Within the current posts on Scripture and Tradition, I brought up cessationism in the context of I Corinthians 13. You may read those posts to see how it fit into the argument. This post is about a distinct but related question. I was asked whether or not "cessationists believe that miracles also ceased after the Apostolic era." My answer was as follows:
The cessation of miracles does not imply the active withdrawel of God. Rather, the miracles existed to reveal even greater works. Instead of diseases being healed, sin is cured; instead of dead bodies coming to life, there is the eternal regeneration of salvation. Furthermore, Calvinist cessasionists recognize that God is just as active and just as necessary for his works of providence as he is for the so called super-natural acts. The universe is not some deist wind up toy, but God controls it all. He is no more or less involved in a miracle than he is in the normal course of nature. God is just as much as here as he always has been. Once Christ has come and once we have the completed Scripture to tell us this, we no longer need any miracles to confirm God's presence.
This was followed by two more questions, which I shall attempt to answer, "Where is the Scripture to support this assumption? And do you not think that the Holy Spirit dwelling inside a believer is miraculous?"
The scriputural support is found in a survey of the miracles themselves. The premise to be defended is that miracles serve to authenticate the messenger/message as being from God. Some preliminary clarification is in order. There is no claim here that miracles are a theistic proof. One must already believe in God and believe that he can both communicate and perform miracles. Otherwise, even if the event itself is acknowledged, it will be regarded as a freak natural occurence with no real connection to any message.
Exodus 4:1-9: Moses is concerned that the elders of Israel will not believe that the LORD had appeared; that is, they wouldn't believe that the message he had been instructed to give them was actually from God. God gives Moses a series of three miracles to perform in order to convince them: his staff turning into a snake, his hand turning leprous and then being healed, and water from the Nile turning into blood.
Exodus 10:1,2: The ongoing series of plagues, along with Pharaoh's reaction at the hand of God, were so that Moses and his descendants (and, by implication, Israel throughout her generations) would know that God is the LORD. The purpose of the plagues is not, as generally thought, to convince Pharaoh to let Israel go (although, ulitmately, they do have this effect). If it were, then God is not being very efficient; he keeps defeating this purpose by hardening Pharaoh's heart. Instead, he is using this series of miracles, up to and including the crossing of the Red Sea, as the paradigm redemptive event of the OT. Israel would be able to look back on it and see that he was the LORD. Israel acknowledges who God is and a relationship is established. This, in turn, forms the basis on which God gives them the Ten Commandments. God prefaces them with, "I am the LORD your God, who brought you out of the land of Egypt, out of the house of slavery." Beyond this, the Exodus event, including its non-miraculous elements, reveals our redemption in Christ. He is our Passover (I Corinthians 5:7), the Lamb of God who takes away the sin of the world (John 1:29). Note, however, that even this non-miraculous element is rooted in a miraculous event: the tenth plague. The plagues did serve a secondary function of getting Israel out of Egypt. But God could just as easily have done this through other means, the most obvious of which is not hardening Pharaoh's heart. "Let my people go." "OK."
Deuteronomy 8:3: The manna was given so that they might know that "man does not live by bread alone, but lives by every word that comes from the mouth of the LORD. The giving of manna over forty years was miraculous. It's immediate effect was to feed the people. But this was not its primary purpose. This was to teach them absolute trust in God's Word. The same God who was providing for them in this way was also beginning to give them revelation. As to feeding them, God could just as easily have arranged circumstances so that the miracle was not needed. Look at how he feeds everyone else with non-miraculous means.
I Kings 17:24: After Elijah has raised the widow's son from the dead, she says, "Now I know that you are a man of God, and that the word of the LORD in your mouth is truth." The miracle has served to authenticate both the messenger and his message as being from God. It did serve a secondary function of giving the widow back her son. However, if the whole point was that the widow have a living son, God could have prevented his death. Furthermore, the miracle was not performed on some general principle that resurrections are always the most desirable thing. In Luke 4:25-27, Jesus points out that there were lots of widows in Israel, but Elijah was only sent to the widow of Zarephath. There were plenty of lepers, but Elisha only healed Naman. A miracle is a sign. What that sign consists of is secondary to its intended function.
I Kings 18:24-40: This a contest between the prophets of Baal and Elijah to determine whose God is the true God. When Elijah prays, he asks God to perform the miracle in order that people might know that the LORD is God. This prayer is answered. The people see the miracle and confess that the LORD is God. Elijah is confirmed as the messenger of God and the people accept and obey his next message, "Seize the prophets of Baal; let not one of them escape."
Matthew 11:2-4: John the Baptist is in prison and starts to doubt whether Jesus is the Christ so he sends some disciples to ask him. Jesus does not just say, "Yes." Instead, he tells the disciples to report the miracles that they have seen and heard. Jesus' status as being from God is confirmed by his miracles.
Luke 5:17-26: A paralyzed man is lowered through a roof so that Jesus can heal him. Instead, Jesus says, "Man, your sins are forgiven you." The Pharisees question his authority to do this and then Jesus heals the man in order to demonstrate that authority.
Acts 3,4: The healing of a lame man is used as an occassion for Peter to preach. Many people who hear, believe. The rulers question by whose authority Peter has healed the man and he gives the credit to Jesus and uses this as another occassion to present the gospel. They can't say anything in opposition because the healed man is standing right there in front of them.
Hebrews 2:3-4: This is not about a specific historical event but describes how the message of salvation had been confirmed. It is declared by the Lord and then attested to others, including the author of Hebrews, by those who heard him. The historical context is first generation believers telling second generation believers, not second to third, or third to fourth. Along with this attestation, "God also bore witness by signs and wonders and various miracles and by gifts of the Holy Spirit distributed according to his will.
In each of these cases, the miracle serves to authenticate the message/messenger. But there is another side. Once the message has been delivered and authenticated, it is sufficient. No further signs are needed and requesting further miraculous signs for this pupose is an indication of wickedness.
Mark 8:11-13: Jesus has just fed the 4000 with seven loaves of bread and the Pharisess want him to show them a sign from heaven. Jesus denies the request.
Luke 11:14-32: Jesus has just cast a demon out of a mute man. Once again, the Pharisees want a sign from heaven. Jesus calls them an evil generation and refuses to give them a sign other than that of Jonah. The result of this sign will be to condemn them.
Luke 16:19-31: Whether this is a parable or Jesus is relating a real event, he states what would be the case. The rich man dies and ends up in Hades. He begs Abraham to send Lazarus to his brothers so that they will not end up where he is. Abraham says, "If they do not hear Moses and the Prophets, neither will they be convinced if someone should rise from the dead." This was the Scripture of the time and sufficient for the immediate purpose of keeping one out of Hades. No miracle was going to make anyone believe what had already been revealed in the Word of God. On the other hand, for those who already believed what God had revealed up until then, miracles would function to confirm new revelation. But the miracle did not automatically justify anything the miracle worker might say. The new revelation must be consistent with what had already been revealed. In Deuteronomy 13: 1-5, Moses condemns any prophets who might come along and work convincing signs and wonders, but then say, "Follow other gods." In such a case, God is testing his people to see if they will follow his commandments.
Hopefully, what I have shown is that miracles serve the consistent function of authenticiating new revelation and that they are no longer needed for revelation already confirmed. These miracles serve the same function even once the revelation has been recorded as Scripture. Recall that the miraculous events of the Exodus were done so that future generations of Israel would know who God is. To be sure, this information would be passed on orally, but it was also inscripturated in the same generation in which it happened. The miracle would serve the same authenticating purpose for those who read about it rather than seeing it. The same goes for the other miracles of Scripture. They are interwoven into the fabric of history in such a way that the historical record itself must be accepted or rejected along with the miracles.
I have not included all the miracles of Scripture, many of which do not state that they exist for this particular purpose. This is, however, no indication that such is not the case. Furthermore, their very presence in the fabric of biblical history serves to authenticate its divine message. But, if anyone disagrees, they are available for use as counterexamples. Also, while I may have shown that authenticating a message is one purpose of miracles, some might argue that I have not demonstrated it to be the only purpose. And this is true. They all had secondary purposes: getting Israel out of Egypt, feeding them, bringing back the dead, healing people. However, in each of these cases, this secondary function is the miracle. To continue them gives the sign more importance than the thing signified.
The continuation of miracles when they no longer serve the function of authenticating new revelation turns the miracle into something of a divine stopgap measure. They fix various problems that may crop up in the world. But this is where God's providence enters. Oftentimes, when a miracle was required, he had set up the circumstances in such a way that it would be required.
John 9: The disciples already know that a certain man's blindness is providential, but they assume the wrong reasons. Jesus says that it happened "that the works of God might be displayed in him." He then restores his sight. Grasp what he is saying here. God, in his providence, had this man be born blind so that, years later, Jesus could perform a miracle. In keeping with the main thesis, the miracle confirms Jesus as a messenger from God to the healed man, who says, "If this man were not from God, he could do nothing." When Jesus asks the man if he believes in the Son of Man, he answers, "Who is he that I may believe?" He believes what Jesus tells him, that he himself is the Son of Man. As with many miracles, not only does this miracle confirm a divine messenger, it serves as a message. This time, it was to reveal the blindness of the Pharisees.
John 11: In this account, Jesus is the one who exercises divine providence. After hearing that Lazarus is sick, he waits two days before going to him. It is quite possible that Lazarus had already died, since he had been dead four days when Jesus finally arrived. Jesus, however, is setting himself up as being in control of the entire situation, as he very well was. He tells his disciples that he is glad that he was not there when Lazarus died, so that they might believe. Just before performing the miracle, he prays that the people standing around may believe that God had sent him. They do. The miracle has authenticated the messenger.
In all cases in which miracles were perfomed, God could have arranged matters so that they would not have been required. As noted earlier, the need itself, death, leprosy, whatever, did not, in itself, constitute sufficient reason for a miracle. Nor does it now. God is quite able to prevent what he wants to prevent or to cause helaing to come by means within the parameters of everyday providence.
