Morphemics

Revelation and Soteriology III

Andrew's last comment was over here on 3/30/200 and I have finally managed to answer. As with previous entries, I will continue to respond directly to Andrew. Consequently, any other readers may find it easier to reference his last comment for context.

You are correct to note that "if the end result of the emphasis is not insignificant, then neither is the beginning emphasis." But this is true in general. If we get down to the specifics of this case, which is the difference between the doctrines of soteriology in Protestantism and Catholicism, the end result is significant. It matters whether we rely on God alone or God and ourselves for our salvation. Demonstrating points of agreement, and there are many, is not going to take away or make irrelevant the points of disagreement.

You write, "...unless you can find a reason to say that God has chosen one particular people over another because of His love for all people, your assertion that He has done such a thing is shaky." My reason is that Scripture teaches it. This is the whole doctrine of election. Aside from particularity being implied in the very concept of choice, we can read that God chooses Israel over all the other nations, that he chooses Isaac over Ishmael, Jacob over Esau, etc. Read Paul's discussion of the latter example in Romans 9. He presents God's choice of Jacob over Esau as unconditioned. "...though they were not yet born and had done nothing either good or bad--in order that God's purpose of election might continue, not because of works but because of his call--she [Rebecca] was told,'The older will serve the younger.' As it is written, 'Jacob I loved,but Esau I hated'" (vs.11-13). It is tempting to argue that both this passage and that to which it refers (Malachi 1:2,3) are only talking about national election. Malachi, for instance, is talking about God's choice of the nation of Israel over that of the Edomites. Even Paul speaks of Israel as a nation. This section of Romans concerns God removing his exlusive focus from Israel and placing it on the whole world. But if he can do this, then what about the promises made to Israel? Paul says that "it is not the children of the flesh who are children of God, but the children of the promise are counted as offspring" (v. 8). And lest we think that the children of promise are descendents of Isaac as opposed to Ishmael, he makes a further distinction between the children of Isaac. If Isaac is called the son of promise, but not all of his descendents are chosen; if Paul can say, "For not all who are descended from Israel [an alternate name for Jacob] belong to Israel" (v.6); then we must consider the possibility that Isaac is not the ultimate son of promise. Rather, the promise made concerning Isaac is a revelation of greater things. The son of promise is Christ and the true Israel consists of all those who are in him. The eternal promise is not made to those who are physical descendents of Jacob, but to all those who are in Christ, no matter what there physical ancestry. God's choice of Israel as a nation is perfectly compatible with his choice of individuals to be included among the children of promise. Paul narrows the scope down to individual election when he speaks of Pharaoh. He concludes, "So then he has mercy on whomever he wills, and he hardens whomever he wills." That God chooses one particular people over another, or even particular individuals over others shouldn't really be a matter of debate. Scripture says that he does. As to the thesis that God loves all people (and, from your argument, I take it that you mean everybody), this doesn't quite fit in with his opinion of Esau. There's nothing wrong with equating election with love, I just dispute your claim that God's love is universal. And it is not an adulteration of God's love to deny that he must love each and every individual. On the contrary, I would see the adulteration of love in the idea that an omnipotent God must love people in such a limited way. In the Calvinistic understanding, when God loves someone, he does everything that is both necessary and sufficient to secure his salvation.

The particularity of the people of God is very much willed by God. When God takes a people unto himself this is just what he is doing. He takes them from the sinful mass in order to dwell with them in eternity. On the view that you have presented, he doesn't really take a people so much as settling with what he can get. You also seem to be confusing the general call with the special call. The case of Christ before his accusers is an example of the former. They have all of the faculties necessary to repent. Nobody is stopping them. The only reason they do not is because they do not want to repent. Ultimately, in the case of those who refuse it, this general call serves to augment their guilt. Furthermore, if there were only a general call, then no one would want to repent, or, if they did want to, they would quickly change their minds after seeing what such repentance entailed. Monergism should never be confused with easy-believism. Those who refuse to cooperate with God in the work of sanctification evidence that fact that they were never saved. The special call is that spoken of in Romans 8:30. Those who are called include those who have been predestined. All who are called will be both justified and glorified. The special call takes place at the point of regeneration. This is the moment of irresistible grace when the Holy Spirit brings us to life by having united us with Christ in his resurrection.

