Clifton provides several points to consider in the conclusion of his Till...We Have Faces:
But given all these, to me, logical entailments of his position, then his denial of equating personhood with nature, while genuine and sincere, cannot follow from his own understanding of nature and will. Indeed, if we map these entailments onto God we end in modalism, and if onto Christ, we end in monotheletism. But if Kevin gives up his monergistic schema, and adopts hypostatic personhood, he can preserve that which he seeks to maintain.
Concerning those "logical entailments," Clifton writes, "I am, perhaps, overstating the case somewhat, ascribing to Kevin an Aristotelian notion of personhood that he doubtless will reject. But I wonder if he doesn't see what I take to be the logical entailments by which I reach my conclusion." Let's just say that my imagination does have its limits. His connections are rather weak. Clifton has spent most of his post trying to show that I do equate personhood and nature. He reasons from this that my view of personhood must be prosoponic and then goes on to map such a position onto God and Christ. If I want to maintain my position, then my only consistent theological options are modalism and monothelitism, which, of course, are heresies. Finally, Clifton blames my difficulties on my monergistic schema. If I would just abandon this view then all problems would be solved.
From what I can tell, Clifton's understanding of my view of personhood is colored by an unspoken assumption; namely, that substantive personhood is only possible where there is libertarian free will. He writes:
I will grant that Kevin can make an argument for ultimate moral responsibility for a will that is free only insofar as it is constrained by its nature--though I, myself, find such arguments thin--but I fail to see how his understanding of personhood can be hypostatic as opposed to prosoponic. The person here seems to me to be only in such a way as to instantiate a particular human nature. It is the will of the nature that does all the work. The person, even if real in a certain way, is little better than a name by which is identified a particular instance of a nature.
Clifton is mixing up personhood as an instantiation of a particular nature with a prosopon. At first, the identification of these concepts is acceptable being, perhaps, only a matter of semantics. The substance of Clifton's response to me is an an argument that I regard personhood as an instantiation of a particular nature. Any prosoponic references are to be understood in this sense: as a name for the instantiation of a particular nature. But when, after arguing for what he believes my postion to be, he tries to show that it ends in modalism by mapping it onto God, Clifton has thrown in an unwarranted equivocation for the use of prosopon. If I believed that a nature and a person were the same thing or even if I subscribed to hypostatic personhood but believed that the relationship between the hypostasis and the ousia was such that there could only be a one to one correspondence, this would not be enough to convict me of modalism. At most, mapping these views onto God would result in unitarianism, that is, a denial of the Trinity. While modalsim also denies the Trinity, it offers the added bonus of trying to explain God's manifestation as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit in terms of various modes or masks. Hypostasis and prosopon are not set against each other in either/or fashion; rather, a single hypostasis manifests himself at various times in one of three prosopa. Whether or not there is too close an identity between hypostasis and ousia is irrelevent to the concept of a prosopon in modalism.
[Clifton also claims that mapping the identification of personhood and nature onto Christ results in monothelitism. This is a possible result, but certainly not necessary. Monothelitism will only be the case if this identification of personhood and nature results in monophysitism. But it could just as easily result in a form of Nestorianism. Both positions begin with too close an identification between hypostasis and ousia. However, while the one starts from the single hypostasis and concludes a single ousia, the other starts from two ousiai and assumes two hypostases. The prosopon is introduced, not on the monophysitist side, but on the Nestorian side. Just as in modalism, prosopon and hypostasis are not set in opposition to one another. Rather, the incarnation results in two hypostases and two ousiai (each hypostasis being associated with its own ousia) appearing together under a single prosopon.]
