This post continues the conversation with Andrew from here and responds to his comments of 3/24/05 and 3/25/05.
I think you have captured a key difference between Reformed and Catholic views of salvation: that between actual and potential grace. The fact that the Catholic system does have a "moment of monergistic action" does make it non-Pelagian, but, to the extent that the grace of salvation must be made actual through a synergistic process, it is still salvation by works. In both views, sanctification is necessary to salvation, yet not in the same way. For one, it is a necessary cause; for the other, it is a necessary effect. Without sanctification, salvation either will not be the case, or it never was the case.
You are probably correct in saying that "the difference between the Catholic view and the Reformed view stems from a difference of emphasis concerning the nature of God's salvific will." Nevertheless, the difference should be measured by the end result, not by the seemingly insignificant matter of emphasis at the beginning. In the one case, God takes a people to himself; in the other, he wants to give himself to human beings. It isn't an either/or case though, at least on the Reformed side. Not only does God take a people to himself, but he also desires to give himself to that people. Your contention that God's self-giving should be open-ended assumes a view of the will that does not necessarily follow. "If human beings may reject God, then someone who does not reject HIm is reponding to God in kind." Now, apply this logic to intratrintitarian relationships. Is the Son's reciprocation of the Father's love only genuine if he could have rejected it?
I accept the notion that those who do not reject God respond to him in kind and that "God's self-giving inspires a reciprocal self-giving." But this inspiration is efficacious. All those to whom God has given himself will respond in kind. None of this is predicated on the possibility of rejection but upon the free desire of the regenerate. If it is the case with human beings that those to whom God has shown initial grace are able to reject him, then the deciding factor in their salvation, no matter how much God may work with them, must be found in their own efforts to give themselves to God.
On the matter of "desire as a force exerted upon the desiring by the thing desired," as a reason for the Catholic tradition to find the Reformed view unacceptable, this goes against the Reformed doctrine of unconditional election. God chooses a particular people to be his own, but the conditions of that choice are not to be found in the ones chosen. As to what did make God choose certain people over others, we leave these to his own secret counsel. What God has not chosen to reveal, we may not investigate.
While it was a good thing for the Berean Jews to not try to kill Paul, this is not the reason given for saying that they were more noble than those in Thessalonica. It was that "they received the word with all eagerness, examining the Scriptures daily to see if these things were so." This is about more than human decency; it has to do with the proper handling of God's word. Furthermore, the Jews had no more of an option of rejecting Paul's message than we do. They were not members of a completely separate covenant that might serve as a fallback position. Any rejection of the NC would indicate that they had never really understood or accepted the substance of the old. They too would have been heretics for thinking that Scripture contradicted Paul. Paul's message was the intended conclusion of the Old Testament. That it is a responsible thing to check teaching against Scripture does not mean that any opinion is valid. Part of Scriptural study involves double-checking the NT against the OT. This is not to look for contradictions, for we know that the Holy Spirit cannot contradict himself. It is rather to understand how Scripture interprets itself. When it comes to those who are teachers in the church, we should still double-check their teaching against the whole of Scripture. Unlike Paul, however, they may be wrong, either by way of honest mistake or by outright deception.
When a teacher in the church substantially disagrees with our own interpretation of Scripture, we are not to accept his teaching passively. Nor do we just assume that we're right. There is a process whereby we may request an explanation. Hopefully, the matter can end here, since, in the normal course of things, one would expect the teacher to know more than the one who is taught. If not, the matter can be taken to a higher authority. In Presbyterian polity this can go from the session to presbytery and, finally, to general assembly. It may be that the teacher is found to be in error. If not, and if the individual cannot in all good conscience say that the disagreement is a minor thing, then he should find another church. Individualism is wrong, but Scripture does not teach corporate unity at the expense of individual responsibility. In the end, the individual will be just as condemned if he leaves the true church as he will be if he remains in a false one. Either way, he answers to God.
