Clifton has combined a response to Darren's Jesus Christ and the Mark of Original Sin and my What to Do? over here. As he mentions, his response to me is not as detailed as before because Perry had already responded in the comments of my post. [Since then, Perry and I have added one more round over here.] Still, Clifton does bring up some points that are worth addressing. He says of my view, "Christ asumes a human nature that was created mortal, and thus heals it, but needs not assume original sin, since this is merely a forensic declaration." Actually, I'm saying that, because original sin is a forensic declaration and not inherited sin, Christ can be declared guilty along with the rest of us without any stain of personal sin. I do not subscribe to Clifton's rejection of the notion that Jesus was born under condemnation. He did die, and that not just as a natural consequence of taking on flesh, but in payment for our sin. I am aware of the biblical teaching of substitutionary atonement- the just for the unjust. Nevertheless, there is also the doctrine of union with Christ- that we are crucified and raised with him. Not only does Christ's bodily resurrection make our future bodily resurrections possible, but we have already been raised when he was raised from the dead.
Note well- union with our Federal Heads, whether Christ of Adam, is not forensic. It is actual. This is not a case of mere nominalism. It is not the case for those who are condemned in Adam that, first Adam sins, and then God declares us to be in Adam and, therefore, guilty. Nor is it the case for those who are justified in Christ that, first Christ is raised, and then God declares us to be in Christ and, therefore, justified. Instead, we are in real union with Christ while he dies and while he raises from the dead so that the declaration of his righteousness, based upon his fulfillment of the covenant, is also the declaration of our righteousness. In like manner, the union of humanity with Adam their Federal Head is the basis whereupon they can be declared guilty when he sins. Forensic declarations are not arbitrary. A just God cannot simply declare a verdict that does not match up with reality. If Adam had not actually sinned, there could be no declaration of original guilt. If Christ had not actually been righteous, then we who are in Christ could never have been justified (which is a declaration of righteousness).
The need for Christ to assume human nature existed before any consideration of Adam's sin. Man was created in order that God might dwell with him forever. To this end, the Son of God had to become incarnate and the Spirit of God had to glorify what had been assumed. It does not follow from the fact that man was created mortal that mortality was the original intent. The intent was that man become immortal by means of the work of the triune God. When Adam sinned, this intent was never abandoned. However, it did mean that the mission of the incarnate Son would now include doing what was necessary to reverse the forensic declaration. While it is quite true that only a forensic remedy is necessary if there was only a forensic change, we cannot ingnore the grounds of the forensic declaration. Adam was declared guilty because he sinned. The sinless life that Jesus lived, both in avoiding unrigteousness and in fulfilling all positive righteousness, was the basis on which he was declared righteous. However, a sinless life does nothing to pay the debt of guilt already incurred. Inasmuch as those with whom Christ has united himself have been declared guilty in Adam, he must also bear the penalty of this guilt. The wages of sin is death. The atonement is a matter of Christ paying the wages of sin. Christ must pay for sin and, thereby, be declared not guilty before he can be declared righteous on the basis of his sinless life.
The necessity of Christ's death is not tied to the mortality of human beings, although, the possibility of Christ's death is. Mortality is not the same thing as actual death; it is potential death. If Adam was created immortal, that is, incapable of death, then God could not have said to him, "In the day you eat thereof you will surely die." Immortal beings do not die. Mortal beings do not need to die. God has never demanded punishment for the state of mortality, only for the actual sin of Adam. Mortality makes the penalty of death possible; however, it is not to be confused with that penalty. Christ only dies on account of sin, not on account of man's original created state as mortal. The death of Christ is necessary to take away man's sin. The incarnation of Christ is necessary to heal man of his mortality- a mortality that, in itself, is not sinful. Had Adam not sinned, the Son of God would still have become incarnate, yet, with no need to suffer the penalty of death.
The incarnation is what frees us from our mortal nature and, as such, is the first step towards our becoming partakers in the divine nature. Although faith and forensic declarations of righteousness are necessary to our final union with God, neither one is sufficient to effect this union. This goes back to the incarnation, wherein Christ condescends to take on contingent nature. When his human nature is made immortal in his resurrection and on the basis of being declared righteous, we are declared righteous and the healing of our natures into immoratality is promised. This then is the basis of our heavenly fellowship with God and of the promise that we will "become partakers of the divine nature, having escaped from the corruption that is in the world because of sinful desire" (II Peter 1:4). [To answer the potential question, I distinguish between the world being created corruptible, which is not due to sinful desire, and the actual corruption, which does result from sinful desire.] Our relationship to God is not "always and only a forensic standing." The forensic standing can only be declared on the basis of that relationship. Union with Christ precedes justification.
Clifton writes that "under Darren's and Kevin's rubrics, we are our natures." No we are not. If this were the case, then my only Christological options would be Monophysitism or Nestorianism. I subscribe to neither. My only theistic options would be Modalism or Tri-theism. I subscribe to neither. All I have done is to insist that a person does not exceed his nature, that he is co-extensive with his nature. This is not the same thing as saying that persons and natures are the same thing. It means that there is no part of my person that is not human; there is no part of the persons of the Father or of the Holy Spirit that is not divine; there is no part of the person of the incarnate Son that is not both human and divine, without confusion and without separation.
Contrary to Cliftons's claims, it is not the case that "All justification accomplishes is that God works his will in us, in opposition to what we want, because we cannot even want justification and indeed are so naturally constituted as to always oppose God's will." This ignores the order of God's work. Justification itself may be forensic, but the declaration is based on what is real, on our union with Christ in his resurrection. It is not the case that a human nature "is always and only naturally opposed to the divine nature." If it were, and if Christ assumed a fully human nature- well, just imagine the internal conflicts. The absolute opposition comes from a human nature that is not energized by the Spirit of God. This is not the case for those who have been regenerated. Regeneration precedes faith, and faith is the instrument of justification. No one is justified in opposition to what he wants (which is not to say that no one is justified in opposition to what he once wanted).
Clifton objects to my contention that "infinite offense [predicated on the one offended, not the one who offends] demands infinite retribution." He writes, "The infinite offense against the divine nature cannot be satisfied by endless retribution of a human nature, for the natures are absolutely and qualitatively dissimilar." But this is not true. Human nature is not divine nature; nevertheless, they are not absolutely dissimilar. Man was created in the imago dei. We were designed with a point of contact between the human and the divine.
It has always been God's intent that his people partake of the divine nature. To this end, he creates man in his image, he assumes human nature, and he glorifes that assumed nature. Regenerate human nature is not always opposed to the divine; glorifed human nature is never opposed. The relation goes beyond forensic declarations. It precedes these declarations. The incarnate Christ is the one who is declared righteous in his resurrection. Consequently, assuming human nature precedes any forensic declaration. The divine wrath, which is predicated on divine justice and holiness, can never be satisifed against a mere human- if only because mere human beings cannot take the full measure of that wrath. Hell is the eternal exercise of divine restraint. It does not follow from this that the divine wrath against God's elect can never be satisfied in the God-man. There is no collapse in Reformed soteriology. Christ assumes original mortality and original guilt. In so doing, he bears the same condemnation as those with whom he has identified. He takes the penalty of this condemnation and is then justified on the basis of his personal righteousness. Forensic declaration is not the only remedy that bridges the gulf between God and man. Nor, though necessary, is it the primary remedy. That remedy is this: the Father elects those who will be put into union with Christ; the Son assumes our nature and is justified in that nature; on the basis of this forensic declaration, the Spirit glorifies that nature. The judgments of God are not merely forensic, but they are true and righteous.
This post continues the conversation with Andrew from here and responds to his comments of 3/24/05 and 3/25/05.
I think you have captured a key difference between Reformed and Catholic views of salvation: that between actual and potential grace. The fact that the Catholic system does have a "moment of monergistic action" does make it non-Pelagian, but, to the extent that the grace of salvation must be made actual through a synergistic process, it is still salvation by works. In both views, sanctification is necessary to salvation, yet not in the same way. For one, it is a necessary cause; for the other, it is a necessary effect. Without sanctification, salvation either will not be the case, or it never was the case.
You are probably correct in saying that "the difference between the Catholic view and the Reformed view stems from a difference of emphasis concerning the nature of God's salvific will." Nevertheless, the difference should be measured by the end result, not by the seemingly insignificant matter of emphasis at the beginning. In the one case, God takes a people to himself; in the other, he wants to give himself to human beings. It isn't an either/or case though, at least on the Reformed side. Not only does God take a people to himself, but he also desires to give himself to that people. Your contention that God's self-giving should be open-ended assumes a view of the will that does not necessarily follow. "If human beings may reject God, then someone who does not reject HIm is reponding to God in kind." Now, apply this logic to intratrintitarian relationships. Is the Son's reciprocation of the Father's love only genuine if he could have rejected it?
I accept the notion that those who do not reject God respond to him in kind and that "God's self-giving inspires a reciprocal self-giving." But this inspiration is efficacious. All those to whom God has given himself will respond in kind. None of this is predicated on the possibility of rejection but upon the free desire of the regenerate. If it is the case with human beings that those to whom God has shown initial grace are able to reject him, then the deciding factor in their salvation, no matter how much God may work with them, must be found in their own efforts to give themselves to God.
On the matter of "desire as a force exerted upon the desiring by the thing desired," as a reason for the Catholic tradition to find the Reformed view unacceptable, this goes against the Reformed doctrine of unconditional election. God chooses a particular people to be his own, but the conditions of that choice are not to be found in the ones chosen. As to what did make God choose certain people over others, we leave these to his own secret counsel. What God has not chosen to reveal, we may not investigate.
While it was a good thing for the Berean Jews to not try to kill Paul, this is not the reason given for saying that they were more noble than those in Thessalonica. It was that "they received the word with all eagerness, examining the Scriptures daily to see if these things were so." This is about more than human decency; it has to do with the proper handling of God's word. Furthermore, the Jews had no more of an option of rejecting Paul's message than we do. They were not members of a completely separate covenant that might serve as a fallback position. Any rejection of the NC would indicate that they had never really understood or accepted the substance of the old. They too would have been heretics for thinking that Scripture contradicted Paul. Paul's message was the intended conclusion of the Old Testament. That it is a responsible thing to check teaching against Scripture does not mean that any opinion is valid. Part of Scriptural study involves double-checking the NT against the OT. This is not to look for contradictions, for we know that the Holy Spirit cannot contradict himself. It is rather to understand how Scripture interprets itself. When it comes to those who are teachers in the church, we should still double-check their teaching against the whole of Scripture. Unlike Paul, however, they may be wrong, either by way of honest mistake or by outright deception.
When a teacher in the church substantially disagrees with our own interpretation of Scripture, we are not to accept his teaching passively. Nor do we just assume that we're right. There is a process whereby we may request an explanation. Hopefully, the matter can end here, since, in the normal course of things, one would expect the teacher to know more than the one who is taught. If not, the matter can be taken to a higher authority. In Presbyterian polity this can go from the session to presbytery and, finally, to general assembly. It may be that the teacher is found to be in error. If not, and if the individual cannot in all good conscience say that the disagreement is a minor thing, then he should find another church. Individualism is wrong, but Scripture does not teach corporate unity at the expense of individual responsibility. In the end, the individual will be just as condemned if he leaves the true church as he will be if he remains in a false one. Either way, he answers to God.