On the subject of intratrinitarian relationships, there is a significant difference between these and those between humans and God. But there is also a significant similarity; namely, that these are both relationships among persons. If we make God so different as to exlcude this point of commonality, we risk losing any meaning at all when speaking of him in personal terms. You have managed to explain why the Son could not have rejected the Father's love; however, this does not address the question, "Is the Son's reciprocation of the Father's love only genuine if he could have rejected it?" Either the Son's love is not genuine, or it stands as a counter-example to the idea that genuine love is predicated on the possibility of rejection. It may be the case that people can reject God's love and that those who do not have genuinely accepted it. However, it does not follow that the genuine nature of this acceptance is predicated on the ability to have rejected it. And, if this is the case, then, although it is evident that some can reject and others can accept, we need to consider whether or not there are factors such that any given individual who accepted could only have accepted (or vice versa). This, in Reformed doctrine, would be a matter of irresistible grace. It's not a matter that anyone accepts against his will, but that, in regeneration, thee will is so disposed as to accept.

Paul does not speak of a division of the will that is proper to the nature of the human person. Instead, this division is proper only to those who have been regenerated and who are in the process of being sanctified. The battle between the flesh and the spirit is more properly understood as between the flesh and the Spirit. It is a matter of the Holy Spirit gradually molding our desires to match God's. And, as long as we are on this earth, with this human nature, it is also a matter of resisitng what the Spirit wants. I won't deny that such a division of the will can exist within an individual. However, it should be clear that "will" is in reference to conflicting desires and not to the faculty of willing or to the exercise thereof.

I have been speaking of man willing according to his strongest want, desire, or inclination. Some of this may be ambiguous, since, as you have shown, words such as "desire" can have other meanings. For now, then, let me narrow my terminology down to "inclination." This way, it will be possible to discuss your thoughts on desire without getting too confused. I plan on dealing more with the topic of inclination in my next post, which will be a response to Chris, so I will limit my comments here. Regarding your example, though, I do mean to say that a man's strongest inclination may be for chocolate cake one moment and for a glass of water the next. This is pretty much why when he is sitting in front of a piece of cake and a glass of water that he either takes a bite of cake or drink of water. He consistently acts according to his strongest inclination at the moment. These are the normal choices. His strongest inclination could also lead him to not eat the cake or drink the water, or it might even lead him to mix the cake with the water. Either way, he will have followed the strongest inclination when presented with the choice of what to do with the cake and water. None of this conflicts with his strongest desire being neither cake nor water. But now, I must consider what you have identified as man's strongest desire.

