One of the benefits of argument is found in the increased ability to be more precise in one’s own position each time it is challenged. This is, in fact, the only way to make progress. Anything less results in repetitious circles. I realize from Chris’ latest response that my idea of just what an inclination is has not been coming across very well. This may also have something to do with Clifton’s charge that I subsume person under nature. I need to make a sharper distinction between what gets inclined and who does the inclining. Related to this, I also need to attempt a clearer delineation between person and nature. In a causal relationship, which comes first? For this, it will be necessary to see both the relation and distinction between the nature and the will.
Chris begins his post by noting a lack of important disagreement regarding God’s libertarian freedom. And I was ready to let it go at that until he said, “I see no reason to posit any third thing in addition to nature and will, so Occam’s razor inclines me to think that God’s libertarian freedom is properly thought of as freedom of will.” This is one thing that I have not conceded, nor that I could concede without serious damage to compatibilism. It is essential that I establish the freedom of all moral agents, i.e., persons, as substantive. True freedom exists when it possible for a person to act according to his desires. Not inclinations, but desires. That a person may not have access to the full palate of possible desires is irrelevant. God’s natural ability far exceeds that of any human. This also goes for the number of things that it is possible for him to do. Nevertheless, the range of possibilities is broader for humanity than it is for God. Though he has the ability, God cannot desire and therefore finds it impossible to do anything immoral. This is not in his nature. Whereas human nature, as such, does nothing to restrict natural ability, God’s nature necessitates him to always do that which is good. This does not mean, however, that God’s nature dictates exactly which option he must choose. The possibilities for good actions are vast.
On the other hand, when it comes to the inclination of the will, the possibilities are not as generous. There is a single option. The will moves in the direction that it is inclined. When speaking of inclinations, we make think either of that inclination immediately prior to the will or of all the causal factors leading to that particular inclination. I have been expressing my view of inclination in the broader sense. In this case, the concept includes desires and along with these the struggle for predominance within morally bipolar beings. Even where the moral struggle is not necessarily an issue, it is possible to include appetites or environmental factors in the list of those things that influence personal desire. However, as long as a person’s choice is according to what he wanted to do, it is free. Whenever a person is compelled to action that is not according to desire, only then is there a lack of freedom.
The use of inclinations in this broader sense makes it possible to speak of their relative strength or weakness. While I believe this to be a legitimate use of the term, it has not been the most helpful in this discussion. Throughout this discussion, I have tried to limit the will to a faculty that is properly a part of the nature. Considering that monergism was saddled with monothelitism in the opening post of this series, this seems to be the only possible option against that charge. In itself, the idea that Jesus had two wills instead of one is purely academic. It should not rise to the level of heresy. As should be evident from this discussion, we have not come to consensus about the proper place of the will. Is it a faculty of the nature, or should it be understood as the person choosing? The answer to this will determine whether, in each particular case, it is monothelitism or dithelitism that is heretical. However, the church did not leave this option open. It declared monothelitism to be heretical. Why? Because it was recognized that monothelitism was intended to introduce monophysitism; i.e., the belief that Jesus had a single nature. Had it not been understood all around that the will attaches to the nature and not to the person, then the connection never would have been made. Either the pronouncement of heresy would have been qualified, or, a consensus being found in the opposite direction, dithelitism would have been the heresy of choice.
If the church was correct in declaring monothelitism heresy, and I believe it was, it must follow that the will is part of the nature. Jesus had two natures; therefore, Jesus had two wills. The will is a faculty, nothing more. So when Chris says that “God’s libertarian freedom is properly thought of as a freedom of will,” I have to conclude there is lack of communication and he is using the word in a different sense. I am, after all, very reluctant to believe that he is a monophysitist. Chris uses Occam’s razor to make his decision between nature and will. Generally, however, the razor doesn’t work when a genus/species or whole/part relationship exists between the perceived options. There are not two options here, just one. Consequently, Occam shouldn’t be too upset if we introduce a second. I nominate the person. God the Father, desiring to elect, inclines the divine will in such a way that the action inevitably follows.