One might argue that miracles demonstrate divine compassion or pity. And so they do. But this is not reason enough to keep them around. God is quite capable of being compassionate through other means. Not the least of these is for the Church to actively care for those in need. We may wish that we could say some magic words and cure people instantly, but this would be too easy. Love is most evidentally shown when people don't fix that easily.
There are probably other reasons for performing miracles that I am not thinking of right now. Nevertheless, I highly suspect that all of them could be fulfilled as a matter of providence. I welcome any scriptural defense of the necessity of current miracles, but, unless this happens, I see no justification for their continued existence. One objection, which would not be answerable by matters of providence, would be that new revelation has not ceased, in which case, all that precedes has begged the question. In response to this, I would say that the telos of revelation is Christ. All Scripture points to Christ. If there is still revelation, then produce an example that compares in glory to Scripture. There is also the prohibition against adding to Scripture in Revelation, the implication being that nothing new will be given to add.
I have been assuming throughout that, if the Bible does not reveal something as necessary, it has not revealed it at all. There is no chapter and verse for this, but then, sola scriptura was never meant to exclude common sense. Miracles are not necessary outside of confirming new revelation. Everything that they would otherwise do can be taken care of by means of divine providence. To claim that they still exist is to claim that they necessarily exist (or it is to claim that God is capricious). Unless it can be shown that Scripture supports their current necessity, then such a doctrine is advanced in addition to Scripture. The burden of proof is on the non-cessationists to support the continuation of miracles.
I believe that the cessation of miracles can be safely deduced from their function as described in Scripture. What clinches it for me is the passage that started this, I Corinthians 13, in which a sample of miraculous gifts are said to come to an end after that which is complete has come. Considering the function of miracles in authenticating new revelation, it makes sense to say that that which is complete refers to the completion of revelation. This completion has made obsolete all miracles, for which those mentioned in I Corinthians are a representative sample.
Now to the second question- do I not think that the Holy Spirit dwelling inside a believer is miraculous? Here's what I do think. It can only be accomplished by the immediate work of God. There are no secondary created causes for the indwelling of the Spirit. It is extraordinary in that it goes far beyond the common grace given to non-believers. It involves regeneration and salvation; as such, it is among those things greater than miracles to which the miracles pointed, especially miracles of resurrection.
But, is it a miracle? No, it is not. The indwelling of the Holy Spirit does not serve to authenticate new revelation. Furthermore, even when there was new revelation to be authenticated, it could not have served this function. The indwelling of the Spirit is an inner reality. It may produce results in the life of the believer, but these results cannot be distinguished, by those looking on, from general good behavior. Signs, by their very nature, must be external; otherswise, no one sees them.
Having stated the cessationist position, I will not object too strongly to anyone who wants to use the term "miracle" for something broader than "an external work, contrary to nature, that authenticates new revelation." This could include the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, extraordinary answers to prayer; I'll even broaden acceptable definitions to include those who want to call life a miracle. However, the expanded definition should not be used to slip in those kinds of contrary-to-nature miracles that are recorded in Scripture. These need to be defended on the basis of Scripture and not by means of verbal equivocation.
This post continues the discussion concerning Scripture and Tradition. It answers first this post and then this one.
(Justification from Properly Exegeted Scriptures)
The content of Scripture is not limited to mere propositions but includes whatever it was intended to teach. This is what I mean by saying that any particular tradition that the Church has, especially if this tradition may authoritatively bind the conscience, must be capable of being justified from Scripture properly exegeted. The WCF I.6a puts it like this, "The whole counsel of God concerning all things necessary for His own glory, man's salvation, faith, and life, is either expressly set down in Scripture, or by good and necessary consequence may be deduced from Scripture: unto which nothing any time is to be added, whether by new revelations of the Spirit, or traditions of men."
It is possible for something to be in no contradiction whatsoever with Scripture yet still fail to be justified by Scripture properly exegeted. The idea is not that Scripture must deny a particular tradition in order for it to be invalid; rather, a tradition is deemed invalid if Scripture does not support it. The burden of justification is on those who would add to Scripture.
Let me clarify something. My stress on "proper exegesis" is to determine those things that are acceptable for the Church to believe. If something is improperly exegeted, this does not, at least in the sense that I am using the term, make it "extra-Biblical tradition." There is, at least, an attempt to follow Scripture. Improper exegesis is a problem and a discussion in which I am interested. However, it does not fall under the parameters of this discussion. Here, I am objecting to tradition that does not claim to have its authority in Scripture. If the entire matter is a difference of interpretation (which I would be glad to take up in its place), then my objection to extra-Biblical tradition, while I still stand by it, is moot regarding the Orthodox Church. Since you believe it it possible "to go through the Tradition and show its complete consonance in its entirety with properly exegeted Scripture," I can't really see that you believe what I have denied. Would you happen to know, then, what is the position of the Orthodox Church? Is it just that certain of the traditions do not contradict Scripture, perhaps, because Scripture does not address them? or is it that all of the traditions can be positively justified by means of Scriptural exegesis?
If it is the latter, then I have no quarrel with the Orthodox conception of Tradition per se. However, before we can move on to matters of specific exegesis, there is still the matter that the Orthodox Church assigns to itself an infallible ability to interpret Scripture. While I freely acknowledge that the Orthodox Church has many things right and that it may even be right on certain points over which I disagree, I can't help but to question the ultimate fruitfulness of many of the specific exegetical points. For one who believes that his church's interpretation is infallible, there must be an a priori assumption that all cases to the contrary are without merit. I may be able to defend my positions against possible misunderstandings, but the game is set up in such a way that I can never make an effective offensive move.
It occurs to me as I read your paragraphs on various scriptural interpretations, with the refrain of "How do you know?" that your own attraction to Orthodoxy may have less to do with the its ability to justify its claims and more to do with your concept of epistemology. You seem to want to define knowledge in terms of Cartesian certainty. One way of doing this when it comes to matters of Scriptural interpretation and general faith is to postulate the existence of infallible interpreters who can tell you precisely what to think. I do not share this view. This kind of epistemological certainty is a myth. I firmly believe in objective truth, but I do not believe that God ever intends to spoonfeed it to us. Those matters that are essential to our salvation are clear from Scripture. These are those matters upon which the Church as a whole is agreed in its common confessions. But there are other matters that require serious study. While a maximum of one interpretation can be correct, these are matters over which individuals and even churches may disagree. This does not mean that knowledge of the truth, which is essential to the life of the Church, is ultimately lost. Rather, it implies that a deepening of faith, which is just as essential to this life, is ultimately gained. There must be some sense in which faith concerns that which is unseen; otherwise, it is not faith, but sight. In a very real sense, and not discounting the necessary function of the Word and the Sacraments, faith grows when it wrestles with the unknown. Furthermore, it is through this process that the Church is guided into the truth.
As to choosing a particular interpretive method, you paint too bleak a picture. It is possible to narrow down the options without resorting to infallible interpretation. If the doctrine of Scripture's infallibility implies anything, it is that there are intended parameters on the range of interpretation. Allegorical and "what does it mean to me" are both far too open to eisegesis to be of any use. On the other hand, the woodenly literal interpretation of many fundamentalists completely misses the intent of the various biblical genres. The Bible is, at the very least, a book of literature. As to the suggestion that Scripture itself cannot suggest an interpretive method, this is not entirely true. My own approach to hermeneutics was greatly helped when I noticed that the authors of the NT have a way of interpreting the OT that is not at all in keeping with what I had been doing. In any event, even if correct exegetical methods were nearly impossible to come by, this would not necessitate an infallible interpreter. The promise that the Church will be led into all truth is not based on her own skills but upon the guidance of the Holy Spirit. Many times I have read various authors throughout church history and have been able to affirm their conclusions even amidst their oftentimes bizarre methodology.
No, there is no reason at all that I need narrow my argument to limiting Tradition to the explicit propositional content of Scripture. The Holy Spirit will lead the Church into all truth. But he will not do this immediately nor will he do it by gifting the Church that remains on this earth with infallibility. The Church is led into truth by dealing with her error; into strength by struggling with her weakness. Ecclesiatical infallibility may be a logical solution to the problem of epistemological uncertainty, but, aside from answering an erroneous concept of epistemology, faith does not require such certainty. I do rest certain in the promise that God will not allow the Church to finally perish nor will he allow the same in me. If I attend to the means of grace, if I add to my faith those things by which I make my calling and election sure (II Peter 1), then I may be assured that, although I may not have everything just right, my grasp of the truth is sufficient unto life.
(Cessationism and Not Adding/Deleting)
No offence taken at your opinion of my interpretation of I Corinthians 13. Your answer to it is rather weak, though. Consider first your appeal to the Greek. The neuter gender of "teleion" is determined by the fact that it is a stand alone adjective. When paired with the definite article "to," it functions as a noun. Literally translated "the complete," the missing noun is understood, "the complete thing," or, as often translated, "that which is complete." The gender of an adjective need only match that of the noun it modifies, whether explicitly stated or implied. That the referent of such a noun may also be denominated by another noun of a different gender is irrelevant. Stipulating to your argument that, when Paul speaks of the Scriptures he means the OT, perhaps this is why he didn't use the term. Also, since the OT was complete, arguing for the completion of Scripture, when it could very well be understood in this sense, would be confusing at best. "To teleion" is much clearer and its precise meaning can be determined by the nature of those things that would come to an end at its arrival. While this nature cannot be determined from the immediate context of chapter 13, that of tongues can be determined from the surrounding chapters. Assuming that Paul is presenting a coherent argument, prophecy and knowledge should have a similar function. The foundational role of the prophet, mentioned in Ephesians, supports such an interpretation. My uncertainty had to do with the specific function of knowledge, not to whether this function is related to that of tongues or prophecy, nor to whether "to teleion" refers to the then incomplete NT canon. The cessationist argument can be made on the basis of Paul's explanation of toungues. It would be falsified by giving a more likely opposing account of prophecy and knoweldge. A Christian who is not a cessationist would probably not want accept this interpretation. However, for those who do deny the present validity of the charismatic gifts, I am hard pressed to think of a better account for "to teleion." Incidentally, I have no idea what the Orthodox position on the charismatic gifts is. I can only assume by your own standards that your suggestion of the Parousia or the coming age is not serious. Neither one matches the gender of "to teleion." As to v. 12, the coming age does make sense, but this does not contradict the cessationist argument. The coming age and revelation are related concepts.