The first answer to the WSC states, "Man's chief end is to glorify God, and to enjoy him forever." This refers to the intent for which man was created and to the fulfillment of that intent in heaven. This an altogether different thing from the proposition that it is within human nature as such to desire God. Contrary to your claims, I would argue that such an underlying desire does not exist unless God specifically creates it in an individual by means of regeneration. In his indictment of humanity, wherein he sets up the necessity of redemption for every individual, Paul states that "no one seeks after God" (Romans 3:11). Adam's sin is not a case of choosing "according to his immediate perception of the Good rather than according to the eternal Truth of the Good." It wasn't a case of the lesser of two goods. Adam's choice was not merely to eat of the fruit of a particular tree, it was to disobey the commandment of God. This was not a case of seeking union with God in a misguided way. The fall is not just a matter of man falling into confusion and breaking the bond of love. Consequently, the atonement is not just a matter of restoring the bond of love and taking away the confusion. Your statement, "God restored the bond of love between Himself and man in Christ (this, in my opinion, is the whole of the work of the Cross)," is very much in keeping with Catholic theology; especially with Abelard's conception of the atonement. The chief efficacy of Christ's passion is found in its ability to stir us to love God. When we see the cross, we see how much God loves us. Consequently, we are able to focus on something that can lead us past our confusion and allow us to demonstrate our love for God. [For those who have seen it, Mel Gibson's "The Passion of the Christ" is a prime example of Abelardian theology.] But this whole concept of the atonement begs the question. For while it is true that the atonement demonstrates God's love, we need to ask why and how this is the case. What is it about God killing his own Son, or, if you prefer weaker terms, allowing his son to be killed, that demonstrates his love? I won't argue that the cross does not demonstrate God's love, especially in light of John 3:16. I do want to know why it is that God's love had to be demonstrated in just this way. If it were only a matter of providing a focal point to excite our own love for God, there are surely less drastic options. And here is where the idea of a the substitutionary atonement comes in. When Adam fell, we fell in him. We were all declared guilty and were all deserving of death. In the atonement, Christ dies in our place. Because he has died, we will never die. He pays the price for sin and, having done so, is declared, not just "not guilty, " but "righteous." All those for whom he died, or better, who were crucified with him, are also justified (i.e., declared righteous). Having been justified, we are not merely restored to the same place that Adam was in where we can break the bond of love again. While it is true that we can continue to sin while we remain in this life, it is not the case that the bond of love is ours to break. Christ has purchased our inheritance for us, which was not true of Adam's original state. Although he enjoyed the presence of the Holy Spirit, the Spirit was not with him as an earnest of his inheritance, as he is with us. When we sin, the Spirit does not leave us but continues to sanctify us.

You have attributed Adam's sin to choosing "according to his immediate perception of the Good rather than according to the eternal Truth of the Good." But you go on to say, "In the end, we will see God face to face, and the choice between God and our immediate pleasures will be obliterated because the immediate pleasure will be the vision of God." If this is so, then how is our behavior in heaven any different from choosing according to our immediate perception of the good? My point is not to say that this is right or wrong, only that, ultimately, it cannot be where Adam went wrong. He disobeyed an explicit command of God. There was no immediate perception of any good. Adam is not a figure to be pitied. And then there is your explanation of man's current condition even after the death of Christ.

In the meantime, for man to respond to God’s self-giving with self-giving, he must often refuse the immediate manifestation of his natural desire because it is conditioned by concupiscence and the habits of sin. He must live according to God’s desire rather than merely according to his own. If he does not do so, he breaks the bond of love once again by refusing to give himself over to the Beloved’s will.

And so on, and so on. Adam falls and breaks the bond of love. Christ suffers on the cross thereby allowing us to respond and restore this bond. If we do not continue to live according to God's desire the cycle starts again. We break the bond of love- our own private fall, as it were. The solution is the same. Well, almost. This time, instead of the historical sacrifice on the cross, Christ is resacrificed over and over in the mass. The sacraments, especially this one, become a means whereby we are enabled to restore the bond of love that our sinful behavior has broken. Until we do it again.

At this point, you write:

This, it seems to me, is why Reformed theology must say that man’s nature was changed by the Fall. Otherwise, total depravity and irresistible grace don’t make sense. Speech about forensic declarations only makes sense if you are speaking figuratively about natures and intrinsic ontological relationships. Otherwise, you fall into speaking of God as if He were dealing with legal fictions instead of with created reality.

I will combine a response to this with what you wrote in your email. [For the sake of any other readers, Andrew had written the following]:

It seems like you are raising "forensic declaration" to a metaphysical status, which throws me completely, and then you speak of human nature changing, which, in the Catholic view, is impossible. A change of human nature is equivalent to God changing His mind. Please clarify, then, what you mean by "human nature," "forensic declaration," and so on, because you obviously don't mean what Catholics mean.

