Even though it’s been over a year since I last posted anything on this particular thread, I had no intention of dropping it altogether. This post will be a response to comments made by Andrew over here. It may be easier to follow this post by using those comments as a reference. As with the previous posts, it will be addressed directly to him.
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God’s Love and Election
We agree that God does not elect everybody. The question is - on what basis does he elect one person over another? Since the act of election is discriminating, the motivation must also discriminate. God’s love will only fit this criterion if it is does not have every person for its object. You can’t have it both ways. If love is the determining factor in election, and if God loves everyone, then everyone is elect. My own position is that God elects those whom he loves and that he does not love everybody. I have also stated that if God does love everyone, then something else must be the motivating factor in election. Just what that might be, I don’t know. To the question of the extent of God’s love, you have responded that God’s love is his most fundamental motivation; in fact, “so fundamental that God can be spoken of as being love.” Since John states in so many words that God is love, I cannot deny the premise; nevertheless, your conclusions do not necessarily follow. It isn’t that a God who is love must indiscriminately love everything and everyone, but that those whom he does love receive all of the benefits of that divine love. As I have indicated, though, I am willing to concede that God’s love could be universal; however, if it is, then there must be something else that determines who he elects. This something else is, from what I can tell, unknown to us. Your appeal to John 15:15 to argue against the possibility of unknowns when it comes to what God is doing or his motivations asks far more of this verse than it was meant to give. Reaching that stage in redemptive history where we can know what God is doing does not mean that we will ever know why he does it. To then say that we know that God always acts in love begs the question. It may be true, but it does not account for why he elects some people and not others. Even if you can make the case that we can know why God does everything he does, you will need to come up with a better reason for particular election than universal love.
Relationship of Persons
I appreciate the distinction that you draw between persons who share the same nature and persons with different natures. When two persons share the same nature, it is not an option for one not to love the other even though the love between them is freely given. To whatever extent a person has a different nature than God, his disposition to love God will be different. That is to say, man is capable of either loving or not loving God. This does not mean, however, that a human person has all options open all the time. Human nature is malleable. The regenerating work of the Holy Spirit effectually disposes a person toward loving God. This love is genuine even though a person so disposed cannot refuse to love God. Okay, he may temporarily fall into sin; however, the general trend will be toward loving God and, once he is in heaven, the ability to sin will be gone. The genuineness of human love for God is found in the source of that love, which is God. It is not found in the fact that, in this life, that love may be impure. The fact that we do not always love God as we ought does nothing to validate that love.
Adam’s Fall
I have no argument against the idea that the Fall was driven by a misguided desire for God or that Adam chose a lesser good. But then, neither of these is an argument against my own position that Adam also chose to disobey an explicit commandment of God. You admit that choosing a lesser good is not necessarily a sin. Can you provide examples where it is a sin (chosen at the expense of the greater good) and a revealed commandment of God has not been broken? With any other tree in the garden, Adam could have eaten because he had an immediate perception that it would be good. Each case would have been a lesser good than communion with God himself; however, in no case would this have been sin. The sin is not found in the fact that there is a distinction between a lesser and a greater good but in whether or not God has declared something that is otherwise good to be off limits.
Love and the Atonement
I seem to have gone too far in connecting your statement to Abelard’s view of the atonement. Not that this may not be your view, but that I can’t assume this from the statement that the work of the cross was to restore the bond of love between God and man. I do disagree with Catholic theology in calling Adam’s original state “original grace.” As I understand it, grace is not mere goodness but is limited to soteriology and only given to undeserving sinners. Even if grace is defined as a good that is not due, I don’t believe that it would apply to Adam before the fall. Being created in the image of God is not synonymous with the indwelling of the Spirit. Nevertheless, by creating man in his own image, God created him with a telos of union with himself. This union was something that man had to merit and this would only be possible with the indwelling of the Spirit. The giving of the Spirit to unfallen man was not optional on God’s part but was the only just thing to do if the end for which man was created was not to be a mockery. Once man had been given a fair chance, then the Spirit could be justly taken away when he failed. Our indwelling by the Spirit, our continued indwelling by the Spirit even when we have sinned is a matter of grace and is based upon the work of Christ and the promise of God. Christ’s work does create a bond of love between God and man. I don’t know that it merely restores it. Inasmuch as I can accept your distinction between love as a matter of affection and as a state of being, I argue that the state of being is a goal that will only be achieved in the resurrection. It is that for which Adam was made, not something that he already had.
