rights of the unborn. For others, it's just politics. Those of us who hold to a pro-life position, if we can't see abortion banned altogether, want to see either the number of abortions reduced, or, at the very least, the intensity of the suffering reduced. The partial-birth abortion ban would have done neither. Consider the issue of fetal pain, which was cited as one of the reasons for passing this law. If it were a matter of preponderance of the evidence, I would vote one way. However, if I had to be sure beyond a reasonable doubt, I wouldn't be able to convict a fetus of feeling pain. A fetus cannot communicate the fact that it is in pain. We can only infer that it is by watching its responses. However, these could be autonomic. It is possible that the brain has not developed enough to interpret particular stimuli as painful. Nevertheless, Judge Hamilton makes a valid point: she says that, if a fetus does feel pain, this is irrelevant to the immediate question. The reason why this is the case leads me to one of two conclusions about those who passed the ban. Either they are ignorant of what is involved in an abortion, or they couldn't care less about the welfare of the fetus: this is all about getting voted back into office.
So why is fetal pain irrelevant? Because the alternatives would be even more painful. Think about what the defendants are saying. They agree, as a matter of law, that a woman has the right to choose and that other forms of abortion are acceptable. But they want intact D&E banned on the basis that the fetus feels pain. And so, to relieve the fetus of its pain, they suggest abortion by some other means. Which is worse: being stabbed in the back of the skull with scissors (which should lead to a fairly quick death), or being dismembered alive? A lot of the horror felt at the thought of partial-birth abortion is psychological. Since part of the fetus is actually outside of the mother's womb, we're inclined to think "A Baby!" (as though this weren't the case with every other fetus). Meanwhile, we never stop to consider that an intact D&E may be one of the most humane forms of abortion.
Even if a law were made that addresses the health of the mother, and even if it were very specific, leaving no doubt as to what was legal, I don't see how a law banning a specific type of abortion could ever be constitutional. It would violate a woman's right to choose every time. The partial-birth abortion ban tried to treat a symptom. We need to get to the root of the problem, which is a woman's right to choose and another post.
Over on Semper Ubi Sub Ubi there is a post on the potential response of America and of the church to the Massachusetts ruling that has legalized same-sex marriage. It's an overall conservative Christian piece of writing, but I'm going to disagree with it. Consequently, I need to establish some identifying marks to ground my own perspective: I profess Christ; I believe, in accordance with scripture, that homosexuality is a sin; I am opposed to recent events in both the Episcopalian and the United Methodist Churches; I am an American.
How will America react? It's hard to tell. My primary reaction, as an American, has nothing to do with the morality of same-sex marriage. I am more interested in whether or not the Massachusetts state constitution was correctly interpreted and, if not, whether this was an honest misreading or a case of judicial activism. The same problem would exist if the situation were reversed; that is, if an activist judge struck down a law allowing for same-sex marriage. A nation, especially one structured as is ours, can survive laws that allow for immorality much longer than it can survive ignoring the rule of law.
Related to this last point is the distinction that should be made between laws that allow for immorality and the actual practice thereof. I do not see this event as "a serious tear in the fabric of society." That there is a serious problem in society, I will allow. Nevertheless, the legalization of same sex-marriage is not, in this case, the tear. It is, rather, the light exposing the tear. Setting aside the issue of whether this particular ruling was constitutionally viable, the problem is not that the state has decided to legalize same-sex marriage. It is that, upon the effective decriminalization of all but non-consensual sex, society confused the state's tacit confession that it was not equipped to equitably punish this sort of thing with the declaration that it was all okay.
The author, Todd Pedlar, writes that he finds himself "incensed at those who profess Christ but claim that somehow gays and lesbians deserve all the civil benefits of marriage..." Implicit here is the notion that those who think so are acting in contradiction to their profession. I do not believe that this has been established. It would first need to be demonstrated that these benefits are inherently the right of married [heterosexual] couples. It is not enough to point out that they currently enjoy them. If there is in marriage, properly defined, a right to civil benefits, then it is wrong to argue that homosexual couples have this same right. However, I find nowhere in the institution of marriage an entitlement to tax breaks and healthcare. And since this is the case, then giving such benefits to anyone else could not possibly harm marriage. I am not opposed to these benefits for married couples, but I don't see why they should be connected to marriage as such. It makes more sense to me to reward these benefits solely on the basis of close financial interdependence.