On the matter of Scriptural inference for the Assumption of Mary, I'd like more detail than the statement that it has been done. And thoroughly Scripture-peppered writings do not count. Quoting Scripture is not the same as exegeting it. I do have a definite idea on how to infer something from Scripture, but this is hardly a problem, unless you're of the opinion that anything goes (of course, you might agree as to the definiteness of the idea but disagree as to its content). I do reject allegorical and mystical interpretations as they are commonly understood because these do little more than to impose a meaning on to the text. They are examples of eisegesis. I accept the historical-grammatical method. As to grammar, this means nothing more than a noun is noun, a verb a verb, and so on. We should understand Scripture as ordinary speech. The historical part means that, as much as possible, we should try to see it through the eyes of the original audience. An example of this happened in my change of view about infant baptism. I was raised a Baptist with the belief that, since Scripture does not specifically say, "Baptize babies," then it shouldn't be done. But I was interpreting the silence of Scripture from my own unaffected perspective. What if I were a first century Jew? In Peter's sermon at Pentecost, he says, "Repent and be baptized every one of you in the name of Jesus Christ for the forgiveness of your sins, and you will receive the gift of the Holy Spirit. For the promise is for you and for your children and for all who are far off, everyone whom the Lord our God calls to himself." Peter is speaking in terms of covenant signs to a Jewish audience, who would naturally apply the covenant sign to their children. In this case, we can infer the validity of infant baptism from the fact that a prohibition is not articulated.
Scripture should be interpreted literally. This can be taken in more than one way. It does not mean, as many fundamentalists suppose, that we must interpret it in a wooden fashion such that every thing means exactly what it says unless such an interpretation is impossible. Rather, it means that we interpret Scripture according to its various literary genres. I also assume the unity of Scripture. It is authored by the Holy Spirit and will not contradict itself. Scripture is always about Christ. Whenever I approach any passage of Scripture, my first question is, "How does this portray Christ?" To this end, the way in which the NT authors interpret the OT has been very helpful. I see their method as a pattern to be followed, not as an exception to the rule. Take Matthew's application of Hosea 11:1 to Christ. On a surface reading, the verse implies nothing of the kind. It is an historical reference to the Exodus. But Hosea's meaning goes deeper than the surface. Both he and Matthew are tapping into the revelation found in the history of Israel. This is a matter of typology. The history of Israel was intended to typify the life of Christ. The life of Christ recapitulates the history of Israel. Matthew is able to apply this bit of history to Christ, not because it made for a nice analogy and he could, therefore, take it out of context, but because he was keeping it in context. The history of Israel, which is the bulk of the OT, is a revelation of Christ. Paul assumes the same thing when, in Galatians 4, he speaks of Abraham's sons in terms of an allegory. Yes, it is the same word that, normally, I don't like. Yet, Paul is not imposing an interpretation onto what Moses wrote. He is interpreting the history of Israel as the history of Christ. In this case, he adds another layer by interpreting the life of Abraham as a foreshadowing of the history of Israel and, by extension, of Christ. If you're interested in how I have expanded on this premise, then you may want to go to the Theology category and read the posts on the life of Abraham.
You are right about my disagreement over what constitutes "the whole history of orthodox thought." The phrase begs the question, especially when I had asked, "What out of all that happens within the visible church constitutes a legitimate element of the Church's life?" That is, unless you mean to answer, "Everything." However, I do not subscribe to the theory that whatever the visible church has done must be right, for, as Luther pointed out, it has often contradicted itself. Looking to such things as the Councils, liturgy, and Thomas' Summa are good, but they must also be evaluated in the light of Scripture. As to the Summa Theologica, I would not put it in the same set as Scripture, which is the inspired and infallible Word of God. There are several points in the Summa with which I disagree, but, even if this weren't the case, it is still just the words of a man. That being said, I can see the value in using it as a secondary standard, much like my own church uses the Westminster Standards. Such standards, although the basis for a common interpretation of Scripture, are also subject to Scripture. The Confession has, on occassion, been amended when further study found it to be out of line with Scripture. Legitimate elements in the life of the church are determined by considering them in the light of Scripture. If they do not pass this test, they are not valid as elements in the church's life.
Prayer is not going to work as an example of something in the church's life for which Scripture is not a prerequisite. We learn about prayer through Scripture. Even if the immediate source of our information is, say, our parents, the ultimate source of this information is still Scripture. Does anything else come to mind?
You write that the historical reality at Cana "is properly speaking revelation, but that it is no more truly a revelation than the revelation that occurs when you read the account." I won't argue. It is not my intent to set the historical event in opposition to Scripture so that we can only choose one of them. I do disagree on what constitutes objective and subjective revelation. That Christ is the object of revelation is not the same thing as saying that he is objective revelation. For that matter, Christ is also the subject of revelation, insofar as he is the one who reveals. This does not mean that he is subjective revelation. Objective revelation is found both in the historical events and in their inscripturation. This is where God speaks. Subjective revelation is found in the individual's apprehension of objective revelation, whether this be as an eyewitness to the original event or by hearing Scripture.
The people who witnessed the miracle at Christ saw Christ in the event of the miracle, not only in the fact that he was the one standing there performing the miracle. In the same way, other miracles not performed by Christ also serve to reveal Christ, both in the original event and in their record in Scripture. Your argument that miracles are not properly called revelation does follow from the premise of Christ performing a miracle without witnesses. However, though it may be valid, we cannot conclude that it is true unless you can verify the premise. When has a miracle ever been performed without witnesses? I would argue just the opposite point: because miracles are a form of revelation, they always have witnesses.
Is Scripture true because it allows us to aprehend the eternal reality of Christ? Or does this truth also imply that when it describes an historical event that this event must have actually happened? Does it matter for the function of the Scriptural narrative of the miracle at Cana as revelation whether it really took place or not? Would Scripture reveal Christ just as well and just as truthfully if it turned out to be an ahistorical myth?
This post is a continuation of the monergism debate and is in response to Perry's comment (3/23/05) down here. The exercise of the faculty of the will always result in action, whether external or in thought; consequently, both faculites of the will in Christ must operate in conjunction. Moreover, it is the person, not the natures, that wills. For any one decision, only as many things as there are persons may be willed. One subject cannot will two different things. When Christ is praying in the garden, the Son is addressing the Father. According to their shared divinity, they have the same faculty of the will, but the things willed are according to the number of subjects.
I did not assert "that it is not possible for persons to be something more than a nature." The implication being that person and nature are synonymous. I said, "A person cannot exceed its nature; nothing can." The implication being that a person and his nature are both distinct and co-extensive. On this understanding of the relationship between person and nature, I rephrased Clifton's "Personhood must necessarily exceed nature," to, "It is in the nature of personhood to exceed nature." What a person must necessarily do says something about his nature and so the contradiction. Nature is both exceeded and not exceeded at the same time and in the same relationship. Modalism or Tri-Theism result from saying that a person is not distinct from his nature, not from saying that a person is not more than [does not extend beyond] his nature.
I did not claim of the Trinity "that the persons are nothing in themselves but only secondary to the essence." The claim that persons are nothing in themselves was not meant to convey the idea that there exist natureless persons who are nothing, but that persons without natures cannot exist. Moreover, persons cannot exist beyond their natures. This was a defense of equal-ultimacy, or co-extension, for any person. Persons are not secondary to their natures, but neither are natures secondary to the persons that support them. Perry also writes, "The idea that a person must have an essence isn't the same idea that a person is determined by their essence." This is true, but no one has said that this is the case. It is the will and actions of a person and not the person himself that are determined by his nature. Furthermore, this should not be understood beyond saying that a person always acts according to his nature. Better still, so this does not turn into a fatalistic determinism, a person cannot act against his nature. There can, however, be a range of options available within the nature, but the will will still be determined according to its strongest inclination at the moment of decision. We cannot explain why creation occurred; however, we can say that it did not go against God's nature.
Perry then writes a paragraph that demonstrates a complete lack of understanding of the Reformed position. It starts, "Monergists assume that an act that has merit before God must either be wholly mine or wholly God's but it cannot be both." The 'wholly mine' part is not true unless he's including Pelagianism among the monergists. As to 'wholly God's,' this doesn't capture it either. The point of monergism is not to establish a dichotomy between human and divine works. The difference is maintained between our works and the salvific historical works of Christ. In this respect, there is complete synergy between the human and the divine. It's just that we, personally, have no part in the work. There is no point in blaming a faulty Reformed Christology because the foundation of Reformed monergism is the synergy found in person of Christ according to his two natures. Monergism is not about the inherent impossibility of man pleasing God without God's antecedent help. It is first about the absolute impossibility of a mere man paying the penalty of sin. Secondly, it is about the superfluousness of man pleasing God in order to effect his own salvation when Christ has already done all the pleasing that is necessary.
Perry asks, "The question is does the divine will in Christ determine his human will?" The definition of the faith of the Sixth Ecumenical Council says, "And these two natural wills are not contrary the one to the other (God forbid!) as the impious heretics assert, but his human will follows and that not as resisting and reluctant, but rather as subject to his divine and omnipotent will. For it was right that the flesh should be moved but subject to the divine will, according to the most wise Athanasius." And, "For as his most holy and immaculate animated flesh was not destroyed because it was deified but continued in its own state and nature, so also his human will,although deified, was not suppressed, but was rather preserved according to the saying of Gregory Theologus: "His will [i.e., the Saviour's] is not contrary to God but altogether deified." Going back to the statements in the garden, this definition answers in the negative the contention that the same subject was willing two different things. The divine will does not determine the human will; however, the human will is subject to the divine will. The human will is determined by the human nature of the person, which, in this case, has been deified (without losing its own state and nature). Perry's observation that "if natures did determine agents then we would have to render the fall of humans and the devil inexplicable or it would be possible for morally perfect beings to sin," is true in regard to most Reformed theology. I have offered a possible solution here. The next phrase in his sentence, "in which case it would then be possible for people in heaven to sin as well as God" begs the question of his own position. If the will is undetermined, then how is it possible that people in heaven as well as God can't sin. If we attribute the inability to sin to moral perfection, then all we have said is that the will is determined by the nature. Either true freedom is not forfeited when the will is determined, or heaven is defined either by a lack of freedom or the presence of a sinful population, including God.
I will agree with Perry that Christ "has to assume every property essential to being human;" however, it does not follow from this that he takes on all of human nature rather than a human nature. The assuming of human nature does not constitute union with that nature; rather, it makes union with Christ possible. This union is personal according to our shared natures. The union is prior to our healing, which is begun in the resurrection and fulfilled in our glorification. The wicked have no part in this healing, evne though their bodies to come to life again. The plan to take on mortal human nature and heal it, thus uniting it with the divine, has pre-soteric intent. The main point in creating man was so that God could be united to his people. He could have carried out this purpose without the fall. There is no healing without divine union; consequently, those who remain wicked and spend eternity in hell cannot have been healed. The Reformed view of original sin is consistent with Chalcedonian theology. Christ does not become fully human by taking on all human nature, no more than I am in possession of all of human nature. It is sufficient that his human nature is the same as the human natures of all persons that are to be in union with him.