I'm glad we agree that the Revelation passage can refer to the whole of Scripture. We do not agree, however, that it is a stretch to say, "Don't add traditions." The stretch is found in excluding tradition from the prohibition. Doing so fails to acknowledge the primary purpose of Scripture as a (the) rule of faith and practice. Inasmuch as tradition is intended to function in the same way, adding it to Scripture would have the same effect as adding to a book or canonical list. Also note that what is added to Scripture is not specified, whereas what is taken away is specified as "the words of the book of this prophecy." If the same phrase can be taken of all Scripture, then the prophibition is against taking away any Scripture, not just that contained in Revelation. More to the point, though. The prohibition is only against taking away Scripture: no mention is made of taking away from extra-Biblical tradition. The prohibition against adding is not limited to Scripture; rather, it is extensive enough to mean, "Don't add anything." A fully consistent account for this is that there is no valid extra-Biblical tradition from which to subtract or that can be added to Scripture. This, I believe, is John's original intent. As to those traditions that are justified from a proper exegesis of Scripture, these had always been latent within Scripture and cannot constitute an addition once such teaching of Scripture has been recognized.
I do not commit the logical fallacy of which you accuse me- assuming the absence of a proof for the opposing position as proof of my own. My position concerning extra-Biblical tradition is simply this: There is no proof of its validity. I infer from this that it is invalid. I will continue to assume that it is invalid until the burden of proof is met. Something simple like Acts 29:1, "And he gave them many infallible traditions, which are not recorded in the words of this book." I'm relatively easy to please.
(The Foundation of Tradition and Scripture in the Holy Spirit)
I don't get the distinction you're making in the first paragraph, although, I am happy to see that you're being more generous to the Holy Spirit than my first impression had led me to believe.
A single verse in Acts is sufficient to take Sunday worship out of the realm of extra-Biblical tradition. But, say that you're right, that it only applies to a particular congregation. In this case, the practice of corporate worship is still directed in Scripture. The specific day in this case would be a necessary matter of extra-Biblical tradition. However, such tradition would not be binding but could be changed by any church at any time. Having said this, there is more of a Scriptural basis for Sunday worship than a single passage in Acts. I Corinthians 16:2 specifies the first day of the week as the time to set aside for the collection for the saints. Taken alone, this would suffer the same problem as the Acts passage- it could be specific to the church at Corinth. Instead, both of these passages should be seen as standing in agreement with a broader theology of the Sabbath. The last day of the week was the established day for worship in the OT. It was the day of rest and its place in the week revealed its eschatological function. It was a continual reminder of the final rest that would be inaugurated in the last days by the advent of Christ. We are living in the last days in which the New Age has broken into this age by means of the resurrection of Christ. That to which the Sabbath pointed has now arrived. We acknowledge this by worshipping on the first day of the week, the day of Christ's resurrection.
(The Stable Content of Tradition)
You write, "But there is no distinction between that which you agree 'may be categorized as holy Tradition' and something else you call the 'fuller' tradition.' Your construing it this way implies that Tradition is little more than centuries of accretion upon accretion." Um,... Exactly.
Concerning icons- they're probably a lot older than the eighth century. As to your evidence of iconography in first century practice, please produce it. I would like something more substantial than the fact that the catacombs had pictures. Nevertheless, I must acknowledge that the practice came from somewhere. A likely source may be found in various Gentile converts who imported their cultural idol worship into the church. Moreover, I have a particularly hard time accepting iconography. Even if I did agree to the validity of extra-Biblical tradition, I could not see my way to making icons a part of it. Considering the predominance of Jews in the early church coupled with the post-exilic Jewish aversion to anything that even smelled like an idol, I would have expected historical evidence (preferably Scriptural) that this issue had been addressed to the satisfaction of the Jews. I have read some early material on the subject, it may have even been John of Damascus. As I recall, the argument was two-fold. One part appeared to the Platonic chain of being; the other argued that the incarnation had changed the terms whereby the Second Commandement, the one prohibiting graven images, was to be understood. While I believe this to be enough, technically, to take iconography out of the category of extra-Biblical tradition, it strikes me more as rationalization of a prior belief using Scripture rather than an example of sound exegesis. In light of such a specific prohibition, I want more than an argument that the incarnation may allow for iconography; I want the incarnation to require iconography.
As to the Eucharist, this is, as you indicate from the claims in the NT, a matter of interpretation. Consequently, it does not fall under the rubric of extra-Biblical tradition. Yes, the NT is explicit in its wording and the early church fathers did not shy away from such language. I acknowledge the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist; however, there is nothing either in NT language or that of the early church that requires such interpretive extremes as that which results from the Roman Catholic infusion of Aristotelian philosophy. As to the Orthodox view, I do not know what it is and so cannot say whether or not I would agree with its substance after any potentially confusing wording had been removed. I am not convinced that you have the historical evidence to say that "the Tradition has been pretty much stable from the time of the Apostles." Things such as Catacombian pictures might confirm such a hypothesis once it had been established, but are hardly sufficient to prove it otherwise.
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The remainder deals with the second post, "A-Voiding the Word."
Calling the Orthodox Church a "denomination" was not a slip but deliberate. It represents the view of every other denomination. The Orthodox Church would do well not to stick so close to its distinctives and listen to the judgment of everyone else who has been baptized into the name of the triune God. I am well aware of the Orthodox Church's opinion of herself. She is quite mistaken.
The strength with which you state the claims of the Orthodox Church does, indeed, lead to the conclusion that other denominations have no life. But then, may it never be said that I have forced anyone into being logical. Actually, I believe your explanation and understand it in an odd sort of way. I grew up in a number of Baptist Churches, some of which held to a belief called the "Baptist Bride." The idea was that since baptism was the only door into the church, since only believers were to be baptized, since it had to be by immersion, and since baptism was only valid if administered by someone in the church (i.e., a baptized believer), then there had to be an unbroken line of believers' baptism all the way back to John the Baptist. Conversely, any group that practiced any baptism besides the immersion of believers, or that could be traced back to such a group, could not be considered a true church. They could be saved, but would remain second class citizens in heaven. The same view of the Church that turned me away from any further possibility of accepting the Baptist Bride will not allow me to accept the Orthodox doctrine of the Church. The Church comprises all of the elect of all time. It consists of all those who are in union with Jesus Christ. Such union is, since the advent of Christ, sacramentally symbolized in baptism. The visible Church, then, consists of all those to whom this baptism rightly applies: those who profess Christ and their children. Most important, though, is the concept of union with Christ. Where this is the case, there is the Church and there is life. Where there is no union with Christ, there is neither. Your own account of other denominations is an odd chimera in which the head, though severed from the other parts, is still able to impart life. It is true that the Holy Trinity makes alive, but this is not done apart from justice. We are not just dead, but dead in sin. Life may only be granted to those who are united with Christ in his death and resurrection. But then, such union defines the church.
Matthew 18:18-20 is not an unconditional promise of the Church's infallibility in binding and loosing such that we can be sure that a thing is bound because the Orthodox say it is. The passage concerns local church discipline- two or three. The condition is found in v. 20, the two or three are gathered in my name, that is, in the name of Christ. The idea is that they are acting according to the will of Christ, presenty known by its revelation in Scripture. The idea is not a license for the Church to do as it pleases knowing that she can't be wrong. It is that, provided she is acting according to the revealed will of God, then her verdicts will reflect those that are true in heaven.
I Timothy 3:15. I could say that neither the masculine stulos nor the neuter hedraioma could possibly have anything to do with the feminine ecclesia, but I won't. :) As it is, I don't think it can support the weight of ecclesiastical infallibility. First, there is no article. It is not "the pillar..." but "a pillar..." Ho stulos simply means a pillar. The language is figurative and complements the next term to hedraioma, which means, "that which provides the basis or foundation for belief or practice." Assuming the presence of both the Holy Spirit and of Scripture (or, at the time, that tradtion which had yet to be inscripturated), there is no need to postulate infallibility for the Church in order for it to function in this regard.
To your question, "Where in all of Scripture does Scripture say this about itself?" the only positive statement I made to this effect in the relevant quote was that "Scripture sets the parameters both of the Gospel and of the Church." So far, the scriptural examples that you have have produced illustrate this quite nicely. As to the rest of the quote, I said, "Scripture gives no warrant..," and "Christ has given no such authorization." I don't have to show any place in Scripture where warrant is not given. I'm simply stating a fact; the evidence is not there. You have to show me that it is.