Finally, I disagree with the assessment of the church- that it has lost "the will to speak out when things are so obviously wrong." I am far more concerned with a church that has become so caught up in society and the affairs of state that it neglects to speak up when things are so obviously right. The church does not exist to ensure a moral America. It is here to declare the gospel. It is the bride of Christ; its purpose is the glory of the groom. It is not called to spend its time saying to the world, "Live like this." Nothing could be more shallow. The church's message is, "The Bridegroom is coming; repent, and join us at the wedding feast."
This is the longer version of my response to Nick's questions on Ranting to/dev/null. See this post for more background. He asked, "Is it possible for a government to steal? The government is to punish theft. Is there any _moral_ restriction on how the government may take (or otherwise control the use of) somebody's property? Would a Christian in government be under any _moral_ obligation to refrain from taking the property of others for a particular purpose?"
The shorter answer is that it is possible for a government to steal (the answers to the other two questions flow from this). However, this possibility results, not from some inherent restriction on a government's actions, but on the particular form a government has taken. Two ideas should be considered: 1) the right of private ownership and 2) the responsibilities of government.
The first premise, which is implied in what has already been stated, is that there is no inherent right to private property or private ownership of any kind. I can already hear the objections- hasn't he ever read the Ten Commandments? One Reformed ideology states the objection like this:
We believe that in the prohibition of stealing, God has ordained the institution of private property. We believe that the Christian church should teach against theft in all its forms (Ex. 20:15).
We deny that the institution of private property is a human invention. Rather, it is the result of a biblical understanding of God's ordination of private property. But because man is fallen, the institution of private property, like all God-ordained institutions, has been much abused (Eph. 5:5).We believe that the root cause of political disregard for the institution of private property is envy and covetousness (Matt. 20:1-16). We deny that theft can be sanctified, even if it is done in the name of civil justice (Is. 5:20). If the civil magistrate oversteps the boundaries established for him in Scripture, one result can be various forms of theft, including oppressive taxation.
A single counter-example will do: Library Book. If it is possible to steal public property, then the prophibition of stealing does not constitute the ordination of the institution of private property. It certainly allows for private property; it does not, however, require it. The only implication that I am allowed to draw from this commandment is that lots of things are not mine. Personally, I think that free-enterprise and low taxes and private property are a great idea; nevertheless, I cannot sanction scriptural proof-texting to turn this into an article of the Christian faith.
Another case, which might be made in favor of private property, actually pervades scripture. This is the whole theme of the inheritance of the land. There is the division of the land amongst the tribes and to families within the tribes. Furthermore, to insure perpetual ownership, there is the provision of the year of Jubilee and of the kinsman-redeemer. And this would make a compelling argument if the political and economic situation of ancient Israel were normative for modern nations. But it is not. The nation of Israel was a theocratic kingdom, the purpose of which was to be a typological foreshadowing of our final and eternal inheritance of the earth when we shall reign with Christ.
I grant that I have not proven that private property is not an inherent right. But the burden is not mine. Unless the question of a government's ability to steal is purely academic, then it is a matter of injustice; a question of grounds for revolution. It is not enough to deny the premise; the opposite must be proven at least to the point of justifying civil disobedience.
The next thing to consider is government itself. One of the best statements that I know of outlining the purpose of government is found in the preamble to the US Constitution. It lists: establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquillity, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity. The question then is this: is it possible for a government to fulfill its purpose while denying the existence of private property?
As for establishing justice, if private property is an inherent right, then it is obviously unjust for a government to take a form that would deny this. Circle back to the first premise. The next purpose, to insure domestic tranquillity, might be the strongest argument in favor of private property. If we grant that the government has the right to eliminate private property, can it do this and keep the peace? This is a question of prudence.
Then there is the provision of common defense. This necessitates the right on the part of the government to claim some property. Adequate defense requires adequate funds. Beyond this, it becomes another question of prudence. If a government lays claim to all the property, will the economic situation be such that the common defense can be supported?
The promotion of the general welfare is the most relevant. How is never stated. Capitalism is not the only option. Even if it can be shown that an overly socialist state fails to promote the general welfare, it cannot be shown that all degrees of socialism have failed. Note that the general welfare does not need to mean that people are rich, only that their needs are met.