Choice Between Eternal Truth and Immediate Perception of the Good
You explain that, in heaven, there will be no more differentiation between these. Choosing the immediate just is choosing the eternal. I will accept this only if the apparent lack of difference is due to a change in our perception; i.e., that there will be something about us such that our immediate perceptions of the good are always a clear vision of the eternal truth of the good. Our ability to remain sinless in heaven cannot be because God relaxes his standards, nor can it be a lack of opportunity. The ultimate goal of salvation must involve a change in us.
The End of Human Nature
I will agree that teleology should govern a given nature; I’m not so sure that it actually does. People have within their natures the capacity to desire God. It is also possible for human nature to become so disordered that a person is repulsed by God. Your statement that “a man will gladly embrace that which by nature beckons him to God, but he will be repulsed by that which by nature separates him from God” sounds reasonable, but it doesn’t fit the Scriptural evidence. Consider John 3:19- “And this is the judgment: the light has come into the world, and people loved the darkness rather than the light because their deeds were evil.” Somehow, I have a hard time thinking of the love of darkness as following one’s immediate perception of the good.
You draw a distinction between Adam’s human nature before the Fall and that of Christ: the first was incomplete and still disordered whereas the latter was fully formed. This would explain why Adam was vulnerable to temptation whereas Christ was not. The problem, though, is that it violates the principle of “that which is not assumed is not healed.” As I understand it, the capacity to fall into disorder or to be immune from disorder is, itself, a part of a given nature. The former is the state of human nature before the resurrection and the latter that of human nature afterwards. In the incarnation, Christ took on human nature as it exists so that we could be changed with him in the resurrection. I have no problem attributing the lack of actual corruption in Christ’s human nature, and thus the lack of sin as to his person, to an even greater measure of the Holy Spirit than Adam had, if this is even necessary. The difference here is extrinsic to the nature itself. I do have problems accepting an intrinsic difference. I agree that we will be made perfect like Christ is perfect, but I believe that Christ himself had to be made perfect as to his human nature. He was not formed that way from the beginning.
The Sacrifice of the Mass
The idea that Christ is resacrificed in the mass is not some Protestant conspiracy to make Catholics look bad. It comes straight out of the twenty-second session of the Council of Trent. In Catholic theology, the cross is the one bloody sacrifice of Christ, but it is not the only sacrifice of Christ. “That same Christ is contained and immolated in an unbloody manner, who once offered Himself in a bloody manner on the altar of the cross...For the victim is one and the same, the same now offering by the ministry of the priests, who then offered Himself on the cross, the manner alone of offering being different” (Chapter 2). You are correct that Christ is not crucified again, but this is technicality. Crucifixion is a bloody sacrifice, which Trent rejects other than the one time historical event. It does not, however, reject the notion that the same Christ who was crucified is immolated, i.e., sacrificed again and again in an unbloody manner in the mass. The mass is, as you say, “the re-presentation of the one sacrifice of the cross;” however, the means of this re-presentation is through another sacrifice of the same victim. See chapter 1- “– that He might leave, to His own beloved Spouse the Church, a visible sacrifice, such as the nature of man requires, whereby that bloody sacrifice, once to be accomplished on the cross, might be represented...” It is not enough in the Tridentine conception of the mass “merely that His one offering (Himself, body, soul, and Divinity) be forever present with us.” This is an accurate account of Transubstantiation or what the elements actually are despite appearances. The doctrine of the sacrifice of the mass is not, however, solely about what the elements are, but about what is done to them. Christ is not merely present in the mass, he is also sacrificed in it. For those who claim that the mass does not constitute an actual sacrifice, Canon I offers the following- “If any one saith, that in the mass a true and proper sacrifice is not offered to God; or, that to be offered is nothing else but that Christ is given us to eat; let him be anathema.” Another anathema, from Canon III, is pronounced on those who say “that the sacrifice of the mass is only a sacrifice of praise and of thanksgiving; or, that it is a bare commemoration of the sacrifice consummated upon the cross, but not a propitiatory sacrifice.”