Perry asks what grace is. "Is grace created or uncreated?" He then answers for both Catholics and Protestants by saying that it is created. For the former it is a "created effect in the soul," and, for the latter it is, "a contingent relationship established between God and the individual." From this he concludes that union with God is made impossible. I'll let the Catholics defend themselves, but grace is not a relationship between God and the indivdual. That relationship is union with God. Grace, broadly speaking, is God being good to his creatures. It is a divine disposition and, therefore, not created. More accurately, grace is God's good disposition to sinners.
In response to my presentation of the atonement, Perry writes, "To see in the atonement a payment of debt to God is to foist an unargued for theory of the atonement onto the discussion, namely, the penal theory, which is quite distinct from the earlier scholastic satisfaction theory and the even earlier Christus Victor model." The penal theory is not all that distinct from the earlier satisfaction theory, which is extensively argued in Cur Deus Homo by Anselm. [I do have some reservations with his argument, which I have expressed here.] In both cases, satisfaction is made to God in the death of Christ. In the former, it is restore God's honor due to man's sin. The latter shifts the emphasis to a debt paid for breaking the moral Law. While it is true that Anselm developed the satisfaction theory in a European feudal context, it does not follow from this that it is therefore wrong and based only on the contemporary context. Perry's allusion to Hosea 6:6, "God desires mercy, not sacrifice," is hardly appropriate. The verse is not about the atonement. Bedsides that, why not take it even further out of context and say that God never wanted any kind of sacrifice. The Levitical sacrificial system, which was not about inspiring love, or paying the devil, or triumphing over the forces of evil, but about satisfying divine justice (you sin, you pay) never happened: God didn't want it. Furthermore, it was never God's intention to allow the sacrifice of his Son. Neither the moral theory nor the Christus Victor model can adequately explain why the atonement had to involve Christ's death. As to the ransom theory, God doesn't owe the devil a thing.
Perry segues into one of the more bizarre accounts of justification that I have ever read. It starts on the premise that "Death is the wages or consequence of sin and death here means annihilation." Okay, let's read the verse that states this, Romans 6:23, "For the wages of sin is annihilation, but the free gift of God is eternal life in Christ Jesus our Lord." But then, "Christ rescues everyone, even those who deny him (2 pet 2:1) from annihilation, which is why everyone is resurrected and receives a measure of eternal life." So now, "eternal life in Christ Jesus our Lord" applies even to those who deny him. Furthermore, everyone is justified: "In Romans 5;18, how are we to understand that justification to life came to all men if not in the preceding way?" So far, this might be mistaken for your ordinary universalism. Not so, for Perry writes later on, "The scope of the redemptive work of Christ is universal with respect to nature, but not necessarily with respect to person." So then, in healing the natures of everyone, Christ rescues them all from annihilation. This is the free gift of God. Everyone is either declared righteous or made righteous, depending upon your view of justification. But eternal life and justifcation have no bearing on whether or not a person actually makes it to heaven and, supposedly, into union with God. The thing is, a nature, considered in itself, is not a thing that can be healed. Just as persons cannot exist apart from natures, there can be no human nature without human persons. If the nature of a person is healed, then it must inevitably follow that the person himself is healed. This is not a matter of failing to distinguish, but of refusing to separate nature from person. For this is what must be the case for those persons who are not redeemed even though human nature is. A person whose human nature is finally redeemed cannot be wicked and cannot deny Christ.
How should we understand the "all" of Romans 5:18? As all who are in union with the one who performs the righteous act, that is, Christ. Perry offers up other verses in which all just has to mean "every single person without exception." John 1:9, "The true light, which enlightens everyone, was coming into the world." A more accurate translation than this one (ESV) reads "all men" (panta anthropon) in place of "everyone." This is all without distinction. The gospel is for the all nations, not just Israel. The following verses contrast "all men" with the world and with his own [people]. These did not know him, nor did they receive him. In other words, they are not a part of "all men." I Timothy 4:10, "For to this end we toil and strive, because we have our hope set on the living God, who is the Savior of all people, especially of those who believe." Yes, I suppose that this one could be construed according to Perry's theology- God saves everbody from annihilation, but he really saves those who trust him. Or it could be all without distinction again. Or, more likely in light of the contrast, God is the savior of all people in the sense that the offer is genuine. II Peter 2:1, "But false prophets also arose among the people, just as there will be false teachers among you, who will secretly bring in destructive heresies, even denying the Master who bought them, bringing upon themselves swift destruction." Here, Peter is speaking, not of the actual status of the false teachers, but of their equally false profession.
Perry on hermeneutics: "Retreating to what 'the rest' of Scripture says first begs the question since the same theology will be at issue in the other verses." Quite possibly the first time I have ever been faulted for potential consistency. "Second, it is neglecting the task of exegesis. You can't just run to every other passage every time you find a difficult passage for your theology." Why not? Furthermore, it is not a matter of running to another passage and having verse feuds. It's a matter of alreay knowing what the rest of Scripture says and of being responsible enough to keep everything in context. "A verse must be exegeted on its own merits and not on what "Scripture" says everywhere else." Again, why? Why is it that, with any other interpretive difficulty, be it in literature, music, art, whatever, we are allowed to make comparisons with the author's other work, but, in Bible study, we must stick to the merits of the verse? Individual passages of Scripture do not have their own merits but are designed to be read in context. Exegeting a verse on its "own merits" is prooftexting at its worst. "What is really happening here is that a problematic piece of data is being interpreted according to prior theoretical commitments when we are being told that it is being interpreted on the merits of exegesis." Of course. And the whole idea that death is annihilation and that persons with a justified and redeemed nature still end up unredeemed themselves has nothing whatsoever to do with prior theoretical commitments.
To Perry, "it is not clear at all that Romans 5 is talking in legal terms instead of say consequential terms." First, these are not opposed to one another. Forensic declarations along with their punishment or rewards are consequences of prior acts. What kind of consequences are these? Are they in God's control or out of it? How can a tresspass, which is breaking the law, not have legal consequences? But then, I wouldn't see legal terms either if justification included healing the natures of those who deny Christ. Perry then makes another false claim about Reformed theology, "This is because the Reformed are anthropocentric rather than Christocentric. Their entire theology is constructed on the need to get guilty humans off the hook rather than seeing Christ as the fulcrum and center of every biblical teaching." Just within the confines of this discussion alone, Christ is the only one who merits salvation, Christ is the one with whom we are drawn into union, Christ is the one who assumes human nature in order that we might be healed; moreover, this healing and the intended incarnation of Christ precedes any notion of guilt.
Perry ends with this description of Reformed salvation, "The entire scheme of reaching up and laying hold of the merits of Christ is an essentially Pelagian or at least semi-Pelagian mechanic of salvation, even if it is supplanted by an Augustinian view of divine preemption. This is why any kind of sinfulness indicates for the Reformed that there is no justice present- it is an all or nothing deal because nature is identified with grace." So, how many Reformed people are buying this? First, the idea of "reaching up and laying hold" of anything is contrary to monergistic thinking- man is totally depraved and unable. Second, I've already dealt with the notion that nature is identified with grace. It isn't. Finally, it is not all or nothing; it is not a matter of sinfulness or justice. The Reformed affirm one of Luther's phrases, simul justus et peccator, "at the same time righteous and a sinner." The presence of sin does not cancel our standing in Christ once we have been declared righteous. Of course, in our sanctification, we strive to overcome sin, but the main focus is on Christ and what he has done for us. When our meditation is on him, we become more and more like him even as we are made more aware of our sinful state. Even so, we await the day when we will be completely righteous with no stain of sin. All of which will happen because grace is not nature but an intrusion of God into our natures whereby we are apprehended and our natures are brought into communion with his.
Clifton responds to my charge that his view of Gods' personhood is irrational by claiming that my God "happily conforms and confines himself to logical categories." If he means, as he tesitifies of his own view in the following paragraph, that God is "the font of all truth, and as such does not actually commit logical fallacies or contradictions, nor can such be truthfuly predicated of him," then yes, God is very happy to thus conform and confine himself. But, as Clifton is critiquing my view, I doubt that he means to imply that it is the same as what he has just affirmed. Rather, he wants the reader to infer that, in my view, God can be fully comprehend; which is altogether unlike anything I have ever implied. I do not contend that God can be fully grasped by reason alone. There are aspects of God, most of them I would venture to say, that we will never know simply by virtue of our finitude. My contention is not that God can be fully understood, but that what can be understood of him, due to its having been revealed to us, can only be predicated of God in rational and logical categories. Clifton's assertions of a God whose Person exists beyond his nature are an attempt at non-rational predication.
Clifton has stated that part of the difficulty is that we come from two different traditions. Understated at best. However, I would locate the divergence of traditin at a later time than he has chosen. I am currently unaware of any fundamental disagreement between Augustine and the Cappadocians. Clifton goes on to describe his views of the Trinity as taken from Oration XXIX by Gregory of Nazianzus. I have no real disagreent with this Oration and am left wondering what it has to do with this discussion.. That is, until I remember that Clifton is accusing me of subsuming personhood into essence. But this is not the case. I suspect Clifton believes that it is because, in his own view, Person is prior to essence. I argue that neither is the case but that both are equally ultimate- which is not to say that they are absolutely identical.
Let's examine some of Clifton's reflections on the Trinity. He writes that "the Godhead receives its essence, its divinity, from the Person of the Father." The Father begets the Son and sends forth the Spirit. [The filioque is irrelevant to the point since both sides agree that the Spirit proceeds from the Father.] But this implies more than what Clifton has asserted. Not just the essence of the Godhead, but the other two persons find their origin in the Father. Or should we imagine featureless person stuff that gets filled with divine essence and then drawn into the Godhead? No, persons and essence cannot be separated. When God begets the Son, he does so both as to his person and as to his divine nature. The one cannot exist without the other. And even if we see the Father, who is a Person, as the cause of the Godhead, he is not a Person who exists apart from his own nature. The Father does not exist prior to the divine essence, but begetting and procession are eternal. It is the nature of the Persons of the Trinity to be one God in which the relationships between the persons are expressed in terms of begetting and procession. Even though he is unbegotten and unproceeding, we cannot abstract the Person of the Father from the divine essence and claim that "Personhood exceeds the divine essence." The question is not one of "a God whose fundamental nature is one of essence." It is that the Persons of the Trinity all have the same divine nature, which, being coextensive with themselves, makes of them one God. This is not a matter of priority.