The blessings of liberty could easily be taken in an individualistic sense and, in the specific case of our present government, this would be appropriate. There is a strong case to made here for an individual's freedom to own property. However, this is a matter of how our government has defined itself. My claim is that the form of the goverment determines the extent or existence of private property, yet, I had included this in a list of the responsibilities of all governments. I stand by that inclusion by noting that the original intent of this phrase was probably not so centered on the individual as on the state. The thirteen colonies had just won their freedom from the Bristish sovereign. Without banding together, they could not hope to retain this freedom. One of the duties of a government, related to the common defense, is to prevent being taken over by a foreign power. Freedom is, or at least was, not so much about individual rights as it was about domestic vs. foreign rule. [For a fuller treatment of the idea that the original intent of the Constitution was not geared toward the individual, see this post.]
Even under those governments in which private property is granted, there is still eminent domain, which is defined as "a right of the government to take private property for public use by virtue of the superior dominion of the sovereign power over all lands within its jurisdiction." If I am living in an economic system in which my private property is the means to my welfare, then a government that exercises the right of eminent domain must compensate me to the extent that my welfare has been compromised. At the same time, if I live in such a society, I am generally expected to take care of myself. But say I live in a socialist state. The government has the right to tax me as much as it wants to. If it does, though, it bears the responsibility of my welfare. There is still the possibility in both cases of a government acting immorally. Whether or not it is guilty of stealing might be a technicality. In any event, those governments that fail to act in accordance with their own standards would be guilty of deriliction of duty. Still, until this actually happened, we are called to submit as unto the Lord. We're not allowed to revolt over our political or economic theories, no matter how sound.
Some of you may remember watching the Ken Burns documentary on the Civil War. One point that has stuck with me, for whatever reason, was a comment made on a point of grammar. It was to the effect that, since the Civil War, it has been customary to say, "The United States is." However, the antebellum usage was the grammatically correct, "The United States are". I suspect that there was more to this change than a collective nose-thumbing at the Queen's English. A recent discussion I had with Nick over at Sylvan Manor has me thinking about it again.
The issue is the evolution in how, for right or wrong, we have come to perceive ourselves as a nation. Is it desirable, or even possible for that matter, to interpret the Constitution in such a manner as to get back to the original intent of its authors? Or is it the case that the course of history has brought about changes within the document itself that have virtually redefined its terminology? I maintain the latter and, consequently, would argue that not every change in our political society has been the result of an out of control judiciary. Often, it is not so much a case of judicial legislation as it is a matter of trying to keep up with a morphing standard.
When compared with other world civilizations over the course of history, a democracy of the kind that we now have in the United States is a truly radical concept. Back at the founding of our nation, it was unheard of. Although the roots were definitely in the making, Revolutionary America knew nothing of our brand of individualism. It is possible, even likely, that the Founding Fathers were not thinking of liberty so much in terms of personal freedom as in terms of the freedom of societies from outside interference (not that the concept wasn't around- just consider the Declaration of Independence with its appeal to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness"). The colonies had just cooperated to throw off the rule of a de facto outsider: the King of England. This does not mean, however, that they disparaged the rule of law. The point was freedom for each of the colonies. These colonies could then govern their own citizens in whatever manner they saw fit. The circumstances of the time required that they maintain a common bond. But this did not mean that they had any intention of giving up their own sovereignty. None of the colonies would do it for the British Crown, and they certainly wouldn't do it for the newly formed Federal government.
In light of this backdrop, consider the original Constitution as it existed from the Preamble through the Bill of Rights. The most important point is a matter of terminology. "People" and "states," while not absolutely identical, are inseperable. Take, as an example, the second amendment: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." Reading this today, we are inclined to insist on our individual right to own a gun, presumably in order to protect our homes. But in the original context of the amendement, the issue is not burglars. It is the security of a free state. This amendment guarantees the right of the states to maintain and regulate their own militias.
Or, consider the first amendment: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." Today, we understand this to mean that we can believe whatever we want, say whatever we want, report whatever we want, and peaceably gather in protest whenever we want. But is this the original intent of the amendment? Rather than protecting the rights of the individual from any government interference, it would appear that this amendment was designed to protect the states from Federal interference. At the time of its ratification, many of the states had an established church. Individual religious freedom is not so much in view then as the right of each state, if it so chose, to determine the religion of its citizens for itself. Also, nothing in this amendment forbids the states from regulating speech or the press. The ability to control both of these (or, at least, the Federal government's inability to control them) was seen as essential to the freedom of the state. Finally, the right of the people peaceably to assemble would probably not be talking about grassroots protests, but of the rights of the states to assemble and petition the Federal government.