Ephesians 4:16. You ask, "But where does it say in Scripture that Scripture has this capacity to bring the whole Church into maturity in Christ?" Let's consider the immediate context. Christ gives the Church gifts, which include apostles, prophets, evangelists, and pastors and teachers (v.11). I've already mentioned the foundational role of the apostles and prophets (2:20). Now take the office whose present validity is undisputed; pastor and teacher (or, as some would have, two offices of pastor, and teacher). Paul's admonition to Timothy, the pastor at Ephesus, was, "Preach the word; be ready in season and out of season; reprove, rebuke, and exhort, with complete patience and teaching" (II Timothy 2:2). Just prior to this, Paul had identified the Scripture as being sufficient unto these things, "All Scripture is breathed out by God and profitiable for teaching, for reproof, for correction, and for training in righteosness, that the man of God may be competent, equipped for every good work" (3:16,17). Back in Ephesians 4, these officers are given as gifts to the Church in order that they might "equip the saints for the work of the ministry" (v.12). They are to "attain to the unity of the faith" (v.13) and not be "carried about by every wind of doctrine" (v.14). The pastor accomplishes this through the faithful preaching of the Word. The result is that the Church, "speaking the truth in love" (v.15) will grow into maturity in Christ. And so the prayer of Christ is answered, "Sanctify them in the truth; your word is truth" (John 17:17). Scripture, considered in the abstract as a collection of propositions, has no power. But this has nothing to do with sola scriptura. Scripture preached and lived is another matter altogether. "For the word of God is living and active, sharper than any two-edged sword, piercing even to the division of soul and spirit, of joints and of marrow, and discerning the thoughts and intentions of the heart" (Hebrews 4:12).
I don't reject the Trinity because Scripture clearly teaches it. I suppose, though, that you want me to affirm what the Church has said about it. I do. I take the Church's declarations very seriously and, often, they have pointed me in the right direction for interpretation. But I would be a fool if I didn't double check. As to inferring Arianism, I know that this can be done, but I've never seen how. Isn't it nice how the Church, in agreeing on an essential doctrine, has reshaped the likely ways to think about it? I admit it, my views of the Trinity have been greatly influenced by the teaching of the Church.
"Name one heresy that the Orthodox Church as a whole as espoused." Do you mean that there are parts of the one infallible Church that have espoused heresy? In any case, this is a loaded request considerig the technical definition of a heresy, which is whatever is contrary to the ecumenical creeds and councils. As if these councils could have addressed the sum total of heresy before both sides of the Church, Orthodox and Catholic, decided to flaunt their immaturity and split from one another. Basically, anything that I might suggest will only be dismissed on the grounds that the Orthodox Church as a whole doesn't agree.
Churches can fall into heresy becase of their interpretation of the Scripture. More often, this is not the sole cause. They are are either ignoring other parts of Scripture or they are adding what is not contained in Scripture. Furthermore, they are paying no attention to the general consensus of thought within the historical Church. I would also say that, depending on the seriousness of the heresy, they are not being led by the Holy Spirit. In short, churches that have fallen into and persist in serious heresy may soon cease to be a part of the Church. Interpretation is no problem for my thesis. I am perfectly confident that the Holy Spirit can overcome any and all epistemological objections.
You present a false dichotomy. The options are not either accept the infallibility of the Orthodox Church or enshrine my own mind and thinking over it. Rather, the Church works in cooperation with her people in order to grow into a knowledge of the truth. There may be some deviation, which will be corrected, and some may ultimately fall away, but the general trend is always toward maturity in the knowledge of the truth. It is not up to the Orthodox to say to the rest of the Church, "No, you got it wrong. You must not be a part of us." No. The Orthodox Church is a denomination. As much as it would like to claim infallibility, that it alone of all those who profess Christ has remained united, it just ain't so. To the extent that we are all the recipients of baptism, to the extent that Christ claims all of the Church as his own, you're stuck with us.
Please understand that my final conclusion was not meant to be gratuitously offensive. I truly mean nothing personal. Nevertheless, I make no further apology and I cannot take it back. The nature of such a discourse, which is deeply held matters of faith, must necessarily offend in some points. In order to avoid such a thing, I will not resort to saying that religion is a personal thing that has no bearing on reality. One of us has to be wrong. My conclusion is only illogical if the Orthodox Church is, in fact, the one, true, and infallible Church. However, if it is not, as I firmly believe, if it is just a denomination that is mistaken about its infallibility; if it has added to the Scripture contrary to Scripture and then played the part of the schismatic by claiming that those who do not follow it in this heresy are no part of the Church, then it does stand in some serious need of repentance. My statement was not intended for that body of Christians who came before me. I honor both their sacrifices and what they have done for the Church. My statement is aimed at that particular and present day denomination that makes claims for itself the likes of which the early church never could have dreamed (well, the Novatians might have come close). As to Orthodoxy not judging "those outside her bounds as having outgrown the need for humility and repentance," wouldn't this beg the question? Most of them don't claim infallibility. As for those that do, think of black kitchenware.
This is written in response to My Account of Scripture and Tradition, which I see a heartfelt account of the meaning of the Orthodox faith. I wish everyone believed that the church's life was something given to it by Christ; that this life is no mere doctrinal concept. To this extent, we agree. Yet, the substance of the account consists in beautifully worded descriptions of the Life of the Church interwoven with unsubstantiated claims concerning the origin of extra-Biblical tradition. I believe that the Church has been blessed with Life; however, I am far from being persuaded that this Life is not fully attained (as much as it can be before the return of Christ) when the church believes and puts into practice that which is recorded in Scripture.
Consider this quote, "Because this Tradition is filled with the Life of Christ himself, it carries His authority, and is thus infallible. But this Tradition is not, nor ever could be, separable from the Church, for the Church Herself is the Body of Christ, and is filled with Christ in whom is the fullness of the Godhead." This statement would be fine if "Tradition" meant those beliefs and practices which exhibit the truths of the Gospel and are common to all those who profess the name of Christ. But it does not. It refers to the beliefs and practices of a specific denomination. The Orthodox Church is the true church of Christ. It has a specific way of doing things, which it defines as its "Tradition." This, it claims, is given in infallible and unbroken form all the way from Christ. The proof of such a pedigree is found in the fact that it is this church that does these things.
But, if Tradition is defined as the Life of the Church, what does this say for all other Christian denominations? Precisely this, that they have no life. If the Tradition cannot be separated from the Church, then those denominations that do not practice this Tradition are no part of the Church. If this Church, the one that has all of this Tradition, is defined as the Body of Christ, then denominations without the Tradition are no part of the Body of Christ. If it is this body of Christ that is filled with Christ, then no other denomination can claim such a fulness. In fact, it would seem that, besides the Orthodox Church, that no other church that professes Christ can claim Christ at all. If Christ's Church is thus defined by its Tradition, then no other church belongs to Christ. These are conclusions necessarily drawn from so strong an account of Tradition.
Am I saying that this is not possible? Not at all. I do not shy away from an exclusive faith. There is life in Christ and in Christ alone. Any creed that does not acknowledge this has already been condemned to death. I am saying that Scripture sets the parameters both of the Gospel and of the Church. I am saying that Scripture gives no warrant whatsoever for a particular church to say, "plus all the things that we've been doing," and then call this, "Life." Even more, I am saying that Christ has given no such authorization. It is unthinkable that the One whom Scripure so fully reveals in the simplicity of the Gospel should have entrusted extra conditions for Life to a particular church with no indication that he had done so, no indication of what these conditions are, and no way of determining which church has this extra-Biblical but oh so essential truth. For every other doctrine and practice, we can know how close a church is to the will of Christ by comparing it to his inscriputurated will. Not so with Orthodox Tradition.
I have seen particular churches throughout history fall into heresy or some other sin far too often to think that it can't happen to any other church. The only defense against this, and only sure way by which the Church will triumph agaisnt the gates of Hell, is to know the will of God as it has been given in Scripture. What possible motivation could there then be for following a church whose distinctive beliefs are not a misinterpretation of Scripture simply by virtue of the fact that they are not based on Scripture at all? The claim that these distinctives, otherwise called Tradition, are infallible is of little comfort. This amounts to little more than the claim that the church that holds to these Traditions is infallible, for an infallible Tradition must be infallibly preserved in the actions of the people, else the Tradition changes.
So then, even though Scripture has presented the Gospel, which is life, in its simplicity, the Orthodox Church says that this is not enough, our Tradition is life; trust us, we're infallible. I cannot doubt the sincerity. Years, even centuries of doing things the same way can make any group think they're right. What bothers me most, though, is the corresponding idea that the Orthodox cannot be wrong. It is a church that has outgrown the need both for humility and for repentance. I can think of nothing more devastating to the soul.
This is, as the title suggests, a response to another post. It may be easier to read that one first or at least side by side with this. I have used the same headings and tried to respond in the order of that argument.
The topic of debate here concerns the validity of extra-Biblical Church Tradition. To that end, I'd like to skip over two points in your response. If you want me to address any of them, don't hesitate to ask and I will. These include: intercessions of the 'dead' and fallibilty and infallibility. For both of these, you are making your case from Scripture, which makes them a matter of scriptural exegesis and not of extra-Biblical tradition.
(Sufficiency of Oral Transmission)
You write that I "seem to assume that since the NT Scriptures were written down within the first two generations of the Church (from, presumably, A.D. 50s-90s), that all had ready access to those Scriptures." I do not. Near the end my comment, I wrote, "The incomplete status of Scripture during the first century necessitated oral Tradition; the sufficiency of the completed Scripture today makes such oral Tradition obsolete. Two options exist for those local congregations that did not have all of the NT: 1) They made do with what they had (unlikely, since the whole of Tradition is not only sufficient, but necessary); 2) they relied on oral Tradition." As I indicated, I believe option 2 to be more likely and I am willing to extend this necessity for oral transmission of the Tradition for as long as the entire canon had not been made available. I concluded, "There is, however, no argument here that the legitimate content of that Tradition was any more than what is contained in the NT." [Or, for that matter, all of Scripture- OT included.]
(Sufficiency of Scripture for faith and practice)
Am I to understand that Judaism recognized a larger group of books than is in their present Scripture but allowed a council at Jamnia to throw some of them out just to spite the Christians? I don't think so. Anyway, see here. The author writes:
So far, we have seen that the canonicity of from six to eight books was discussed by the rabbis, all but one of which are in the third of the present divisions of the Hebrew Bible. Unless one considers the books of Hamiram to have been real candidates for canonicity, only books in the present canon were even mentioned.