On the matter of Scriptural inference for the Assumption of Mary, I'd like more detail than the statement that it has been done. And thoroughly Scripture-peppered writings do not count. Quoting Scripture is not the same as exegeting it. I do have a definite idea on how to infer something from Scripture, but this is hardly a problem, unless you're of the opinion that anything goes (of course, you might agree as to the definiteness of the idea but disagree as to its content). I do reject allegorical and mystical interpretations as they are commonly understood because these do little more than to impose a meaning on to the text. They are examples of eisegesis. I accept the historical-grammatical method. As to grammar, this means nothing more than a noun is noun, a verb a verb, and so on. We should understand Scripture as ordinary speech. The historical part means that, as much as possible, we should try to see it through the eyes of the original audience. An example of this happened in my change of view about infant baptism. I was raised a Baptist with the belief that, since Scripture does not specifically say, "Baptize babies," then it shouldn't be done. But I was interpreting the silence of Scripture from my own unaffected perspective. What if I were a first century Jew? In Peter's sermon at Pentecost, he says, "Repent and be baptized every one of you in the name of Jesus Christ for the forgiveness of your sins, and you will receive the gift of the Holy Spirit. For the promise is for you and for your children and for all who are far off, everyone whom the Lord our God calls to himself." Peter is speaking in terms of covenant signs to a Jewish audience, who would naturally apply the covenant sign to their children. In this case, we can infer the validity of infant baptism from the fact that a prohibition is not articulated.
Scripture should be interpreted literally. This can be taken in more than one way. It does not mean, as many fundamentalists suppose, that we must interpret it in a wooden fashion such that every thing means exactly what it says unless such an interpretation is impossible. Rather, it means that we interpret Scripture according to its various literary genres. I also assume the unity of Scripture. It is authored by the Holy Spirit and will not contradict itself. Scripture is always about Christ. Whenever I approach any passage of Scripture, my first question is, "How does this portray Christ?" To this end, the way in which the NT authors interpret the OT has been very helpful. I see their method as a pattern to be followed, not as an exception to the rule. Take Matthew's application of Hosea 11:1 to Christ. On a surface reading, the verse implies nothing of the kind. It is an historical reference to the Exodus. But Hosea's meaning goes deeper than the surface. Both he and Matthew are tapping into the revelation found in the history of Israel. This is a matter of typology. The history of Israel was intended to typify the life of Christ. The life of Christ recapitulates the history of Israel. Matthew is able to apply this bit of history to Christ, not because it made for a nice analogy and he could, therefore, take it out of context, but because he was keeping it in context. The history of Israel, which is the bulk of the OT, is a revelation of Christ. Paul assumes the same thing when, in Galatians 4, he speaks of Abraham's sons in terms of an allegory. Yes, it is the same word that, normally, I don't like. Yet, Paul is not imposing an interpretation onto what Moses wrote. He is interpreting the history of Israel as the history of Christ. In this case, he adds another layer by interpreting the life of Abraham as a foreshadowing of the history of Israel and, by extension, of Christ. If you're interested in how I have expanded on this premise, then you may want to go to the Theology category and read the posts on the life of Abraham.
You are right about my disagreement over what constitutes "the whole history of orthodox thought." The phrase begs the question, especially when I had asked, "What out of all that happens within the visible church constitutes a legitimate element of the Church's life?" That is, unless you mean to answer, "Everything." However, I do not subscribe to the theory that whatever the visible church has done must be right, for, as Luther pointed out, it has often contradicted itself. Looking to such things as the Councils, liturgy, and Thomas' Summa are good, but they must also be evaluated in the light of Scripture. As to the Summa Theologica, I would not put it in the same set as Scripture, which is the inspired and infallible Word of God. There are several points in the Summa with which I disagree, but, even if this weren't the case, it is still just the words of a man. That being said, I can see the value in using it as a secondary standard, much like my own church uses the Westminster Standards. Such standards, although the basis for a common interpretation of Scripture, are also subject to Scripture. The Confession has, on occassion, been amended when further study found it to be out of line with Scripture. Legitimate elements in the life of the church are determined by considering them in the light of Scripture. If they do not pass this test, they are not valid as elements in the church's life.
