Over on Parableman, Jeremy Pierce argues against the thesis that Muslims worship a different God than Christians. He presents a fairly strong case, but I'm not convinced. The George Bush clone is presented as an example of someone who can successfully refer to the current president even while denying an essential property (his origins). I see it as an illustration that ideas about the history of a referent do not carry as much weight as ideas about that referent's current state. So, the fact that Muslim ideas about the history of Allah coincide in many respects with Christian ideas about the history of God is not enough to override their denial of what God essentially is right now (and eternally); i.e., a triune being.
If the coincidence of ideas about referents were sufficient to make them numerically identical, then Paul's rebuke in II Corinthians 11:4 wouldn't make much sense: “For if someone comes and proclaims another Jesus than the one we proclaimed, or if you receive a different spirit from the one you received, or if you accept a different gospel from the one you accepted, you put up with it readily enough” (ESV). If this other Jesus had beeen presented as completely different, then there wouldn't be a problem. It is a problem because there is enough similarity between this Jesus and Christ to fool the Corinthians. They do not think that they're dealing with a second Jesus, but with the same Jesus that Paul had proclaimed. The apostle is using this opportunity to disabuse them of the notion. The differences between Christ and the Jesus they are now putting up with are enough to constitute different referents, the intentions of the Corinthians notwithstanding.
There is a valid distinction between worshipping a false god and the false worship of the true God. This, at least in Reformed theology, is the distinction between the first and second commandments. The incident with the golden calf while Moses was on Sinai is an example of violating the second. The idol itself was nothing, but they were (falsely) worshipping the true God. Even so, idols representing false gods are also nothing. Paul says as much in I Corinthians 8 when talking about eating food that just happened to be offered to idols. In chapter 10, he is considering actual participation in the offering. He encourages the Corinthians to flee idolatry, explaining in vs. 19 and 20, “What do I imply then? That food offered to idols is anything, or that an idol is anything? No, I imply that what pagans sacrifice they offer to demons and not to God. I do not want you to be participants with demons.” Even though he maintains his position that the idol itself is nothing, he also claims that there is a very real and personal presence behind behind each one. Consequently, while there may be Christians who agree with Jeremy's assessment of their argument that, by denying the Trinity, Muslims “must be talking about a different (and non-existent) being,” I contend that there is good reason to drop the parenthetical “non-existent.” Just as, per his first commenter, it changes everything in his argument if God doesn't actually exist, the same is true if Allah is an extant created being.
Concerning the point that, in claiming that a denial of the Trinity constitutes a denial of the true God, we would have to say the same thing of the Jews, I agree. While I do maintain that the minimal standards for belief in God can change with added revelation, I wouldn't argue that, when Jesus came, “the Jews suddenly were worshiping some fictional being.” Rather, it would seem that the first advent of Christ exposed the presence of those Jews who weren't worshipping the true God at all, even though they were worshipping something. The fact that there were also Jews who were worshipping the true God falsely does not rule out a tertium quid. Moreover, taking it even further, there is no reason to believe that, within the visible church today, all three possibilities don't exist.
Even though it’s been over a year since I last posted anything on this particular thread, I had no intention of dropping it altogether. This post will be a response to comments made by Andrew over here. It may be easier to follow this post by using those comments as a reference. As with the previous posts, it will be addressed directly to him.
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God’s Love and Election
We agree that God does not elect everybody. The question is - on what basis does he elect one person over another? Since the act of election is discriminating, the motivation must also discriminate. God’s love will only fit this criterion if it is does not have every person for its object. You can’t have it both ways. If love is the determining factor in election, and if God loves everyone, then everyone is elect. My own position is that God elects those whom he loves and that he does not love everybody. I have also stated that if God does love everyone, then something else must be the motivating factor in election. Just what that might be, I don’t know. To the question of the extent of God’s love, you have responded that God’s love is his most fundamental motivation; in fact, “so fundamental that God can be spoken of as being love.” Since John states in so many words that God is love, I cannot deny the premise; nevertheless, your conclusions do not necessarily follow. It isn’t that a God who is love must indiscriminately love everything and everyone, but that those whom he does love receive all of the benefits of that divine love. As I have indicated, though, I am willing to concede that God’s love could be universal; however, if it is, then there must be something else that determines who he elects. This something else is, from what I can tell, unknown to us. Your appeal to John 15:15 to argue against the possibility of unknowns when it comes to what God is doing or his motivations asks far more of this verse than it was meant to give. Reaching that stage in redemptive history where we can know what God is doing does not mean that we will ever know why he does it. To then say that we know that God always acts in love begs the question. It may be true, but it does not account for why he elects some people and not others. Even if you can make the case that we can know why God does everything he does, you will need to come up with a better reason for particular election than universal love.
Relationship of Persons
I appreciate the distinction that you draw between persons who share the same nature and persons with different natures. When two persons share the same nature, it is not an option for one not to love the other even though the love between them is freely given. To whatever extent a person has a different nature than God, his disposition to love God will be different. That is to say, man is capable of either loving or not loving God. This does not mean, however, that a human person has all options open all the time. Human nature is malleable. The regenerating work of the Holy Spirit effectually disposes a person toward loving God. This love is genuine even though a person so disposed cannot refuse to love God. Okay, he may temporarily fall into sin; however, the general trend will be toward loving God and, once he is in heaven, the ability to sin will be gone. The genuineness of human love for God is found in the source of that love, which is God. It is not found in the fact that, in this life, that love may be impure. The fact that we do not always love God as we ought does nothing to validate that love.
Adam’s Fall
I have no argument against the idea that the Fall was driven by a misguided desire for God or that Adam chose a lesser good. But then, neither of these is an argument against my own position that Adam also chose to disobey an explicit commandment of God. You admit that choosing a lesser good is not necessarily a sin. Can you provide examples where it is a sin (chosen at the expense of the greater good) and a revealed commandment of God has not been broken? With any other tree in the garden, Adam could have eaten because he had an immediate perception that it would be good. Each case would have been a lesser good than communion with God himself; however, in no case would this have been sin. The sin is not found in the fact that there is a distinction between a lesser and a greater good but in whether or not God has declared something that is otherwise good to be off limits.
Love and the Atonement
I seem to have gone too far in connecting your statement to Abelard’s view of the atonement. Not that this may not be your view, but that I can’t assume this from the statement that the work of the cross was to restore the bond of love between God and man. I do disagree with Catholic theology in calling Adam’s original state “original grace.” As I understand it, grace is not mere goodness but is limited to soteriology and only given to undeserving sinners. Even if grace is defined as a good that is not due, I don’t believe that it would apply to Adam before the fall. Being created in the image of God is not synonymous with the indwelling of the Spirit. Nevertheless, by creating man in his own image, God created him with a telos of union with himself. This union was something that man had to merit and this would only be possible with the indwelling of the Spirit. The giving of the Spirit to unfallen man was not optional on God’s part but was the only just thing to do if the end for which man was created was not to be a mockery. Once man had been given a fair chance, then the Spirit could be justly taken away when he failed. Our indwelling by the Spirit, our continued indwelling by the Spirit even when we have sinned is a matter of grace and is based upon the work of Christ and the promise of God. Christ’s work does create a bond of love between God and man. I don’t know that it merely restores it. Inasmuch as I can accept your distinction between love as a matter of affection and as a state of being, I argue that the state of being is a goal that will only be achieved in the resurrection. It is that for which Adam was made, not something that he already had.
Choice Between Eternal Truth and Immediate Perception of the Good
You explain that, in heaven, there will be no more differentiation between these. Choosing the immediate just is choosing the eternal. I will accept this only if the apparent lack of difference is due to a change in our perception; i.e., that there will be something about us such that our immediate perceptions of the good are always a clear vision of the eternal truth of the good. Our ability to remain sinless in heaven cannot be because God relaxes his standards, nor can it be a lack of opportunity. The ultimate goal of salvation must involve a change in us.
The End of Human Nature
I will agree that teleology should govern a given nature; I’m not so sure that it actually does. People have within their natures the capacity to desire God. It is also possible for human nature to become so disordered that a person is repulsed by God. Your statement that “a man will gladly embrace that which by nature beckons him to God, but he will be repulsed by that which by nature separates him from God” sounds reasonable, but it doesn’t fit the Scriptural evidence. Consider John 3:19- “And this is the judgment: the light has come into the world, and people loved the darkness rather than the light because their deeds were evil.” Somehow, I have a hard time thinking of the love of darkness as following one’s immediate perception of the good.
You draw a distinction between Adam’s human nature before the Fall and that of Christ: the first was incomplete and still disordered whereas the latter was fully formed. This would explain why Adam was vulnerable to temptation whereas Christ was not. The problem, though, is that it violates the principle of “that which is not assumed is not healed.” As I understand it, the capacity to fall into disorder or to be immune from disorder is, itself, a part of a given nature. The former is the state of human nature before the resurrection and the latter that of human nature afterwards. In the incarnation, Christ took on human nature as it exists so that we could be changed with him in the resurrection. I have no problem attributing the lack of actual corruption in Christ’s human nature, and thus the lack of sin as to his person, to an even greater measure of the Holy Spirit than Adam had, if this is even necessary. The difference here is extrinsic to the nature itself. I do have problems accepting an intrinsic difference. I agree that we will be made perfect like Christ is perfect, but I believe that Christ himself had to be made perfect as to his human nature. He was not formed that way from the beginning.
The Sacrifice of the Mass
The idea that Christ is resacrificed in the mass is not some Protestant conspiracy to make Catholics look bad. It comes straight out of the twenty-second session of the Council of Trent. In Catholic theology, the cross is the one bloody sacrifice of Christ, but it is not the only sacrifice of Christ. “That same Christ is contained and immolated in an unbloody manner, who once offered Himself in a bloody manner on the altar of the cross...For the victim is one and the same, the same now offering by the ministry of the priests, who then offered Himself on the cross, the manner alone of offering being different” (Chapter 2). You are correct that Christ is not crucified again, but this is technicality. Crucifixion is a bloody sacrifice, which Trent rejects other than the one time historical event. It does not, however, reject the notion that the same Christ who was crucified is immolated, i.e., sacrificed again and again in an unbloody manner in the mass. The mass is, as you say, “the re-presentation of the one sacrifice of the cross;” however, the means of this re-presentation is through another sacrifice of the same victim. See chapter 1- “– that He might leave, to His own beloved Spouse the Church, a visible sacrifice, such as the nature of man requires, whereby that bloody sacrifice, once to be accomplished on the cross, might be represented...” It is not enough in the Tridentine conception of the mass “merely that His one offering (Himself, body, soul, and Divinity) be forever present with us.” This is an accurate account of Transubstantiation or what the elements actually are despite appearances. The doctrine of the sacrifice of the mass is not, however, solely about what the elements are, but about what is done to them. Christ is not merely present in the mass, he is also sacrificed in it. For those who claim that the mass does not constitute an actual sacrifice, Canon I offers the following- “If any one saith, that in the mass a true and proper sacrifice is not offered to God; or, that to be offered is nothing else but that Christ is given us to eat; let him be anathema.” Another anathema, from Canon III, is pronounced on those who say “that the sacrifice of the mass is only a sacrifice of praise and of thanksgiving; or, that it is a bare commemoration of the sacrifice consummated upon the cross, but not a propitiatory sacrifice.”