The defensive nature of the discussion suggests that the rabbis were trying to justify the status quo rather than campaigning for or against candidates for admission. There is no hint that any of the books discussed was of recent vintage or of any other than traditional authorship. The questions which are raised, in fact, are just the sort that are still being raised today among people with similar theology and interests. These involve internal considerations only, and it appears that no other lines of questioning were pursued.
The LXX itself gives support to the fact that the LXX contained more than the Jewish canon. Neither the LXX nor the Apostles' use thereof supports the extra material in the LXX as canon. The Reformers used the Apocrypha. The original KJV, a Protestant translation, included the Apocrypha between the Testaments. The Belgic Confession, Art. 6 states, "The church may certainly read these [Apocryphal] books and learn from them as far as they agree with the canonical books." None of which is evidence that they considered the Apocrypha to be Scripture. I need more than just usage and appreciation as evidence that the early Church considered these books canonical.
In regard to your charge that the sufficiency of Scripture cannot be justified from Scripture, I refer you back to Revelation 22:18,19, mentioned in my previous response. The prohibition against substraction or addition implies, in turn, both the neccessity and sufficiency of Scripture. I Corinthians13:8-10, "Love never ends. As for prophecies, they shall pass away; as for tongues, they will cease; as for knowledge, it will pass away. For we know in part and we prophesy in part, but when the perfect comes, the partial will pass away." Cessationists interpret "the perfect" to mean the completed Scripture. This is understood in relation to the intended function of prophecies, tongues, and knowledge. Prophecies would relate to the office of a prophet, which, together with that of apostle formed the foundation of the church. The foundational purpose of both was to establish church tradition. In the following chapter, Paul sets up some rules for speaking in tongues in the church. No one could speak in tongues unless there was someone to interpret. Earlier, Paul had asked what good it was to speak in tongues unless he brought "some revelation or knowledge or prophecy or teaching" (14:6). It appears from putting this together that tongues were not given for Charismatic chaos, but in order to act as a supplement for the as yet incomplete Scripture. Knowledge is a bit more illusive. It can't be taken in its broadest sense. Paul is not promising a day when everyone will suddenly be stupid. Noting that it is mentioned in the list of 14:6, it might be the immediate ability to exegete the interpreted tongues without benefit of study. Whatever it is, the general idea that Scripture is that which is perfect is not destroyed. Paul is looking forward to the time when there will be something sufficient enough to eliminate the need for all of these other things. When that which is perfect is come, the partial passes away. Scripture is perfect, all that had been uninscripturated tradition was partial. Scripture teaches its own sufficiency.
The dichotomy between Scripture and Tradition would only be false if Scripture justified the content of the Tradition or, if not that, if it could at least justifify the existence of extra-Biblical tradition. There is no false dichotomy in questioning the existence of a tradition that Scripture does not sanction.
My arguments as they regard the long term insufficiency of oral transmission were more in answer to the question of why Scripture is necessary. They speak only indirectly against the continued existence of an oral tradition. I believe, however, that it is sidetracking the discussion so, for the sake of argument I will concede this point: oral transmission is capable of the indefinite and perfect preservation of tradition. Now, where does that get us? We're still left with the fact the Scripture exists. Why does it exist and what does that imply? I denied the current validity of tradition that is not contained in Scripture. You responded- what about before Scripture was complete or completely distributed? And you are quite right: the circumstance of an incomplete scripture does necessitate the validity of an oral tradition, even a tradition that, by definition, is not in Scripture. Such a circumstance, however, does not necessitate the validity of an oral tradition that would not one day be inscripturated. In the absence of an argument that would necessitate the validity of such a an oral tradtion beyond what was needed to supplement incomplete scripture, my claim that extra-Biblical traditions are invalid is not circular. Rather, your own attempt to justify a post-canonical practice by a narrower pre-canonical necessity is a red herring.
(Limiting the Tradition to the Body of Scripture)
"And when they received these written Scriptures, how were they to verify their authority and divine origin? By way of the Tradition; i. e., Tradition substantiated itself in Scripture." No. Let me throw in a little bit of my own church tradition: WCF I.5b, "Our full persuasion and assurance of the infallible truth and divine authority thereof [of Scripture], is from the inward work of the Holy Spirit bearing witness by and with the Word in our hearts." Tradition is not the foundation of Scripture nor is the reverse true. The Holy Spirit is the foundation. He gives the tradition, oversees its inscripturation process, and guides the church in recognizing what is scripture.
The scriptural warrant for Sunday worship is found in Apostolic practice as recorded in Acts. As to the Protestant sacramental views, let's assume that your own are correct. In this case, the depleted practice of many Protestants would not demonstrate that Tradition and Scripture are not coextensive, but that Protestants have a blind spot in their exegesis. Whatever the range of Protestant views, they are all formulated with the intent to follow Scripture. [OK, big exception for Liberal Protestants.]
See above for scriptural warrant that scripture is coextensive with tradition. To the extent that such warrant exists demonstrating that Scripture is sufficient for faith and practice, it also demonstrates this.
(Obsolescence of Tradition Based on Completed Canon)
You outline an invalid argument, but it's not the one I presented (possible lack of clarity on my part notwithstanding). The antecedent is not "If Scripture is incomplete, " but "If and only if Scripture is incomplete." The rules about denying antecedents or affirming consequents do not apply in such a case.
There is no false dilemma. If Scripture is sufficient to faith and practice, then whatever it doesn't address does not fall under the category of authoritative extra-Biblical Church Tradition.
Paul's apostleship was attested to in the performance of miracles, his faithfulness to the Gospel and the OT, and the testimony of the Holy Spirit. Arguably, these may be categorized as holy Tradition, but their function at the time does nothing to demonstrate the fuller tradition that you wish to advocate for today.
Perhaps the intent is being lost on me due to my own emphasis on the matter, but it looks like the views presented here come dangerously close to the view that baptism saves ex opere operato rather than its saving efficacy being a means of grace. Neither one of these is the current Protestant add-on, but they do differ significantly from each other. A key point, under the second heading, says, "The scriptural writers clearly talk about baptism as being the moment when we receive the forgiveness of sins promised to us by the Gospel." However, such a tie to a moment in time cannot be derived from any of the texts provided ( nor, I would argue, from any text at all.)
The WCF XXVIII.6 maintains the real efficacy of baptism apart from any specified time, "The efficacy of baptism is not tied to that moment of time wherein it is administered; yet notwithstanding, by the right use of this ordinance, the grace promised is not only offered, but really exhibited and conferred, by the Holy Ghost, to such (whether of age or infants) as that grace belongeth unto, according to the counsel of God's own will, in his appointed time."
Keeping this in mind would have avoided the answer to this question:
"Q: So do you mean that I wasn’t saved when I prayed that prayer?
A: You certainly weren’t joined with the body of Christ, cleansed of your sins, and filled with the Holy Spirit then."
I'm not that a big fan of the sinner's prayer; however, to the extent that it is calling upon the name of the Lord, it is evidence of faith. The implication here is that faith routinely occurs without being joined to the body of Christ, being cleansed of one's sins, or being filled with the Holy Spirit. I don't buy it. All of these must occur in the presence of faith because faith is always preceded by regeneration. What does regeneration have to do with it? To see, consider two things:
1) WCF XXVII.1 calls sacraments "holy signs and seals." I don't believe that this is a just a hendiadys; rather, it anticipates section 2, "There is in every sacrament a spiritual relation, or sacramental union, between the sign and the thing signified: whence it comes to pass, that the names and effects of the one are attributed to the other." A sacrament, then, is composed of two parts- the sign and the thing signified.
2) The fourth point of Calvinism; namely, Irresistible Grace. [I will make the connection.] Many people ae familiar with Ephesians 2:8, "For by grace you have been saved through faith." But what about its context? Backing up to 1:19, 20 and 2:5,6, it becomes apparent that this grace is equated with our being raised up with Christ. In the first passage, Paul wants the Ephesians to know "what is the immeasurable greatness of his power toward us who believe, according to the working of his great might that he worked in Christ when he raised him from the dead and seated him at his right hand in the heavenly places..." There is a power that raises Christ from the dead. This translation (ESV), as do many others that I checked, obscures the meaning by inserting a comma after "believe." However, the idea, which will be born out in the second passage, is that the same power that raised Christ from the dead causes us to believe.
In the next passage, we are being raised with Christ. Note, though, how Paul breaks the flow of the passage to insert a familiar phrase, "[God,] even when we were dead in our trespasses, made us alive together with Christ-by grace you have been saved-and raised us up with him and seated us with him in the heavenly places in Christ Jesus..." What is being raised up together with Christ if not regeneration? In context, then, the grace by which we are saved goes far beyond a mere description of God's goodness or kindness toward us. This grace is the power of resurrection. It is that which brings us alive with Christ and places us in heaven.
Bearing this in mind, consider the passages in which baptism unites us to Christ in his death and resurrection (Romans 6:3,4; Colossians 2:12) and note the relationship: Whereas baptism is the sign, regeneration is the thing signified. To forget this distinction is to confuse the means of grace with the grace itself. The one is more basic than the other. In a sense, all who are regenerated have been baptized into Christ. Which is not to suggest that water baptism is just a sign, such that it may be neglected with impunity by those who evidence faith. It is still that true means of grace whereby saving faith is made possible. Don't get hung up on the timing. It is no less difficult to believe that God can grant salvation before baptism than it is to believe that he granted salvation to the OT saints before the work of Christ. God is not trapped in a bottle waiting for us to say, "When." Even more so, just as God can show his grace when he pleases, he may also show it if he pleases. WCF XXVIII.5, "Although it be a great sin to contemn or neglect this ordinance, yet grace and salvation are not so inseparably annexed unto it, as that no person can be regenerated or saved without it; or, that all that are baptized are undoubtedly regenerated."
