Morphemics

Inclined to Respond

Chris responds to my last post in our part of the soteriology debate both in the comments section and in a post over here. I’m going to consider the comment first. Chris is right: my third paragraph is muddled. I believe that the decision is either the exercise of the will itself or the immediate evidence that the will has been exercised. It is not prior to the exercise of the will. I should have chosen the word “inclination” instead of “decision.” In that case, the question is not about any prior restraints on the relative strengths of God’s inclinations, but whether, one of these being the strongest when the will was actually exercised, that will could have been operated contrary to it. I maintain that it could not. To answer a question brought up in the addenda to his post, I agree with Edwards- the idea of libertarian freedom is incoherent.

But I do need to qualify that. Chris goes on in his comment to say that, on pain of infinite regress, there must be something about God’s volens creare that is libertarian free. Despite the fact that I adore the principle of sufficient causation, I’m going to have to agree with this. Something must exist prior to the exercise of the will that is not itself an effect. The exercise of the will itself, however, is an effect that must be according to the strongest inclination. The denial of libertarian free will is not a repudiation of libertarian freedom as such but of the idea that the faculty of the will is ever libertarian free in its operation. It is not, indeed, it cannot be. The faculty of the will has no will of its own. It does not operate anything but is itself operated. [Just as a side note- I believe that there actually was a prior reality such that God could not have not created. I don’t argue the point here because, even if I could prove it, there would still be the matter of why God chose to elect whom he did; and I’m not willing to deny unconditional election.]

And now to the post itself. Chris gives a syllogism for libertarian free will. It is valid; however, the first premise is untrue. God’s nature, N, was prior to his choice, C. So the second premise is correct. However, while a nature can exclude certain options, it does not, in itself, determine between those options that it allows. Still, there was a reality prior to the exercise of God’s will and consistent with his nature that determined the direction in which his will was moved. God wanted to create; he was inclined to do so, and, as a consequence of this inclination, his will could be exercised in no other direction.

Next we turn to my views on Adam. My own syllogism is: 1) The inclination to sin in someone with a perfect nature is zero. 2) Adam sinned. 3) Therefore, Adam did not have a perfect nature. Chris suggests two options for an unspoken premise: a) Adam would not have sinned unless he had an inclination to sin [or sinful inclination]. b) Adam would not have sinned unless he had an inclination to do something sinful. Chris has distinguished between these, but, to me, this is a distinction without a difference. Chris’ explanation of “something sinful” is that which, in itself is not sinful but is made so by the command of God. The desire to eat fruit is a good thing. God’s designating a certain tree as off limits does nothing to change this desire. So far, so good. Absent the command, acting on this inclination is not sinful. However, the command being both given and understood, acting on the same inclination cannot be separated from acting on a simultaneous inclination to disobey God. That is, while it is possible for a person having a perfect nature to desire something that, in abstraction from the commandment, is good, it is not possible that he could act on this unless he were also inclined to disobedience. An example of this can be found in my post immediately prior to this one. When Christ was in the garden, he had an inclination not to be crucified. This is perfectly understandable; in fact, I share it. However, this is as far as it went. He did not refuse, much less argue with the Father. Instead, he immediately submitted to the Father’s will.

Chris’ argument also fails on another point. He quotes himself: “ Since God created [Adam & Eve] good, their desire to obey him was stronger than their desire for what was pleasing to the eye and good for food. Notice that none of their desires is bad. God gave them the desire for what is pleasing to the eye and good for food, and that desire was good. What was evil was their choosing to follow the desire for the lesser good.” He explains that he was using “desire” to mean “inclination.” If it is the case that, in order for Adam and Eve to be created good, the inclination to obey him was stronger than the inclination to have what was pleasing to the eye (a thing in and of itself not bad), then the only way to act on the lesser inclination would be in combination with a stronger inclination. For most trees, the inclinations Chris mentions are compatible. In the case of the forbidden fruit, they are not. Just as the [good] activity of eating is, in this case, inseparably linked to disobedience to God, even so, the inclination to eat is now inseparably linked to the inclination to disobey God. Either way, whether the sin was found directly in choosing the lesser good or whether it was accompanied by the inclination to disobey, the inclination to obey God at the time was not and could not have been the strongest. And if even this one time it failed to be the strongest inclination, it must follow that neither Adam and Eve were created in an incorruptible state.

I do not deny that man was created good. However, the qualifications for good need to be reexamined in light of the context and overall design. The goal for the creation of man is perfection through the incarnation and resurrection of Christ. In the final state, incorruptible will be the standard for what constitutes good, but not before. Had Adam been create already corrupt, he would have been ill made. This was not the case, though. He was created corruptible, which is significantly different. Nor does corruptible imply that Adam’s nature necessitated the fall. To fall or not to fall were both equally viable options. The point of my theory on the Adam’s nature before the fall was that it must have been constituted so as to make the fall possible. Equating this with making the fall necessary is reading too much into it.

Next, Chris goes to where I directly argue for Adam not being made perfect. While I did not reference an Edwardsian theory of the will, I have no objection to the idea that it will not work without it. My claim is that any fundamental change in our nature must be supernatural. Chris disagrees, saying that this “is doubtful when it comes to a change from moral perfection to moral corruption.” But this is part of my point. If supernatural intervention is required for a fundamental change in nature, then God is responsible for that change. It would be against God’s moral nature for him to create fresh evil in someone by corrupting his nature. Therefore, Adam's fundamental nature could not have changed. Furthermore, it appears that Chris has a different understanding of moral perfection. It can either mean not actually corrupt or not able to become corrupt. If the first, then a change from moral perfection to moral corruption is possible without divine intervention. However, this would not constitute a fundamental change in nature. The nature would already have been such that the change was possible. This would only be a change of position and would be no different then Chris’ hypothetical pin. Falling in either direction changes the position of the pin. It was already part of the pin’s nature to fall in one direction or the other whet poised on its point on the edge of a table.

Before the fall, Adam was able to become sinful without supernatural intervention. This would not constitute a change in nature since the possibility was already there. Things are different in the other direction. While the idea of a man in Adam’s position maintaining his original condition by not sinning is possible (if statistically less likely over time), confirmation in righteousness or the change to an incorruptibly righteous nature would require divine intervention. Adam was only able to fulfill the legal conditions for this change under the promise of God. It would be up to God to keep his word by effecting the change.

Even if I did not believe that libertarian freedom was incoherent, that God in some case could exercise it, my theory on the fall would still stand. There is a difference between equal options that a single nature will allow and options not possible given a particular nature. If Adam’s nature were incorruptibly perfect, sinning would not have been a viable option.

On the subject of angels, I agree that they were all created with the same moral nature; that this nature, while it did not determine that some would sin and others would not, made both options possible. In other words, each angel had about the same odds that Adam did.

Posted by kcourter at junho 13, 2006 4:52 PM | TrackBack