I, too, would be suspicious of anyone who can know anything of God's nature a priori. But it isn't like Scripture doesn't reveal anything about God's nature. God is revealed both as to his persons and as to his divine nature. It is not an either/or proposition. To say anything that goes beyond the nature of God is to say things about his Persons that go beyond what has been revealed about them. Clifton writes, "But if the Godhead is a Trinity of Persons, nothing we can predicate of God will be able to be limited to rational categories." This does not follow. We might say that the Godhead as a Trinity of Persons implies that there are many things that cannot be predicated of God, bu this is not the same thing as saying that that which can be predicated must go beyond rational categories.
Contrary to Clifton's claim, I do not resist the principle that God is beyond human comprehension. I only insist that what has been revealed must be predicated of God according to the dictates of truth. There can be no contradictions. At this point, Clifton takes me to task for claiming that his assertions "God is all-good" and "God is not all-good" are contradictory. He says that the only way these phrases "are contradictory is, in fact, we a) comprehensively understand what it means to speak of God's "all goodness" and that in so understanding b) we predicate the same meaning in both sentences." While b) follows, since a contradiction involves an affirmative and a negative statement about the same thing at the same time and in the same relationship, a) does not. The ability to recognize a contradiction need not involve any such understanding of what the terms mean. If it is the case that, "'Twas brillig, and the slithy toves/Did gyre and gimble in the wabe," then I can rest assured that, at the same time and in the same relationship, it is not the case that it wasn't brillig or that slithy toves were not gyring or gimbling in the wabe. Of course, it is also possible that b) is not the case, in which event there is no contradiction. But, once we have recognized that this is so, then it is a matter of further refining our language. It is not the case that "if we can never fully know what it means to predicate of God that he is "all-good," then we can never logically contradict ourself in claiming that God is not "all-good" since we can never know whether or not such terms as "all-good" have been used equivocally." We might be confused by someone else's use of the terms; however, when we say for ourselves that God is all-good, we should know what we mean as far as we do understand the concept. If there is a sense in which God is not all-good, then the person saying this should have some idea of what he means by it. No one needs to have full comprehension in order to know whether or not he himself is using a term univocally or equivically. In the same way, whenever we do run across seeming contradictions in Scripture, then we must assume that the same meaning cannot be predicated in both cases.
Clifton proceeds to make my case for me, saying that though God is beyond our comprehension, we "must speak meaningfully and truthfully of God. The Scriptures, the Ecumenical Councils, the Divine Liturgy, the writings of the Fathers are all testimony to the need for careful articulation of what we can know, in our limited way, of God." I have never implied anything to the contrary, only that Clifton, when he speaks of Personhood exceeding nature, does not follow his own advice. Furthermore, my own articulatation of the Persons and nature of God is not based, as Clifton claims, upon any need to preserve God's sovereignty. It is, rather, within the context of the larger discussion, based upon the need to preserve the reality of his Persons. Recall that my contention that God wills according to his nature is in keeping with the contention that all persons will according to their natures. Whether or not this is true is not immediately at issue; however, if I predicate this of all persons but deny it of God, then I have denied his personhood. It is not a matter of subsuming the Godhead into nature but of preserving any meaningful understanding of his Persons.
In this contribution to the discussion with Clifton on soteriology, which, originally, had been just between him and Darren, I suggested that the fall did not bring about a change in human nature but that original sin is nothing more than the declaration of Adam's guilt on all who are in him. In the following post, I said that I was willing to take this off the table. Not that I don't believe it, but that such a position, because it is not how Reformed theology has actually formulated the doctrine of original sin, might prove too much of a distraction in the debate between monergism and synergism. So I was a little surprised to see that there were aspects of this view that Darren wanted to consider. The purpose of this post, then, will be to a give a more complete account of my view of the fall along with some clarifications and answers to objections that Darren has expressed in this post and a subsequent one in which he was answering Clifton.
The doctrine of original sin received its first extensive treatment in post-apostolic church history in the debates between Pelagius and Augustine. I have written something on it here and here. The chief focus of Augustine's account of original sin is on the change in human nature that occurs as a result of Adam's fall. The debates that produced the Reformation served to give greater emphasis to the declaration of guilt in Adam as opposed to the declaration of righteousness in Christ. The WCF speaks of both imputed guilt and the inherited corruption that came about as a result of Adam's fall. It argues for an actual change in human nature when Adam falls in addition to a declaration of guilt on all who are in Adam. Other traditions within Reformed theology do not articulate the forensic aspect as much as the WCF; although, it is present by implication from the doctrine of justification in the Second Adam.
Here then is where I differ from standard Reformed theology. I believe that forensic categories are sufficient to account for original sin such that Christ's righteousness can be the basis by which we are delcared righteous. Original sin is nothing more than a verdict of guilty upon all those who were in Adam when, as their Federal Head, he failed to keep the commandment of God. All of which forces the question of how one accounts for a corrupt human nature, for our propensity to evil- for total depravity. An attractive feature of saying that this comes about as a result of the fall is that it exhonorates God of having created us in such a sorry state. Everything that he created was pronounced good. But then, I am not arguing that Adam had the same disposition toward evil as the unregenerate do. The fall produced a change in disposition, but not a change in human nature. To see this, consider what factor changes the disposition of the regenerate as compared to the nonregenerate. It is the indwelling of the Holy Spirit. People who have been saved are not completely disinclined to do evil. In fact, while they remain on Earth, there is a constant battle between the flesh and the Spirit. Basically, Adam was no more or less inclined to do make the wrong decision in a given situation than are any of the regenerate. He, as do we, had a human nature tempered by the indwelling of the Holy Spirit. Just as now the entrance of the Holy Spirit into a human being entails new life, even so, in Adam's case, the Holy Spirit's departure entailed death. The subsequent absence of the Holy Spirit from Adam's progeny, and not a fundamental change in human nature, is what accounts for their depravity.
A common view of redemption, even among Reformed circles, is to see it as a restoration of what was lost in Eden. Adam fell from perfection and Christ restores what was lost. The immediate problem with this view is this- what prevents man from losing it again? If it is simple restoration, then all previous conditions must apply, including those that allow for the fall in the first place. So there must be more to it. An alternative is to think that if Adam had not fallen, then we wouldn't have it so good. We would still be in Eden, not Heaven. But even this falls short. Redemption results in so much more than just redemption. It is not simply forgiveness and putting us back where we were only unalterably. Christ unites himself with human nature and thereby makes it possible for us to be brought into union with the divine. Surely such glories should not be considered as mere by products of a divine repair job. On the contrary, man was created with the intent that Christ would become incarnate and thereby fundamentally change man's nature for the better. This new nature would be perfect and incorruptible. In the meantime, man was created with a courruptible nature and had to merit the verdict whereby God, along with the incarnation, would effect this change. But Adam failed and the verdict was guilty. The Son of God, who as the prototype of humanity was all along to have become incarnate, also took on the role of the Second Adam. Now it was not merely a matter of raising a sinless but corruptible humanity into incorruption by assuming all that man was, Christ also had to pay the penalty for Adam's sin and he had to merit that which Adam had failed to merit.
The verdict of justification was still attatched to this fulfillment of merit. Furthermore, the promise of glorification, whereby man's nature would be fundamentally changed, was still attatached to the verdict. When Christ merited our redemption, he was justified. This verdict of righteousness is attatched to his resurrection. Once God has attatched glorification to justification, resurrection is inevitable. Christ is the firstfruits from the dead. Our resurrection into our new natures may not take place until Christ's return, but this resurrection has been insured by our justification and is assured to us by the earnest of the Holy Spirit in our regeneration.
To recap, the ony fundamental change in human nature is between that nature as it was created and human nature as it was intended to become by means of the incarnation of Christ. The difference in disposition between the regenerate and the unregenerate can be accounted for the agent of their regeneration, which is the Holy Spirit. Adam had the same disposition as those who are currenly regenerate but not yet glorified. For Adam, the possession of the Holy Spirit was a gift whose continued presence was conditioned upon meriting his eternal reward. For us, the Holy Spirit is given as a result of Christ's merit: he cannot be taken away again. Human nature as created has always been corruptible. The change in human nature through the incarnation of Christ is built into the original design of creation, with or without sin. It is, therefore, of no consequence to the fullness of our redemption to say that original sin is strictly a forensic declaration of guilt. The intended change was always to have been based upon a forensic declaration of righteousness and effected by Christ's assuming of human nature.
As I have mentioned, this is not the standard Reformed view, although I do believe it to be consistent with the basic outline of Reformed theology. I present it, not as a dogmatic declaration that I, the individual, am right as opposed to the Reformed church, but as a point of discussion. I also mentioned that I was willing to take this view off the table in the debates about monergism. Overall, the Reformed position is not jeopardized by affirming both a change in human nature at the fall and a forensic declaration of guilt. For my part, I believe that asserting such a change is superfluous. The more important point, which a lot of Reformed people miss in wanting to assert the sinlessness of Christ, is that Christ, in order to redeem us, must have taken on the same human nature that we possess. Consequently, if human nature is fallen, then it is a fallen nature that Christ must have assumed. Just as human nature has a tendency to corruption in the model that I have offered, even so, fallen nature need mean nothing more than that human nature has aquired a tendency to corruption after Adam fell. There is no need to think that fallen equals sinful. As far as what kind of nature Christ assumed, there is no need to insist on my views of original sin in the monergism debate. The chief advantage of such a view in this debate would be in accounting for the fall in a way consistent with a Reformed view of the will. Generally, there is no explanation for how Adam could have fallen if he had a perfectly good nature and the will cannot act against nature. If his nature is that of corruptible flesh indwelt by the Holy Spirit, then his odds of falling are the same as ours might have been.
Now to answer some of Darren's objections and observations. In response to my statement that Christ "is not himself sinful, but he shares with us in the guilt of Adam's sin," he writes, "I am not comfortable with talking about Christ as actually guilty of original sin, and that his punishment on the cross was therefore just. If the atonement is substitutionary, it must be in this sense precisely unjust -- not that God acted as an evil tyrant in torturing a guiltless party for the trangressions of others, but that Christ offered up himself for this very purpose. "
First, I must take the blame for some equivocation. Earlier, I had written, "for 'tendency to corruption' is not identical to 'guilty of sin.' In this usage, 'guilty' means actual and personal sin. On the other hand, when I speak of being guilty in Adam, I am referring to a verdict. Think of it this way: a man is accused of murder. If he actually did it, then he is 'guilty' by the first definition of the word. He is taken to trial and evidence is presented. The jury does their best to make the verdict match the facts of the case. However, once they have delivered their verdict, then, no matter what the accused actually did, he either stands guilty or not guilty. A verdict of guilty does not cause the man to have personally commited murder if, indeed, he didn't. In the case of original sin there is another factor- that of being in union with the Federal Head. The verdict, which is delivered by God and, therefore, infallible, is made on the basis of Federal Headship and not of personal action. Christ, by virtue of his human nature and union with Adam, can declared guilty of Adam's sin without any implication that the Second Person of the Godhead has personally and actually sinned, even if only according to his human nature.