I will stipulate that the act of election was different from all acts of any other person and most if not all acts of God in that, being prior to or a part of the decree of God, it did not have to be compatible with that decree. I will call this an example of libertarian free agency. The Father freely chose to elect with nothing determining whether or not he would. But I will not call this libertarian free will. The will cannot choose at all, much less in a libertarian sense. It is a faculty and not a person. It moves in whatever direction the person has inclined it. And here is where I should have been using “inclination” in the narrower sense. An inclination is that which is the immediate cause of any movement of the will. Put another way, it is the person inclining the will in one direction or the other. In a sense, it is virtually identical to decision. Whenever a decision has been made, the will has been inclined. As there is only one decision at a time, there is also one inclination at a time. The relative strength of an inclination is not a factor. It has nothing against which to compete. An inclination of the will [will as object] is either there or it is not. All issues must be resolved (at least for the moment) by the person before he can incline the will in any direction. Once he does, a corresponding decision has been made. If he does not, then nothing happens. The will is not autonomous and cannot act on its own.
If making a decision and inclining the will are so closely related, why not just choose the simpler option and say that they are the same thing? Why go through all the bother of saying that the will is inclined when a decision is made? Both views allow for the freedom of a person to do whatever he wants to do. The seemingly simpler view does not account, however, for the total depravity of unregenerate man or of the impossibility of God to do evil. In the libertarian view, freedom is not possible unless it is possible for a person to do anything that is within his natural ability. Ought implies can and there is therefore no distinction between being able to do something and it being possible to do something. In the compatibilist view, a person is still free even when natural ability has been limited to what is morally possible. Ought does not imply can. Furthermore, even while the unregenerate man’s moral inability makes it impossible for him not to break God’s commandment, the fact that he is naturally able to fulfill it makes him morally responsible.
For the reasons stated, I believe that libertarian freedom of the will is incoherent. This would be rendered false by counterexample. The libertarian free will of God in election would provide just such an occasion. However, I have no intention to concede such a point unless it can be proven. It is sufficient to say that God did whatever he wanted to when he elected; that election or non-election were equally good and, therefore, unrestricted by God’s moral nature; that God was a free moral agent with nothing, not even his own decree to determine how he would act in this case. But it cannot be the case that his will moved or was able to move in any other direction than that to which he inclined it. A unique case of non-compatibilist freedom, yes, but not libertarian free will.
We can finally get to the part where Chris does claim substantive disagreement with me; namely, Adam’s will. Chris begins with a critique of the necessary connection between acting on an inclination to do something sinful and acting on a sinful inclination. I had written, “the command being both given and understood, acting on the same inclination [an inclination not inherently sinful] cannot be separated from acting on a simultaneous inclination to disobey God.” I am still convinced of the substance of this statement; however, I need to reword it to reflect my further explanation of an inclination. Where (X) is an inherently good act, and (Y) is an act forbidden by God, it is possible that these acts are numerically identical (XY). (XY) being a single act, it will only take a single inclination of the will to bring this about. The question now is what factors or combination of factors that would so incline the will are actually possible. For the inability to think of a better word at the moment, I’m going to call these factors ‘dispositions.’ [These can include anything from libertarian free agency (not will) to the strictest compatibilism.] (X1) will now represent the disposition to do something sinful and (Y1) will represent acting on a sinful disposition.
Worst case: Adam isn’t hungry at all and has no good reason to eat of the tree. He just wants to disobey. In this case, (Y1) would suffice to incline his will in the required direction. We know that this was not the case for Eve, who saw that the tree was good for food. I am not aware of this much information on Adam, so the scenario is possible. Guilty.
Adam hasn’t eaten all day; however, he knows the command not to eat of this tree but decides to disobey. (X1Y1) Guilty.