Deliberation and Willing
Inasmuch as deliberation is an act, then yes, it also follows the stronger inclination of the will; namely, the inclination to deliberate as opposed to not deliberate. Deliberation is a means whereby we are able to regulate the strength of those inclinations that are the subject of the deliberation, so I don’t follow how deliberation would throw our wills into chaos. Regulation and chaos are not the same thing. The will is a faculty that only follows its strongest inclination; however, this does not mean that the person is a slave to his own will, as though external forces were inclining the will and the person was just along for the ride. The will is always strictly determined by the person; consequently, there can be no libertarian free will. There is, however, free agency insofar as the person is at liberty to do as he pleases. What a person may be pleased to do or is able to do will be limited by his nature.
Corporate Unity and Individual Responsibility
I claimed that it is naive to think that there have never been any cases where a church has been in error. And you wonder why. I am operating under the assumption that denominations are manifestations of the true universal church. That “particular churches, which are members thereof, are more or less pure” and that “the purest churches under heaven are subject both to mixture and error; and some have so degenerated, as to become no churches of Christ, but synagogues of Satan.” The universal or catholic church is infallible in the sense that “there shall always be a church on earth, to worship God according to his will.” This does not mean, however, that any particular visible manifestation of the church will be free from error. If denominations are true manifestations of the one true church, and if they disagree on certain points, then it would be naive to think that more than one contrary position could be right.
You write, “Insofar as the Catholic Church has spoken definitively on any given issue, it has never erred.” Since I am a Protestant, I hope you will understand if I don’t take this statement at face value. Still, I do appreciate the logic behind the statement. If the church is a divine institution, then it needs an inerrant authority. We both believe the Scriptures to be an error free authority. And I believe that we both see the need for their to be certain people who, in a properly defined situation, speak with unerring authority. The difference is that you believe this to be an ongoing reality whereas I believe that this was no longer necessary after the generation in which Christ finally became incarnate.
A list of Protestant disagreements with Rome probably won’t change your mind. I do wonder, though, how a church that does not err when it speaks definitively is capable of changing its mind on such matters. An example that immediately comes to mind, since I was just referencing it, is the Council of Trent, which contains numerous anathemas pronounced on those who hold to several points of Protestant doctrine. On the other hand, Vatican II recognizes both the work of the Holy Spirit and the presence of saving grace within Protestantism. First, Rome was synonymous with the universal church such that there was no de facto loss of unity. Protestants left the church altogether; therefore, how could there be disunity within the body? But now, even though Rome considers herself the one true church and best expression of the Christian faith, the legitimacy of other churches as being part of the body of Christ is recognized. Consequently, a loss of unity has been recognized and a move toward ecumenicity has been initiated. How is such a major shift in attitude and perspective possible for a church that does not err when it speaks definitively? Or were the Tridentine anathemas merely gentle suggestions? Unless the Catholic church wants to escape into some Orwellian fantasy in which the way it is now is the way that it has always been, then one of these perspectives is in error.
You write that the question of personal responsibility or corporate unity is not needed so long as you and other members of the Body perform their task well. This is obviously true. I only object to the notion that the condition will always be met. As to your statement “that personal responsibility is derivative of corporate responsibility,” I agree. If, however, a particular instantiation of the visible church persists in either doctrinal or moral corruption, it is no evidence of corporate responsibility to remain loyal to it. This is not an argument for individualism or against the necessity of a visible church; for the visible church is the kingdom of Christ, the ministry of Word and Sacrament is entrusted to it, and, outside of it, there is no ordinary possibility of salvation. Still, it is possible for a particular church to become so corrupt that remaining a part of it constitutes disloyalty to those visible churches, past and present, which are and have been faithful to the core of Christian belief.
If you object to the vacant reasons that Protestants have for flitting around from church to church, then we have no disagreement. More likely, though, the objection is to the Protestant Reformation itself. A discussion of this point, based on the premise that the Catholic church had done nothing worthy of protest and was not in error, would be fruitful. The same cannot be the case if objections to Reformed theology carry no more substance than the mantra that Catholic doctrine and practice is, by definition, free of error.