Clifton's attempt to map my views of personhood onto God and Christ is, at best, backward. Consider the charge of modalism. In light of my interpretation of Jesus' prayer in the garden, this cannot be the case. Whereas Clifton has presented the statement, "Not my will but yours be done," as an interplay between the two wills of Christ- human and divine, I have presented it as an example of the Second Person of the Trinity talking to the First Person of the Trinity. Whatever legitimate criticisms anyone may have for this interpretation, "modalistic" is not one of them. No modalist is going to claim that one person of the Trinity can have a meaningful conversation with another person of the Trinity. In fact, modalists interpret all of the prayers of Christ in precisely the same way that Clifton has interpreted the prayer in the garden: Jesus' human nature is praying to his divine nature. But this interpretation has its own set of problems, which can be seen if I turn the tables and map Clifton's understanding of human willing onto Christ. I will agree with Clifton that willing, of any kind, is a function of personhood rather than nature. Note carefully, however, that I do not predicate the same thing of the will. Willing and the will are not identical. The one is a conscious act perfomed by a person. The other is the the faculty of choosing. As far as I have been able to tell, Clifton's primary mistake is found in confusing the two. He has applied dithelitism, not to the faculty of choosing, but to conscious desire. Go back to his objection to monergism (or, more specifically, to the compatibilist views of the will underlying some forms of monergism) and to his interpretation of Jesus prayer in the garden. Monergism = practical monothelitism. Why? Because, if it is the case that human nature is such that the human will cannot cooperate with the divine will, then, even if Christ technically had two wills, his human will must have been suppressed so that only his divine will was functional. Clifton's solution? Posit libertarian free will. Which is fine except that he takes the concept far too literally. Rather than granting Christ libertarian freedom as to his person, he gives this libertarian freedom to his human will. Thus, when Jesus prays, "Not my will but yours," his human will, instead of being involuntarily suppressed as [supposedly] would be the case if compatibilism were true, submits itself to his divine will in a libertarian free act. This presents a problem. The issue is not whether the human will of Christ had libertarian freedom but that Clifton has even allowed for the possibility. It would be just as bad if he believed that the human will of Christ had compatibilist freedom. These are options predicated, not of the faculty of choosing, but of a person. If the human will of Christ is capable of free submission to Christ's divine will, then, it is not a faculty of choosing but is the conscious exercising of choice. On this reading, Christ's human will has done something that is only meaningful as a function of personhood. In order for Christ's wills to function in the manner that Clifton has predicated- either freely submitting or requesting submission, each will must have its own hypostasis. How this understanding of the interactions between the wills of Christ is not Nestorian is beyond my ability to explain.
Finally, there is the matter of monergism. Even though Clifton only mentions it in the last paragraph of his post, it is the main topic of the series. He wants to identify monergism as heresy; however, his focus is too narrow- specifically, the relation between monergism and the will. In any event, the will does not become a primary factor in the defense of monergism until we get to the intra-Protestant debate between Calvinism and Arminianism. Here, the question concerns the relationship between faith and regeneration. What is the order? For the Calvinist, regeneration precedes faith. In Reformed theology, faith alone is the instrument of our justification. The order, then, is regeneration, faith, justification. This should not be taken to imply that faith is something that we must do in order to be justified. No one who is not justified is saved; however, all who are regenerated are saved. It is not the case that, of the those who have been regenerated, some might fail to exercise faith and thus fail to be justified. This is not so much a temporal order of conditions as it is a logical order of results. Faith, which is sufficient for us to be declared righteous, is the necessary evidence of our regeneration. Regeneration results from our union with Christ in his death and resurrection. We are regenerated because he is risen. This union results in our actual righteousness, which, before the return of Christ exists in an already/not yet state and which, after his second advent, will be made complete. Justification is the legal declaration that this righteousness is the case. Faith is the instrument of the legal declaration and not of our actual possession of righteousness. The actual possession of righteousness is that, without which, faith cannot be exercised. Once regeneration has occurred, the question of our salvation is settled. Because we have nothing to do with that regeneration, salvation is monergistic.
Staying within Protestantism, I'd like to consider the Arminian side. First, though, I need to narrow it down a bit. The term "Arminian" has come to include a broader category than may be historically justified. As a result, it is often used to mean any non-Calvinistic Protestant. This can cover anything from a full-blooded Pelagian to a terminologically challenged Calvinist. Historical Arminianism is synergistic and teaches that it is possible to lose one's salvation. One simply stops doing that which he did to obtain salvation. If that thing is exercising faith, then the explanation for apostatization is that someone who no longer believes what he did believe at one time. The Calvinist, on the other hand, would explain apostatization as evidence that faith was never present in the first place. Having said this, I'm not concerned with Pelagianism or historical Arminianism. My focus in on that group of Protestants who, with the Calvinists, believe that salvation can never be lost, but, against the Calvinists, believe that faith precedes regeneration. [This group can be further divided into those who teach "easy-believism" or "Lordship salvation." Other than noting that the former has some serious sanctification problems, I will leave it at that since what they have in common is more important to this debate.]
