Morphemics

Appetites and Inclinations

Chris has entered the discussion by objecting to my acceptance of Edwards' thesis that "For any given decision, the will will always choose according to its strongest inclination at the moment of decision." Related to this, he also rejects my claim that a person can never transcend his nature unless we posit a metanature; and he rejects my hypothesis that "Adam's natural inclinations before the fall were essentially the same as those of the redeemed before glory." I'd like to address these in order after acknowledging some points of agreement. First, that Edwards' thesis is "not required by Reformed theology or by Scripture." I believe it to be compatible with both but I certainly have no intention of making adherence thereunto a matter of orthodoxy. I am content that those who adhere to Reformed theology acknowledge both that man is a free moral agent and that God has decreed whatsoever comes to pass. They need offer no explanation for how these two truths fit together. On the other hand, I do not believe that Reformed theology is compatible with a consistent libertarian view of the will. Such a view is not even compatible with the notion that God knows everything that will happen in advance, much less with the notion that he decrees everything that will happen.

I also agree with Chris' account of the reprobate's inability to do good. He writes, "They may choose a lesser sin over a greater, they may choose to do the right thing for the wrong reason, and may thus live in a way that is, as far as externals go, morally admirable, but all the while they act from ungodly motives and thus their apparently good works are in fact sins." And with his distinction between "what is possible for me and what is in my power." This is the same distinction, and quite a bit clearer, as that between what I have called natural and moral ability (I don't recall if this is Edwards' terminology or not, it's been a number of years since I read his book). More accurately, when it comes to total depravity, this should be natural ability and moral inability. Or, to put it in terms of power and possibility, it is within the power of the reprobate to do good but it is not possible for them to do so. They are judged, not on the basis of moral inability, but on the basis of what is in their power due to a complete possession of all the necessary faculties. On the other hand, Christ, during his first advent, had all of the necessary faculties for commiting evil but it was not possible for him to do so. He had what might be termed an "immoral inability" (not that anything about him was immoral, just that he was unable to do immoral deeds).

Against my claim that a person can never transcend his nature unless we posit a metanature, Chris writes, "The ability to make choices beyond what our natures determine does not require positing a metanature. There is no contradiction involved in saying that it is our nature to be able to sometimes transcend our nature." But then, the example he provides does not support his objection, "For instance, as mammals, it is our nature to reproduce sexually, but as intelligent beings, it is our nature to be able to come up with non-sexual means of reproduction and transcend our animal nature." Either our nature as intelligent beings stands as a metanature in relation to our animal nature or our nature is better described as an intelligent animal, in which case, we have transcended nothing. Chris continues, "As appetitive creatures it is our nature to follow our strongest inclinations, but as creatures with a free-will, it is our nature to be able to choose to follow a weaker inclination over a stronger." Here, Chris has confused "inclination" with "appetite." He does the same thing in his discussion of two or more conflicting desires. But neither an appetite nor a desire is synonymous with an inclination of the will, although both may serve as factors when it comes to inclining the will.

I need to stop here and clarify just what the will is. The will is nothing more or less than the faculty of choosing. It is not the thing chosen, nor is the various items subject to deliberation before a decision is reached. While both of these constitute legitimate uses of the term "will," the word as it is used in Edward's thesis refers to the faculty of choosing. This faculty, as are all of our faculties, is a part of our nature, which is why monothelitism was rejected. Both God and humans are able to choose by virtue of their respective natures. Since Christ had two natures, it follows that he had two faculties of choosing. Had Constantinople III taken will in the sense of the thing chosen, or had it taken the ability to will as belonging directly to the person instead of being a faculty of the person's nature, then it would not have rejected monothelitism. Although we may speak of the will willing, this should not be confused with the idea that the faculty of choosing has its own ego. In like manner, I can say that my eyes see. But this is not entirely accurate. I see by virtue of my faculty of sight. Even so, I will something by virtue of my faculty of choosing.

If we were by nature nothing more than appetitve creatures, then following our strongest inclination would be the same as following our strongest appetite. But we are not. We have the ability to supress or even to reject our strongest appetite. However, it does not follow from this that we have supressed the strongest inclination upon our faculty of choosing. When considering two or more conflicting desires, Chris said, "I can see no reason to think that I must always follow the strongest one. On the contrary, it seems that whenever I make a decision, my very act of deliberation presupposes that my inclinations need not determine my action." No, the only thing to we need to presuppose is that the strongest desire need not incline the will to action. This does not mean that when a voluntary action has occurred that the will will not have been exercised according to its strongest inclination at the moment of decision. As to the act of deliberation itself, note what Chris has rightly called it. Deliberation is an "act." What is more, it is a voluntary act. As such, it does not precede but follows the will. Essentially, my act of deliberation does not presuppose "that my inclinations need not determine my action." Rather, it presupposes that the inclination to deliberate was the strongest factor influencing my will at the moment it was exercised. I will stop deliberating when the inclination to deliberate becomes weaker than the inclination to make up my mind for a particular option (A or non-A). None of this makes deceptive the phenomenon of making a decision. Deliberation can have a very real effect on a subsequent choice. Through deliberation, we are able to manipulate the strength of our inclinations concerning that choice. Deliberation can allow me to choose against my strongest appetite or desire. Assuming, that is, that this is even relevant. The fact that I have a strong desire does not imply that I am in any position to fulfill that desire (which is why I reject the idea that our strongest desires are equal to the strongest inclinations of our wills).