Not only is baptism not necessarily tied to the moment of forgiveness, it is not necessarily tied to forgiveness at all. Otherwise, all who receive the sign of baptism would be saved and those who are saved could lose their salvation. Peter offers this perspective in I Peter 3:21, where he says, "Baptism, which corresponds to this, now saves you." He is not making the blanket statement that baptism, considered in itself, is a salvific act. The emphasis is not so much on save as it is on you (Peter is speaking to the elect [1:1]). The end of the verse indicates that baptism saves through the resurrection of Christ, which fits in with what we've already seen. The interesting part is the previous verse, which presents what saving baptism through the resurrection of Christ is being compared to; namely, the flood and Noah's ark, which "was being prepared, in which a few, that is, eight persons, were brought safely through the water." Salvation is not proper to baptism itself, for baptism is the water ordeal. It is the flood that destroyed the ancient world. It is also that which threatens those in the ark, but through which both they and the ark are safely carried. Only those who are in the ark came out of the flood alive.
Baptism is that which leads to the final sancitification of the Bride. It is union with Christ. It is unthinkable that, after such a consummation, this Groom could grant, much less desire, a bill of divorcement. We must conclude then, that not all baptism is baptism into Christ. Neither, however, is it just an empty sign. Baptism brings one into a covenantal relationship with God, which relationship is not necessarily synonymous to union with Christ. Just as with the elect, the curses of the covenant are truly threatened and the blessings given, so with the others in the covenant, the blessings are truly offered and the curses executed. Consider what the sign of the covenant is. It is being cut off; it is passing through the waters of judgment; it is the cross. The covenant demands that all go through this ordeal. Only those who are in Christ come out their baptism alive.
One of the tragic, if unintended, consequences of the Reformation is the proliferation within Protestantism of go-it-alone, voluntary Christianity. Whether manifested in sufficiency-of-personal-quiet-time individualism, or in denominations that think of themselves as the sole recepticals of truth and light, or in the wilfull ignorance of a living Church before 1517, the results are just as deadly. True spirituality is less frequently defined in terms of participation in the Church's ministry of Word and Sacrament; more often, it is in terms of the mental accumulation of Bible-like aphorisms along with the occassional charitable social deed. Nor is the church entirely free of blame. In a tradition that rightly emphasized the return to robust, soundly exegeted preaching, we are often given therapeutic drool.
It becomes increasingly difficult to maintain faith in the sacramental aspect of the preached Word when it is possible to get so much more out of it on our own (not that everyone does). This should not be possible. Not that the individual should cease and desist from all serious Bible-study. Scripture commends the Bereans, who were "examining the Scriptures daily to see if these things were so." What things? The things that they were being taught by the Apostle Paul. The Bereans were never able to find that Word preached to them hadn't been so. Too often, the same does not hold true today. And it's not the fault of the person who did the double checking. If things do not improve, this person can do one of three things: 1) maintain the status quo; 2) go it alone, which involves separation from life of the Church along with the corresponding view of Scripture as a set of universal and rational propositions upon which to agree; 3) retreat to the safety of Mother Church as she existed before the Reformation.
The temptation in this third step is to absolutize the authority of the Church above that of Scripture. All these squabbling children can't agree on proper hermeneutics and exegesis? Well, we'll just stop that right now. Scripture and the Tradition of which it is a part are a product of the Church; consequently, it means whatever we say it means. End of discussion. But churches disagree among themselves. So, which church is the true Church? At which point we go back to the Great Schism of 1054 ("I'm in charge-you're excommunicated!" "How dare you put that clause in there- you're excommunicated!") and find that these psuedo-Mothers have nothing over the Protestants.
The idea is that the Church, in order to be One, Holy, Catholic, and Apostolic, must have existed and continue to exist in a particular, unbroken, and visible instantiation. [I ran across a similar thing growing up in the doctrine of the "Baptist Bride".] This alone is the true Church and she derives her authority from this identity. I can see how such an idea would be comforting, how it would avoid the baser excesses of Protestantism. But for those tempted to go this route, it represents, on at least one level, a colossal shirking of personal responsibility. If a church's rendition of Tradition, including Scripture, is deemed correct based on nothing more than its claimed exclusive identity as "Christ's Church," then there is no place for a Berean. Either such study will result in some heavy-duty reevaluation of this church's claims (since no particular church is without error), or constant demurring to the will of this church will result in eventual surrender. The anti-intellectual tendencies are just as thick here as they are in Protestant evangelicalism.
Neither extreme is necessary. I started out by assigning blame to the Reformation. Please don't get the wrong idea, for this is not entirely so. While it is true that the Reformers were a product of their time and somewhat blinded to it (as happens to all people concerning their particular era), it is not the case that, but for the Reformation, the Enlightenment and secular degeneration of the West would never have occurred. The backlash against an increasingly apostate church/state had been building for years. The Reformation was necessary to the well-being, even to the life, of the Church. For those whom it touched, it brought an unprecedented depth and balance to the faith and practice of the Church. Not least of the reasons for this was the Reformer's insistence on sola scriptura accompanied by the study and adoption of the consensus of Church teaching, from the Fathers on, about that Scripture. In my estimation, the faith of the Reformation stands as the best articulated synthesis between Church Tradition and authority, and individual piety and responsibility. But, for those who would prefer to trust their own individual judgment or for those who would prefer to surrender their judgment to an ultimate authority figure, this is a scary proposition. Where's the certainty? To which I must respond-where's the faith?
Just recently, I responded to a post that claimed that we do not have the right to depart from Tradition. I stated in seed form much of what I've already said here. I don't know how succesfully I communicated the idea that I do not deny Tradition. For one thing, the response made me feel as though I were standing in the middle of a room, the Orthodox Traditional types on one side, the Protestant Lone Ranger types on the other side, and the respondant talking past me to the other guy. Meanwhile, I was very tempted to cheer and say, "Yeah, you tell him!" A lot of what was said to me is what I would have said to someone else. Which is good. This is possible common ground. We should want as much common ground as possible with those who confess Christ.
There is much good to be said about Orthodoxy. I do appreciate the emphasis on the Church. I appreciate Orthodoxy for being a repository for the teaching of many of the Fathers, for the connection that this gives the Church entire to its own history. I am particularly attracted to certain doctrines within Orthodoxy. The emphasis on the importance of the incarnation for redemption and even some form of theosis (if not taken as the crass idea that we turn into God) both play into my developing understanding of eschatology. On the other hand, I cannot agree to some of the practical results of its traditions. I find it horrifying, for instance, that Orthodoxy adovates praying to dead people and venerating their body parts. Despite objections to the contrary, such traditions do exist in opposition to Scripture and thereofore, as I will argue below, to Apostolic Tradition itself.
The following is the response that I was going to post over there (the preceding originally intended as a couple sentences of introduction when I decided to post it here).
"Scripture itself is part of Tradition." Agreed. Scripture is not written in an historical and theological vacuum. The revelation of God first comes by means of providential events and the spoken word of his prophets. This revelation is handed down to the Church as its Tradition. The Tradition is received by the Church, it is not created by the Church. This Tradition is sufficient for the life of the Church from the first time that it is handed down. The Tradition must be preserved. Oral transmission, from one generation to the next, has limited efficacy. It is likely that, intentionally or not, things will be added or taken away. The Tradition is best preserved through a process of inscripturation. This is true of all Tradition received from God by the Church. Scripture is a part of Tradition because Scripture is the written record of the whole of Tradtition. Scripture includes all that the Church, as the Church, may believe and practice. Any belief or practice to which the Church holds must either be explicitly taught in Scripture, or be capable of being justified from Scripture properly exegeted. Any belief or practice that does not meet these criteria is no part of Tradition but has been introduced without proper authority at some point in the Church's history.
"The problem is when Christians try to excise Scripture from Tradition and interpret it outside of the Tradition. It is inevitable that the meaning of Scripture will then be distorted beyond, if you will, authorial (and Authorial) intent." Again, agreed. The inscripturation of Tradition does not imply that the individual does not need the Church. The Tradition is passed down to the Church defined corporately. It is designed to be understood by the Church, taught by the Church, and used by the Church. The Church is not confined to any particular denomination, time, or place. The Church is composed of individuals. As these individuals are fallible, so are churches. The individual is to submit to the teaching of the Church. A particular church may fall into false teaching. The individual is to know both Scripture and the consensus of the historical Church's teaching on Scripture in order that he may detect false teaching. A particular church is to know both Scripture and the consensus of the historical Church's teaching on Scripture in order that it may avoid false teaching.
I do appreciate the use of Scripture to defend Tradition; however, the exegesis lacks. There is nothing in either text [II Thessalonians 2:15 and 3:6,7] that requires a reference to the whole body of the Tradition. In each case, Paul is referring to what he himself had taught them. Paul was an apostle and as such had the authority to initiate traditions in the Church, having received these himself from God by inspiration of the Holy Spirit. He had done just this in the church of Thessalonica both by his spoken word while visiting them and by writing I Thessalonians. Both of these constituted tradition that they were to hold and pass down. Soon after this, the tradition was jeopardized by a letter pretending to be from Paul claiming that the Day of the Lord ( a subject of the first epistle) had already come. II Thessalonians is written to correct this. In it, he exhorts his readers to hold fast the traditions that they were taught "whether by word or by epistle of us." The traditions are, specifically, those things that Paul had already spoken and written to the church at Thessalonica.
In the second passage, Paul is instructing them to stay away from anyone who, claiming to be a Christian, refuses to work or "walks in idleness." [The translation "who walketh disorderly" cannot be justified within the context. The adverb in question comes from a verb meaning, "to refuse to be engaged in the efforts of work."] The refusal to work is contrary to the tradition that they had received from Paul on his first visit. As before, though, the text does not require that this be the whole of the Tradition. Paul immediatley describes how he had delivered this specific tradition: 1) by his own example in order that they might imitate him; 2) by a specific command- "For even when when we were with you, we would give this command: If anyone is not willing to work, let him not eat" (v. 10). The passage stands, not as an example of a Tradition that continues to exist beyond Scripture (although, the very nature of Scripture requires that, at one point, it had to), but as an example of the inscripturation of traditions.