First, human nature and its change. This is not a change of human nature (although, I might have used that pronoun), but a change in human nature. That is, our nature does not change into something else. We remain human throughout eternity. This change occurs at the resurrection. Paul describes it in I Corinthians 15:51-53, "Behold! I tell you a mystery. We shall not all sleep, but we shall all be changed, in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, at the last trumpet. For the trumpet will sound and the dead will be raised imperishable, and we shall be changed. For this perishable body must put on the imperishable, and this mortal body must put on immortality." Once this change occurs, the possibility of sin will no longer be in our nature, for death will have lost its sting. As to man's nature being changed by the fall, this is where I disagree with Reformed theology. I find no reason to believe that there was such a change (or, if this change did occur, I will have to insist that the human nature Christ took on is that of man after the fall and not before; otherwise, we are not healed). I think a lot of resistance to the idea that the nature that man has now is the same that he had before the fall is due to the notion that whatever God creates must be pristine and perfect. Why? God can create in this way and has done so in the creation of that realm in which he lives and to which we are destined. But he has also created an entire realm that awaits perfection. Notice the very first description of the earth after we find out that God created it. "The earth was without form and void." And now, consider that man was a product of the earth. The promise of the resurrection, that man will one day be imperishable and immortal, is not a promise to restore him to past glory, but to give him that for which he had always been intended. God meant for man to be both immortal and imperishable; however, he did not create him in this condition. Such a reward would have to be merited. It was to have been given to Adam and to his posterity upon his justification. Had Adam obeyed God, he would have been declared righteous and would have received the promised reward- eternal life. Instead, Christ obeyed God and he received the promised reward. Upon being declared righteous, he was raised from the dead and was made both immortal and imperishable. Both our regeneration and our future bodily resurrection are conditioned upon our union with Christ in his death and resurrection.

On the issue of forensic declarations, considering the way in which many Protestants speak of them, Catholics are well within their rights to label them as "legal fictions." It's as though God just decides to declare something without any basis in fact or reality. But if he can do this, why not just make the declaration without the bother of being crucified? Forensic declarations are not figurative language nor do they have any metaphsyical status. They are legal judgments. If I commit a crime, I cannot be sentenced until a verdict has been rendered. There is a difference between the polutution of sin and our standing before the law of God. It is necessary that we be both cleansed and justified. Redemption involves real ontological relationships. We are actually placed into union with Christ. This is not nominal. We are crucified and raised together with him. None of this constitutes a forensic declaration. It is, rather, the basis in reality whereby God's forensic declarations can be made. A judge must never clear those who have actually committed the crime. This is no less true of God. His verdicts must be according to justice; they must be true. There would be no more justice in God imputing Christ's rigtheousness to me and my unrighteousness to Christ than there would be for some earthly judge to decide that you were guilty of my crimes. A legal fiction, if that's what imputation and justification are, is an injustice of the worst sort. It doesn't work that way, though. The righteousness of Christ is imputed to us only because it actually belongs to us by virtue of our union with him. Our justification is declared on the basis that, in Christ, we have already paid the full penalty of sin. Having so justified us, a just God cannot reverse this declaration, for it is not fictional. As you indicated earlier, it is unthinkable that God would change his mind. Justification is not just an indicator of our current status, but is a preview of the final judgment. Everyone will pay the penalty for sin. If not with Christ on the cross, then it will be paid in an eternal hell.