Summa as Revelation
Both the Scripture and the Summa (as well as other ecclesiastical writings) have this in common: they were written for the church by men who are in the church. Nevertheless, being produced by the church, even if there is common purpose with that of Scripture, is not enough to classify something as revelation. The human authors of Scripture were inspired by the Holy Spirit in such a way that he, too, is the author of Scripture. This point is essential to revelation and is not something that can be said of the Summa. It is not a proper use of the word “revelation” that it be defined according to content. It is possible for non-inspired writings to be about Christ; it is not possible that these writings be revelation. Even more than subject matter, revelation is defined by its divine source. It is the Word of God. You have already admitted that the Summa has things that are not true. This is not something that is possible for God’s Word, which is both true and inerrant in all that it intends to teach. I will entertain the idea that the Summa can be classified along with Scripture as an important church document, but I will not classify them both as revelation, which is nothing more nor less than the infallible Word of God.
History and Allegory
It’s not so much that history is being used to interpret Scripture but that Scripture is understood to be an accurate documentation of history. Your appeal to the Jesus Seminar to show “an example of a bad construction arising from historical interpretation” does not work. Not that it isn’t a bad construction, but that it has nothing to do with historical interpretation. The Jesus Seminar is based on the denial that Scripture is history. Consequently, we must look elsewhere to find out what really happened.
I have no objection to figurative interpretation provided that this is not set in opposition to reading Scripture as history. Both symbols and metaphors take the following form: x represents y. In both cases, x must be something that is naturally perceived and understood; consequently, there is no requirement that either one be couched in fictional terms. Take, for example, the Exodus. This is a figurative passage, a metaphor for the redemption that Christ ultimately provides for his people through his death and resurrection. Even so, it still happened. Or take the records of the resurrection itself. These are not symbols nor are they metaphors but are straightforward accounts of that which is physical, corporeal, and human. And it’s about as superior as revelation gets. Allegory has a place is the interpretation of some Scripture, but never when it goes against or makes irrelevant an understanding of Scripture as history.
Posted by kcourter at setembro 5, 2006 02:07 AM | TrackBack
Before I reply, I want to say that a lot has happened since I last wrote you on this subject, Kevin, and some of those things affect the direction of the conversation. For one, I am now considered by the Catholic Church to be lapsed/schismatic, and so I can’t really say that I’m speaking in defense of the Catholic position any more. I’ve actually been going to mostly Reformed or conservative Presbyterian churches lately, though I’m not a member anywhere, and I pretty obviously don’t subscribe to orthodox Reformed theology. I am also just starting law school, so I may not have very much time to pursue this subject.
God’s Love and Election
The view I would propose in this matter is what I understand to be the Thomistic view – namely that God moves the world through desire. Thus, God is motivated solely by His own Being, and in that God is Agape, He is (in that sense) moved solely by love. This love is not indiscriminate (in that it is of a very definite character), but it is pervasive. God’s creations and especially human beings are motivated by desire for God, which is the response that God’s Love always elicits. Human nature is hardwired to respond. However, because human beings are fallen, that ever-present response to God exists within a confused and disordered being. One analogy for this state would be that of a car with a fully functional engine, and unbalanced wheels. If the wheels were balanced, you could let it go on a perfectly straight road, and it would go straight, but with unbalanced wheels, it will tend to run off of the road.
God calls all human beings to union with Him, since this is the purpose for which he made us, and in Christ, He provides a way for all men to come to Him despite their spiritual disorders. However, some will come and some will not.
According to this manner of understanding the relationship between God and man, election is a matter of God controlling the circumstances in which a human being is formed such that the given human being will have clear direction to become part of the New Covenant. Thus, a child born into a Christian family is among the elect. A Hindu man who moves to America and becomes involved with a Christian co-worker may also be among the elect if that encounter can engage the ever-present response to God’s love, which exists within him, and so on and so on. Such persons are set apart for baptism, and, for the most part, set apart by baptism. They are a holy people like Israel (indeed, they are the new Israel), but like the Jews of the Old Testament, their election is not equivalent to their salvation.
Thus, God has elected some, and not others, but the offer to salvation is open to all, for He desires that all should be saved. Why would He have made them otherwise?
On a sidenote, when I speak of God’s desire for the salvation of human beings, I do not speak of a desire which is like human desire. Human beings desire that which they lack. Thus, primarily, human beings desire God, for He is that which will fully complete them. God, however, is complete already, and He may only be spoken of as “desiring” by analogy. Within the economy of the Trinity, there is a dynamic of Love, which overflows into creation, and election, and salvation, and all divine acts. Thus, to speak of God’s desire is to speak of that overflow of Divine Love, and speaking of God’s desire to save human beings, one is not speaking of a different desire than His desire to create.