I would argue that the "New Testament Scripture is fundamentally necessary for determining the parameters and content of Christian life and doctrine." But I would not intend the NT as an abstract collection of propositions, as, unfortunately, is the underlying assumption in much of Protestantism. Instead, the fundamental necessity of the NT is derived from the fact that it is the embodiment of the Tradition. Before this Tradition was inscripturated, the Church had the Apostles to deliver this Tradition. This does not imply a problem with numbers: 1) the Tradition delivered by the Apostles could be handed down orally by others people; 2) the inscripturation of this Tradition was relatively fast; 3) the Apostles were not the only ones authorized to establish Tradition. Ephesians 2:20 describes the Church as "built on the foundation of the Apostles and Prophets." Both of these are NT offices specifically designed to act as the foundation, i.e., source of Tradition, for the Church. Once the foundation is laid, the offices die out. It is necessary that this foundation be laid before its inscripturation is complete. It is not necessary, and, given the absence of the foundational offices, is even dangereous, that non-inscripturated Tradition continue to exist.
My objection is not to NT Christianity being truly Apostolic and truly Traditional. But I expect that a church that claims this of itself (as all churches should) will be able to justify the Apostolic foundations of its traditions and, therefore, its Tradition by grounding each instantiation of this Tradition in its Apostolic inscripturation. Whereever this cannot be done there is no unity between Scripture and that tradition. Such a tradition, no matter how ancient, no matter how much it may be attested to in the creeds and councils, must be thrown out. It is not of Apostolic origin.
Here is yet another response from the same thread as my previous post. This time, it addresses a comment made by The Dane, who wrote:
Does the normative tithe predate the Law? I'm not sure how. Yes, Abraham tithes once in his life, but it's a bit more complicated than just a tenth of income since he gives not out of what is his, but out of the loot from the conquered kings - and he gives the whole other 90% to those from who it was stolen in the first place. That's a good, well, hundred percent, minus what his men had already eaten and what went as share to his allies. And we've got to note, that this Abrahamic tithe was nowhere in Scripture commanded.
You mention that "several things in the OT are no longer required; however, this is not due to a lifting of requirement as such, but to the nature of the thing abrogated." Of course, everything intrinsic to the Law alone is abrogated - as Christ, while not destroying the Law, certainly fulfilled it. Therefore, the Mosaic Law is only pedagogical at this point in redemptive history. To better understand my view of the Mosaic Covenant, please refer to here.
Although this post should be able to stand on its own, you may want to read the comments leading up to it.
I was only alluding to Abraham as a counterexample to the idea that the tithe is no longer required simply because it was proper to the Law. It was not my intent to justify a theology of the tithe on a story about what Abraham just happened to do one day. Having said this, I do not think it is correct to say that, since the Abrahamic tithe was nowhere in Scripture commanded, it cannot, therefore, inform our theology. This is an argument from silence and, to me, just a bit thin. The fact that no such command is explicitly recorded is no evidence that no such command existed. If we consider the Abrahamic narrative in conjunction with the rest of scriptural teaching on the subject, then it is legitimate to assume either an explicit command or an implicit obligation. The rest of scriptural teaching is not that on the tithe per se, but on the support of ministers and the ministry. Anything from the Mosaic tithe being instituted for the support of the Levites, to Paul's teaching. He writes in I Corinthians 9:13,14, "Do you not know that those who are employed in the temple service get their food from the temple, and those who serve at the altar share in the sacrificial offerings? In the same way, the Lord commanded that those who proclaim the gospel should get their living by the gospel." I do not take Paul as saying that Christ commanded something similar to these temple regulations (although he may have); rather, the point is that the regulations for the support of those who minister in the temple constitute the command of Christ concerning those who are ministers of the gospel. If we go back to the institution of Mosaic law, not all of it is a new thing. We know, from the existence of Melchizedec, that there was a priest of God (if not priests) before Moses. The obligation to ministerial support is not limited to the explicit commands concerning the Levites, but is implicit in the existence of ministers of Christ.
There is a deeper point that can be obscured in a theology of tithing. The support of Christ's ministers is more than a practically good thing. This is not just another instantiatian of the principle that workers are worth their wages. Tithing is not just a necessity to keep the ministry intact- God could have used other means. The tithe is an act of worship. In tithing, we acknowledge and worship Christ, who has commissioned both his ministers and their work. Our obligation is to worship Christ when and wherever he is revealed. Such is the case in the existence of the ministry. [I have dealt more with this, at least as it relates to Abraham, here.]
When writing of the "nature of the thing abrogated," I meant more by "nature" than being intrinsic to the Law alone. I see little difference between this and the notion that, since Christ has fulfilled the law, we are free from requirements. Christ did fulfill the law, all of it; yet, I would argue (and am doing so in the comment thread here) that "fulfill" does not equal "make null and void." The Decalogue has been fulfilled in Christ; nonetheless, it still presents a required standard for covenant, even NC, living. Where a command is abrogated upon being fulfilled, it is not because fulfillment causes indiscriminate cessation. Instead, this cessation of ceremonial law is built into its revelatory function. The ceremonial laws, as does all of scripture, reveal Christ. This is true, not only of their existence in history, but, even more of their removal. When the ceremonial laws cease, when the temple veil is ripped in two, it isn't just "good riddance to a contract now we're free from its terms." These laws, as intended, existed not as taskmasters but as promises of grace. The moral law, standing alone, reveals our condemnation. The ceremonial law was a revelation of forgiveness. The sudden vacuum caused by its removal could be traumatic, especially to those who were looking to that law in itself. Instead, the abrogation of the ceremonial law stands as its final and fullest revelation of Christ. "Behold the Lamb of God, the eternal priest who now has taken away our sins once and for all." Before I could be convinced that the tithe is no longer required under the NC, I would have to be shown how its cessation reveals Christ (if at all) more than its continuation does.
In response to an observed inconsistency between Baptist views of tithing and baptism, I had written, "In defense of the Baptists, giving is plainly evident in the NT without recourse to the OT. Having seen it in the NT, it is then possible to go to the OT and learn more about it. Infant baptism is not plainly evident in the NT unless one approaches it through the OT. The problem is not in an arbitrary inconsistency, but in the idea that the NT can stand on its own when it comes to any given doctrine. The whole of scripture needs to be considered for every doctrine, not just those that are obvious." Whereupon I have been asked to explain the hermenuetic "if it's not mentioned in the NT then it doesn't cross over." I assume that this means it doesn't cross over from the OT.
When it comes to infant baptism, many Baptists might object to the notion that they are not allowing something to cross over. This kind of baptism is not explicitly mentioned in any testament. But in this case, it isn't the narrower point of baptizing infants, but that of applying the covenant sign to infants. The NT has no explicit command to apply the sign of the covenant to infants. So then, why this reluctance to look to the OT? Essentially, there is a default position that the old covenant and thus the OT is abrogated as any kind of a normative standard unless there is good reason to make an exception. This is just a restatement of the basic hermeneutic, though. Why hold to this position?
I suggest that it is the result of falling head long into a ditch. An ugly ditch, as Gotthold Lessing described his maxim: "Accidental truths of history can never become the proof of necessary truths of reason." A necessary truth of reason is a timeless and universal moral principle. It is something that all thinking people, in all times and places, know is right. There is no need to hear a story about it or to know that someone else did it; it's just reasonable that it's the right thing to do. This consensus crosses all cultural and religious barriers. Truths of reason are the way things should be. Truths of history, on the other hand, are the way things have actually been. Because they are accidental, they could just as well have been otherwise. Consequently, it is not possible to look at a truth of history and say that things should have been this way. You can't get an 'ought' from an 'is,' or, in this case, from a 'was.' Accidental truths cannot prove necessary truths, nor, for that matter, do necessary truths require any proof.
Now, apply this to the present example. A covenant, along with its sign, is not a necessary truth of reason. It is not the case that people across all cultures and religions think that it's just not right to lack such a thing. Some cultures have had covenant signs, many more have not. Israel just happened to have one. But this is an accidental truth of history at a specific time and place. The fact that it was this way provides no imperative for what ought to be done. When it comes to the parameters of the NT covenant sign, we must be informed by what the NT says to do and not by the historical features of another covenant.
Another side of this same hermeneutic is seen in the linked article on tithing. The historical connection between the old covenant and the new covenant is broken. What happened to be true under the OC is not binding on us now. But then the article quotes from both testaments in order to present its position on giving. These are prefaced with, "Note however, that while tithing is no longer required, giving is still a principle of God." What's going on here? The scriptural texts are not being used as the binding Word of God. Instead, being charitable, i.e., giving as "a principle of God," is recognized as a timeless moral principle. The force of the argument lies here and not in the particular texts gleaned to illustrated a preconceived idea. Yet, if this is the case, if the principle is timeless, why use scripture at all? Any illustration will do.
Now, it is not always the case, especially among those who believe in the inspiration of scripture, that the Bible entire is reduced to illustrations of moral principles. God does issue commands that are not timeless truths of reason. Lessing's ditch is far too ugly, and so it's been landscaped. The covenant life of ancient Israel can never be the proof of the commands of the NT. However, this brings us back to the point that something must either be mentioned in the NT, or be a necessary truth of reason. And so the OT is used, but not under its own authority. Instead, it provides the material for Sunday School stories/Aesop's fables. The same thing seeps over into NT historical narrative.