Adam hasn’t eaten all day; however, he knows the command not to eat of this tree. Eve has eaten of the tree without his knowledge. That afternoon, she presents him with a wonderful fruit pie. Adam, having no reason to distrust his wife, freely partakes. In this case, I am going to invoke the concept of invincible ignorance. ( X1) Not guilty.
Adam hasn’t eaten all day; however, he knows the command not to eat of this tree. Strolling through the garden, he notices his wife putting all sorts of fruit into a basket, including the forbidden variety. Later that evening, she serves fruit salad. Upon being confronted, Adam expresses shock that the woman God gave him would do such a thing. Vincible ignorance. Definitely (X1) and my vote is also on (Y1), though Chris my disagree. In any case, guilty.
Adam hasn’t eaten all day; however, he knows the command not to eat of this tree. His disposition to obey God in this regard ranges anywhere from just under (X1) to none at all. This is essentially the same as Chris’ supposition about his own ravenous hunger. There, he admits that a weak inclination (disposition) to obey God indicates that there is something morally wrong. In Chris’ self example, he is defending the idea that (X1) and (Y1) can be separated when considering (XY). (X1) is to be considered by itself in support of a guilty verdict. We both agree that this scenario could not apply to Adam, but for entirely different reasons. Chris maintains that a weak inclination to obey God, being an indication that something is morally wrong, would be impossible in pre-fall man because this would entail Adam being ill made. His alternate scenario would still have Adam being charged for (X1); however, the inclination to obey God would either be equal to X1 or incomensurable, or it would be stronger with the understanding that it is impossible to follow a weaker inclination. In neither of these options could God be charged with faulty workmanship.
My own rejection of this scenario is based on the absence of a tertium quid. When is ‘little to no inclination to obey’~(IO) separable from ‘an inclination to disobey’(ID)? Let’s keep the narrow definition of inclination. Let us also assume a specific command to be obeyed. There are three situations in which ~(IO) can stand alone. 1) Invincible ignorance of the command. Not possible with regard to Adam: God wouldn’t be that sloppy. 2) Being asleep or otherwise unconscious. If one is rendered temporarily incapable of having any inclinations, it follows that
~(IO) would also be the case as would be ~(ID). [(ID), however, would not be the case, since no inclinations are possible at the moment.] 3) The immediate opportunity to commit the act is not available. This says nothing about what the dispositions would be if the opportunity were available.
In all other cases, not only is the separation gone, but the distinction exists in name only. If the command is given and I understand that I am forbidden to do something that is otherwise good; if, all things being equal, (X1) comes into play, then my knowledge that (X)=(Y) requires me to consider (Y1). There are, again, three possibilities. 1) (X1) is diluted or replaced and I reject (Y1). My will is not inclined toward but is inclined away from (XY). 2) I keep (X1) and accept (Y1). My will is inclined toward (XY). 3) I keep (X1) but never make up my mind on (Y1). My will is not inclined toward (XY). It isn’t inclined away from it, either. However, until it is inclined toward (XY), then it will be impossible for me to commit this act. [ This possibility will either resolve into one of the first two or the continuous contemplation of (Y1) will be replaced with the acceptance of (Y1jr.): I will not actually commit (XY), but I will be guilty of lusting after it.] My point is this: knowledge of the command necessitates deliberation of that command when considering an act that would break that command, though otherwise good. ~(IO) by itself is not a possibility. The deliberation implied by the knowledge of the command must result in intentional disobedience in the event of (X1).
Chris is quick to point out that “X=Y does not entail knowledge of X= knowledge of Y.” And he is, of course, correct. Nevertheless, this does not apply to the fall of Adam. The identity of the forbidden tree was not a secret. God told Adam that X=Y. Having been informed of the connection, Adam cannot contemplate X without also contemplating Y.