There was a balance of power between the Federal government and the states with the emphasis going to the states. The individual did have certain rights enumerated in the constitution, which are especially evident in the third through eighth amendments where the subject is not "the people" but "person" (either explicitly or by implication; sometimes stated as "the owner" or "the accused"). The ninth amendment then states: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." Note again the mention of "the people." While not denying the existence of individual rights not listed in the Constitution, this amendment leaves these at the discretion of the states. The tenth amendment may actually contain a distinction between "states" and "people," in which case "people" would mean "persons." Or it could be using "people" by way of explication for "states." It reads: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." If there is a different meaning for "people" here, the states are still being given priority.
I don't deny that individual freedom was emerging as an issue, but it wasn't nearly as prominent as it is today. It wasn't where we might expect to see it. Take the compromise that led to our present two-part legislature. The larger states wanted representation according to population; the smaller states wanted it to be just for the fact that they were states. However, the larger states were not being champions of the individual. They just believed that size entitled them to certain advantages. One area in which some concern for the individual may be evident is found in the direct election of the lower house. Originally, members of the upper house were chosen by the state legislatures. The choice of President still belongs to the states. Our right to vote in Presidential elections has been granted to us by our respective states. That this is not a right granted to us as US citizens can be seen by the fact that US citizens who are not residents of any of the states or of the District of Columbia (per the 23rd amendment) do not get to vote. Puerto Rico would be the most prominent example.
The seeds of individualism were already present in revolutionary America. The concept gradually developed and a new revolution, or the Civil War, confirmed it. Southern states tried to secede from the Union. Since the Union originated as a voluntary cooperation of states, this would seem to fall within their rights. But Linclon didn't see it that way. Strictly speaking, he was probably wrong. However, in his defense, there were two other considerations. First, there was no reason to believe that the necessity, which had led to the original act of cooperation, had in any way been abated. The secession of any state represented a potential threat to the security and welfare of those that remained. In the second place, there was the matter of slavery. The status quo had served to sanction and preserve the worst form of institutional racism. To be sure, such an institution was not inherent within the system. Nevertheless, since it existed at the formation of this system and had, in a sense, developed a symbiotic relation with it, its irradication necessitated a paradigm shift. Individual states were just as despotic towards some of their subjects, if not more so, than the tax happy British monarch had been towards some of his. Time had done nothing to lessen this.
During the course of the war, the subject of the "people" was once again brought into the foreground. The occassion was the end of the President's speech at Gettysburg. Lincoln concludes, "...that this nation under God shall have a new birth of freedom, and that government of the people, by the people, for the people shall not perish from the earth." No longer was the term being used as a virtual synonym for the state. Lincoln, of all people, did not have states' rights in mind. The old concept of the divine right of Kings had been replaced by the God given rights of the individual.
The shift that had occurred in war was soon to be reflected in the Constitution itself. The first section of the fourteenth amendment is as follows: "All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
At first, this appears obvious and maybe even somewhat redundant. But it represented a major change in the balance of power. No longer was the state equated with the people. For better or worse, the state/people did not stand in need of protection from the outside Federal government. Instead, the citizens of the United States were now to be protected against the potential abuses of the several states. The rights of the people had been expanded; however, along with this, so had the power of the Federal government. Over time, these two sides would work together towards more individual rights and equaility. The Civil Rights Movement originated with people who recognized their status as US citizens and who, consequently, made their appeal to the government of the United States. Much civil rights legislation is designed to curb the discretionary power of the states.
The tension between a radically free citizenry and a powerful government is enormous. On one side, this government could go the way of all other powerful governments. On the other, the people could devolve into anarchy. And here is where I believe that the individual states have a valid and necessary function. They act as a guard against the excesses of either side. The dynamic between citizens, Federal government, and states has gradually developed into a system of checks and balances. Within a Constitutional framework, each has its own powers and rights. The full blown states rights of the original Union no longer exists. This does not mean, however, that the states have been reduced to nothing more than geographic land markers. Then again, they no longer serve as such strong emblems of our identity. We are no longer New Yorkers, Pennsylvanians, Virginians, or Georgians who are also Americans. We are Americans who also reside in our own individual state. The United States has become the new civic community and, as such, it is now the State. Our language has changed to reflect this: "The United States is."