It is in reference to this group, and this group only, that the issue of total inability of the will becomes primary in a discussion of monergism. [Even then, there is the question of whether we are even talking about monergism at all.] Within these confines, all sides are agreed that justification is by faith alone. Now the question is whether faith is seen in opposition to works or as the only work that justifies. Logically, the belief that faith is the one work that we bring to our salvation would seem to follow from the proposition that faith precedes regeneration. However, many, if not most, who hold to this proposition would also deny this conclusion. And here is where I think monergism.com is, perhaps, being a bit unfair. On the one side, "work" is defined as that which I do prior to regeneration. On the other, "work" is defined as that which takes some effort on my part. The parameters of monergism can, perhaps, be a bit too exclusive. It should not be a matter of Calvinsim alone = monergism. Even if all the points don't add up exactly, if someone confesses monergism, we should, as far as possible, take his word for it. For, if we are agreed that faith is the sole requirement for justification, we cannot add onto this the requirement that we understand everything that that faith entails. It is sufficient that we have it. When Paul writes that our salvation by grace through faith is "not a result of works, so that no one may boast," he is talking about legitimate boasting.
Where Calvinism is in dialogue with those whose most significant soteriological difference is the order of regeneration and faith, there we can start talking about total inability. Whether they see themselves as synergists or monergists our answer is the same. The unregenerate are dead in their sins and are, therefore, unable to comprehend what the object of their faith should be. They cannot will to have faith because they cannot see what it is that they are supposed to believe. As I said, though, this is an intra-Protestant debate. The end result is that not all monergists believe in total inability of the unregenerate will. Most are quite happy to affirm libertarian free-will. If Clifton is going to attempt a connection between monergism and monothelitism, he will have to limit his critique to Calvinistic monergism. Since I consider myself a Calvinistic monergist, I will not attempt to duck his criticisms of my beliefs based on the fact that other monergists have different views of the will. My point here is that Clifton's explanation for just how monergism is heresy cannot serve as a blanket critique of all monergists. Clifton is certainly free to modify this discussion into the claim that Calvinism is heresy due to an alleged connection to monthelitism. If, however, he wants to maintain the thesis that monergism is heresy, he will have to explain why it is heretical to believe that faith in the finished work of Christ, no matter how that faith is conceived, is the only requirement for justification.
While belief in the total inability of the unregenerate to exercise faith is sufficient to a conclusion of monergism, it is not necessary. That which separates monergists from undisputed synergists is not found in our respective views of the will, for many monergists and synergists are agreed about the will. Monergism is not predicate on a human inability to cooperate with divine grace. It is not a matter of what anyone might be willing to do in order to help out in their own salvation. For the sake of argument, let me agree with the most un-Calvinistic of monergists and deny both total depravity and total inability. I will only affirm that everyone is sinful enough to stand in need of salvation. What is it then that makes synergism impossible? It is this and only this: everything that can be done has been done. As I have stated before, monergism is not the denial of a synergy between the human and the divine in the work of salvation. This synergy is found in the incarnate Word. The triune God has done everything necessary for our salvation. Even if we wanted to contribute, even if Calvinists were completely wrong and the will were not an issue, monergism would still be true for the simple fact that, when it comes to our salvation, there is nothing left for us to do. All of these discussions about the will and its relation to soteriology, Christology, and Trintitarian theology are fine in their own right and worthy of debate. Yet, inasmuch as they do not address the deeper point of monergism, which is not about the will, they have nothing to do with Clifton's thesis that monergism is heresy.
I was glad when they said- when they said unto me,
"Let us go to the house of the Lord.
Let us enter within Salem's gates with his tribes
To give thanks to the name of the Lord."
Jerusalem, all they that love thee shall prosper,
Their joy shall forever increase-
So, because of the house of the Lord, I will seek
All thy good and will pray for thy peace.
I am called by thy name and am formed for thy glory
And precious, my Lord, in thy sight.
Thou hast loved me and kept me- the sun shall not smite me
By day, nor the moon by the night.
For death cannot celebrate God and the grave
Cannot praise thee. By this, I now know-
At the last day, when Christ shall return, I shall rise.
Thou hast promised this, Lord: it is so.
My Jesus, the living, the living shall praise thee
As I do this day, for thou hast,
In love to my soul from the pit of corruption,
Delivered it when thou didst cast
My sins all my sins far behind thee and buried
In waters no being can ford
And, therefore, we will sing these songs all the days
Of our life in the house of the Lord.