I would agree that miracles "are not properly called revelation in isolation from a subjective apprehension of that which is revealed." The same would go for any thing that purports to be revelation. That which it reveals must be subjectively apprehended. The question, though, is whether this subjective apprehension always takes place at the same time that the miracle is witnessed. How many people witnessed the miracles of the feedings of the 5000 and the 4000? And how many of them even came close to understanding what Christ had revealed until he explained it to them in John 6? The Pharisees witnessed the healing of the blind man in John 9 (if not the event itself, then the results were obvious to them); however, they could not understand anything that this miracle had revealed because they themselves were blind. Revelation is not merely telling us something we didn't know before. Just as not all those who witnessed the miracles of Christ apprehend what these miracles revealed, even so, not all those who find out that these miracles happened through reading Scripture have apprehended what these miracles reveal. As you wrote, miracles are mediums of revelation and not revelation proper. Thus, merely finding out from one medium of revelation (Scripture) about another medium of revelation (miracles) does not guarantee that we will apprehend the revelation itself. This requires the work of the Holy Spirit and, without it, we are like the Pharisees who were as blind spiritually as the man born blind had been physically.

Thanks for clearing up the point about not trying to get rid of those events that make revelation actual. The way you were putting things was confusing and sounded like you were advocating some sort of neo-orthodoxy. I wanted to be sure so that I wouldn't waist any time responding to something you weren't saying. On the matter of classifying the Summa Theologica as revelation according to intension, you're economy of qualities and attributes is leading to an overly liberal idea of just what revelation is. The only attribute you have listed is "a manifestation of the life of the Church." Since both the Summa and Scripture have this in common, then both must be a revelation of Christ. But this does not follow unless, according to extension, "a manifestation of the life of the Church," is revelation. This has not been established; instead, the relationship of revelation to a manifestation of the church's life is one of species to genus. I could, following a similar method of reasoning, conclude that I am a frog, since both frogs and myself are manifestations of biological life. Fortunately, froghood does not exhaust what it means to possess biological life.

One quality that would separate the Summa from revelation according to intension is found in your discussion of the Bereans. We do not have the option to consider rejecting Paul's message. Insofar as it has been inscripturated, it has already been verified as the Word of God and we must accept it as we would any other part of Scripture. We can consider rejecting and even flat out reject a number of things that Thomas has to say. You wrote, "The Scriptures differ from the Summa Theologica in that they more perfectly manifest the essence of revelation..." But this should have hinted at another quality of revelation. When God reveals, he does so inerrantly. Unless you are willing to predicate this of the Summa, then it should not be classified as revelation. And if you're not, then I compelled to wonder just where Scripture's more perfect manifestation of the essence of revelation lies. On the specific matter of considering a rejection of what Paul or any other biblical writer has recorded in Scripture, this should not be confused with considering a rejection of any given interpretation of Scripture. For instance, the issue of women's ordination is not even a matter of improper Scriptural exegesis, for Paul's opinion on the matter is clear. Very little interpretive ability is required. Instead, people have just decided that Paul is a product of his backward times and should be ignored on this topic. But there are also times when Scripture is improperly exegeted, even by those invested with authority in the church to teach it. We should never be passive recipients of biblical teaching but should always compare what has been taught with our study of Scripture. Ideally, this would lead to a deeper understanding and agreement with the teaching received. But it is also possible that something won't add up, in which case we may both consider rejecting and actually reject it. It is one thing to give a church the benifit of the doubt in what it teaches and to accept it even if we don't quite understand it all. It is another not to question or even reject the doctrinal discrepancies that we are able to see.

I will have to disagree with the identification of the grammatical/historical method as another form of allegory. You write that "the historical method depends upon hearsay and the fallible accounts of men." While it is true that we can make use of extra-biblical historical records to help us understand Scripture, the historical method does not depend on these. Rather, the idea is that the Bible itself, especially in its historical narratives, is an accurate record of history. All other biblical genres are predicated on the fact that the historical events recorded actually happened. For example, the didactic writings of Paul, in which he is defining Christian doctrine, would have little authority if the historical events of Christ's salvific work had not taken place. The Psalms are not just expressions of general human emotion, but they find their specific context in the history of Israel (or, even more specifically in most cases, in that of David), which history is a revelation of Christ. The Law is not just an expression of timeless moral principles, but is given to a particular people at a particular point in their history. It is given to the nation of Israel after they have been redeemed from slavery in Egypt. Any revelatory value that the Law has must be considered against this background. On a related point going back to your description of history as "hearsay and the fallible accounts of men," read chapter 28, "To what extent history is an aid," of Augustine's On Christian Doctrine. I think you will find that his view of profane history is not quite as pessimistic. On the matter of "metaphysical truths which are everywhere and always available," is this only what you believe Origen to be doing or do you advocate basing biblical interpretation on these yourself? If so, what are these truths? This would help to know how further to respond to your comments on allegory and interpretation.