Deliberation and Willing
Inasmuch as deliberation is an act, then yes, it also follows the stronger inclination of the will; namely, the inclination to deliberate as opposed to not deliberate. Deliberation is a means whereby we are able to regulate the strength of those inclinations that are the subject of the deliberation, so I don’t follow how deliberation would throw our wills into chaos. Regulation and chaos are not the same thing. The will is a faculty that only follows its strongest inclination; however, this does not mean that the person is a slave to his own will, as though external forces were inclining the will and the person was just along for the ride. The will is always strictly determined by the person; consequently, there can be no libertarian free will. There is, however, free agency insofar as the person is at liberty to do as he pleases. What a person may be pleased to do or is able to do will be limited by his nature.
Corporate Unity and Individual Responsibility
I claimed that it is naive to think that there have never been any cases where a church has been in error. And you wonder why. I am operating under the assumption that denominations are manifestations of the true universal church. That “particular churches, which are members thereof, are more or less pure” and that “the purest churches under heaven are subject both to mixture and error; and some have so degenerated, as to become no churches of Christ, but synagogues of Satan.” The universal or catholic church is infallible in the sense that “there shall always be a church on earth, to worship God according to his will.” This does not mean, however, that any particular visible manifestation of the church will be free from error. If denominations are true manifestations of the one true church, and if they disagree on certain points, then it would be naive to think that more than one contrary position could be right.
You write, “Insofar as the Catholic Church has spoken definitively on any given issue, it has never erred.” Since I am a Protestant, I hope you will understand if I don’t take this statement at face value. Still, I do appreciate the logic behind the statement. If the church is a divine institution, then it needs an inerrant authority. We both believe the Scriptures to be an error free authority. And I believe that we both see the need for their to be certain people who, in a properly defined situation, speak with unerring authority. The difference is that you believe this to be an ongoing reality whereas I believe that this was no longer necessary after the generation in which Christ finally became incarnate.
A list of Protestant disagreements with Rome probably won’t change your mind. I do wonder, though, how a church that does not err when it speaks definitively is capable of changing its mind on such matters. An example that immediately comes to mind, since I was just referencing it, is the Council of Trent, which contains numerous anathemas pronounced on those who hold to several points of Protestant doctrine. On the other hand, Vatican II recognizes both the work of the Holy Spirit and the presence of saving grace within Protestantism. First, Rome was synonymous with the universal church such that there was no de facto loss of unity. Protestants left the church altogether; therefore, how could there be disunity within the body? But now, even though Rome considers herself the one true church and best expression of the Christian faith, the legitimacy of other churches as being part of the body of Christ is recognized. Consequently, a loss of unity has been recognized and a move toward ecumenicity has been initiated. How is such a major shift in attitude and perspective possible for a church that does not err when it speaks definitively? Or were the Tridentine anathemas merely gentle suggestions? Unless the Catholic church wants to escape into some Orwellian fantasy in which the way it is now is the way that it has always been, then one of these perspectives is in error.
You write that the question of personal responsibility or corporate unity is not needed so long as you and other members of the Body perform their task well. This is obviously true. I only object to the notion that the condition will always be met. As to your statement “that personal responsibility is derivative of corporate responsibility,” I agree. If, however, a particular instantiation of the visible church persists in either doctrinal or moral corruption, it is no evidence of corporate responsibility to remain loyal to it. This is not an argument for individualism or against the necessity of a visible church; for the visible church is the kingdom of Christ, the ministry of Word and Sacrament is entrusted to it, and, outside of it, there is no ordinary possibility of salvation. Still, it is possible for a particular church to become so corrupt that remaining a part of it constitutes disloyalty to those visible churches, past and present, which are and have been faithful to the core of Christian belief.
If you object to the vacant reasons that Protestants have for flitting around from church to church, then we have no disagreement. More likely, though, the objection is to the Protestant Reformation itself. A discussion of this point, based on the premise that the Catholic church had done nothing worthy of protest and was not in error, would be fruitful. The same cannot be the case if objections to Reformed theology carry no more substance than the mantra that Catholic doctrine and practice is, by definition, free of error.
Summa as Revelation
Both the Scripture and the Summa (as well as other ecclesiastical writings) have this in common: they were written for the church by men who are in the church. Nevertheless, being produced by the church, even if there is common purpose with that of Scripture, is not enough to classify something as revelation. The human authors of Scripture were inspired by the Holy Spirit in such a way that he, too, is the author of Scripture. This point is essential to revelation and is not something that can be said of the Summa. It is not a proper use of the word “revelation” that it be defined according to content. It is possible for non-inspired writings to be about Christ; it is not possible that these writings be revelation. Even more than subject matter, revelation is defined by its divine source. It is the Word of God. You have already admitted that the Summa has things that are not true. This is not something that is possible for God’s Word, which is both true and inerrant in all that it intends to teach. I will entertain the idea that the Summa can be classified along with Scripture as an important church document, but I will not classify them both as revelation, which is nothing more nor less than the infallible Word of God.
History and Allegory
It’s not so much that history is being used to interpret Scripture but that Scripture is understood to be an accurate documentation of history. Your appeal to the Jesus Seminar to show “an example of a bad construction arising from historical interpretation” does not work. Not that it isn’t a bad construction, but that it has nothing to do with historical interpretation. The Jesus Seminar is based on the denial that Scripture is history. Consequently, we must look elsewhere to find out what really happened.
I have no objection to figurative interpretation provided that this is not set in opposition to reading Scripture as history. Both symbols and metaphors take the following form: x represents y. In both cases, x must be something that is naturally perceived and understood; consequently, there is no requirement that either one be couched in fictional terms. Take, for example, the Exodus. This is a figurative passage, a metaphor for the redemption that Christ ultimately provides for his people through his death and resurrection. Even so, it still happened. Or take the records of the resurrection itself. These are not symbols nor are they metaphors but are straightforward accounts of that which is physical, corporeal, and human. And it’s about as superior as revelation gets. Allegory has a place is the interpretation of some Scripture, but never when it goes against or makes irrelevant an understanding of Scripture as history.
Andrew's last comment was over here on 3/30/200 and I have finally managed to answer. As with previous entries, I will continue to respond directly to Andrew. Consequently, any other readers may find it easier to reference his last comment for context.
You are correct to note that "if the end result of the emphasis is not insignificant, then neither is the beginning emphasis." But this is true in general. If we get down to the specifics of this case, which is the difference between the doctrines of soteriology in Protestantism and Catholicism, the end result is significant. It matters whether we rely on God alone or God and ourselves for our salvation. Demonstrating points of agreement, and there are many, is not going to take away or make irrelevant the points of disagreement.
You write, "...unless you can find a reason to say that God has chosen one particular people over another because of His love for all people, your assertion that He has done such a thing is shaky." My reason is that Scripture teaches it. This is the whole doctrine of election. Aside from particularity being implied in the very concept of choice, we can read that God chooses Israel over all the other nations, that he chooses Isaac over Ishmael, Jacob over Esau, etc. Read Paul's discussion of the latter example in Romans 9. He presents God's choice of Jacob over Esau as unconditioned. "...though they were not yet born and had done nothing either good or bad--in order that God's purpose of election might continue, not because of works but because of his call--she [Rebecca] was told,'The older will serve the younger.' As it is written, 'Jacob I loved,but Esau I hated'" (vs.11-13). It is tempting to argue that both this passage and that to which it refers (Malachi 1:2,3) are only talking about national election. Malachi, for instance, is talking about God's choice of the nation of Israel over that of the Edomites. Even Paul speaks of Israel as a nation. This section of Romans concerns God removing his exlusive focus from Israel and placing it on the whole world. But if he can do this, then what about the promises made to Israel? Paul says that "it is not the children of the flesh who are children of God, but the children of the promise are counted as offspring" (v. 8). And lest we think that the children of promise are descendents of Isaac as opposed to Ishmael, he makes a further distinction between the children of Isaac. If Isaac is called the son of promise, but not all of his descendents are chosen; if Paul can say, "For not all who are descended from Israel [an alternate name for Jacob] belong to Israel" (v.6); then we must consider the possibility that Isaac is not the ultimate son of promise. Rather, the promise made concerning Isaac is a revelation of greater things. The son of promise is Christ and the true Israel consists of all those who are in him. The eternal promise is not made to those who are physical descendents of Jacob, but to all those who are in Christ, no matter what there physical ancestry. God's choice of Israel as a nation is perfectly compatible with his choice of individuals to be included among the children of promise. Paul narrows the scope down to individual election when he speaks of Pharaoh. He concludes, "So then he has mercy on whomever he wills, and he hardens whomever he wills." That God chooses one particular people over another, or even particular individuals over others shouldn't really be a matter of debate. Scripture says that he does. As to the thesis that God loves all people (and, from your argument, I take it that you mean everybody), this doesn't quite fit in with his opinion of Esau. There's nothing wrong with equating election with love, I just dispute your claim that God's love is universal. And it is not an adulteration of God's love to deny that he must love each and every individual. On the contrary, I would see the adulteration of love in the idea that an omnipotent God must love people in such a limited way. In the Calvinistic understanding, when God loves someone, he does everything that is both necessary and sufficient to secure his salvation.
The particularity of the people of God is very much willed by God. When God takes a people unto himself this is just what he is doing. He takes them from the sinful mass in order to dwell with them in eternity. On the view that you have presented, he doesn't really take a people so much as settling with what he can get. You also seem to be confusing the general call with the special call. The case of Christ before his accusers is an example of the former. They have all of the faculties necessary to repent. Nobody is stopping them. The only reason they do not is because they do not want to repent. Ultimately, in the case of those who refuse it, this general call serves to augment their guilt. Furthermore, if there were only a general call, then no one would want to repent, or, if they did want to, they would quickly change their minds after seeing what such repentance entailed. Monergism should never be confused with easy-believism. Those who refuse to cooperate with God in the work of sanctification evidence that fact that they were never saved. The special call is that spoken of in Romans 8:30. Those who are called include those who have been predestined. All who are called will be both justified and glorified. The special call takes place at the point of regeneration. This is the moment of irresistible grace when the Holy Spirit brings us to life by having united us with Christ in his resurrection.