Relationship of Persons
“[M]an is capable of either loving or not loving God. This does not mean, however, that a human person has all options open all the time.”
Granted.
“The regenerating work of the Holy Spirit effectually disposes a person toward loving God.”
Granted.
“This love is genuine even though a person so disposed cannot refuse to love God.”
And here’s where we diverge, I think. So long as the Spirit of God works within a person, that person loves God. That person shares in the life of God, and thus responds to God in Love just as the Son responds in Love to the Father. When one becomes part of the New Covenant, one becomes unified with Christ and thus driven by His Spirit, Who is Love. In Christ, one enters into the economy of Love within the Trinity. However, while one is then driven by the same Drive that drives God Himself, one is not by nature God, and thus the Drive does not act the way it acts in God.
The economy of Divine Love rests upon a dynamic of reciprocal self-giving. Thus, the Father gives Himself to the Son, who, in response, gives Himself to the Father. That the Son’s Love is a response to the Father’s is absolutely essential to the dynamic of Love within the Trinity, and He responds according to His nature. It is likewise essential that the man who has become one with Christ should respond to God in a manner which is analogous to Christ’s response, and he does so also according to his nature. But man’s nature is different from God’s nature. Response in Love must be made according to the free will of the responder, and for man’s will to be free with respect to God, he must have the option of refusing to do God’s will. Christ is not subordinate to the Father, so His inability to refuse to respond to the Father in Love arises out of His own nature and is therefore totally free. Man, however, is subordinate to God and entirely dependent upon God. If he were to be unable to refuse to respond in Love to God, that inability would necessarily be imposed upon him by God. And thus, because the nature of the economy of Love within the Trinity is what it is, we cannot participate in it unless we have the ability to refuse to participate in it. Otherwise our participation in the Economy of Love would not be free and it would not truly be Response in the manner of Christ’s Response.
That is all probably quite confusing. I apologize. However, the upshot is that, while I agree with you that a person within the New Covenant will always be disposed to loving God, he can nevertheless freely exercise his will to fight that disposition and grieve the Holy Spirit. The analogy Scripture gives us for the relationship between God and His people is that of a marriage. Just like in marriage, there is an unbreakable bond regardless of what husband and wife do, and God provides to the husband and wife grace for the sake of preserving their bond, but a wife does not have to continue to love her husband. She may willfully grieve her husband from the moment she says “I do” to the moment she dies. Does she then enjoy the benefits of the covenant she made?
Adam’s Fall
“But then, neither of these is an argument against my own position that Adam also chose to disobey an explicit commandment of God.”
Well, I’m not really arguing against that position.
“The sin is not found in the fact that there is a distinction between a lesser and a greater good…”
Not simply in that, no.
“…but in whether or not God has declared something that is otherwise good to be off limits.”
Partially, yes. However, my argument is that when God makes a commandment, He’s basically saying “This choice is a choice of a lesser good to the significant exclusion of a significantly greater good.” Thus, when He said to Adam “Don’t eat of the tree of Good and Evil,” He was saying that the only way Adam could eat of the tree was to make a choice against communion with Him. He didn’t make that so when He made the commandment. He just informed Adam of a reality of their relationship/covenant. Thus, my contention is that sin is a function of man’s relation to the objective hierarchy of Goods, which is informed by God’s commandments. The commandments raise the stakes of this relation because they take away man’s excuses for making bad choices, but they don’t change its substance.
Love and the Atonement
“As I understand it, grace is not mere goodness but is limited to soteriology and only given to undeserving sinners. Even if grace is defined as a good that is not due, I don’t believe that it would apply to Adam before the fall.”
I, personally, understand grace to be a matter of one’s relationship to God. Thus, if one is in covenant with God, and obedient, one is in a state of grace. It’s not like a present God gives us except in the sense that one can never merit on ones own the blessedness of being in relationship with God. We don’t get a package of grace from God. We get God. If one’s relationship with God is right, and this has significance at a very basic level of one’s being. Thus, “original grace” means that man was created in a state of good relationship with God. It’s distinguished from salvific grace because salvific grace proceeds from union with Christ.
“Once man had been given a fair chance, then the Spirit could be justly taken away when he failed.”