Prayer is not going to work as an example of something in the church's life for which Scripture is not a prerequisite. We learn about prayer through Scripture. Even if the immediate source of our information is, say, our parents, the ultimate source of this information is still Scripture. Does anything else come to mind?
You write that the historical reality at Cana "is properly speaking revelation, but that it is no more truly a revelation than the revelation that occurs when you read the account." I won't argue. It is not my intent to set the historical event in opposition to Scripture so that we can only choose one of them. I do disagree on what constitutes objective and subjective revelation. That Christ is the object of revelation is not the same thing as saying that he is objective revelation. For that matter, Christ is also the subject of revelation, insofar as he is the one who reveals. This does not mean that he is subjective revelation. Objective revelation is found both in the historical events and in their inscripturation. This is where God speaks. Subjective revelation is found in the individual's apprehension of objective revelation, whether this be as an eyewitness to the original event or by hearing Scripture.
The people who witnessed the miracle at Christ saw Christ in the event of the miracle, not only in the fact that he was the one standing there performing the miracle. In the same way, other miracles not performed by Christ also serve to reveal Christ, both in the original event and in their record in Scripture. Your argument that miracles are not properly called revelation does follow from the premise of Christ performing a miracle without witnesses. However, though it may be valid, we cannot conclude that it is true unless you can verify the premise. When has a miracle ever been performed without witnesses? I would argue just the opposite point: because miracles are a form of revelation, they always have witnesses.
Is Scripture true because it allows us to aprehend the eternal reality of Christ? Or does this truth also imply that when it describes an historical event that this event must have actually happened? Does it matter for the function of the Scriptural narrative of the miracle at Cana as revelation whether it really took place or not? Would Scripture reveal Christ just as well and just as truthfully if it turned out to be an ahistorical myth?
If synergism makes some system of theology Pelagian, then Augustine is a Pelagian. Augustine clearly holds to synergism at every stage of the ordo solutis. See McGrath, Rist, Markus, Dodaro, et al.
Posted by: Perry Robinson at março 30, 2005 8:07 AM” Nevertheless, the difference should be measured by the end result, not by the seemingly insignificant matter of emphasis at the beginning.”
I would argue that, if the end result of the emphasis is not insignificant, then neither is the beginning emphasis.
” God chooses a particular people to be his own, but the conditions of that choice are not to be found in the ones chosen. As to what did make God choose certain people over others, we leave these to his own secret counsel. What God has not chosen to reveal, we may not investigate.”
But God has revealed His motivation in a general way. He is motivated by agape. Divine love is so fundamental that God can be accurately called by that name. I would argue that unless you can find a reason to say that God has chosen one particular people over another because of His love for all people, your assertion that He has done such a thing is shaky. If He loves one set of people more than another set, then that would suggest that His love is not as unadulterated as the Scriptures lead us to believe.
The Catholic reading of the Scriptures is that the particularity of the people of God is not specifically willed by God. Only, He simply gives Himself, and whosoever will respond will respond. When God takes a people to Himself, this is a function of His primary action – the self-giving of Divine love. He calls all men to Himself, but in such a way that they don’t all have to respond. Consider Christ’s words to His accusers. He very meekly calls them to recognize His Godhood. When they ask if He is the Christ, He says “you say so.” He turns the finger back at them. Continually, He calls them to accountability for the actions they are about to perform. The character of His rebuke is such that He is truly offering repentance, but in such a way as can be refused. He is not offering repentance to people who are unable to repent (why would He?), but He is also not offering repentance in an utterly compelling way. He calls all men (even those who murder Him), and He embraces whosoever responds to Him.