On the subject of intratrinitarian relationships, there is a significant difference between these and those between humans and God. But there is also a significant similarity; namely, that these are both relationships among persons. If we make God so different as to exlcude this point of commonality, we risk losing any meaning at all when speaking of him in personal terms. You have managed to explain why the Son could not have rejected the Father's love; however, this does not address the question, "Is the Son's reciprocation of the Father's love only genuine if he could have rejected it?" Either the Son's love is not genuine, or it stands as a counter-example to the idea that genuine love is predicated on the possibility of rejection. It may be the case that people can reject God's love and that those who do not have genuinely accepted it. However, it does not follow that the genuine nature of this acceptance is predicated on the ability to have rejected it. And, if this is the case, then, although it is evident that some can reject and others can accept, we need to consider whether or not there are factors such that any given individual who accepted could only have accepted (or vice versa). This, in Reformed doctrine, would be a matter of irresistible grace. It's not a matter that anyone accepts against his will, but that, in regeneration, thee will is so disposed as to accept.
Paul does not speak of a division of the will that is proper to the nature of the human person. Instead, this division is proper only to those who have been regenerated and who are in the process of being sanctified. The battle between the flesh and the spirit is more properly understood as between the flesh and the Spirit. It is a matter of the Holy Spirit gradually molding our desires to match God's. And, as long as we are on this earth, with this human nature, it is also a matter of resisitng what the Spirit wants. I won't deny that such a division of the will can exist within an individual. However, it should be clear that "will" is in reference to conflicting desires and not to the faculty of willing or to the exercise thereof.
I have been speaking of man willing according to his strongest want, desire, or inclination. Some of this may be ambiguous, since, as you have shown, words such as "desire" can have other meanings. For now, then, let me narrow my terminology down to "inclination." This way, it will be possible to discuss your thoughts on desire without getting too confused. I plan on dealing more with the topic of inclination in my next post, which will be a response to Chris, so I will limit my comments here. Regarding your example, though, I do mean to say that a man's strongest inclination may be for chocolate cake one moment and for a glass of water the next. This is pretty much why when he is sitting in front of a piece of cake and a glass of water that he either takes a bite of cake or drink of water. He consistently acts according to his strongest inclination at the moment. These are the normal choices. His strongest inclination could also lead him to not eat the cake or drink the water, or it might even lead him to mix the cake with the water. Either way, he will have followed the strongest inclination when presented with the choice of what to do with the cake and water. None of this conflicts with his strongest desire being neither cake nor water. But now, I must consider what you have identified as man's strongest desire.
The first answer to the WSC states, "Man's chief end is to glorify God, and to enjoy him forever." This refers to the intent for which man was created and to the fulfillment of that intent in heaven. This an altogether different thing from the proposition that it is within human nature as such to desire God. Contrary to your claims, I would argue that such an underlying desire does not exist unless God specifically creates it in an individual by means of regeneration. In his indictment of humanity, wherein he sets up the necessity of redemption for every individual, Paul states that "no one seeks after God" (Romans 3:11). Adam's sin is not a case of choosing "according to his immediate perception of the Good rather than according to the eternal Truth of the Good." It wasn't a case of the lesser of two goods. Adam's choice was not merely to eat of the fruit of a particular tree, it was to disobey the commandment of God. This was not a case of seeking union with God in a misguided way. The fall is not just a matter of man falling into confusion and breaking the bond of love. Consequently, the atonement is not just a matter of restoring the bond of love and taking away the confusion. Your statement, "God restored the bond of love between Himself and man in Christ (this, in my opinion, is the whole of the work of the Cross)," is very much in keeping with Catholic theology; especially with Abelard's conception of the atonement. The chief efficacy of Christ's passion is found in its ability to stir us to love God. When we see the cross, we see how much God loves us. Consequently, we are able to focus on something that can lead us past our confusion and allow us to demonstrate our love for God. [For those who have seen it, Mel Gibson's "The Passion of the Christ" is a prime example of Abelardian theology.] But this whole concept of the atonement begs the question. For while it is true that the atonement demonstrates God's love, we need to ask why and how this is the case. What is it about God killing his own Son, or, if you prefer weaker terms, allowing his son to be killed, that demonstrates his love? I won't argue that the cross does not demonstrate God's love, especially in light of John 3:16. I do want to know why it is that God's love had to be demonstrated in just this way. If it were only a matter of providing a focal point to excite our own love for God, there are surely less drastic options. And here is where the idea of a the substitutionary atonement comes in. When Adam fell, we fell in him. We were all declared guilty and were all deserving of death. In the atonement, Christ dies in our place. Because he has died, we will never die. He pays the price for sin and, having done so, is declared, not just "not guilty, " but "righteous." All those for whom he died, or better, who were crucified with him, are also justified (i.e., declared righteous). Having been justified, we are not merely restored to the same place that Adam was in where we can break the bond of love again. While it is true that we can continue to sin while we remain in this life, it is not the case that the bond of love is ours to break. Christ has purchased our inheritance for us, which was not true of Adam's original state. Although he enjoyed the presence of the Holy Spirit, the Spirit was not with him as an earnest of his inheritance, as he is with us. When we sin, the Spirit does not leave us but continues to sanctify us.
You have attributed Adam's sin to choosing "according to his immediate perception of the Good rather than according to the eternal Truth of the Good." But you go on to say, "In the end, we will see God face to face, and the choice between God and our immediate pleasures will be obliterated because the immediate pleasure will be the vision of God." If this is so, then how is our behavior in heaven any different from choosing according to our immediate perception of the good? My point is not to say that this is right or wrong, only that, ultimately, it cannot be where Adam went wrong. He disobeyed an explicit command of God. There was no immediate perception of any good. Adam is not a figure to be pitied. And then there is your explanation of man's current condition even after the death of Christ.
In the meantime, for man to respond to God’s self-giving with self-giving, he must often refuse the immediate manifestation of his natural desire because it is conditioned by concupiscence and the habits of sin. He must live according to God’s desire rather than merely according to his own. If he does not do so, he breaks the bond of love once again by refusing to give himself over to the Beloved’s will.
And so on, and so on. Adam falls and breaks the bond of love. Christ suffers on the cross thereby allowing us to respond and restore this bond. If we do not continue to live according to God's desire the cycle starts again. We break the bond of love- our own private fall, as it were. The solution is the same. Well, almost. This time, instead of the historical sacrifice on the cross, Christ is resacrificed over and over in the mass. The sacraments, especially this one, become a means whereby we are enabled to restore the bond of love that our sinful behavior has broken. Until we do it again.
At this point, you write:
This, it seems to me, is why Reformed theology must say that man’s nature was changed by the Fall. Otherwise, total depravity and irresistible grace don’t make sense. Speech about forensic declarations only makes sense if you are speaking figuratively about natures and intrinsic ontological relationships. Otherwise, you fall into speaking of God as if He were dealing with legal fictions instead of with created reality.
I will combine a response to this with what you wrote in your email. [For the sake of any other readers, Andrew had written the following]:
It seems like you are raising "forensic declaration" to a metaphysical status, which throws me completely, and then you speak of human nature changing, which, in the Catholic view, is impossible. A change of human nature is equivalent to God changing His mind. Please clarify, then, what you mean by "human nature," "forensic declaration," and so on, because you obviously don't mean what Catholics mean.
First, human nature and its change. This is not a change of human nature (although, I might have used that pronoun), but a change in human nature. That is, our nature does not change into something else. We remain human throughout eternity. This change occurs at the resurrection. Paul describes it in I Corinthians 15:51-53, "Behold! I tell you a mystery. We shall not all sleep, but we shall all be changed, in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, at the last trumpet. For the trumpet will sound and the dead will be raised imperishable, and we shall be changed. For this perishable body must put on the imperishable, and this mortal body must put on immortality." Once this change occurs, the possibility of sin will no longer be in our nature, for death will have lost its sting. As to man's nature being changed by the fall, this is where I disagree with Reformed theology. I find no reason to believe that there was such a change (or, if this change did occur, I will have to insist that the human nature Christ took on is that of man after the fall and not before; otherwise, we are not healed). I think a lot of resistance to the idea that the nature that man has now is the same that he had before the fall is due to the notion that whatever God creates must be pristine and perfect. Why? God can create in this way and has done so in the creation of that realm in which he lives and to which we are destined. But he has also created an entire realm that awaits perfection. Notice the very first description of the earth after we find out that God created it. "The earth was without form and void." And now, consider that man was a product of the earth. The promise of the resurrection, that man will one day be imperishable and immortal, is not a promise to restore him to past glory, but to give him that for which he had always been intended. God meant for man to be both immortal and imperishable; however, he did not create him in this condition. Such a reward would have to be merited. It was to have been given to Adam and to his posterity upon his justification. Had Adam obeyed God, he would have been declared righteous and would have received the promised reward- eternal life. Instead, Christ obeyed God and he received the promised reward. Upon being declared righteous, he was raised from the dead and was made both immortal and imperishable. Both our regeneration and our future bodily resurrection are conditioned upon our union with Christ in his death and resurrection.
On the issue of forensic declarations, considering the way in which many Protestants speak of them, Catholics are well within their rights to label them as "legal fictions." It's as though God just decides to declare something without any basis in fact or reality. But if he can do this, why not just make the declaration without the bother of being crucified? Forensic declarations are not figurative language nor do they have any metaphsyical status. They are legal judgments. If I commit a crime, I cannot be sentenced until a verdict has been rendered. There is a difference between the polutution of sin and our standing before the law of God. It is necessary that we be both cleansed and justified. Redemption involves real ontological relationships. We are actually placed into union with Christ. This is not nominal. We are crucified and raised together with him. None of this constitutes a forensic declaration. It is, rather, the basis in reality whereby God's forensic declarations can be made. A judge must never clear those who have actually committed the crime. This is no less true of God. His verdicts must be according to justice; they must be true. There would be no more justice in God imputing Christ's rigtheousness to me and my unrighteousness to Christ than there would be for some earthly judge to decide that you were guilty of my crimes. A legal fiction, if that's what imputation and justification are, is an injustice of the worst sort. It doesn't work that way, though. The righteousness of Christ is imputed to us only because it actually belongs to us by virtue of our union with him. Our justification is declared on the basis that, in Christ, we have already paid the full penalty of sin. Having so justified us, a just God cannot reverse this declaration, for it is not fictional. As you indicated earlier, it is unthinkable that God would change his mind. Justification is not just an indicator of our current status, but is a preview of the final judgment. Everyone will pay the penalty for sin. If not with Christ on the cross, then it will be paid in an eternal hell.