Next, Chris restates his position that it is possible to act on inclinations other than the strongest at the moment of decision. I must admit my own weakness here. Although I understand the meaning of the words, I cannot conceive of a situation in which this would be true. My own observation that Adam’s inclination to obey God at the moment of the fall could not have been the strongest is regarded as question begging. I’ll except the criticism. As long as I keep saying no to his yes, neither of us will get anywhere. Chris breaks the cycle by introducing a new concept (or, at least one that I had not picked up on before); namely, ordered inclinations.
We both agree that Adam could not have been created in an incorruptible state. According to Chris, though, he “affirm[s] that they were created in a state such that there was nothing morally wrong with them.” Perhaps one should infer from this that I do not affirm the same thing. I do insist that Adam was not created perfect; however, I do not equate imperfect creation with having something morally wrong. I am willing both to say and believe that Adam was created with nothing morally wrong. Still, as has been the case several times throughout this discussion, it isn’t so much a matter of what a person professes to believe as it is of the logical consequences, perceived or actual of other things he professes to believe. So we should probably look into whether or not my scheme does require disordered inclinations in Adam as he was created.
Based on the more restricted definition of inclination given at the beginning of this post, this cannot be the case. Inclinations don’t even exist until the will is activated. God could hardly have created Adam with disordered inclinations if, by definition, they cannot exist until after he has finished creating him. This is, perhaps, unfair. When Chris made the charge, I had not explicitly restricted the scope of an inclination. So let’s consider the possibility of disordered dispositions.
What then makes for disordered dispositions? They can be disordered when the disposition to obey God is weaker than any other disposition. Remember that on Chris’ account, this is not the case. Adam is able to sin despite the fact that his disposition to obey God is not weaker than any other disposition. I claim that, not only did Adam have a weak disposition to obey God at the fall, but he had a stronger disposition to disobey him. How is this not disordered? Consider the source of the disposition. If God had created Adam with this disposition, then I concede that he was ill made. But I deny that this is the case. Chris, however, will not let me get away with this. He quotes my own concession to his argument, “...if Adam always acts according to his strongest inclinations, then the fall was ultimately necessitated by the way God made Adam and the situation in which he placed him.” Along with this concession, I had also invoked the WCF III.1- God from all eternity did, by the most wise and holy counsel of his own will, freely and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass: yet so, as thereby neither is God the author of sin, nor is violence offered to the will of the creatures, nor is the liberty or contingency of second causes taken away, but rather established.
Chris objects. The secret will of God, with which he agrees, is not the same thing as an unbroken chain of necessary causation. Perhaps, but I don’t see why it can’t be. Sure, I wouldn’t be able to explain the confessional denial that God is the author of sin. On the other hand, if I hold to the secret will of God and do not link it to such a causal chain, then I am at a loss to explain how it is has anything to do with what happens in the world. Either way, something’s missing. Moreover, since I am convinced that the doctrine of God’s secret will is taught in Scripture, I cannot toss it out in order to open up other options. It appears that this causal chain from decree to creation and through Adam’s choices to the fall is within the bounds of the confession.
There is, perhaps, another way to refute Chris’ charge of disordered inclinations that is consistent with the view that the will is never libertarian free but must be inclined in one direction or another from outside of itself. I could steal Chris’ answer to a question that he asks toward the end of his post. He had suggested that we ask what causes the will to choose between two conflicting inclinations. I will have to restate this since it represents an unacceptable personification of a faculty. What causes the person to incline the will in only one of two conflicting directions? “My answer is: in some case at least, nothing apart from the secret will of God.” Since I have conceded the libertarian free agency of God in election, why not allow this for other acts of God or even acts of other persons? The inclination of the will is an effect and so, I must insist on sufficient causation. But it is not necessarily true that inclining the will is an effect. Unless someone can show that this is incoherent, I can deny libertarian free will and affirm libertarian free agency at the same time. Either the causal chain is broken as soon as we move back from the inclined will to the person, or the person was free to have broken it. Nothing necessitated that Adam fall. It could not have been his nature, since the range of moral options was equal to that of his natural ability. Not only was Adam able to not sin, but it was possible for him to not sin. His inclinations were not disordered and he was not ill-made.