” It isn't an either/or case though, at least on the Reformed side. Not only does God take a people to himself, but he also desires to give himself to that people. Your contention that God's self-giving should be open-ended assumes a view of the will that does not necessarily follow. "If human beings may reject God, then someone who does not reject HIm is reponding to God in kind." Now, apply this logic to intratrintitarian relationships. Is the Son's reciprocation of the Father's love only genuine if he could have rejected it?”
It isn’t either/or on the Catholic side either. Only, the Catholics would say “God desires to give Himself, and therefore takes a people for Himself.”
As for the intraTrinitarian relationships, I think you would agree that they are significantly different from the relationships between human beings and the Godhead. Between the Father and the Son, there is an irreducible equality and unity. The Son responds to the Father and in the same moment calls upon the Father to respond. The will of God is truly unified and it is of a consistent character – love.
Between man and God, however, there is tremendous inequality and division. Furthermore, the will of man is divided in itself as Paul describes when He speaks of the flesh and the spirit. Part of that internal division is a result of the disorder of man’s nature caused by the Fall, but part of it is proper to the nature of the human person. In other words, man desires evil because of the Fall, but even before the Fall, his willing was not unified with the willing of God as the Son’s willing is unified with the Father’s. Thus, man’s proper relationship with God is synergistic – the indwelling of the Spirit and participation in the Godhead. God’s internal relationship is monergistic. The Three Persons share the same nature, and their eternal action is one action - agape.
Thus, if man is to respond in kind to God’s action of self-giving, his response must be substantially different from the Son’s response to the Father’s self-giving. Man’s self-giving must be in keeping with his nature as a free being separate from God. So what does it mean to say that man is a free being? It does not mean that man is independent of God, or that at any point man is free to choose against his own strongest desire, but I disagree with the way you speak of desire.
You speak as if one moment a man’s strongest desire may be for chocolate cake and the next for a glass of water. As Catholic theology conceives of it, desire is something that arises out of the nature of a certain being. As such, man’s strongest desire (one might say his only desire) is at all times for union with God, for that is his final end according to his nature – his telos. When we say that man desires self-preservation, we must understand this as a function of his desire for God. We desire to preserve ourselves because without doing so, we cannot be unified with God. Just so with the desire for pleasure. We have pleasure because we sense in the object of pleasure some resemblance or trace of God.
However, man is required to prioritize and to choose between the various objects to which his desire attaches itself. In the beginning, because of original grace, he had the option of choosing according to the Truth about Creation. That is, he had access to the mind of God through the Spirit, and he was able to make choices on that basis. He was also able, however, to make choices only according to the immediate manifestation of his desire. Thus, Adam chose something which was truly good insofar as it was created by God and bore His handiwork, but He chose according to his immediate perception of the Good rather than according to the eternal Truth of the Good.
Man selfishly chose his own desire over that of his Beloved, and so broke the bond of self-giving love which had once formed his communion with God. He no longer had the perfect access to the eternal Truth of his own desire and so he fell into confusion chasing after phantoms. But his nature had not changed and he chased the transitory pleasures of the flesh because his being cried out with desire for the traces of God’s goodness he saw therein. He could not find his way to God and he added sin upon sin to that original offense against the bond of love.
God restored the bond of love between Himself and man in Christ (this, in my opinion, is the whole of the work of the Cross), but he did not change man’s nature and He did not do away with man’s circumstances. We now have access to the mind of God through the Spirit, and we can now choose to do good in the true knowledge of the Good. However, we can still choose our own immediate pleasures over God. We can continue to sin and to break the bond of love. In the end, we will see God face to face, and the choice between God and our immediate pleasures will be obliterated because the immediate pleasure will be the vision of God.
In the meantime, for man to respond to God’s self-giving with self-giving, he must often refuse the immediate manifestation of his natural desire because it is conditioned by concupiscence and the habits of sin. He must live according to God’s desire rather than merely according to his own. If he does not do so, he breaks the bond of love once again by refusing to give himself over to the Beloved’s will.