I would agree that miracles "are not properly called revelation in isolation from a subjective apprehension of that which is revealed." The same would go for any thing that purports to be revelation. That which it reveals must be subjectively apprehended. The question, though, is whether this subjective apprehension always takes place at the same time that the miracle is witnessed. How many people witnessed the miracles of the feedings of the 5000 and the 4000? And how many of them even came close to understanding what Christ had revealed until he explained it to them in John 6? The Pharisees witnessed the healing of the blind man in John 9 (if not the event itself, then the results were obvious to them); however, they could not understand anything that this miracle had revealed because they themselves were blind. Revelation is not merely telling us something we didn't know before. Just as not all those who witnessed the miracles of Christ apprehend what these miracles revealed, even so, not all those who find out that these miracles happened through reading Scripture have apprehended what these miracles reveal. As you wrote, miracles are mediums of revelation and not revelation proper. Thus, merely finding out from one medium of revelation (Scripture) about another medium of revelation (miracles) does not guarantee that we will apprehend the revelation itself. This requires the work of the Holy Spirit and, without it, we are like the Pharisees who were as blind spiritually as the man born blind had been physically.
Thanks for clearing up the point about not trying to get rid of those events that make revelation actual. The way you were putting things was confusing and sounded like you were advocating some sort of neo-orthodoxy. I wanted to be sure so that I wouldn't waist any time responding to something you weren't saying. On the matter of classifying the Summa Theologica as revelation according to intension, you're economy of qualities and attributes is leading to an overly liberal idea of just what revelation is. The only attribute you have listed is "a manifestation of the life of the Church." Since both the Summa and Scripture have this in common, then both must be a revelation of Christ. But this does not follow unless, according to extension, "a manifestation of the life of the Church," is revelation. This has not been established; instead, the relationship of revelation to a manifestation of the church's life is one of species to genus. I could, following a similar method of reasoning, conclude that I am a frog, since both frogs and myself are manifestations of biological life. Fortunately, froghood does not exhaust what it means to possess biological life.
One quality that would separate the Summa from revelation according to intension is found in your discussion of the Bereans. We do not have the option to consider rejecting Paul's message. Insofar as it has been inscripturated, it has already been verified as the Word of God and we must accept it as we would any other part of Scripture. We can consider rejecting and even flat out reject a number of things that Thomas has to say. You wrote, "The Scriptures differ from the Summa Theologica in that they more perfectly manifest the essence of revelation..." But this should have hinted at another quality of revelation. When God reveals, he does so inerrantly. Unless you are willing to predicate this of the Summa, then it should not be classified as revelation. And if you're not, then I compelled to wonder just where Scripture's more perfect manifestation of the essence of revelation lies. On the specific matter of considering a rejection of what Paul or any other biblical writer has recorded in Scripture, this should not be confused with considering a rejection of any given interpretation of Scripture. For instance, the issue of women's ordination is not even a matter of improper Scriptural exegesis, for Paul's opinion on the matter is clear. Very little interpretive ability is required. Instead, people have just decided that Paul is a product of his backward times and should be ignored on this topic. But there are also times when Scripture is improperly exegeted, even by those invested with authority in the church to teach it. We should never be passive recipients of biblical teaching but should always compare what has been taught with our study of Scripture. Ideally, this would lead to a deeper understanding and agreement with the teaching received. But it is also possible that something won't add up, in which case we may both consider rejecting and actually reject it. It is one thing to give a church the benifit of the doubt in what it teaches and to accept it even if we don't quite understand it all. It is another not to question or even reject the doctrinal discrepancies that we are able to see.
I will have to disagree with the identification of the grammatical/historical method as another form of allegory. You write that "the historical method depends upon hearsay and the fallible accounts of men." While it is true that we can make use of extra-biblical historical records to help us understand Scripture, the historical method does not depend on these. Rather, the idea is that the Bible itself, especially in its historical narratives, is an accurate record of history. All other biblical genres are predicated on the fact that the historical events recorded actually happened. For example, the didactic writings of Paul, in which he is defining Christian doctrine, would have little authority if the historical events of Christ's salvific work had not taken place. The Psalms are not just expressions of general human emotion, but they find their specific context in the history of Israel (or, even more specifically in most cases, in that of David), which history is a revelation of Christ. The Law is not just an expression of timeless moral principles, but is given to a particular people at a particular point in their history. It is given to the nation of Israel after they have been redeemed from slavery in Egypt. Any revelatory value that the Law has must be considered against this background. On a related point going back to your description of history as "hearsay and the fallible accounts of men," read chapter 28, "To what extent history is an aid," of Augustine's On Christian Doctrine. I think you will find that his view of profane history is not quite as pessimistic. On the matter of "metaphysical truths which are everywhere and always available," is this only what you believe Origen to be doing or do you advocate basing biblical interpretation on these yourself? If so, what are these truths? This would help to know how further to respond to your comments on allegory and interpretation.
As you present it, the Assumption of Mary is based upon her Immaculate Conception. Mary was born without sin; consequently, she did not have to wait until the resurrection to achieve bodily union with God, since the resurrection purifies us of our sins, which Mary did not have. The argument seems to be valid, but what about the premises? First, Mary "was clearly sinless because Christ did not inherit original sin." But this is not so clear. 1) There is the problem of infinite regress. Why didn't Mary's parents have to be sinless in order for her not to be sinless? 2) One view within the church has been that sin is inherited through the father. If so, then the Virgin Birth would prevent Christ from inheriting original sin. 3) Original sin is not inherited at all. It has nothing to do with the personal pollution of sin but is, rather, a guilty verdict pronounced on everyone for the sin of Adam. In this case, original sin does not bypass Christ since he must be declared guilty in order that his death might be just. Unless 1) is answered and 2) and 3) are discounted, then there is no point in seeing whether Mary's sinlessness implies her Assumption.
When discussing specific instances of prayer or prayer in general, you still maintain that Scripture is not a prerequisite. However, you are not consistent as to why this is the case. In the first case, it is because the person praying does not need to have read Scripture in order to pray. In the second, it is because Scripture is not in the definition of prayer. But your argument does not follow. Finding one way in which two things are not related does not indicated that there are no ways in which they are related. This would be like me making the claim that my cousin and I are not related because I am not her nephew. Scripture's function as a prerequisite for the church's life, including prayer, does not require that each individual therein read Scripture for himself. It is sufficient that the church teach its members to pray and that this teaching is either explicitly taught in Scripture or that it can bederived as a matter of good and necessary consequence. As to Enoch and Noah living before Scripture, this begs the question of a point that we have been discussing. Scripture's ability to be a prerequisite for the church's life comes from its status as revelation. Before Scripture was completed there were other forms of revelation. This is no longer the case. Finally, to say that Scripture is not a prerequisite of something in the church's life because it is not in the definition of that thing is to seriously limit its role, if not to deny altogether that it can be a prerequisite for anything in the church's life. I suppose an exception could be made for preaching. But if you're going to deny Scripture's function as a prerequisite to the church's life, then you need to do so in the manner that I have been using the concept; otherwise, we're talking about two different things. Here, then, is what I mean in making this claim: Everything that a church teaches its members to believe or practice must be explicitly taught in Scripture or derived therefrom by good and necessary consequence. Prayer falls under this category.
If it is true, as you have written, that Scripture does not "teach individual responsibility at the expense of corporate unity," then one of three other propositions must also be true. 1) It does teach corporate unity at the expense of individual responsibility; 2) it is not a matter of individual responsibility to oppose heresy- we should ultimately tolerate it; 3) there have never been any cases where a church has been in error and so any reason for making such a choice doesn't exist. You've already agreed to the opposite of option 1, and option 3 is just naive, which leaves option 2. If unbroken communion must be maintained even at the expense of tolerating heresy, then, what distinguishes the church from an inescapable social club? If the goal is unity at all costs, then doctrine, except for the one that teaches this goal, cannot have any ultimate meaning. As it is not a uniquely Christian thing to form groups, the church canno tbe defined on the basis of unity alone. You also seem to be confusing breaking away from a particular congregation or denomination from breaking away from the body of Christ altogether. Leaving one church is not the same thing as not belonging to any church.
This post continues the conversation with Andrew from here and responds to his comments of 3/24/05 and 3/25/05.
I think you have captured a key difference between Reformed and Catholic views of salvation: that between actual and potential grace. The fact that the Catholic system does have a "moment of monergistic action" does make it non-Pelagian, but, to the extent that the grace of salvation must be made actual through a synergistic process, it is still salvation by works. In both views, sanctification is necessary to salvation, yet not in the same way. For one, it is a necessary cause; for the other, it is a necessary effect. Without sanctification, salvation either will not be the case, or it never was the case.
You are probably correct in saying that "the difference between the Catholic view and the Reformed view stems from a difference of emphasis concerning the nature of God's salvific will." Nevertheless, the difference should be measured by the end result, not by the seemingly insignificant matter of emphasis at the beginning. In the one case, God takes a people to himself; in the other, he wants to give himself to human beings. It isn't an either/or case though, at least on the Reformed side. Not only does God take a people to himself, but he also desires to give himself to that people. Your contention that God's self-giving should be open-ended assumes a view of the will that does not necessarily follow. "If human beings may reject God, then someone who does not reject HIm is reponding to God in kind." Now, apply this logic to intratrintitarian relationships. Is the Son's reciprocation of the Father's love only genuine if he could have rejected it?
I accept the notion that those who do not reject God respond to him in kind and that "God's self-giving inspires a reciprocal self-giving." But this inspiration is efficacious. All those to whom God has given himself will respond in kind. None of this is predicated on the possibility of rejection but upon the free desire of the regenerate. If it is the case with human beings that those to whom God has shown initial grace are able to reject him, then the deciding factor in their salvation, no matter how much God may work with them, must be found in their own efforts to give themselves to God.
On the matter of "desire as a force exerted upon the desiring by the thing desired," as a reason for the Catholic tradition to find the Reformed view unacceptable, this goes against the Reformed doctrine of unconditional election. God chooses a particular people to be his own, but the conditions of that choice are not to be found in the ones chosen. As to what did make God choose certain people over others, we leave these to his own secret counsel. What God has not chosen to reveal, we may not investigate.