The atonement is substitutionary viewed from the perspective of discreet personhood. The man Christ Jesus took the punishment for my sin. But it does not follow from this that the atonement was unjust, any more than it follows that the declaration of original sin is unjust because Adam was the one who actually sinned. Justice is contained in the idea of union with the Federal Head. If the only valid way to look at Christ's death is as a substitutionary atonement (and this is valid), then what do we make of Paul's assertion, "I have been crucified with Christ"? As to Christ offering himself up, a judge is still unjust and no less of a tyrant if he allows such a thing.
As a point of clarification, if original sin is forensic, then we do not inherit Adam's guilt (although we do inherit human nature). Guilt is declared upon those who are in Adam, just as righteousness is declared, and not inherited, upon those who are in Christ.
In Darren's next post, he writes, "This by no means implies that there is some post-Fall state of nature that [Christ] did not possess, and therefore could not redeem -- for there is nothing different about post-Fall human nature other than the stain of sin, both actual and inherited." So far, my point that there is nothing different. However, in the next paragraph, he writes, "I still contend that the Fall brought about an ontological change to human nature, so that rather than being inclined to sin man is now unable to not sin..." But he can't have it both ways. If there is an ontological change in human nature such that man is unable to not sin, and if Christ does not assume this nature as it has been changed, then we're back to the problem that "whatever is not assumed is not healed." The change from inclined to sin to unable to not sin is due, not to a change in nature, but to the absence of the Holy Spirit.
Next, Darren asks if my suggestion necessitiates "that Christ had what we (at least in Evangelical circles) would call a 'sinful nature'." No, it does not. It only necessitates that he actually took on human flesh. The concept of a "sin nature" is, in my view, an overreaction to a perceived gnostic interpretation of Scripture. Paul often speaks in terms of the flesh vs. the Spirit. And he actually says "flesh." But, of course this can't really mean "flesh" because that would be gnostic. And so we substitute the concept of a sin nature. The NIV even goes as far as to translate sarx as "sinful nature." But it doesn't mean "sinful nature, " it means "flesh." I see no textual reason to assume that Paul does not mean exactly what he says when he speaks of the flesh. The flesh as created is corruptible. The intent was always that Christ would assume it and thereby glorify it.
Pelagius believed in justification by faith alone. This was heresy. To see why this as the case, a discussion of baptism is in order. It was generally agreed that infants should be baptized; however, there was dispute as to what this implied about their spiritual condition. The most common position was that baptism was necessary to wash away original sin. Pelagius denied this. From a Reformed point of view he was right, but he was still a heretic. The heresy was due to why he was right. Pelegius did not believe that baptism washed away original sin because he did not believe the doctrine of original sin. He used a somehwat creative hermeneutic to explain why so many people sin if they aren't born sinners. Romans 5:19 states, "For as by the one man's disobedience the many were made sinners, so by the one man's obedience the many will be made righteous." Pelagius states, "Just as by the example of Adam's disobedience many sinned, so also many are justified by Christ's obedience" (Commentary on St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans). By this, he meant the example of Christ's obedience. He gos on to say, "Great, therefore, is th ecrime of disobedience that kills so many." In other words, because Christ obeyed, we should know better than to disobey. The further implication is that it is possible to not sin. Here is his explanation of Romans 5:12:
By example or by pattern. Just as through Adam sin came at a time when it did not yet exist, so in the same way through Christ righteousness was recovered at a time when it survived in almost no one. And jsut as through the former's sin death came in, so also through the latter's righteousness life was regained. As long as they sin the same way, they likewise die. For death did not pass on to Abraham and Isaac [and Jacob], [concerning whom the Lord says: 'Truly they are all living' [Luke 20:38]. But here he says all are dead because in a multitude of sinners no exception is made for a few righteous. So also elsewhere: 'There is not one who does good, not even one' (Ps. 13:1; cf. Rom. 3:12), [and 'every] one a liar' (Rom. 3:4). Or: Death passed on all who lived in a human, [and] not a heavenly, fashion."
So how does this make justification by faith alone a heresy? Well, for one thing, it was far from the Reformed doctrine of the same name. In that doctrine, a forensic righteousness is taught. God declares his elect to be righteous. Good works are not needed before this pronouncement can be made. "Faith alone" is then understood to mean faith apart from works. However, in Pelagius' view, man, by his own merit, is able to save himself without assistance from God. He simply needs to have faith in the obedience of Christ and then copy it. "Faith alone" is then understood to mean faith apart from grace. Pelagius denied that this was exactly what he meant.
Because of his talent for prevarication, a series of synods ensued before he was finally declared a heretic. The first, at Carthage in 411, was actually against Caelestius; however, he held to the main points of Pelagianism. These were as follows:
1. Even if Adam had not sinned, he would have died.
2. Adam's sin harmed only himself, not the human race.
3. Children just born are in the same state as Adam before the fall.
4. The whole human race neither dies through Adam's sin or death, nor rised through the resurrection of Christ.
5. The (Mosaic Law) is as good a guide to heaven as the Gospel.
6. Even before the advent of Christ there were men who were without sin.
He was excommunicated and appealed to Rome.
The next event happened when Augustine sent the Spanish priest Orosius to Palestine to warn Jerome about Pelagianism. A synod was convened in Bethlehem in 415 presided over by Bishop John of Jerusalem. it was decided that since John did not speak the language of either of the parties, the Latins could best handle it. A letter to this effect was sent to Pope Innocent; however, before anything could happen, another synod was convened that same year in Diospolis, Palestine. Pelagius' accusers were unable to show up due to illness. Parts of their letter of accusation was read in mistranslation to the bishops who only spoke Greek. Fortunately for Pelagius, he also could speak Greek. He managed to convince the bishops that his true beliefs weren't anything like they had been made to sound. The synod at Carthage was told. They confirmed the pronouncement of 411 against Pelagianism. In 416, the synod at Mileve, at which Augustine was present, joined them in sending an appeal to the pope. He confirmed the decision at Carthage and Pelagius was excommunicated. Then the pope died.
When the new pope came into office, Pelagius managed to convince him that he had been wronged. In 418, the bishops at Carthage, hearing this, sent as letter to the pope asking "that he should uphold the sentence pronounced by Pope Innocent against Pelagius and Caelestus, until both of them distinctly acknowledged that for every single good action we need the help of the grace of God through Jesus Christ; and this not only to perceive what is right, but also to practice it, so that without it we can neither possess, think, speak, or do anything really good and holy" (from Hefele, A History of the Councils of the Church). Evidently, the pope didn't want to deal with it. Instead, he sent them all the appropriate documents for common consultation. They used this opportunity for a General Synod at Carthage, which finally anathematized Pelagianism.
Pelagius, up to this point, had been able to lie his way out of being convicted. Perhaps Augustine, who had tteh best grasp of the true doctrine, deserves the most credit for stopping this. In reference to Pelagius' denial of the necessity of grace for justification, he says, "The bishops believed that Pelagius confessed this grace, which they knew was commonly accepted in the catholic Church." However, Augustin goes on to say that Pelagius, prior to this had "very explicitly admitted that he understood by the 'grace of God' that, when our nature was created, it received the posibility of not sinning, because it was created with a free will. -And thus while the bishops understood him to mean by 'grace,' not that by which we humans were created, but that by which we have been made new creatures by adoption (since it is this latter grace which divine Scripture very clearly commends), they, not realizing he was a heretic, acquitted him as a catholic."
This post continues a conversation with Andrew down here. It is in response to his comment of 3/21/05, which you may want to read in order to better follow this one.
I recognize that those who reject sola scriptura posit the existence of a larger fabric of life that can be contained in the propositions of Scripture. As stated, I would agree with this. The point of contention is whether anything within the Church's life that is able to be described in propositional form is legitimate if such propositions are not directly from or necessary inferences of Scripture. Sola scriptura is not about limiting life, denying Church authority, or about replacing Christ as the proper foundation of the Church's life. It is about making Scripture the sole and final rule of faith and practice. The function of Scripture within the Church is to express what may or may not be believed or practiced. The "may" by statement or inference and the "may not" by statement against, inference from statements against, or lack of statements or inferences for. You claim that the function of Scripture "is not to be the prerequisite of the other parts of the Church’s life." In order that I can know just what you mean by this, would you provide some examples of the Church's life for which Scripture is not a prerequisite?
The statement, "We cannot read Scripture accurately or faithfully unless we accept every element of the Church’s life along with it," begs the question, "What out of all that happens within the visible church constitutes a legitimate element of the Church's life?" Other than that, I agree. You illustrate the problem yourself by speaking of both Catholics and Orthodox rejecting sola scriptura. But they differ on the specifics of their faith and practice. Where these differences occur, which, if any, is an example of ecclesiastical life? As to their objection to holding "Scripture up as an independent standard by which to judge the life of the Church," if this is the case, then they are objecting to a phantom, at least as far as the Reformed understanding of the term ( I realize that many Protestant individuals hold to this kind of view- I have no intention of defending them).
I'm having trouble making sense of the this statement, "An orthodox Catholic may very well argue that Scripture is formally sufficient – i.e. that every true doctrine is contained within or implied by the Scriptures, but the Catholics and Orthodox reject the idea that Scripture is actually sufficient." All that is meant by Scripture being sufficient is that every true doctrine is contained within or implied by it. As to an orthodox Catholic believing this, consider the doctrine of the Assumption of Mary. Try inferring that one from Scripture. They do reject the idea that Scripture has all the answers. As to checking up on what the Church is teaching by going to the back of the book, that's one of reasons we have Scripture. As I noted in one of my earlier responses to Clifton on this topic, the Bereans are commended for double checking Paul against Scripture (Acts 17:11).
The purpose of revelation goes beyond communication. Revelation exists either for the salvation of those who accept it or for the greater condemnation of those who reject it. Revelation itself is effectual toward salvation. It is not about believing and apprehending a story. Revelation is the intersection of heaven into earth, culminating in the incarnation. Subjective apprehension is important, but it means nothing apart from the objective communication by means of certain events in history. Christ reveals nothing to the other persons of the Trinity. Revelation is a one way communication from heaven to earth.
"It is not the historical reality of Cana which is finally significant, but the eternal reality of Christ’s Being." This one's going to need some explaining. When you say "finally significant," are you saying this because you believe that the only sensible way to speak of revelation is "that which is being revealed (Christ) and the subjective apprehension of that which is being revealed"? This would mean that the historical reality of Cana is significant in its own right (it had to happen in order for the written revelation to be true and significant) but that, properly speaking, it is not revelation. In this case, we'd still have more to discuss since I am putting the focus of revelation on objective historical events. Nevertheless, your position would still be within the bounds of orthodoxy. Or, are you saying that the only finally significant thing is the subjective apprehension of the eternal reality of Christ's being? In this case, the written account is so sufficient in revealing Christ that the connection of the narrative to historical reality is irrelevant. Maybe it did happen, maybe it didn't. Either way, the eternal Christ has been revealed to me just as well. In this case, my objection will have to be a lot stronger. But I won't make any objection unless I have reason to believe you actually meant this.
