Morphemics

Peter Lombard on Grace

I am not inclined to take a very positive outlook on Peter Lombard’s view of grace; nevertheless, I would like to examine various areas in which it might be possible to give him the benefit of the doubt. His view of predestination as it relates to free will is very similar to the prescient view of Arminianism. God foreknows everything that will happen. Although God may act as the ultimate cause for whatever he foreknows, this is not always the case. Especially when it comes to the rational choice of free agents, God just knows. But does this apply to the decision of repentance unto salvation? Peter defines predestination in terms of grace. It is, in the words of Marcia L. Colish, “the grace of preparation which God grants to the elect” (The Medieval Theologians p.172). Salvation involves their cooperating with this grace. The salvation of each individual is assured; however, this may be only in the sense that God knows beforehand what will happen.

There is a point that remains unclear. Does God foreknow that the elect are the only ones who will cooperate with this grace, or is it the case that any one would cooperate with this grace but God only gives it to whomever he wills? While it is the case that this predestinating grace moves the decision of the elect, is it also the case that their decisions somehow move God to bestow this grace? When it comes to salvation, is God’s foreknowledge causative? I tend to think that, in Peter’s estimation, it is not. The context, at least as Colish presents it, is the free will and consequent free decisions of rational creatures. As systematic and detailed as Peter is in his writing, I would expect that if predestinating grace were, in itself, sufficient unto salvation, he would have mentioned this as an exception.

Earlier, Colish has already pointed out Peter’s belief that grace may be rejected, “…not all people receive his grace and those who do may reject it; those who accept it do not always act with it to the same degree or in the same way” (p. 172). In itself, this is not a problem; that is, unless, foreknowledge aside, the ability to reject grace also applies to predestinating grace.

One area in which Peter may talk about sufficient grace is when he is talking about the fallen angels and those angels that have been confirmed as good. Both act with completely free wills, but the fallen angels, from whom grace has been removed, always will to do evil, while the confirmed angels, because they continue they continue to cooperate with the grace that they have been given, always will to do good. By virtue of this perpetual cooperation, they continue to merit eternal life. How is Peter using merit here? It could be that the confirmation of the righteous angels is no more than a matter of foreknowledge. The power to cooperate with grace arises solely within themselves. God just happens to know that they will never fall and has let everyone else in on the secret. Or it could be that the grace of confirmation is sufficient to cause the angels to always will good, even to the point that they could never will to resist it. If Peter will allow for this kind of grace that is able to change the will, then, perhaps the same can be said of predestinating grace. Or not.

Peter’s view of the sacraments is not particularly promising. It is his writing that finally locks down the Roman Catholic number to seven. In all fairness, though, having five too many sacraments is not the issue when it comes to grace. What matters is how these sacraments are supposed to work. Given the appropriate method, minister, and intention, they objectively convey grace. Nevertheless, this grace can only be received if the recipient has faith and the right intentions. One positive point, if this is Peter’s view, is that he has not degenerated to the view of sacraments operating ex opere operato. He does make an exception for infant baptism. Obviously, an infant cannot have proper intentions. Consequently, the grace is conveyed to them and “remains latent in them until they are mature enough to decide whether or not to collaborate with it” (p. 179). Not much different than the other sacraments- the process is just delayed.

Even though the grace of the sacraments is not automatically conveyed without faith, I cannot help believing that Peter views this cooperating faith as a work performed by the one receiving the sacrament. Whatever the case, he does distinguish it from the grace conveyed by the sacrament. In that case, is faith a work arising from within the individual, or is it the necessary result of the grace of predestination?

Because of Peter’s views relating to the extent of man’s depravity, I believe that he sees faith and good intentions as human works. Grace is necessary, but it is not sufficient. Colish writes, “For Peter, the most serious consequence of original sin is the depression of the will” (p.175). In other words, the will is still intact. Peter believes that there is a “spark of reason inclining us toward the good” (ibid). With the grace of God, it may be possible for this spark to act righteously. It cooperates with grace and is thereby meritorious. “And, when God awards the meritorious, He rewards not Himself but the virtues that moral agents have made their own ingrained character traits” (ibid). This, if an accurate representation of Peter’s view, taken in the context of his other beliefs, looks as though Peter fits right into Rome's view of grace. It is necessary to salvation, but the deciding factor is our own good works.