While it was a good thing for the Berean Jews to not try to kill Paul, this is not the reason given for saying that they were more noble than those in Thessalonica. It was that "they received the word with all eagerness, examining the Scriptures daily to see if these things were so." This is about more than human decency; it has to do with the proper handling of God's word. Furthermore, the Jews had no more of an option of rejecting Paul's message than we do. They were not members of a completely separate covenant that might serve as a fallback position. Any rejection of the NC would indicate that they had never really understood or accepted the substance of the old. They too would have been heretics for thinking that Scripture contradicted Paul. Paul's message was the intended conclusion of the Old Testament. That it is a responsible thing to check teaching against Scripture does not mean that any opinion is valid. Part of Scriptural study involves double-checking the NT against the OT. This is not to look for contradictions, for we know that the Holy Spirit cannot contradict himself. It is rather to understand how Scripture interprets itself. When it comes to those who are teachers in the church, we should still double-check their teaching against the whole of Scripture. Unlike Paul, however, they may be wrong, either by way of honest mistake or by outright deception.
When a teacher in the church substantially disagrees with our own interpretation of Scripture, we are not to accept his teaching passively. Nor do we just assume that we're right. There is a process whereby we may request an explanation. Hopefully, the matter can end here, since, in the normal course of things, one would expect the teacher to know more than the one who is taught. If not, the matter can be taken to a higher authority. In Presbyterian polity this can go from the session to presbytery and, finally, to general assembly. It may be that the teacher is found to be in error. If not, and if the individual cannot in all good conscience say that the disagreement is a minor thing, then he should find another church. Individualism is wrong, but Scripture does not teach corporate unity at the expense of individual responsibility. In the end, the individual will be just as condemned if he leaves the true church as he will be if he remains in a false one. Either way, he answers to God.
On the matter of Scriptural inference for the Assumption of Mary, I'd like more detail than the statement that it has been done. And thoroughly Scripture-peppered writings do not count. Quoting Scripture is not the same as exegeting it. I do have a definite idea on how to infer something from Scripture, but this is hardly a problem, unless you're of the opinion that anything goes (of course, you might agree as to the definiteness of the idea but disagree as to its content). I do reject allegorical and mystical interpretations as they are commonly understood because these do little more than to impose a meaning on to the text. They are examples of eisegesis. I accept the historical-grammatical method. As to grammar, this means nothing more than a noun is noun, a verb a verb, and so on. We should understand Scripture as ordinary speech. The historical part means that, as much as possible, we should try to see it through the eyes of the original audience. An example of this happened in my change of view about infant baptism. I was raised a Baptist with the belief that, since Scripture does not specifically say, "Baptize babies," then it shouldn't be done. But I was interpreting the silence of Scripture from my own unaffected perspective. What if I were a first century Jew? In Peter's sermon at Pentecost, he says, "Repent and be baptized every one of you in the name of Jesus Christ for the forgiveness of your sins, and you will receive the gift of the Holy Spirit. For the promise is for you and for your children and for all who are far off, everyone whom the Lord our God calls to himself." Peter is speaking in terms of covenant signs to a Jewish audience, who would naturally apply the covenant sign to their children. In this case, we can infer the validity of infant baptism from the fact that a prohibition is not articulated.
Scripture should be interpreted literally. This can be taken in more than one way. It does not mean, as many fundamentalists suppose, that we must interpret it in a wooden fashion such that every thing means exactly what it says unless such an interpretation is impossible. Rather, it means that we interpret Scripture according to its various literary genres. I also assume the unity of Scripture. It is authored by the Holy Spirit and will not contradict itself. Scripture is always about Christ. Whenever I approach any passage of Scripture, my first question is, "How does this portray Christ?" To this end, the way in which the NT authors interpret the OT has been very helpful. I see their method as a pattern to be followed, not as an exception to the rule. Take Matthew's application of Hosea 11:1 to Christ. On a surface reading, the verse implies nothing of the kind. It is an historical reference to the Exodus. But Hosea's meaning goes deeper than the surface. Both he and Matthew are tapping into the revelation found in the history of Israel. This is a matter of typology. The history of Israel was intended to typify the life of Christ. The life of Christ recapitulates the history of Israel. Matthew is able to apply this bit of history to Christ, not because it made for a nice analogy and he could, therefore, take it out of context, but because he was keeping it in context. The history of Israel, which is the bulk of the OT, is a revelation of Christ. Paul assumes the same thing when, in Galatians 4, he speaks of Abraham's sons in terms of an allegory. Yes, it is the same word that, normally, I don't like. Yet, Paul is not imposing an interpretation onto what Moses wrote. He is interpreting the history of Israel as the history of Christ. In this case, he adds another layer by interpreting the life of Abraham as a foreshadowing of the history of Israel and, by extension, of Christ. If you're interested in how I have expanded on this premise, then you may want to go to the Theology category and read the posts on the life of Abraham.
You are right about my disagreement over what constitutes "the whole history of orthodox thought." The phrase begs the question, especially when I had asked, "What out of all that happens within the visible church constitutes a legitimate element of the Church's life?" That is, unless you mean to answer, "Everything." However, I do not subscribe to the theory that whatever the visible church has done must be right, for, as Luther pointed out, it has often contradicted itself. Looking to such things as the Councils, liturgy, and Thomas' Summa are good, but they must also be evaluated in the light of Scripture. As to the Summa Theologica, I would not put it in the same set as Scripture, which is the inspired and infallible Word of God. There are several points in the Summa with which I disagree, but, even if this weren't the case, it is still just the words of a man. That being said, I can see the value in using it as a secondary standard, much like my own church uses the Westminster Standards. Such standards, although the basis for a common interpretation of Scripture, are also subject to Scripture. The Confession has, on occassion, been amended when further study found it to be out of line with Scripture. Legitimate elements in the life of the church are determined by considering them in the light of Scripture. If they do not pass this test, they are not valid as elements in the church's life.
Prayer is not going to work as an example of something in the church's life for which Scripture is not a prerequisite. We learn about prayer through Scripture. Even if the immediate source of our information is, say, our parents, the ultimate source of this information is still Scripture. Does anything else come to mind?
You write that the historical reality at Cana "is properly speaking revelation, but that it is no more truly a revelation than the revelation that occurs when you read the account." I won't argue. It is not my intent to set the historical event in opposition to Scripture so that we can only choose one of them. I do disagree on what constitutes objective and subjective revelation. That Christ is the object of revelation is not the same thing as saying that he is objective revelation. For that matter, Christ is also the subject of revelation, insofar as he is the one who reveals. This does not mean that he is subjective revelation. Objective revelation is found both in the historical events and in their inscripturation. This is where God speaks. Subjective revelation is found in the individual's apprehension of objective revelation, whether this be as an eyewitness to the original event or by hearing Scripture.
The people who witnessed the miracle at Christ saw Christ in the event of the miracle, not only in the fact that he was the one standing there performing the miracle. In the same way, other miracles not performed by Christ also serve to reveal Christ, both in the original event and in their record in Scripture. Your argument that miracles are not properly called revelation does follow from the premise of Christ performing a miracle without witnesses. However, though it may be valid, we cannot conclude that it is true unless you can verify the premise. When has a miracle ever been performed without witnesses? I would argue just the opposite point: because miracles are a form of revelation, they always have witnesses.
Is Scripture true because it allows us to aprehend the eternal reality of Christ? Or does this truth also imply that when it describes an historical event that this event must have actually happened? Does it matter for the function of the Scriptural narrative of the miracle at Cana as revelation whether it really took place or not? Would Scripture reveal Christ just as well and just as truthfully if it turned out to be an ahistorical myth?
This post continues a conversation with Andrew down here. It is in response to his comment of 3/21/05, which you may want to read in order to better follow this one.
I recognize that those who reject sola scriptura posit the existence of a larger fabric of life that can be contained in the propositions of Scripture. As stated, I would agree with this. The point of contention is whether anything within the Church's life that is able to be described in propositional form is legitimate if such propositions are not directly from or necessary inferences of Scripture. Sola scriptura is not about limiting life, denying Church authority, or about replacing Christ as the proper foundation of the Church's life. It is about making Scripture the sole and final rule of faith and practice. The function of Scripture within the Church is to express what may or may not be believed or practiced. The "may" by statement or inference and the "may not" by statement against, inference from statements against, or lack of statements or inferences for. You claim that the function of Scripture "is not to be the prerequisite of the other parts of the Church’s life." In order that I can know just what you mean by this, would you provide some examples of the Church's life for which Scripture is not a prerequisite?
The statement, "We cannot read Scripture accurately or faithfully unless we accept every element of the Church’s life along with it," begs the question, "What out of all that happens within the visible church constitutes a legitimate element of the Church's life?" Other than that, I agree. You illustrate the problem yourself by speaking of both Catholics and Orthodox rejecting sola scriptura. But they differ on the specifics of their faith and practice. Where these differences occur, which, if any, is an example of ecclesiastical life? As to their objection to holding "Scripture up as an independent standard by which to judge the life of the Church," if this is the case, then they are objecting to a phantom, at least as far as the Reformed understanding of the term ( I realize that many Protestant individuals hold to this kind of view- I have no intention of defending them).
I'm having trouble making sense of the this statement, "An orthodox Catholic may very well argue that Scripture is formally sufficient – i.e. that every true doctrine is contained within or implied by the Scriptures, but the Catholics and Orthodox reject the idea that Scripture is actually sufficient." All that is meant by Scripture being sufficient is that every true doctrine is contained within or implied by it. As to an orthodox Catholic believing this, consider the doctrine of the Assumption of Mary. Try inferring that one from Scripture. They do reject the idea that Scripture has all the answers. As to checking up on what the Church is teaching by going to the back of the book, that's one of reasons we have Scripture. As I noted in one of my earlier responses to Clifton on this topic, the Bereans are commended for double checking Paul against Scripture (Acts 17:11).
The purpose of revelation goes beyond communication. Revelation exists either for the salvation of those who accept it or for the greater condemnation of those who reject it. Revelation itself is effectual toward salvation. It is not about believing and apprehending a story. Revelation is the intersection of heaven into earth, culminating in the incarnation. Subjective apprehension is important, but it means nothing apart from the objective communication by means of certain events in history. Christ reveals nothing to the other persons of the Trinity. Revelation is a one way communication from heaven to earth.