I don’t really like the way you say that. It sounds like God was waiting for the opportunity to boot Adam out of Paradise. But I’ll agree with the substance. Adam broke with God, and the Spirit was taken away.
“Our indwelling by the Spirit, our continued indwelling by the Spirit even when we have sinned is a matter of grace and is based upon the work of Christ and the promise of God. Christ’s work does create a bond of love between God and man. I don’t know that it merely restores it.”
When Adam was standing before God at the moment of his creation, he was standing as a bare human being indwelled by the Spirit because of his innocence and nature as a being whom God created for the indwelling of the Spirit and communion with God. When you and I stand before God, we are members of Christ in the New Covenant, and so things are different even though the basic purpose and nature of the relationship is the same. In the sense that the nature of the relationship is the same, the bond of love is restored, but the terms are different. It is a New Covenant. Only Christ can break it, so the Spirit will not be taken away even if we grieve Him extensively.
” Inasmuch as I can accept your distinction between love as a matter of affection and as a state of being, I argue that the state of being is a goal that will only be achieved in the resurrection.”
All right, what I’m contending is that the bond of Love is a participation in the Economy of Love within the Trinity through unity with Christ. The indwelling of the Spirit is the current form of this participation, which is bound up in our current state of imperfection and toil. The Beatific Vision is the final form of that participation. The difference is the state of the man who participates. Before death, the Old Man lingers.
Choice Between Eternal Truth and Immediate Perception of the Good
I will accept this only if the apparent lack of difference is due to a change in our perception; i.e., that there will be something about us such that our immediate perceptions of the good are always a clear vision of the eternal truth of the good.
Yes. Exactly. Our perception changes because we come face-to-face with God. Our immediate perception will be of God rather than of fruit or what have you. Thus, there will be no difference between what we see with our senses as good and what we know by our reason to be The Good. As it is, we know God intuitively as the Perfection which individual experiences of earthly goods points to, and we know Him as revealed in Scripture and in our experiences of His grace. When our lives are over, however, we will know God directly, and perceive Him to be Good even as we perceive food to be good now. We will be unable to sin because the disorder in our being will be eradicated by a completion of our nature, which is full entry into the Economy of Love within the Trinity
The End of Human Nature
“Somehow, I have a hard time thinking of the love of darkness as following one’s immediate perception of the good.”
I would argue that we should understand “darkness” in John 3:19 with reference to our everyday experience of darkness. When you turn out the lights to go to bed, your room is dark, but that doesn’t mean there is the complete absence of light. Darkness is a relative concept. You can’t go to a place where there is absolutely no light. Just so, you can never ever get away from God, and no matter how you resist it, your nature will always force you to desire God and respond to intimations of His Presence/Love/Grace. Men loved darkness. They did not love the absence of God, but they loved the indirect intimations of God more than God Himself.
“ You draw a distinction between Adam’s human nature before the Fall and that of Christ: the first was incomplete and still disordered whereas the latter was fully formed. This”
If I said Adam’s nature was disordered before the Fall, then I misspoke. All I mean to imply is that his nature was incomplete (in that he had not yet attained to the Beatific Vision). Christ, in essence, however, fully participated in the Trinitarian Economy of Love even on earth.
“ As I understand it, the capacity to fall into disorder or to be immune from disorder is, itself, a part of a given nature.”
I would argue that Christ’s human nature had the same capacity to fall into disorder as Adam’s. But the conditions in which that nature existed were the conditions of the Beatific Vision, in which any human being would be definitively prevented from sin. Thus, all of human nature was assumed. There is no intrinsic difference between Adam’s nature and Christ’s human nature.
I agree that we will be made perfect like Christ is perfect, but I believe that Christ himself had to be made perfect as to his human nature.
I would argue that there are two manners in which human beings are imperfect: 1) in that we are disordered (we are concupiscent and Fallen), and 2) in that we are incomplete (we have not attained to the Beatific Vision yet). Adam before the Fall was 2, but not 1. Christ was imperfect in neither respect.
I realize I’m repeating myself a lot. I hope it’s not too noxious. I’m just trying to be very clear about what I’m saying.
The Sacrifice of the Mass
I’m not going to pursue the defense of this question for the reasons I mentioned above, but I would like to better understand your objections to the Catholic doctrine.