I move now to Chris' rejection of the hypothesis that Adam's natural inclinations before the fall were essentially the same as those of the redeemed before glory. In making this claim, I do not mean to suggest that environment or habituation to evil are not factors, even though I do reject these as the sole factors explaining our propensity toward sin. I am not concerned with Adam's habit before the fall, only with an account for how he could have fallen. If his nature was perfectly good, if the will always wills according to its strongest inclination at the moment of decision, if a person with a perfectly good nature cannot have an inclination toward evil, much less a strongest inclination thereto, then we are at a loss to explain how a perfectly good agent willed to do evil. My claim is that Adam was not created perfectly good, at least, not in the sense with which this concept is usually invested. Yes, Scripture does state that God saw everything he had created, including man, and that it was good. But we need to keep the pronouncement in context. The created order exists in two different realms: the eternal, eschatological realm and the temporal earthly realm. The bulk of Genesis 1 is about the creation of the the second realm, which is characterized in its initial state as "without form and void." The creation of man belonged to this second realm with the intent that he would be recreated into the first. Redemption is not only about reversing the fall and restoring what we had. It's goal is much higher. Redemption is about giving us what Adam could have gained but failed to get. We cannot take the pronouncement of "good" on this realm of creation and invest it with all the meaning that the same pronouncement would have concerning the eternal realm.

No matter how you look at, since Adam did fall, it follows that he was created such that he could fall. While this does mean that he was not created with the perfection of the heavenly realm, it does not mean that he was "bad or corrupt or ill-made." Chris writes, "Since God created them good, their desire to obey him was stronger than their desire for what was pleasing to the eye and good for food." I don't think this necessarily follows, but it's still possible so I'll accept it. This only brings us back to the earlier point that the strongest desire is not always synonymous with the strongest inclination of the will at the moment of decision. It is within man's ability to overcome a strong desire with reason and thereby act against it. Oftentimes this works to his advantage. There are other times when his reasons are corrupt and sinful. I must reject Chris' claim that "What was evil was their choosing to follow the desire for the lesser good." I agree with the idea that the object chosen was good insofar as God had created it. I also agree that God gave them a desire for what is pleasing to the eye and good for food. However, since every tree yielding edible fruit fell under this category, this cannot be the deciding factor in determining the morality of their choice. When eating of any other tree there was no choice between the greater good of obeying God or the lesser good of eating what was pleasing- they did both. This lesser good remained a constant factor no matter what tree they ate from. We need to explain the fall in terms of what was different. The fall was not the result of choosing a lesser good but the result of flat out disobedience. We cannot reconcile Adam's fall with his supposed perfect nature by trying to look on the bright side of things.

Overall, I agree with Chris' postulate that "Adam and Eve had freedom of decision in the garden to sin or not to sin." I just reject his explanation. Nothing about my hypothesis that Adam's natural inclinations were the same as those of the redeemed before glory can be construed to conclude that "God made human nature such that its strongest desire would of necessity lead it into sin." I've already addressed the difference between desire and inclination of the will, but another common assumption may be hidden behind this charge. The prohibition given to Adam against eating of the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil has been understood in two different ways, even within Reformed theology. One of these is perpetual. That is, for as long as Adam did not eat of this tree, he would live. As soon as he did, however, he would fall. Under this rubric, saying that Adam's nature was the same as ours is a virtual guarantee that he would fall. None of us is able to go very long without sinning. On the other hand, this prohibition can also be understood as a temporary probation, which is how I take it. If Adam fails this test, he and all his posterity fall; if he passes, he merits eternal life for all of his posterity. This way it is not a matter of God setting us up for a fall, for we often are able to obey in particular circumstances. Adam's probation was not rigged. While it is true that Adam necessarily followed his strongest inclination, which was for eating the fruit, it is not the case that this inclination necessarily had to be. Adam's nature as created made it a possible inclination, but other factors contributed both to actualizing this inclination and to making it the strongest at the moment he chose to eat of the fruit, not the least of which was his own deliberation. The bondage of the faculty of choosing to its strongest inclination at the moment of decision is not at all incompatible with the ability of a moral agent to make a free decision.