As you present it, the Assumption of Mary is based upon her Immaculate Conception. Mary was born without sin; consequently, she did not have to wait until the resurrection to achieve bodily union with God, since the resurrection purifies us of our sins, which Mary did not have. The argument seems to be valid, but what about the premises? First, Mary "was clearly sinless because Christ did not inherit original sin." But this is not so clear. 1) There is the problem of infinite regress. Why didn't Mary's parents have to be sinless in order for her not to be sinless? 2) One view within the church has been that sin is inherited through the father. If so, then the Virgin Birth would prevent Christ from inheriting original sin. 3) Original sin is not inherited at all. It has nothing to do with the personal pollution of sin but is, rather, a guilty verdict pronounced on everyone for the sin of Adam. In this case, original sin does not bypass Christ since he must be declared guilty in order that his death might be just. Unless 1) is answered and 2) and 3) are discounted, then there is no point in seeing whether Mary's sinlessness implies her Assumption.

When discussing specific instances of prayer or prayer in general, you still maintain that Scripture is not a prerequisite. However, you are not consistent as to why this is the case. In the first case, it is because the person praying does not need to have read Scripture in order to pray. In the second, it is because Scripture is not in the definition of prayer. But your argument does not follow. Finding one way in which two things are not related does not indicated that there are no ways in which they are related. This would be like me making the claim that my cousin and I are not related because I am not her nephew. Scripture's function as a prerequisite for the church's life, including prayer, does not require that each individual therein read Scripture for himself. It is sufficient that the church teach its members to pray and that this teaching is either explicitly taught in Scripture or that it can bederived as a matter of good and necessary consequence. As to Enoch and Noah living before Scripture, this begs the question of a point that we have been discussing. Scripture's ability to be a prerequisite for the church's life comes from its status as revelation. Before Scripture was completed there were other forms of revelation. This is no longer the case. Finally, to say that Scripture is not a prerequisite of something in the church's life because it is not in the definition of that thing is to seriously limit its role, if not to deny altogether that it can be a prerequisite for anything in the church's life. I suppose an exception could be made for preaching. But if you're going to deny Scripture's function as a prerequisite to the church's life, then you need to do so in the manner that I have been using the concept; otherwise, we're talking about two different things. Here, then, is what I mean in making this claim: Everything that a church teaches its members to believe or practice must be explicitly taught in Scripture or derived therefrom by good and necessary consequence. Prayer falls under this category.

If it is true, as you have written, that Scripture does not "teach individual responsibility at the expense of corporate unity," then one of three other propositions must also be true. 1) It does teach corporate unity at the expense of individual responsibility; 2) it is not a matter of individual responsibility to oppose heresy- we should ultimately tolerate it; 3) there have never been any cases where a church has been in error and so any reason for making such a choice doesn't exist. You've already agreed to the opposite of option 1, and option 3 is just naive, which leaves option 2. If unbroken communion must be maintained even at the expense of tolerating heresy, then, what distinguishes the church from an inescapable social club? If the goal is unity at all costs, then doctrine, except for the one that teaches this goal, cannot have any ultimate meaning. As it is not a uniquely Christian thing to form groups, the church canno tbe defined on the basis of unity alone. You also seem to be confusing breaking away from a particular congregation or denomination from breaking away from the body of Christ altogether. Leaving one church is not the same thing as not belonging to any church.