I won't object to saying that my apprehension of Christ is in the reading and not in the event itself. That is, as long as "apprehension" implies no more than cognitive knowledge. I will object if you mean that such apprehension is sufficient to my union with Christ. The incarnation, wherein Christ takes on the same human nature that we have, is essential to our salvation. Furthermore, the incarnation is the revelation of Christ. The incarnate Christ, his person and work, are the final events of revelation. He is that to which the OT always pointed. He is the one who, coming into the world, brings salvation. The incarnate Christ is the whole reason for revelation and, ultimately, he is the revelation itself. Whenever I or anyone else apprehends Christ through reading Scripture, this must be understood of Christ incarnate. His identity as the eternal Word may anticipate his revelatory status through the incarnation, it may even make prophetic revelation of his salvific work possible. However, unless it is predicated on the incarnation , revelation is meaningless, if not impossible. The subjective apprehension of Christ cannot be of anything other that what was objectivley revealed in history and then recorded in Scripture.
The events of Christ's life do reveal more than was available at his nativity. It's not that the whole Christ wasn't born, but that the whole Christ can never be revealed. We do not possess such a capacity to comprehend him. The revelation of Christ does not come all at once. It is his person and work. The latter, by definition, must take place over a process of time. Revelation is necessary to salvation. No separation can be made between the salvific acts of Christ and the revelation of Christ. Consequently, if revelation is complete at the nativity, then so is redemption. Further redemptive events are superfluous. As far as our salvation goes, Herod could have had his way and that would be that. We could still be saved. Christ's post-nativity life and work is a great deal more than adding to our maturity and vision of Christ. It is about what Christ had to do for our redemption.
I offered the illustration of distinguishing between the functions of integrated canine body parts to show that different things having different functions does not destroy the overall unity. Sanctification and justification are both aspects of salvation, both are made possible by the work of Christ; however, in their own right, they do not perform the same function. They are necessary for the function of the larger whole. Your own counter-example of a partly grown partly embryonic dog is, indeed, a monstrosity; however, you have not shown how it is connected to the views that I have presented. The question of whether sanctification and justification are separate or distinct needs to be answered as a matter of perspective. If it is monergistic vs. synergistic works, then they are separate. If it is things that happen to the believer because of the death and resurrection of Christ, then they are distinct. If it is things that cannot fail to be true of saved people, then they are distinct. If it is things that contribute to my status as being saved, then they are separate. There are two ways in which sanctification can be used, positional and progressive. So far, this discussion has been about the latter. Justification is a legal verdict. It is a declaration based on my positional sanctification in Christ. Positional sanctification is a monergistic work whereby I am set apart into Christ. Consequently, when he is declared righteous, I am declared righteous in him. Progressive sanctification is the work of the Holy Spirit whereby I am caused to conform in this life to my position in Christ. This conformity involves my own works and is, therefore, synergistic. Progressive sanctification is the evidence of positional sanctification. Lack of progressive sanctification does not mean that my position has changed again , but that I was never in Christ.
It may be the case that "any given moment stands in the same relation to the eternal as any other moment." However, we are not considering these matters from the perspective of eternity, but from our own. While there is temporal simultaneity between the state of justification and the state of being sanctified, there must be a temporally sequential relationship between the verdict of justification and the process of sanctification. In the same way, living in jail may be simultaneous with the state of having been found guilty, but the verdict itself was a one time declaration. Both justification and sanctification result from the grace of God, but the question of whether this is manifest as a declaration or a process is not one of origin but of specific intent and function.
The topic is still monergism and Clifton's latest disagreement with it. He believes that it leads to monothelitism, which was condemned as heresy at Constantinople III, the sixth Ecumenical Council. I don't believe that he's made his case. Some background is in order here. For instance, what is monthelitism? Essentially, it is the belief that Christ had only one will. The orthodox doctrine is that Christ has two wills that will the same thing. It all looks rather academic on the surface, so you might wonder who cares. We need to back it up then to the issue behind this belief. Monothelitism came about as an attempted compromise between orthodox Christology and monophysitism, which was the doctrine that Christ had only one nature. Chalcedon had condemned this belief along with its opposite extreme Nestorianism. This was the belief that Christ had two natures, two hypostases, and one person. In this case, hypostases would be what we think of as persons and person would convey the idea of mere appearance. Both monophysitism and Nestorianism started within the bounds of orthodoxy. It was a matter of emphasis. Those on the one side believed that an emphasis on Christ's natures implied two persons, while those on the other believed that an emphasis on Christ's person implied one nature. Basically, this was a misunderstanding between Cyril and Nestorius, but some of their followers would actually develop the heresy that each man had feared. [For a more detailed account, I've written on the subject here.] Right now, though, the focus is on monophysitism.
There is an important principle in Patristic theology that whatever is not assumed is not healed. This idea has to do with the incarnation and it guided the formation of orthodox Christology. Consider some heresies. Docetism- Jesus only appeared to have a body. If he didn't really have a body, then our bodies cannot be healed. More to the point, our bodies cannot be saved. Adoptionism- the Christ Spirit descended onto Jesus' body at his baptism and left before his crucifixion. Again, inhabiting a body is not the same thing as assuming flesh. There were also views that Jesus became incarnate simply by taking on a human body. That is, his body was human, but, in place of the human soul was the Logos. In this case, the soul hasn't been assumed, but replaced altogether. The problem was always the same. If the Logos, retaining his full divinity, did not become human in every way, then we cannot be saved. Enter monophysitism. In this view, Jesus has neither a human nature nor a divine nature but a unique Christ nature. But if he has no human nature, then he cannot redeem human nature. Furthermore, it takes a divine nature to be able to redeem- and he didn't have this either. Christology is essential to soteriology.
In a lot of cases, monophysitism was not so much a commitment to a single nature in Christ as it was a reaction to perceived Nestorianism. Two natures would be fine but for a single hang-up: the will. It's just too easy to associate the will with the person. What I will, the choices I make, are too much a part of who I am. Consequently, to the monophysites, two wills implied two persons. Divide up all the other attributes between human and divine natures but two wills crosses the line. Or so they believed. Then a compromise was reached. The monophysites would agree that Christ had two natures if the orthodox would allow that Christ had only one will. Not all the orthodox agreed and monothelitism was subsequently condemned. Why? Because if a human will was not assumed, then our wills cannot be healed. In making this ruling Constantinople III affirmed something about the will. Contrary to the monophysites, who wanted to associate the will with person and, therefore conclude that there must be only will, the council associate the will with the nature and concluded that Christ must have had two wills. Both were logical conclusions based on the premises. Which leads me to a problem with Clifton's view. In his attempt to deny that the will is exercised according to our nature, he has affirmed that "Christ, the express image of God, exercised his will from his Person, and not from his nature..." But Clifton rejects monothelitism and asserts that Christ has two wills. Nestorians everywhere agree.
When I pointed out that his formula of two wills and two natures in one person was dangerously close to the Nestorian formula of two natures and two hypostases in one person, Clifton quoted the definition of faith as Chalcedon III. It does not support his formulation. The first part reiterates Chalcedon. Remember that monthelitism was an attempt to compromise with monophysitism. So the council talks about how Christ has two natures and in one Person. The definition goes on to say, "Defining all this we likewise declare that in him are two natural wills and two natural operations indivisibly, incontrovertibly, inseparably, inconfusedly, according to the teaching of the holy Fathers." They are not saying that he has two natures and he has two wills, too. Instead, the idea is that, based on the established teaching that Christ has two natures, it must be concluded that he has two wills, since the will is a faculty of the nature. Note that they are called natural wills. The definition goes on to answer Clifton's contention "that the exercise of Christ's wills, human and divine, was from his Person, not from either of his natures." It says, "...each nature wills and does the things proper to it and that indivisibly and inconfusedly."
A note on "two natural operations": these do not exist in disinction from the two wills. The council is clarifying how will is to taken. If the will is considerd from the perspective of what is actually done, then Christ only had one will. But this was not the question. It was, "When the incarnate Second Person of the Trinity wills, does he do so according to his divine nature or according to his human nature?" And the answer is, "Both." "Operation" is the same as what I have been calling "faculty."
Apart from what the monophysites assumed and what Clifton has asserted, is it even possible for a person to do anything in abstraction from his nature? Clifton descends into the absurd, arguing that "Personhood must necessarily exceed nature" and "God is not an essence, but is superessentially a person." Let me rephrase these, "It is in the nature of personhood to exceed nature." "God is, by nature, superessentially a person." Clifton is making assertions about personhood in general and the personhood of God. But it is not possible to make assertions about anything without saying something about its nature. A person cannot exceed its nature; nothing can. Clifton hopes to escape such logical contradictions by asserting even more of them. "God is all-good and God is not all-good, are, in fact, both true when predicated of God as Person." God's goodness "is beyond all human grasp, fallen or completely regenerated." Well, God's goodness and everything else about God may be -is- beyond human comprehension. But a contradiction is a contradiction no matter whose person you're trying to predicate it in. The argument about the antinomies of Sextus Empiricus fares no better. I responded to the same in the comment section here (3/17/05). In short, these antimonies lose their force if you define the terms according to what God has revealed about himself rather than according to some supposed universal standard.
Clifton's response to the antinomies is, "Rather, the ancient Church's insistence on approaching kataphatic theology from the starting point of the Persons of God preserves such theology from rational antinomies (at least antinomies that derive from the rational concepts themselves) and preserves the inherent paradox and mystery of the Trinity by asserting the Personal transcendence of what we might term God's nature.'' First, I'm not at all convinced that this was the approach of the ancient Church. Second, if we're left preserving inherent paradox or, even worse, avoiding rational antinomies by fleeing rationality altogether, then any chances of coherent discussion are pretty well shot. There's really nothing meaningful left to affirm.
No one is denying that it is Christ's person that acts and wills. Natures can do nothing. The language in the definition that "each nature wills' must be taken in context. It is a way of expressing that the person wills according to each nature. But even as natures do nothing in themselves, so persons are nothing in themselves. A person must have a nature. A person can never transcend his nature, for the ability to transcend anything can only be explained according to and as a function of nature. We would have to posit a metanature, which, in the end, would just be a nature. All persons, human, angelic, and divine, act and will according to their natures. Clifton is quite right that if we predicate willing according to nature of man that we must also predicate it of the persons in the Trinity. But the only argument he has offered against the divine persons willing in this way is in the assertion of an impossible "superessential personhood." Augustinian scholaticism knew very well what it was doing to argue about God from his nature. For, even if we always have God's persons in mind, we must either speak of them according to their nature or we must say nothing at all.
Let's go to Clifton's main contention that monergism implies monothelitism. Why would this be the case? First, some more definitions. Monergism comes from the Greek and means "one work." It is the belief that salvation is solely the work of God. Synergism is the belief that salvation is the result of God and man cooperating in their work. While monergists do believe in synergistic sanctification, this takes place only after salvation has been accomplished and settled. Sanctification is never seen as a way to earn or keep salvation. Monergists believe that salvation is all of grace and "not of works, lest any man should boast." Not all monergists have the same view of the will. Arminians, for example, believe that the will is free to choose or not choose to believe. Calvinists think that this is really a form of synergism, but Arminians, at least the ones I've met, don't see it that way. Calvinsitic monergism claims that the will is bound by its sinful nature. It can't will to cooperate with salvation so the salvation itself must involve a change of nature. God has to do this by himself. There is more to it than this, but this is sufficient for the present purpose. Clifton's argument is this: if it is the case that man's will is so bound that God must act in salvation by himself, then Christ's human will must have also been bound. And if Christ's human will was bound against God, but the divine will willed for God, then the human will was effectively non-existent. Therefore, Christ only had one functioning will, which is a form of monothelitism.