“Another anathema, from Canon III, is pronounced on those who say ‘that the sacrifice of the mass is only a sacrifice of praise and of thanksgiving; or, that it is a bare commemoration of the sacrifice consummated upon the cross, but not a propitiatory sacrifice.’”
My understanding is that the Catholic Church is just saying that the mass is a sacrifice in the sense that human beings are presenting the Body of Christ to the Father. It’s not equivalent to a second crucifixion. Christ doesn’t die a second time for our sins (which is what I would say the Scriptures are speaking against when they say Christ was sacrificed once and for all). It’s just that the Victim Who is eternally present before the Father allows Himself to also be presented to the Father by those for whom He died. It is the presentation of the Victim that is referred to as the sacrifice. I don’t see how this is a more noxious practice than crying out in prayer “God, look upon the Holy Victim who died for me, and have mercy.” The only difference is that the Catholic Church says the Victim Himself gets involved to amplify the presentation of Himself.
So, am I right, and if so, what is the objection?
Deliberation and Willing
This was an issue I commented on from another conversation you were having a year ago. I’m sure you’ve moved far past this in that argument, so I’m going to drop it if you don’t mind.
Corporate Unity and Individual Reponsibility
I’m really not sure what I think on this point now. Your position actually suggests a good middle position. Individuals enter into a pre-existing covenant, and so an individual cannot assert his individual responsibility above the requirements of the covenantal body. A break from the covenantal body is a break from the source of personal responsibility – the covenant itself. However, maybe there’s something about the covenantal body which creates fuzzy areas as to what direction the covenantal body is going, and in those cases, you have to make reference to personal responsibility. If you see the body as a disparate grouping of denominations, then this would definitely be the case. I’m not sure that position is finally tenable, but it’s at least a sensible position, and I’ll consider it for my own adoption.
” A discussion of this point, based on the premise that the Catholic church had done nothing worthy of protest and was not in error, would be fruitful.”
Well, I don’t know that anybody argues that the Catholic Church had done nothing worthy of protest. The Catholic Church only claims that its sinful members, while committing sins, did not overcome the sacramental grace given by God to the Church for the sake of preserving the teaching of the Truth. There was much to protest, and errors were, indeed, taught. The Catholic Church does not deny that. It just denies that the errors taught were of such substance, or taught in such a way as to disprove the very narrow claims that it makes. And it denies that the sins of its members (even members wearing the papal tiara) could ever be sufficient to remove the sacramental authority given to the Catholic Church. The gifts and calling of God are irrevocable, so you have to prove that the gift was never given in the way the Catholic Church says it was in the first place. Point to an ex cathedra statement or definitive pronouncement from a council ratified by the Pope that the Catholic Church has since rescinded, and you’ve got your proof. Other than that, you have only personal or denominational grievances based upon your own pre-existing understanding of the Covenant, etc. These things may be very worthwhile and educational to discuss and consider, and the Catholic Church would like to talk to you about them, but they aren’t going to convince the Catholic Church that you are justified in breaking with Catholic tradition/authority.
In other words, the way the Catholic Church poses its claims makes it almost impossible to definitively disprove them. The Catholic Church has all teaching authority, they say, BUT this teaching authority is only fully exercised when…, and the rest is a gray sort of mush. In fact, even those statements everybody agrees are definitive (there are only a handful, really) tend to be tremendously vague/obtuse and subject to interpretation and development ad infinitum. The example you give of the status of Protestantism is an excellent example of this mash of doctrines. This is maddening, and part of the reason I don’t mind being among the lapsi. But it is still possibly the truth about the Covenant.
” If, however, a particular instantiation of the visible church persists in either doctrinal or moral corruption, it is no evidence of corporate responsibility to remain loyal to it.”
My question is… Let’s say that we’ve got an even playing field (which we obviously don’t), and every individual has the right and responsibility to decide for himself what is the truth about the Covenant. Isn’t that an amazingly frightening responsibility? How in the world are we going to live up to the responsibility of passing judgment upon all of the claimants to the Covenant? What standard shall we use? How rigorous must we be? How can we be sure of our own judgments? I know you’ll probably say something about the Scriptures being our guide, so how do we know that we’re reading the Scriptures properly and really understanding what we need to understand? These sort of questions really bother me.
Summa as Revelation
” Nevertheless, being produced by the church, even if there is common purpose with that of Scripture, is not enough to classify something as revelation.”