"It is not the historical reality of Cana which is finally significant, but the eternal reality of Christ’s Being." This one's going to need some explaining. When you say "finally significant," are you saying this because you believe that the only sensible way to speak of revelation is "that which is being revealed (Christ) and the subjective apprehension of that which is being revealed"? This would mean that the historical reality of Cana is significant in its own right (it had to happen in order for the written revelation to be true and significant) but that, properly speaking, it is not revelation. In this case, we'd still have more to discuss since I am putting the focus of revelation on objective historical events. Nevertheless, your position would still be within the bounds of orthodoxy. Or, are you saying that the only finally significant thing is the subjective apprehension of the eternal reality of Christ's being? In this case, the written account is so sufficient in revealing Christ that the connection of the narrative to historical reality is irrelevant. Maybe it did happen, maybe it didn't. Either way, the eternal Christ has been revealed to me just as well. In this case, my objection will have to be a lot stronger. But I won't make any objection unless I have reason to believe you actually meant this.
I won't object to saying that my apprehension of Christ is in the reading and not in the event itself. That is, as long as "apprehension" implies no more than cognitive knowledge. I will object if you mean that such apprehension is sufficient to my union with Christ. The incarnation, wherein Christ takes on the same human nature that we have, is essential to our salvation. Furthermore, the incarnation is the revelation of Christ. The incarnate Christ, his person and work, are the final events of revelation. He is that to which the OT always pointed. He is the one who, coming into the world, brings salvation. The incarnate Christ is the whole reason for revelation and, ultimately, he is the revelation itself. Whenever I or anyone else apprehends Christ through reading Scripture, this must be understood of Christ incarnate. His identity as the eternal Word may anticipate his revelatory status through the incarnation, it may even make prophetic revelation of his salvific work possible. However, unless it is predicated on the incarnation , revelation is meaningless, if not impossible. The subjective apprehension of Christ cannot be of anything other that what was objectivley revealed in history and then recorded in Scripture.
The events of Christ's life do reveal more than was available at his nativity. It's not that the whole Christ wasn't born, but that the whole Christ can never be revealed. We do not possess such a capacity to comprehend him. The revelation of Christ does not come all at once. It is his person and work. The latter, by definition, must take place over a process of time. Revelation is necessary to salvation. No separation can be made between the salvific acts of Christ and the revelation of Christ. Consequently, if revelation is complete at the nativity, then so is redemption. Further redemptive events are superfluous. As far as our salvation goes, Herod could have had his way and that would be that. We could still be saved. Christ's post-nativity life and work is a great deal more than adding to our maturity and vision of Christ. It is about what Christ had to do for our redemption.
I offered the illustration of distinguishing between the functions of integrated canine body parts to show that different things having different functions does not destroy the overall unity. Sanctification and justification are both aspects of salvation, both are made possible by the work of Christ; however, in their own right, they do not perform the same function. They are necessary for the function of the larger whole. Your own counter-example of a partly grown partly embryonic dog is, indeed, a monstrosity; however, you have not shown how it is connected to the views that I have presented. The question of whether sanctification and justification are separate or distinct needs to be answered as a matter of perspective. If it is monergistic vs. synergistic works, then they are separate. If it is things that happen to the believer because of the death and resurrection of Christ, then they are distinct. If it is things that cannot fail to be true of saved people, then they are distinct. If it is things that contribute to my status as being saved, then they are separate. There are two ways in which sanctification can be used, positional and progressive. So far, this discussion has been about the latter. Justification is a legal verdict. It is a declaration based on my positional sanctification in Christ. Positional sanctification is a monergistic work whereby I am set apart into Christ. Consequently, when he is declared righteous, I am declared righteous in him. Progressive sanctification is the work of the Holy Spirit whereby I am caused to conform in this life to my position in Christ. This conformity involves my own works and is, therefore, synergistic. Progressive sanctification is the evidence of positional sanctification. Lack of progressive sanctification does not mean that my position has changed again , but that I was never in Christ.
It may be the case that "any given moment stands in the same relation to the eternal as any other moment." However, we are not considering these matters from the perspective of eternity, but from our own. While there is temporal simultaneity between the state of justification and the state of being sanctified, there must be a temporally sequential relationship between the verdict of justification and the process of sanctification. In the same way, living in jail may be simultaneous with the state of having been found guilty, but the verdict itself was a one time declaration. Both justification and sanctification result from the grace of God, but the question of whether this is manifest as a declaration or a process is not one of origin but of specific intent and function.
Within the current posts on Scripture and Tradition, I brought up cessationism in the context of I Corinthians 13. You may read those posts to see how it fit into the argument. This post is about a distinct but related question. I was asked whether or not "cessationists believe that miracles also ceased after the Apostolic era." My answer was as follows:
The cessation of miracles does not imply the active withdrawel of God. Rather, the miracles existed to reveal even greater works. Instead of diseases being healed, sin is cured; instead of dead bodies coming to life, there is the eternal regeneration of salvation. Furthermore, Calvinist cessasionists recognize that God is just as active and just as necessary for his works of providence as he is for the so called super-natural acts. The universe is not some deist wind up toy, but God controls it all. He is no more or less involved in a miracle than he is in the normal course of nature. God is just as much as here as he always has been. Once Christ has come and once we have the completed Scripture to tell us this, we no longer need any miracles to confirm God's presence.
This was followed by two more questions, which I shall attempt to answer, "Where is the Scripture to support this assumption? And do you not think that the Holy Spirit dwelling inside a believer is miraculous?"
The scriputural support is found in a survey of the miracles themselves. The premise to be defended is that miracles serve to authenticate the messenger/message as being from God. Some preliminary clarification is in order. There is no claim here that miracles are a theistic proof. One must already believe in God and believe that he can both communicate and perform miracles. Otherwise, even if the event itself is acknowledged, it will be regarded as a freak natural occurence with no real connection to any message.
Exodus 4:1-9: Moses is concerned that the elders of Israel will not believe that the LORD had appeared; that is, they wouldn't believe that the message he had been instructed to give them was actually from God. God gives Moses a series of three miracles to perform in order to convince them: his staff turning into a snake, his hand turning leprous and then being healed, and water from the Nile turning into blood.
Exodus 10:1,2: The ongoing series of plagues, along with Pharaoh's reaction at the hand of God, were so that Moses and his descendants (and, by implication, Israel throughout her generations) would know that God is the LORD. The purpose of the plagues is not, as generally thought, to convince Pharaoh to let Israel go (although, ulitmately, they do have this effect). If it were, then God is not being very efficient; he keeps defeating this purpose by hardening Pharaoh's heart. Instead, he is using this series of miracles, up to and including the crossing of the Red Sea, as the paradigm redemptive event of the OT. Israel would be able to look back on it and see that he was the LORD. Israel acknowledges who God is and a relationship is established. This, in turn, forms the basis on which God gives them the Ten Commandments. God prefaces them with, "I am the LORD your God, who brought you out of the land of Egypt, out of the house of slavery." Beyond this, the Exodus event, including its non-miraculous elements, reveals our redemption in Christ. He is our Passover (I Corinthians 5:7), the Lamb of God who takes away the sin of the world (John 1:29). Note, however, that even this non-miraculous element is rooted in a miraculous event: the tenth plague. The plagues did serve a secondary function of getting Israel out of Egypt. But God could just as easily have done this through other means, the most obvious of which is not hardening Pharaoh's heart. "Let my people go." "OK."
Deuteronomy 8:3: The manna was given so that they might know that "man does not live by bread alone, but lives by every word that comes from the mouth of the LORD. The giving of manna over forty years was miraculous. It's immediate effect was to feed the people. But this was not its primary purpose. This was to teach them absolute trust in God's Word. The same God who was providing for them in this way was also beginning to give them revelation. As to feeding them, God could just as easily have arranged circumstances so that the miracle was not needed. Look at how he feeds everyone else with non-miraculous means.
I Kings 17:24: After Elijah has raised the widow's son from the dead, she says, "Now I know that you are a man of God, and that the word of the LORD in your mouth is truth." The miracle has served to authenticate both the messenger and his message as being from God. It did serve a secondary function of giving the widow back her son. However, if the whole point was that the widow have a living son, God could have prevented his death. Furthermore, the miracle was not performed on some general principle that resurrections are always the most desirable thing. In Luke 4:25-27, Jesus points out that there were lots of widows in Israel, but Elijah was only sent to the widow of Zarephath. There were plenty of lepers, but Elisha only healed Naman. A miracle is a sign. What that sign consists of is secondary to its intended function.
I Kings 18:24-40: This a contest between the prophets of Baal and Elijah to determine whose God is the true God. When Elijah prays, he asks God to perform the miracle in order that people might know that the LORD is God. This prayer is answered. The people see the miracle and confess that the LORD is God. Elijah is confirmed as the messenger of God and the people accept and obey his next message, "Seize the prophets of Baal; let not one of them escape."
Matthew 11:2-4: John the Baptist is in prison and starts to doubt whether Jesus is the Christ so he sends some disciples to ask him. Jesus does not just say, "Yes." Instead, he tells the disciples to report the miracles that they have seen and heard. Jesus' status as being from God is confirmed by his miracles.
Luke 5:17-26: A paralyzed man is lowered through a roof so that Jesus can heal him. Instead, Jesus says, "Man, your sins are forgiven you." The Pharisees question his authority to do this and then Jesus heals the man in order to demonstrate that authority.
Acts 3,4: The healing of a lame man is used as an occassion for Peter to preach. Many people who hear, believe. The rulers question by whose authority Peter has healed the man and he gives the credit to Jesus and uses this as another occassion to present the gospel. They can't say anything in opposition because the healed man is standing right there in front of them.
Hebrews 2:3-4: This is not about a specific historical event but describes how the message of salvation had been confirmed. It is declared by the Lord and then attested to others, including the author of Hebrews, by those who heard him. The historical context is first generation believers telling second generation believers, not second to third, or third to fourth. Along with this attestation, "God also bore witness by signs and wonders and various miracles and by gifts of the Holy Spirit distributed according to his will.
In each of these cases, the miracle serves to authenticate the message/messenger. But there is another side. Once the message has been delivered and authenticated, it is sufficient. No further signs are needed and requesting further miraculous signs for this pupose is an indication of wickedness.
Mark 8:11-13: Jesus has just fed the 4000 with seven loaves of bread and the Pharisess want him to show them a sign from heaven. Jesus denies the request.
Luke 11:14-32: Jesus has just cast a demon out of a mute man. Once again, the Pharisees want a sign from heaven. Jesus calls them an evil generation and refuses to give them a sign other than that of Jonah. The result of this sign will be to condemn them.
