Morphemics

Intratrinitarian Disagreements

Clifton and I are in substantial agreement on at least one point in his Personhood Backwards and Forwards and Monergism’s Essence; namely, that the starting point for any discussion of human personhood is found in the revelation of the Trinity and the Incarnation of Christ. We both agree that our understanding of these will inform our conception of a human person. I must disagree, however, with the idea that our understanding of human personhood can always be mapped backward onto Christological and Trinitarian doctrine. To be sure, our understanding of persons as such can be transferred between the three categories of persons; i.e., divine, human, and angelic. Still, even if we accept Clifton’s claim that my own view of human personhood does not match up with this standard, it is up to him to demonstrate that this difference is a question of substance rather than accidents. If this cannot be done, then his claim that monergism’s ‘understanding of human personhood necessarily results in a deficient Trinitarianism and Christology” is false.

Clifton still believes that I identify person with nature, my objections to the contrary notwithstanding. These objections are, he says, mere assertions and not argument. But I have presented an argument, one which Clifton quotes only to promptly miss the point. Part of Clifton’s strategy has been to claim that my views logically entail modalism. [I tried to say that the most he could claim was unitarianism; however, he has rightly pointed out that since I do profess a belief in the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, then my views, if they are unitarian, must also be modalistic.] If person is identified with nature, then God’s nature, since it is one, can only be associated with one person. Orthodox Trinitarianism becomes impossible.

In an attempt to disprove my claim that the two wills of Christ were always directed toward the same object, Clifton introduced the Garden of Gethsemane in which Jesus says, “Not my will, but thine be done.” Clifton explains, “For if they willed the same thing, then Jesus had no need to deny the object of his human will (drawing back from death), and would simply have acquiesced to the Father’s will.” This makes no sense. If the wills of Christ both willed the same thing, then there must be a numerical identity in the object of those wills. If Jesus denies this object, then he is denying the object both of his human will and of his divine will. The initial disagreement lies, not between the two wills of Christ, but between the persons of the Father and of the Son. This is not a state of affairs that can be maintained when the inclination of one of these persons is put into action and so the Son submits to the Father.

It is true, as Clifton mentions, that the original context of this exchange was the nature-willing schema rather than the person-nature schema. My defense against the charge of modalism is not found directly in my reply itself but in the necessary assumptions behind that reply. By accusing me of modalism, Clifton affirms that I believe God has a single nature. This much is correct. The faculty of the will is numerically associated, not with the person, but with the nature. Since Christ has two natures in one person, then the belief in monothelitism constitutes a denial of these two natures (most often replaced with a single morphed nature that turns out to be neither human nor divine). Within the Trinity, the situation is reversed. Here, we want a monothelitism of sorts because the single divine nature can only be associated with a single faculty of the will.

Keep this in mind: the three persons of the Trinity possess the same faculty. In my reply to Clifton’s take on what happened in Gethsemane, I have gone so far as to claim that, before their will was actualized toward a single object, their was a brief disagreement between two persons of the Trinity as to what that object should be. This happened despite the fact that, by nature, they share the same faculty of willing. Whether or not my claim is correct is irrelevant right now. The point is the possibility of even making such a claim. It requires certain presuppositions; namely, that there exists a distinction, not only between the persons of the Trinity, but between each of these persons and the divine nature. If I identified person with nature, then there is no way that I could maintain that these persons, whose nature is numerically identical, could talk to one another, much less that they could disagree. Now, because I agree that our understanding of divine personhood should inform how we conceptualize human personhood, I map this distinction between person and nature forward onto humans.

This leads to another objection to Clifton’s backward mapping of my views of human personhood onto the Trinity. It is more difficult to demonstrate the distinction between person and nature when the ratio is 1:1 rather than 3:1. It is not legitimate to move from the more obscure to the less obscure. If, confining myself to human persons, I have not been able to demonstrate the person/nature distinction to Clifton’s satisfaction, then he must leave it at that. This is nothing more than a communications failure and there is no warrant in making it contradict what I have been able to show about Trinitarian personhood.