Leaving aside the question of how the will actually functions, let's go to the standard Reformed reply: Jesus' took on a human nature as it was created, not as it had fallen; therefore, his human will was not bound to a fallen nature. But there is a big problem with this answer and the Orthodox are well within their rights to call us on it. It is this, "Whatever is not assumed is not healed." If falleness is the disease of our nature, then it is fallen nature that must be assumed, it is fallen nature that must be crucified, and it is fallen nature that must be ultimately healed of its falleness in the resurrection. The Reformed generally reject this notion because they equate falleness with sinfulness. And Christ cannot be sinful. But this is not necessary. Clifton defines falleness in terms of death and a disposition to sin (which is not in itself sinful). Reformed theology would do well to adopt this view and to recognize imputed guilt as a distinct concept. I suggested that human nature never fell but is prone to death and corruption by virtue of its creation. Clifton quoted some verses about death coming into the world as a result of sin; however, these are not the clear refutation that he would have us to believe. The claim that man was not intrinsically immortal before the fall cannot be equated with the claim that God would have allowed him to die before the fall. The important thing, though, is where Clifton and I are in agreement: the nature that Christ assumed is the same as that which we now have. For purposes of this discussion, I accept his view of fallen nature.
More to the point, however, is Clifton's denial of imputed guilt, which is fully consistent with his advocation of synergism. In Reformed theology justification is a declarative act. God declares us to be righteous because Christ's righteous works have been imputed to us. In the same way, we had been declared guilty because Adam's sinful works were imputed to us. Salvation has two distinct yet inseperable components: 1) the healing of corruption and 2) forensic declaration of righteousness. In a synergistic system (and here I must note that, being more familiar with it, I am using the model of Catholicism over what Orthodoxy might be) the declaration is a matter of stating what is true at the time in regards to healing. A baptized infant is cleansed of original sin and infused with righteousness. The emphasis of justification is "to make righteous" rather than "to declare righteous." Once made righteous, the declaration can follow. But it isn't so much a judicial decree as it is a statement of fact. Rome criticizes the Protestant view of being a 'legal fiction.' When the justified person sins, he is no longer righteous and, therefore, no longer justified. Grace must be restored by further application of the sacraments. Purgatory is always available for those who die in a deficit mode.
In contrast, Reformed theology ties justification to the work of Christ alone. He bears the penalty of sin on the cross. In his resurrection the disease of sin is healed and he is declared righteous. There is no legal fiction here. Our own regeneration and justification is based on our union with Christ in his death and resurrection. At whatever time he pleases, the Holy Spirit regenerates us individually from being "dead in trespasses and sins" because he has already raised us up together with Christ. We are also declared righteous because Christ was justified in his resurrection. The forensic aspect of our salvation is a done deal. Objectively, God sees us in Christ and the work of Christ settles the matter. This is all monergistic. Christ has done the work. The healing aspect of our salvation considers us subjectively. It is a process between our regeneration and our final glorification in heaven. The initial regeneration is monergistic but subsequent sanctification is synergistic. The main difference between viewing salvation as a whole in monergistic or synergistic terms is that, in monergism the declaration does not depend upon our cooperation in progressive sanctification (although our cooperation is assured) but upon our positional sanctification in Christ.
Back to imputed Adamic guilt. The reason that we can be declared righteous on the basis of the works of another rather than on our individual works is because we have been declared unrighteous on the basis of the works of another. If Adam's sin did nothing more than to give us a disposition to unrighteousness, then Christ's atonement can do nothing more than give us a disposition to righteousness. The atonement was not merely about healing our natures (though that was a big part of it). It was the payment of a debt to God for our sins. How does a just God justify the ungodly? He doesn't if he wants to remain just himself. Forgiveness is not a matter of forgetting the former trespasses so long as arrangements can be made that they never be repeated. It is the acknowledgment of payment received. To put it another way, vengeance belongs to the Lord. When his holiness has been insulted, as is the case with sin, then his justice demands that this be made right. To answer a potential objection, I am not saying that we should withhold forgiveness until all debts are paid. Forgiveness is to be given freely as often as repentance requests it. But the reason that we can do this without offending justice is because, ultimately, all debts have already been paid in Christ. Vengeance is not ours.
But what about Scripture itself? Clifton states, "In none of these texts is guilt attributed to humans on the basis of Adam's sin." These texts would be the ones that he quoted to refute my views and to which I will limit myself. First, his premise begs the question that death merely means death. Death is a judgment for sin. Just as the resurrection of Christ entailed justification both for himself and for those in him, even so, the sentence death on Adam entailed condemnation both for himself and for all who were in him. Nor is this merely the kind of death wherein the body stops functioning for a while. It is eternal death, even as the resurrection is unto eternal life.
One might argue that my own premise, death as judgment, begs the question. Let's look at the context. Take the first passage Clifton considered, Romans 5:12-19. V. 15- "For if by the offence of the one man many died..." 'Offence' translates to paraptoma, which means, "what a person has done in transgressing the will and law of God by some false step or failure" (Luow-Nida 88.297). The word used implies that the result of death is a matter of judgment for breaking God's law. This is made explicit in v. 16, "For the judgment which came from the offense resulted in condemnation..." And even more so in v. 18, "Therefore, as through one man's offense judgment came to all men, resulting in condemnation, even so through one Man's righteous act the free gift came to all men, resulting in justification of life." Paul does not say that the offense made possible the conditions whereby judgment and condemnation might occur. Rather, the judgment came upon all men through one man's offense, not through the offense of the many in imitation thereof. This judgment resulted in condemnation. Neither judgment nor condemnation are intelligible apart from guilt. More to the point for the discussion of monergism, the free gift that results (not just makes possible) justification unto life came about through one Man's righteous act. Our eternal life, which is ours because we have been justified, is the result of the work of one Man, who is not us. This passage supports forensic declaration and cannot be used in support of synergistic salvation. One note on the "all" in v. 18. "The free gift came to 'all' men.." Keep this in context with the rest of Scripture. On the surface, this appears to be teaching universal justification. However, we know from other texts that this is not the case. I Corinthians 15:22 uses the word in the same sense, "For as in Adam all die, even so in Christ all will be made alive." That is, all who are in Adam die, and all who are in Christ are made alive. In any event, the text still does not support synergism, for a universalistic reading (which Reformed theology denies) would indicate universal monergistic salvation.
To move on, Clifton has attacked monergism based on its view of the will. However, though monergists have such a view, monergism is not ultimately predicated on the will. It is predicated on ability and what can actually be done. The question is not, "Can man want to assist in his salvation?" but, "What can man do about it?" The magnitude of an offense is according to the majesty of the one offended. Even if, for the moment, we leave off the question of Adamic guilt, we are guilty of our own sins. We have offended an infinitely holy God. What could we possibly do to pay for this? Infinite offense demands infinite retribution. This can be settled in one of two ways: 1) In a short time upon the God-man, or 2) during an eternity in hell for everyone else. You want to work for your salvation? Fulfill option two first and then God might discuss it with you. On the other hand, when Christ has taken the full brunt of God's wrath, there is nothing more to be done. Salvation has been accomplished on our behalf. It would be unjust for God to require anything else. If we keep in mind both the gravity of sin and the holiness of God, then the attempt to have something to do with our own salvation is not just the innocent activity of a child trying to "help" his parents. It is yet another offense against the character of God and the work of Christ. Can it be forgiven? Of course. But such forgiveness will result in sanctification. The non-repentance evidenced by continuing in synergistic activities can only indicate that regeneration and justification have never taken place. Synergism and monergism are contradictory modes of salvation. One of them is heretical. I have no problem if Clifton or anyone else wants to call monergism heresy. Let us then examine the reasons and appeal to the Word of God for a verdict. But, because this is a matter of salvation, neither side should be allowed to make a charge of heresy without the full measure of what that implies. My own views are evident. I can only hope that, for many who claim synergism, their artuculation does not match up with the substance of their deepest beliefs and actions.
The comments section of my penultimate post of the discussion with Clifton over Tradition and Scripture has been growing by means of a conversation with Andrew, a large part of which is about the differences between synergism and monergism. In the meantime, Clifton has taken up the same topic in this post and a follow-up contending that monergism is heresy. Clifton deserves some leeway, since he has admitted that his "understanding of the Reformation theology and Calvinism is pretty much limited to the infamous TULIP." A lot of self-styled Calvinists also limit themselves to TULIP, which can add to the confusion. However, while TULIP is a legitimate part of Reformed theology, to limit one's self to it, or even to think of it as foundational to Reformed theology is to severely misunderstand that theology. The foundation of this theology is a proper understanding of Christology. Clifton rightly criticizes a lot of people within the Reformed camp for missing this; nevertheless, his criticism does not apply to the full-orbed theology itself. Now, I'd like to respond to some of the main points.
In other words, orthodoxy rejects the necessary presupposition of monergism that man is totally depraved not merely forensically but volitionally, and that such depravity excludes free will. But if one takes away that presupposition, monergism cannot go forward in its argument.
Monergism does assert man's forensic and volitional depravity; however, this is not the necessary presupposition behind monergism. It is not merely that man won't work with God to effect his salvation, or that, if he wanted to that he would still be unable to; although, both of these are true. It is, rather, that there is no work to be done. The triune God has done it all. The Father elects and then declares righteous on the basis of Christ's work, the Son pays the penalty for our sin and redeems us, and the Spirit effectually calls, that is, regenerates us. Once these things have taken place, salvation is as good as done. Nothing can change the outcome. In a broader concept of salvation, it also includes progressive sanctification, which is a synergistic work performed in cooperation with the Spirit of God. Yet, the monergistic work having been done, we cannot fail to cooperate. This does not take away our freedom, as I will attempt to explain below. Technically speaking, the Reformed do not claim that depravity excludes free-will, or to put it another way, free moral agency. The depraved person is perfectly free to will according to his strongest inclination.