I also would argue that this approach is behind the almost universal fascination within the evangelical church with exemplaristic preaching. Read the biblical narrative and then subject it to practical application. That is, determine which necessary truth has been illustrated by the text and then explain how to put this imperative of reason into practice. Why bother with the first step then? Perhaps as a psychological preparation for the second. But if this is the case, why not expand the repertoire? It wouldn't even have to be historically accurate. Just make it up. The same Bible stories again and again do get awfully boring.
In the end, a hermeneutic that assumes the existence of Lessing's ditch leaves us with no way to defend the existence of a unique and uniquely relevant revelation from God. And it is no wonder. It isn't just that Lessing is mistaken about the relationship between these two truths. Rather, if the triune God of the covenant exists, then there are no accidental truths of history and there are no necessary truths of reason. He is the sovereign Lord of history who reveals his truth by means of that history to whomever he will. Not only is the ditch a figment of the collective evangelical imagination, so is the surrounding territory.
O Lord our Lord, how excellent
Is all your holy name:
In awe, I stand before your works
Considering the same.
The moon and stars ordained by you
Are wondrous past compare.
How can I, gazing on them all,
Not know the God who's there?
For all the things invisible
Of him I clearly see,
And understand, by what he's made,
His power over me.
For what is man, that you have put
All things beneath his feet?
Or even babes, that from their mouth
Your foes you will defeat?
Professing then themselves to be
As wise, they fools became,
While those on whom you set your love
Did simply trust your name.
A name at which all knees shall bow
And every tongue confess
That Jesus Christ shall ever be,
"The Lord our Righteousness."
My God, I so desire that day-
Come quickly, then, for me.
O Lord our Lord, how excellent
Your name will ever be.
The following constitutes my attempt to deal with this: I'd really be interested in reading an explanation of the "Free-Will Defense of God" that more than one Presbyterian has insisted upon. I mean, you know the question's out there: How can it be the case that humans have the ability to choose right or wrong AND that the Church is the predetermined vessel of Glory since before Creation?. I don't so much offer a direct explanation of the free-will defense as I try to explain the different ideas of what the will is and why the free will defense cannot consistently be held by Presbyterians.
Monothelitism is the doctrine that the incarnate Christ has a single will, much like any other person. It was condemned as heresy at Constantinople III, the sixth ecumenical council. Monothelitism was consistent with monophysitism, which is the doctrine that the incarnate Christ had only one nature, the human and divine having been somehow merged. The council declared that since Christ was one person in two natures, he therefore had two wills. These wills were always in perfect harmony; nevertherless, they had to be distinguished. The point to note here is what is assumed of the will on both sides. The will is a faculty of the nature.
Now, jump ahead to current discussions on the freedom of the will and, more often than not, the will is equated with the self. The implication is a readoption of monothelitism. There is no longer a conscious claim that Christ has only one nature. Supposedly, the will is something that the person of Christ does. Stop just a minute, though. What do you think a nature is? If the Logos chooses, then it follows that it is in his nature to choose. And, if both natures of the incarnate Logos are to remain intact, then each must retain its own faculty of willing. Free-will, as it is popularly understood among most Christians, is incompatible with the church's rejection of monthelitism. This view of the will is characterized by indeterminacy; i.e., the will cannot be truly free unless its actions are not determined by anything outside of itself. At the moment of decision, I must have the equal ability to choose a or non-a. This kind of free-will is seen as necessary to the existence of moral beings. An action is not truly moral, they say, unless it is free. An automaton cannot be praised or blamed for what it does because it had to do it.
But there are problems with this view of free-will greater than anything it claims to solve. If the will of a moral being must be characterized by indeterminacy, then what prevents the possibility of evil at any point in eternity? The Church could not be a predetermined vessel of Glory. Maybe in the sense of God's wishful thinking, but not in much else. Also, God is a moral being. What prevents arbitrary evil decisions on his part? One might argue that whatever he does is good by virtue of the fact that he does it. But this is hardly comforting. I, for one, do not relish the thought of standing before the judgment seat of Christ only to see him in hysterical laughter saying, "I lied" The idea is repugnant; however, we cannot eliminate it by defining the will in such a way that God cannot be free.
The Reformed/Augustinian view is compatibilism. [I have also discussed it here.] Moral beings are free to do whatever they want, but this freedom is compatible with the sovereignty of God. Although the Reformed (including the WCF IX) call this free-will, it is better understood as "free moral agency." The key is this: the will of the moral agent is not indeterminately free, but the moral agent is free to do whatever he wants. The will is not to be equated with the self, but is a faculty of the nature. Our choices are always determined by our strongest moral inclinations. God is absolutely free but he can only act in a perfectly righteous manner because he is holy. When we have been completely redeemed, we will be even more free than we are now. Free to always do what is right.
All of which leads to my baffllement at Presbyterians adopting the Free-will defence (FWD) of God. [The FWD needs to be distinguished from a free-will theodicy. The former defends God's existence, the latter defends his righteousness.] The classic objection had been, "How can an all good and all powerful God allow evil? If evil exists, then God is not all powerful or he is not all good." The next step, of course, was that, since God is defined as all powerful and all good, and since there is evil, then God must not exist. There never really has been a satisfactory rational answer to this. Until the FWD. After all, everyone agrees that free-will is a good thing and that God would have to voluntarily limit himself in order to allow it to operate.
Assuming that this view of free-will is correct, this works as a defense (note: a defense of the existence of God is not to be confused with a proof or argument for the existence of God). The problem is this: since the wrong view of the will has been assumed, then the wrong God has been defended. It is not the case that there exists a God who created moral beings capable of indeterminate choice. Instead, the Reformed claim is that God created moral beings who always act according to their natures. This claim fails to answer the classic objection to God's existence and cannot stand as a defense of that existence. Under the FWD, God's creation of moral beings necessitates the possibility of evil. This is not the case if complatibilism is true. There is, from our perspective, no defensible reason why God could not have created all moral beings impeccable, as he did with the unfallen angels.
This was written in response to a comment the Dane made over here. The topic was Plantinga's criticism of classical foundationalism. The question was, "Well, taking Plantinga's criticism of foundationalism to his own thoughts, how can belief in God (or in his actions) be properly basic - since so many vary on whether God exists or not?"
Plantinga's critique of classical foundationalism (CF) for "its excessive exclusion and its self-referential incoherence" cannot be applied to his idea that belief in God is properly basic. According to CF, a belief, in order to constitute knowledge, must either be properly basic or based on propositional reasoning from a properly basic foundation. There is nothing wrong with the idea that certain known things follow this paradigm: foundational propositions + reason = knowledge. The weakness of CF is found in its self imposed limitations. A properly basic belief in CF must either be self-evident for me or immediately about my experience (Warrant and Proper Function p.182). A properly basic belief of the second kind says nothing about the external world. Therefore, the proposition "I see a black dog" is not properly basic. The properely basic belief in this case is, "I am being appeared to both blackly and dogly." It is only through a relatively complex reasoning process that I can be justified in saying that my experience results from the existence of a black dog external to my own mind. The self-referential incoherence of CF comes in the fact that the belief "a properly basic belief must either be self-evident for me or immediately about my experience" is itself neither self-evident for me nor immediately about my experience; nor does it have such a belief as a premise.
By accepting the idea of properly basic beliefs, Plantinga demonstrates that he is a foundationalist. He rejects the other two options, which are 1) Dismissing altogether the possibility of epistemology and, consequently, ability to know the truth. This is repugnant to Christian claims, especially Reformed claims, that knowledge is possible. 2) Coherentism. According to a popular misunderstanding of this system (unfortunately, even by some who hold to it), coherentism is a big epistemic circle. Belief A is based on belief A(1), which is based on A(2), and so on to A(n), which is based on A. Warrant for belief is being transferred all over the place, but there is no accounting for how the warrant got there. Transfer does not equal creation. A more likely coherentism does not claim that warrant is created in the process of transfer, but that the fact of systemic coherence itself constitutes warrant. Plantinga disproves this view by his telling of the Epistemically Inflexible Climber. Briefly, a climber scales a mountian and sits on a ledge. He forms certain beliefs about his situation. He is sitting on a mountain, wearing red shoes, the sun is shining, an eagle is circling below, etc. All of these beliefs are coherent- they do not contradict one another. Suddenly, a rare burst of solar energy damages a part of his brain causing his latest beliefs to become fixed. Even when his friend manages to get him down the mountain and takes him to the opera in an attempt to cure him, he still believes that he is on a mountain, in red shoes, watching an eagle, etc. His beliefs are just as coherent as they were before, but they hardly match the reality of his present situation.
Coherentism is fine as far as it goes- we want our beliefs to match up with each other. But there needs to be something more. This can only be found in some form of foundationalism. Certain beliefs need to be properly basic, not in the limited sense of CF, but in the sense that they have an immediate correspondence to external reality. A properly basic belief does not need to rely on any self-evident propositions, nor any propositions at all, for that matter. I would be warranted in my belief that I see a black dog simply by virtue of the fact that I see a black dog. There is no need to go through a reasoning process in order to be justified in concluding that there really is a black dog. I am warranted in believing that there is a black dog on the basis of seeing a black dog provided that two things are true; 1) there really is a black dog and 2) my senses and mental faculties are functioning within normal parameters. However, and this is a key difference between CF and this broader variety, I don't have to form any beliefs at all about these conditions for knowledge in order for warrant to obtain. Whereas CF is a form of internalist epistemology, in which I am constantly asking, "how do I know that I know?" this other foundationalism is an externalist epistemology. It seeks, not to eliminate all doubt as in the Cartesian model, but only to explain the mechanism of knowledge. It assumes the existence of a creator. [This is not to say that belief in God is necessary in order for knoweldge to be warranted, only his actual existence.] We are placed in a world of external objects and are given both mental faculties and sensory abilities designed to give us knowledge of the existence of these objects. The difference lies in a paradigm of faith as opposed to one of doubt.