I’m not arguing that the author’s intention in writing is the telos of the writing, which determines its nature, but that what it objectively exists to do. We actually learn something about God when the read the Summa, and if we didn’t, then the Summa would be worthless. It would not be fulfilling its purpose. It’s not a poem about God or an essay about bees. It’s a treatise on theology. It exists in order to communicate the truth about God. It may or may not perform that task well, but that’s why it exists, and its reason for existence determines what sort of being it is.
So, considered separately, what is the reason for the existence of Scripture? To communicate the truth about God, right?”
“ The human authors of Scripture were inspired by the Holy Spirit in such a way that he, too, is the author of Scripture. This point is essential to revelation and is not something that can be said of the Summa.”
I will grant that this cannot be said of the Summa. However, lets say you have made a flint knife, and I have made a flint knife. Does it matter at all who made which knife if we’re just asking what sort of beings they are? I don’t think so. They’re both knives. By the same token, does it matter at all how well-made they are? Is a flint knife I made at summer camp in middle school just as much a knife as the Damask steel dagger made by a Spanish master blacksmith? Yes. A being which perfoms the function of a knife as its primary function is a knife even if it’s ugly, brittle, and has a dull edge.
So, I’m not arguing that the Summa is revelation at the same level as the Scriptures. Obviously, the Scriptures are far superior to the Summa, and is more reliable. We should not even begin to treat them the same. The Summa at best should be used as a commentary on Scripture. However, in bare bones terms, they are the same sort of being (and that, incidentally, is the only reason the Summa can be used as a commentary on the Scriptures).
” I will entertain the idea that the Summa can be classified along with Scripture as an important church document, but I will not classify them both as revelation, which is nothing more nor less than the infallible Word of God.”
I think your setting the standard too high, and I would argue that the only Christ Himself could be accurately called “the infallible Word of God.” It bothers me to call the Scriptures “the Word of God” in light of John 1, and it’s unclear to me in what sense the Scriptures could be called “infallible.” After all, even if everyone admits that nothing in the Scriptures is in error (I’ll admit it), that doesn’t really mean much since it’s still a book, and we very fallible human beings have to tease that wonderful infallible stuff out of the cryptic little black shapes on the pages. Not an easy task. And let’s not forget the problem of determining what the original text looks like, and the problem of translating from an essentially dead idiom.
I think it’s much more sensible to move away from comparing the situations of the texts themselves, and look at the subjective effects of the texts, which is where the rubber meets the road. And I would argue that the subjective effect of the texts is substantially similar. Not completely similar, of course, but boil it down to the bare bones, and they’re similar enough to exist within the same category of being.
It seems to me that you’re defining the Scriptures as the only revelation a priori. I’m quite open to arguments from the evidence you’ve given that the Scriptures are the only relevant revelation, or the only reliable revelation, but I don’t see any arguments thus far that lead me to believe that the telos of the Scriptures are so extraordinarily unique as to exclude all subsequent communications from existing within the same category of being.
History and Allegory
“Allegory has a place is the interpretation of some Scripture, but never when it goes against or makes irrelevant an understanding of Scripture as history.”
I’ll grant that.
What I’m arguing against is 1)the idea that there is some favored method of biblical interpretation, which makes interpretion orderly and clear, and 2) the idea that the Scriptures are such an unproblematic basis of doctrine that they can stand alone as the foundation of modern Christian doctrine and practice.
Historical interpretation is not easy, clear, or definitive. The assumption that every passage of Scripture has a concrete reference is problematic, but I’ll grant it. I believe it myself. It still only gets us one mile down a hundred mile road.
I don’t think I’ll get any argument from you when I say allegorical interpretation is not easy, clear or definitive, either, but I am very glad to see you acknowledging that allegorical interpretation has some place in the bigger picture of interpretation.
We’ve got to be realistic about our situation here. We’ve got a book which contains truths far beyond the unaided capacity for human knowing. Are we really going to point to historical (or any other brand of) interpretation and say “the fact that we use this sort of interpretation rather than the rival school of interpretation means we’ve got it right?”
If not, then we go back to the question of why we are able to assert that our interpretations of the Scriptures are better than the Catholic Church’s, or, for that matter, than anybody else’s.
Posted by: Andrew at setembro 26, 2006 08:53 AMSorry about the odd spacing.
Posted by: Andrew at setembro 26, 2006 08:54 AM