Luke 16:19-31: Whether this is a parable or Jesus is relating a real event, he states what would be the case. The rich man dies and ends up in Hades. He begs Abraham to send Lazarus to his brothers so that they will not end up where he is. Abraham says, "If they do not hear Moses and the Prophets, neither will they be convinced if someone should rise from the dead." This was the Scripture of the time and sufficient for the immediate purpose of keeping one out of Hades. No miracle was going to make anyone believe what had already been revealed in the Word of God. On the other hand, for those who already believed what God had revealed up until then, miracles would function to confirm new revelation. But the miracle did not automatically justify anything the miracle worker might say. The new revelation must be consistent with what had already been revealed. In Deuteronomy 13: 1-5, Moses condemns any prophets who might come along and work convincing signs and wonders, but then say, "Follow other gods." In such a case, God is testing his people to see if they will follow his commandments.
Hopefully, what I have shown is that miracles serve the consistent function of authenticiating new revelation and that they are no longer needed for revelation already confirmed. These miracles serve the same function even once the revelation has been recorded as Scripture. Recall that the miraculous events of the Exodus were done so that future generations of Israel would know who God is. To be sure, this information would be passed on orally, but it was also inscripturated in the same generation in which it happened. The miracle would serve the same authenticating purpose for those who read about it rather than seeing it. The same goes for the other miracles of Scripture. They are interwoven into the fabric of history in such a way that the historical record itself must be accepted or rejected along with the miracles.
I have not included all the miracles of Scripture, many of which do not state that they exist for this particular purpose. This is, however, no indication that such is not the case. Furthermore, their very presence in the fabric of biblical history serves to authenticate its divine message. But, if anyone disagrees, they are available for use as counterexamples. Also, while I may have shown that authenticating a message is one purpose of miracles, some might argue that I have not demonstrated it to be the only purpose. And this is true. They all had secondary purposes: getting Israel out of Egypt, feeding them, bringing back the dead, healing people. However, in each of these cases, this secondary function is the miracle. To continue them gives the sign more importance than the thing signified.
The continuation of miracles when they no longer serve the function of authenticating new revelation turns the miracle into something of a divine stopgap measure. They fix various problems that may crop up in the world. But this is where God's providence enters. Oftentimes, when a miracle was required, he had set up the circumstances in such a way that it would be required.
John 9: The disciples already know that a certain man's blindness is providential, but they assume the wrong reasons. Jesus says that it happened "that the works of God might be displayed in him." He then restores his sight. Grasp what he is saying here. God, in his providence, had this man be born blind so that, years later, Jesus could perform a miracle. In keeping with the main thesis, the miracle confirms Jesus as a messenger from God to the healed man, who says, "If this man were not from God, he could do nothing." When Jesus asks the man if he believes in the Son of Man, he answers, "Who is he that I may believe?" He believes what Jesus tells him, that he himself is the Son of Man. As with many miracles, not only does this miracle confirm a divine messenger, it serves as a message. This time, it was to reveal the blindness of the Pharisees.
John 11: In this account, Jesus is the one who exercises divine providence. After hearing that Lazarus is sick, he waits two days before going to him. It is quite possible that Lazarus had already died, since he had been dead four days when Jesus finally arrived. Jesus, however, is setting himself up as being in control of the entire situation, as he very well was. He tells his disciples that he is glad that he was not there when Lazarus died, so that they might believe. Just before performing the miracle, he prays that the people standing around may believe that God had sent him. They do. The miracle has authenticated the messenger.
In all cases in which miracles were perfomed, God could have arranged matters so that they would not have been required. As noted earlier, the need itself, death, leprosy, whatever, did not, in itself, constitute sufficient reason for a miracle. Nor does it now. God is quite able to prevent what he wants to prevent or to cause helaing to come by means within the parameters of everyday providence.
One might argue that miracles demonstrate divine compassion or pity. And so they do. But this is not reason enough to keep them around. God is quite capable of being compassionate through other means. Not the least of these is for the Church to actively care for those in need. We may wish that we could say some magic words and cure people instantly, but this would be too easy. Love is most evidentally shown when people don't fix that easily.
There are probably other reasons for performing miracles that I am not thinking of right now. Nevertheless, I highly suspect that all of them could be fulfilled as a matter of providence. I welcome any scriptural defense of the necessity of current miracles, but, unless this happens, I see no justification for their continued existence. One objection, which would not be answerable by matters of providence, would be that new revelation has not ceased, in which case, all that precedes has begged the question. In response to this, I would say that the telos of revelation is Christ. All Scripture points to Christ. If there is still revelation, then produce an example that compares in glory to Scripture. There is also the prohibition against adding to Scripture in Revelation, the implication being that nothing new will be given to add.
I have been assuming throughout that, if the Bible does not reveal something as necessary, it has not revealed it at all. There is no chapter and verse for this, but then, sola scriptura was never meant to exclude common sense. Miracles are not necessary outside of confirming new revelation. Everything that they would otherwise do can be taken care of by means of divine providence. To claim that they still exist is to claim that they necessarily exist (or it is to claim that God is capricious). Unless it can be shown that Scripture supports their current necessity, then such a doctrine is advanced in addition to Scripture. The burden of proof is on the non-cessationists to support the continuation of miracles.
I believe that the cessation of miracles can be safely deduced from their function as described in Scripture. What clinches it for me is the passage that started this, I Corinthians 13, in which a sample of miraculous gifts are said to come to an end after that which is complete has come. Considering the function of miracles in authenticating new revelation, it makes sense to say that that which is complete refers to the completion of revelation. This completion has made obsolete all miracles, for which those mentioned in I Corinthians are a representative sample.
Now to the second question- do I not think that the Holy Spirit dwelling inside a believer is miraculous? Here's what I do think. It can only be accomplished by the immediate work of God. There are no secondary created causes for the indwelling of the Spirit. It is extraordinary in that it goes far beyond the common grace given to non-believers. It involves regeneration and salvation; as such, it is among those things greater than miracles to which the miracles pointed, especially miracles of resurrection.
But, is it a miracle? No, it is not. The indwelling of the Holy Spirit does not serve to authenticate new revelation. Furthermore, even when there was new revelation to be authenticated, it could not have served this function. The indwelling of the Spirit is an inner reality. It may produce results in the life of the believer, but these results cannot be distinguished, by those looking on, from general good behavior. Signs, by their very nature, must be external; otherswise, no one sees them.
Having stated the cessationist position, I will not object too strongly to anyone who wants to use the term "miracle" for something broader than "an external work, contrary to nature, that authenticates new revelation." This could include the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, extraordinary answers to prayer; I'll even broaden acceptable definitions to include those who want to call life a miracle. However, the expanded definition should not be used to slip in those kinds of contrary-to-nature miracles that are recorded in Scripture. These need to be defended on the basis of Scripture and not by means of verbal equivocation.
Perhaps the intent is being lost on me due to my own emphasis on the matter, but it looks like the views presented here come dangerously close to the view that baptism saves ex opere operato rather than its saving efficacy being a means of grace. Neither one of these is the current Protestant add-on, but they do differ significantly from each other. A key point, under the second heading, says, "The scriptural writers clearly talk about baptism as being the moment when we receive the forgiveness of sins promised to us by the Gospel." However, such a tie to a moment in time cannot be derived from any of the texts provided ( nor, I would argue, from any text at all.)
The WCF XXVIII.6 maintains the real efficacy of baptism apart from any specified time, "The efficacy of baptism is not tied to that moment of time wherein it is administered; yet notwithstanding, by the right use of this ordinance, the grace promised is not only offered, but really exhibited and conferred, by the Holy Ghost, to such (whether of age or infants) as that grace belongeth unto, according to the counsel of God's own will, in his appointed time."
Keeping this in mind would have avoided the answer to this question:
"Q: So do you mean that I wasn’t saved when I prayed that prayer?
A: You certainly weren’t joined with the body of Christ, cleansed of your sins, and filled with the Holy Spirit then."
I'm not that a big fan of the sinner's prayer; however, to the extent that it is calling upon the name of the Lord, it is evidence of faith. The implication here is that faith routinely occurs without being joined to the body of Christ, being cleansed of one's sins, or being filled with the Holy Spirit. I don't buy it. All of these must occur in the presence of faith because faith is always preceded by regeneration. What does regeneration have to do with it? To see, consider two things:
1) WCF XXVII.1 calls sacraments "holy signs and seals." I don't believe that this is a just a hendiadys; rather, it anticipates section 2, "There is in every sacrament a spiritual relation, or sacramental union, between the sign and the thing signified: whence it comes to pass, that the names and effects of the one are attributed to the other." A sacrament, then, is composed of two parts- the sign and the thing signified.
2) The fourth point of Calvinism; namely, Irresistible Grace. [I will make the connection.] Many people ae familiar with Ephesians 2:8, "For by grace you have been saved through faith." But what about its context? Backing up to 1:19, 20 and 2:5,6, it becomes apparent that this grace is equated with our being raised up with Christ. In the first passage, Paul wants the Ephesians to know "what is the immeasurable greatness of his power toward us who believe, according to the working of his great might that he worked in Christ when he raised him from the dead and seated him at his right hand in the heavenly places..." There is a power that raises Christ from the dead. This translation (ESV), as do many others that I checked, obscures the meaning by inserting a comma after "believe." However, the idea, which will be born out in the second passage, is that the same power that raised Christ from the dead causes us to believe.
In the next passage, we are being raised with Christ. Note, though, how Paul breaks the flow of the passage to insert a familiar phrase, "[God,] even when we were dead in our trespasses, made us alive together with Christ-by grace you have been saved-and raised us up with him and seated us with him in the heavenly places in Christ Jesus..." What is being raised up together with Christ if not regeneration? In context, then, the grace by which we are saved goes far beyond a mere description of God's goodness or kindness toward us. This grace is the power of resurrection. It is that which brings us alive with Christ and places us in heaven.
Bearing this in mind, consider the passages in which baptism unites us to Christ in his death and resurrection (Romans 6:3,4; Colossians 2:12) and note the relationship: Whereas baptism is the sign, regeneration is the thing signified. To forget this distinction is to confuse the means of grace with the grace itself. The one is more basic than the other. In a sense, all who are regenerated have been baptized into Christ. Which is not to suggest that water baptism is just a sign, such that it may be neglected with impunity by those who evidence faith. It is still that true means of grace whereby saving faith is made possible. Don't get hung up on the timing. It is no less difficult to believe that God can grant salvation before baptism than it is to believe that he granted salvation to the OT saints before the work of Christ. God is not trapped in a bottle waiting for us to say, "When." Even more so, just as God can show his grace when he pleases, he may also show it if he pleases. WCF XXVIII.5, "Although it be a great sin to contemn or neglect this ordinance, yet grace and salvation are not so inseparably annexed unto it, as that no person can be regenerated or saved without it; or, that all that are baptized are undoubtedly regenerated."