Next, Clifton argues that monergism leads to monothelitism because it assumes either that Christ's human will was non-existent or that it was practically non-existent in that it wasn't truly free. I find this interesting since I have recently made the opposite contention. Before going any further, we need to distinguish between two different views of the will, commonly known as libertarian and compatibilist. The former is, by far, the majority view, and the one that Clifton has been assuming. Here, the will is not truly free unless, for any given decision, it could have chosen otherwise; that is, a free will must be an indetermined will. The will, in this view, is virtually equated with the ego or the self. To say that my will is free is to say that I am free and vice versa. Under this view, it is only natural to see any talk of necessary cooperation in sanctification as a denial of free will, for 'necessary' must imply unable to have chosen otherwise. The compatibilist view, also known as the Augustinian view, is developed during the Reformation, but does not come to its best expression until Jonathan Edward's The Freedom of the Will. Here, we as persons are free moral agents. There is a distinction made between ourselves and our will. The will is not indetermined, but is determined by the nature of the one who wills. For any given decision, the will will always choose according to its strongest inclination at the moment of decision. This inclination can be influenced by a any number of factors: the final and strongest of these is the nature of which it is a part. In this view, the will is not to be equated with the self, but is a faculty of the nature. As to what the will is, this is what Constantinople III assumed in its condemnation of monothelitism. Because the will is a faculty of the nature, then Christ must have had two wills, both human and divine, because he had two complete natures. Considering his own understanding of how the will functions, Clifton might want to reword his formulation of the Council's teaching. "Christ has two natures and two wills in one Person" is dangerously close to the classic formulation of Nestorianism, "Two natures and two hypostases in one Person." The will is not distinct from but is a component of the nature. I argue that the Reformed view of the will does not lend itself to monothelitism but is completely in keeping with the Sixth Ecumenical Council.
Strictly speaking, monergism does not distinguish the work of God from the work of man. It distinguishes the work of God from the work of all men who are not Christ. The work of redemption, performed by the Second Person of the Trinity, is done according to both of his natures. In this sense, salvation very much involves a synergistic cooperation between human and divine works. The point that monergism wants to get across is that Christ alone does the work. Monergism does not, in fact, apply to Jesus since, in his human nature, he is the only man who is able to cooperate with the divine work.
Under the correct premise that whatever is not assumed is not healed, Clifton observes, "And furthermore, if Jesus' human will was unfallen, it did not need to be saved. But if his human will was not saved, then it was never assumed into his Person in the first place and so neither is our human will saved." Later, he follows this up with, "A fundamental tenet of the Church with regard to salvation must be that of the Incarnate assumption of all things human, apart from sin." The Reformed response is that Christ does assume a human nature, but not a fallen human nature because "fallen" simply indicates a human nature that has sin. There is, however, a potential problem with this response. If the human nature of Christ is so separate from all other human nature such that it is not fallen but the rest are, then where is the connection? What is actually being assumed? Which is why I'm not completely satisfied with the Reformed response. But I do think that Reformed theology has all that is needed to reformulate this response. In order to do this, it needs to draw on two of its strengths: 1) the concept of the covenant and 2) our union with Christ. It also needs to consider a relatively recent emphasis in certain sectors on eschatology. Here, eschatology is not relegated to a doctrine of last things, but it primarily refers to the original intent of our creation, which was for God to unite himself to us by means of the incarnation. Eschatology precedes soteriology. The incarnation was not an afterthought of a creation gone bad but was the very purpose behind the creation.
Here is where I differ, then, with the usual understanding of Reformed theology, although, I do believe that I am being consistent with Reformed premises. The question of whether Jesus takes on a human nature as created or a human nature as fallen is moot because no change occurs in human nature as such after Adam sins. Original sin, which we all have as a result of Adam's sin, is a matter of forensic declaration due to union with our Federal Head. Period. The tendency towards corruption, which is shared by the regenerate and the totally depraved alike, is a result of our human nature as created. This is not contrary to God's declaration that man was created good, for 'tendency to corruption' is not indentical to 'guilty of sin.' This tendency is not something introduced by the fall, but is due to the simple fact that this creation is not the final and permanent eschatological creation. We were designed to be translated into that creation by means of our union with the incarnate Christ. In the meantime, this creation is, by its very nature, temporal and corruptible. What then accounts for the difference between those who are totally depraved and want nothing to do with God and those who, having been regenerated, respond in faith? The Holy Spirit, who is the agent of regeneration. Basically, I am differing with Augustine when he posits four states of humanity: pre-fall, post-fall unredeemed, post-fall redeemed, and glorified. For substance, pre-fall and post-fall redeemed are the same thing- corruptible human nature indwelt by the Holy Spirit. The difference is that our possession of the Holy Spirit is predicated upon our justification in Christ. He won't leave when we sin but will work with us toward sancitification. Back to the main point, though. Jesus assumes the same human nature that we have and is therefore able to heal it. He is tempted just like we are, yet without sin. He is not himself sinful, but he shares with us in the guilt of Adam's sin. Otherwise, it is unjust for God to punish him. Having taken the punishment for this sin, having done the work that Adam that failed to do, Christ is justified in his resurrection. By uniting with his people in their guilt and paying for that guilt, Christ remains united to his people and they are vindicated with him. The original intent of man's creation, which is that God might unite himself with man by means of the incarnation and live with him in perfect holiness, is fulfilled. I fully agree with Clifton's statement, "Christ, not Adam, is the archetype of humanity."
I started out by affirming TULIP but wanting to put it in its place, which is not as the foundation of Reformed theology. That foundation is Christ. Reformed theology is not about naked and arbitrary decrees, it is about the person and work of Christ. I have already written about the connection between Christology and Calvinism in the following two posts: Covenantal Calvinism and Sovereign Grace and Union with God.
So far, a single question stands in the way of knowing whether or not Anselm has an orthodox theology of grace. He starts off on much better ground than Abelard, if only because of the differences between their doctrines of the atonement. To briefly summarize Abelard, he teaches that the death of Jesus was an example to make us feel love and pity for him and thereby be motivated to obedience. The emphasis ends up on our works.
Anselm, on the other hand, holds that the atonement was a satisfaction paid to God the Father by Christ on our behalf. In his Cur Deus Homo, he explains that, in the fall, Adam sinned against God and put humanity in his debt. Consequently, only a human being was legally qualified to pay this debt. There was, however, a problem: no human being was morally qualified to pay it. This was something that only God could do. The solution was for the Son of God to take on human nature in order to satisfy the debt. The atonement is something merited by Christ, yet, as far as believers are concerned, it is a matter of grace.
So far, Anselm is on track. But there is more. Justification, the grace accomplished in the atonement, has both a negative and a positive aspect. The concept of satisfaction answers to the first aspect. The penalty for sin is paid. However, it does not necessarily answer to the second aspect, which is our sanctification, or, the acquisition of holiness required to live in the presence of God. The question is whether or not Anselm believes that both of these aspects are covered under grace.
Another question, lying in back of this one, is whether or not Anselm believes that there even are two aspects. One might argue for the possibility of misunderstanding this; that is, of believing that Christ’s payment of the penalty of sin is, in itself, sufficient unto salvation. Technically, the doctrine of grace would still be intact, even if floating around in an impoverished context. There is, however, evidence that Anselm does recognize a twofold aspect. It is also found in his Cur Deus Homo.
Not only does Anselm believe that God had to become human in order to be our redeemer, but he believes that God had to be our redeemer. Evidently, once God had decided that he would create personal beings and live with them forever, there had to be just so many of them. There is a perfect number that only God knows. Anselm wonders if the angels once made up this perfect number until some of them fell. If so, then people were created to make up the difference. This, he concludes, is unseemly. It would not do for one who was saved to be happy about the fact that an angel had been eternally damned in order to make room for him. Anselm decides that, while people do make up the difference, the perfect number is higher than the number of angels created. That way, we never know. Since people were created to make up the perfect number, God could not have his plans thwarted by the fall.
The whole scenario seems just a bit far fetched. Nevertheless, I believe that Anselm is on to something. Anselm is right: it is not the case that God could have decided not to redeem anybody. It goes back to God’s original intent in creating mankind: he wanted to live with them forever. It is not, though, as Anselm supposes, a matter of replacing angels or making up a perfect number. Rather, I see this redemptive compunction as the fulfillment of a pre-creative intratrinitarian covenant. In agreement with Anselm, this necessity is not a matter of some external force compelling the will of God. He was, after all, free not to decide to create.
To bring things back into focus, Anselm believes that man was created for something beyond his original paradise. Had Adam not sinned, humanity would have been promoted to something higher. This historical paradigm suggests that Anselm does not view our justification simply in terms of a satisfaction for sin. There is a twofold aspect: redemption to our original state and progression to what had been intended. So then, does Anselm believe that this second aspect is the result of grace alone?
On the surface, he does not. In fact, Anselm has a whole treatise on the compatibility of grace with the free will of the individual. He argues that both are necessary for salvation. All of which is fine so long as free will is not confused with individual merit. The problem, however, is that it looks as though Anselm might do this. It happens in his De Concordia Praescentiae et Praedestionatis et Gratiae Dei cum Libero Arbitrio, III, 9. He is answering the question of why “in this life the penalty for sin remains in us after the sin has been blotted out.” Why, upon baptism, are we not immediately transformed into a state of incorruption? His answer is that merit would perish. He writes, “Faith and hope—without which no man who has understanding can merit the Kingdom of God—would vanish.”
Does Anselm mean to say that the grace of God found in the atonement qualifies us for our own meritorious works? Maybe not. He concludes the paragraph by saying, “In order that through merit of faith and of hope we may more gloriously obtain the happiness we desire, we remain—for as long as we are in this life—in this state.” The key is in the words “more gloriously.” I am willing to accept the suggestion that Anselm is not talking about the merit of justification, but of the merit which results in the rewards of sanctification. Still, if this is the case, I would prefer that he use different words.
Anselm’s definition of a free will fits, for the most part, with an orthodox conception of grace. He does not take a libertarian view. The will follows its own nature. God’s will, though free, is not able to sin. Apart from the grace of God, the will of fallen man is not able to follow God. Anselm argues that not everyone is given this grace. He does not, then, follow the semi-Pelagian/Arminian notion of a blanket application of prevenient grace, which neutralizes the biblical declarations of being dead in sins. The dispensation of grace is according to the will of God.
And then, Anselm complicates the picture. He talks about degrees of grace and of the possibility of overcoming grace by an act of the will. There is no question that, in Anselm, grace is necessary unto salvation. But then, the same thing can be said for Roman Catholicism. Furthermore, there is nothing wrong with positing a level of grace that can be overcome by an even more corrupt will. That is, as long as it is understood that God had no intention for this grace to be salvific. What I have yet to find in Anselm is a statement to the effect that there exist those degrees of grace that necessarily stronger than any opposing act of the will.
Does Anselm believe in irresistible grace? If not, then no matter how much grace has been given, the determining factor in the salvation of one person over another is that some quality of his own, above and beyond the grace of God, was better than that in someone else. It is not sufficient to go back to Anselm’s reasons for the incarnation and the atonement to answer this. He does believe that God had every intention to spend eternity with people. Furthermore, he believes that God was able to bring about what he intended. However, because he ties this, not to individual election, but to the filling up of a perfect number, there is no need for God to guarantee the salvation of any specific individual. If one resists, another would eventually take his place.
For now, the question remains unanswered, especially with Anselm’s talk of meritorious faith and grace that can be overcome by the will. If it is the case that Anselm would subscribe to irresistible grace, I can accept his view of grace as a whole. If it is God’s will that his grace not be resisted, then this grace is sufficient to my justification. Even though Anselm wants to label them as “merits,” he would see faith and hope as the fruit of grace. Faith would then be seen as the instrument of justification and not another ground thereof.