But Clifton will argue that my identification of person and will is proven my denial of libertarian freedom. In fact, he has: “In other words, substantive personhood makes real libertarian free will. If you hold one, I contend, you must hold the other. Obviously, I do not think Kevin’s is a substantive view of personhood, but is, if you will, a two-dimensional construct.” For Clifton, substantive personhood implies libertarian free will and libertarian free will implies substantive personhood. This is rather circular, though. And, no, I’m not referring to the “p if and only if q” aspect of his argument. I had a larger circle in mind. Specifically, this is a premise that Clifton needs to prove in order to make his argument against monergism. I don’t believe that he has succeeded, although, in all fairness, I do believe he has tried.

Let me see if I can restate the attempt. Monergism implies a denial of libertarian free will at least at the point of regeneration. Even in sanctification, which most monergists will agree is synergistic, libertarian free will is rendered impossible by the teaching that the ultimate perseverance of those who are regenerate is assured. Monergism coupled with the perseverance of the saints implies a compatibilistic view of the will. Now throw into the mix an explanation for how compatibilism works, which is that the exercise of a person’s will is always determined by his nature. But if this is true, says Clifton, then, at best, person is identified with nature if not completely superceded by it. I hope that I have captured the essence of his argument. If not, he can correct me and we’ll start over.

Now let’s try another one. Synergism implies the affirmation of libertarian free will, perhaps even to the exclusion of any example of compatibilism. Actually, let’s just get to the point. Clifton has already stated that a substantive view of personhood implies libertarian free will and vice versa. In libertarian free will, the will is not determined by the nature; consequently, there is no danger that the nature could ever supercede the person. But if the will does operate independently of the nature, then I am at a loss to explain the purpose of a nature. It is just as easy to suppose that libertarianism also equates person with nature if it doesn’t practically eliminate the nature altogether. It all depends on how you look at it.

In another thread within this overall debate, I am having a discussion with Chris as to whether or not God has libertarian free will. Chris is a fellow compatibilist, at least as far as the human will and most cases of the divine will. He claims, however, that on at least two occasions, the decisions to create and to elect, God must have exercised libertarian free will. This is because he locates the necessity for compatibilism in the decree of God, whereby he has ordained everything that comes to pass. The decisions to create and elect logically fall before the decree: there is nothing with which to be compatible. I agree as far as it goes. Chris’ account is in line with Reformed theology. It is sufficient to affirm the necessity of compatibilism between the human will and the decree of God. Overcoming agnosticism as to how, exactly, this works is not required. It is, however, possible and, in my estimation, Edwards has provided a philosophically satisfying account. If it is the case that personal action is always determined by a person’s nature, then this is true whether or not there is a divine decree with which to be compatible. The decisions to create and elect, while technically not examples of compatibilism, are also not examples of libertarianism. Despite all this, Chris’ account, if not true in my estimation, is, at least, coherent. He has provided a rational basis for believing that the possibility of libertarian free will in one case need not imply the necessity thereof in all others. And if there is no necessary connection, then Clifton’s backward mapping is once more proven invalid.

The most that can be gathered from monergism is that compatibilism is necessary in the people getting saved. It is not possible to argue that this compatibilism is part of the substance of personhood. At best, it is an accident made necessary by the fall. Not wishing to subject myself to another red herring charge, I freely admit that I do, in fact, believe that compatibilism is a matter of substance and not accident. However, while I may use this to support my monergistic tendencies, it is not possible to derive this belief from monergism itself. I state outright that none of the persons within the Trinity has libertarian free will. So even if it could be done, there’s no need to backward map my views of human personhood. Perhaps Clifton could modify his thesis from “Monergism is heresy” to “Kevin is a heretic.”

In the second part of his post, Clifton considers the essence of monergism. I do believe that the essence of monergism is about God having done everything that there is to do. Still, I must concede Clifton’s point: the practical working out of monergism cannot escape a specific view of the human will. Fair enough. Still, I must insist that this view of the will cannot be backward mapped onto the Trinity. Clifton, if he wishes to maintain his position that monergism is heresy, would probably do better with a more direct approach. I’d be willing to consider as evidence an ecumenical condemnation of the doctrine. As it is, his attempt to connect it with legitimate heresy isn’t working out all that well.

Posted by kcourter at junho 11, 2006 6:45 PM | TrackBack