Not only is baptism not necessarily tied to the moment of forgiveness, it is not necessarily tied to forgiveness at all. Otherwise, all who receive the sign of baptism would be saved and those who are saved could lose their salvation. Peter offers this perspective in I Peter 3:21, where he says, "Baptism, which corresponds to this, now saves you." He is not making the blanket statement that baptism, considered in itself, is a salvific act. The emphasis is not so much on save as it is on you (Peter is speaking to the elect [1:1]). The end of the verse indicates that baptism saves through the resurrection of Christ, which fits in with what we've already seen. The interesting part is the previous verse, which presents what saving baptism through the resurrection of Christ is being compared to; namely, the flood and Noah's ark, which "was being prepared, in which a few, that is, eight persons, were brought safely through the water." Salvation is not proper to baptism itself, for baptism is the water ordeal. It is the flood that destroyed the ancient world. It is also that which threatens those in the ark, but through which both they and the ark are safely carried. Only those who are in the ark came out of the flood alive.
Baptism is that which leads to the final sancitification of the Bride. It is union with Christ. It is unthinkable that, after such a consummation, this Groom could grant, much less desire, a bill of divorcement. We must conclude then, that not all baptism is baptism into Christ. Neither, however, is it just an empty sign. Baptism brings one into a covenantal relationship with God, which relationship is not necessarily synonymous to union with Christ. Just as with the elect, the curses of the covenant are truly threatened and the blessings given, so with the others in the covenant, the blessings are truly offered and the curses executed. Consider what the sign of the covenant is. It is being cut off; it is passing through the waters of judgment; it is the cross. The covenant demands that all go through this ordeal. Only those who are in Christ come out their baptism alive.
Here is yet another response from the same thread as my previous post. This time, it addresses a comment made by The Dane, who wrote:
Does the normative tithe predate the Law? I'm not sure how. Yes, Abraham tithes once in his life, but it's a bit more complicated than just a tenth of income since he gives not out of what is his, but out of the loot from the conquered kings - and he gives the whole other 90% to those from who it was stolen in the first place. That's a good, well, hundred percent, minus what his men had already eaten and what went as share to his allies. And we've got to note, that this Abrahamic tithe was nowhere in Scripture commanded.
You mention that "several things in the OT are no longer required; however, this is not due to a lifting of requirement as such, but to the nature of the thing abrogated." Of course, everything intrinsic to the Law alone is abrogated - as Christ, while not destroying the Law, certainly fulfilled it. Therefore, the Mosaic Law is only pedagogical at this point in redemptive history. To better understand my view of the Mosaic Covenant, please refer to here.
Although this post should be able to stand on its own, you may want to read the comments leading up to it.
I was only alluding to Abraham as a counterexample to the idea that the tithe is no longer required simply because it was proper to the Law. It was not my intent to justify a theology of the tithe on a story about what Abraham just happened to do one day. Having said this, I do not think it is correct to say that, since the Abrahamic tithe was nowhere in Scripture commanded, it cannot, therefore, inform our theology. This is an argument from silence and, to me, just a bit thin. The fact that no such command is explicitly recorded is no evidence that no such command existed. If we consider the Abrahamic narrative in conjunction with the rest of scriptural teaching on the subject, then it is legitimate to assume either an explicit command or an implicit obligation. The rest of scriptural teaching is not that on the tithe per se, but on the support of ministers and the ministry. Anything from the Mosaic tithe being instituted for the support of the Levites, to Paul's teaching. He writes in I Corinthians 9:13,14, "Do you not know that those who are employed in the temple service get their food from the temple, and those who serve at the altar share in the sacrificial offerings? In the same way, the Lord commanded that those who proclaim the gospel should get their living by the gospel." I do not take Paul as saying that Christ commanded something similar to these temple regulations (although he may have); rather, the point is that the regulations for the support of those who minister in the temple constitute the command of Christ concerning those who are ministers of the gospel. If we go back to the institution of Mosaic law, not all of it is a new thing. We know, from the existence of Melchizedec, that there was a priest of God (if not priests) before Moses. The obligation to ministerial support is not limited to the explicit commands concerning the Levites, but is implicit in the existence of ministers of Christ.
There is a deeper point that can be obscured in a theology of tithing. The support of Christ's ministers is more than a practically good thing. This is not just another instantiatian of the principle that workers are worth their wages. Tithing is not just a necessity to keep the ministry intact- God could have used other means. The tithe is an act of worship. In tithing, we acknowledge and worship Christ, who has commissioned both his ministers and their work. Our obligation is to worship Christ when and wherever he is revealed. Such is the case in the existence of the ministry. [I have dealt more with this, at least as it relates to Abraham, here.]
When writing of the "nature of the thing abrogated," I meant more by "nature" than being intrinsic to the Law alone. I see little difference between this and the notion that, since Christ has fulfilled the law, we are free from requirements. Christ did fulfill the law, all of it; yet, I would argue (and am doing so in the comment thread here) that "fulfill" does not equal "make null and void." The Decalogue has been fulfilled in Christ; nonetheless, it still presents a required standard for covenant, even NC, living. Where a command is abrogated upon being fulfilled, it is not because fulfillment causes indiscriminate cessation. Instead, this cessation of ceremonial law is built into its revelatory function. The ceremonial laws, as does all of scripture, reveal Christ. This is true, not only of their existence in history, but, even more of their removal. When the ceremonial laws cease, when the temple veil is ripped in two, it isn't just "good riddance to a contract now we're free from its terms." These laws, as intended, existed not as taskmasters but as promises of grace. The moral law, standing alone, reveals our condemnation. The ceremonial law was a revelation of forgiveness. The sudden vacuum caused by its removal could be traumatic, especially to those who were looking to that law in itself. Instead, the abrogation of the ceremonial law stands as its final and fullest revelation of Christ. "Behold the Lamb of God, the eternal priest who now has taken away our sins once and for all." Before I could be convinced that the tithe is no longer required under the NC, I would have to be shown how its cessation reveals Christ (if at all) more than its continuation does.
In response to an observed inconsistency between Baptist views of tithing and baptism, I had written, "In defense of the Baptists, giving is plainly evident in the NT without recourse to the OT. Having seen it in the NT, it is then possible to go to the OT and learn more about it. Infant baptism is not plainly evident in the NT unless one approaches it through the OT. The problem is not in an arbitrary inconsistency, but in the idea that the NT can stand on its own when it comes to any given doctrine. The whole of scripture needs to be considered for every doctrine, not just those that are obvious." Whereupon I have been asked to explain the hermenuetic "if it's not mentioned in the NT then it doesn't cross over." I assume that this means it doesn't cross over from the OT.
When it comes to infant baptism, many Baptists might object to the notion that they are not allowing something to cross over. This kind of baptism is not explicitly mentioned in any testament. But in this case, it isn't the narrower point of baptizing infants, but that of applying the covenant sign to infants. The NT has no explicit command to apply the sign of the covenant to infants. So then, why this reluctance to look to the OT? Essentially, there is a default position that the old covenant and thus the OT is abrogated as any kind of a normative standard unless there is good reason to make an exception. This is just a restatement of the basic hermeneutic, though. Why hold to this position?
I suggest that it is the result of falling head long into a ditch. An ugly ditch, as Gotthold Lessing described his maxim: "Accidental truths of history can never become the proof of necessary truths of reason." A necessary truth of reason is a timeless and universal moral principle. It is something that all thinking people, in all times and places, know is right. There is no need to hear a story about it or to know that someone else did it; it's just reasonable that it's the right thing to do. This consensus crosses all cultural and religious barriers. Truths of reason are the way things should be. Truths of history, on the other hand, are the way things have actually been. Because they are accidental, they could just as well have been otherwise. Consequently, it is not possible to look at a truth of history and say that things should have been this way. You can't get an 'ought' from an 'is,' or, in this case, from a 'was.' Accidental truths cannot prove necessary truths, nor, for that matter, do necessary truths require any proof.
Now, apply this to the present example. A covenant, along with its sign, is not a necessary truth of reason. It is not the case that people across all cultures and religions think that it's just not right to lack such a thing. Some cultures have had covenant signs, many more have not. Israel just happened to have one. But this is an accidental truth of history at a specific time and place. The fact that it was this way provides no imperative for what ought to be done. When it comes to the parameters of the NT covenant sign, we must be informed by what the NT says to do and not by the historical features of another covenant.
Another side of this same hermeneutic is seen in the linked article on tithing. The historical connection between the old covenant and the new covenant is broken. What happened to be true under the OC is not binding on us now. But then the article quotes from both testaments in order to present its position on giving. These are prefaced with, "Note however, that while tithing is no longer required, giving is still a principle of God." What's going on here? The scriptural texts are not being used as the binding Word of God. Instead, being charitable, i.e., giving as "a principle of God," is recognized as a timeless moral principle. The force of the argument lies here and not in the particular texts gleaned to illustrated a preconceived idea. Yet, if this is the case, if the principle is timeless, why use scripture at all? Any illustration will do.
Now, it is not always the case, especially among those who believe in the inspiration of scripture, that the Bible entire is reduced to illustrations of moral principles. God does issue commands that are not timeless truths of reason. Lessing's ditch is far too ugly, and so it's been landscaped. The covenant life of ancient Israel can never be the proof of the commands of the NT. However, this brings us back to the point that something must either be mentioned in the NT, or be a necessary truth of reason. And so the OT is used, but not under its own authority. Instead, it provides the material for Sunday School stories/Aesop's fables. The same thing seeps over into NT historical narrative.
I also would argue that this approach is behind the almost universal fascination within the evangelical church with exemplaristic preaching. Read the biblical narrative and then subject it to practical application. That is, determine which necessary truth has been illustrated by the text and then explain how to put this imperative of reason into practice. Why bother with the first step then? Perhaps as a psychological preparation for the second. But if this is the case, why not expand the repertoire? It wouldn't even have to be historically accurate. Just make it up. The same Bible stories again and again do get awfully boring.
In the end, a hermeneutic that assumes the existence of Lessing's ditch leaves us with no way to defend the existence of a unique and uniquely relevant revelation from God. And it is no wonder. It isn't just that Lessing is mistaken about the relationship between these two truths. Rather, if the triune God of the covenant exists, then there are no accidental truths of history and there are no necessary truths of reason. He is the sovereign Lord of history who reveals his truth by means of that history to whomever he will. Not only is