I reiterate, however, that the choice of God’s way over man’s way is not possible according to mere human nature, but only according to the indwelling of the Holy Spirit. For man to follow God’s desire over his own, he must have God’s desire moving within Him. Thus, if a Christian does a good work, it is not because he chose it of his own, but because the Holy Spirit moved him according to God’s desire, and the man did not quench the Spirit by exercising his own natural will. The good work is salvific because it is performed by the Spirit, and the man is a vessel or a conduit. The man is active according to the activity of the Spirit, but according to his own natural faculties, he is passive. In the image of Christ’s choice at Gethsemane, man must say “not my will but your will be done.” Man’s own works, which originate with him according to his nature, can never be salvific, but man may work without willing the work from himself.
In this way, man giving himself to God is simply an extension of God’s own self-giving.
If God were to make it such that the manifestation of man’s desire pointed only to Him and to nothing else, He would either have to change man’s nature such that he would no longer freely choose the way in which he follows his desire, or take away the immediate goods of the world, which would also take away the testimony of God’s goodness made manifest to unbelievers. Neither of these options is in keeping with God’s dignity or with His Divine love.
This, it seems to me, is why Reformed theology must say that man’s nature was changed by the Fall. Otherwise, total depravity and irresistible grace don’t make sense. Speech about forensic declarations only makes sense if you are speaking figuratively about natures and intrinsic ontological relationships. Otherwise, you fall into speaking of God as if He were dealing with legal fictions instead of with created reality.
” Your argument that miracles are not properly called revelation does follow from the premise of Christ performing a miracle without witnesses. However, though it may be valid, we cannot conclude that it is true unless you can verify the premise. When has a miracle ever been performed without witnesses? I would argue just the opposite point: because miracles are a form of revelation, they always have witnesses.”
My argument is not that miracles are not properly called revelation, but that they are not properly called revelation in isolation from a subjective apprehension of that which is revealed. I spoke of a miracle without witnesses as an illustration of my assertion that the medium of revelation is no more than that – a medium instead of revelation proper. Revelation itself according to its definition does not require any particular medium, and thus does not require miracles. According to its manifestation, revelation may require miracles, but not according to its definition.
I’m not trying to get rid of the events which make revelation actual. I’m only trying to separate speech about what revelation is from speech about particular instances of revelation. In other words, I’m trying to make sure we’re either both talking about intension or both talking about extension.
And my reason for doing so is to show that, according to intension, the Summa Theologica is a manifestation of the life of the Church, and as such a revelation of Christ. The Scriptures differ from the Summa Theologica in that they more perfectly manifest the essence of revelation, but the two books share the same essence, and proceed from the same Spirit. They differ insofar as they have different purposes (i.e. insofar as they are different media) and they differ insofar as they have different places in relation to one another and to the other parts of the life of the Church. Thus, the difference between the Summa and the Scriptures is one of extension, not one of intension.
” Furthermore, the Jews had no more of an option of rejecting Paul's message than we do. They were not members of a completely separate covenant that might serve as a fallback position.”
The point I was trying to make about the Bereans was not that they had the option of rejecting Paul’s message but that they had the option of considering whether or not to reject it. Had they rejected it, they would have been in the wrong, but they were not in the wrong when they considered rejecting it. A Christian, however, having already accepted the New Convenant, does not have the option to take such a course of action into consideration. We can’t take the Berean’s actions as indicative of how we ought to behave ourselves in the New Covenant.
“I do reject allegorical and mystical interpretations as they are commonly understood because these do little more than to impose a meaning on to the text.”
I’m wondering how you think they are commonly understood because the only way I have ever understood them, and the only way I have heard them discussed in Catholic circles is in this way,
“Yet, Paul is not imposing an interpretation onto what Moses wrote. He is interpreting the history of Israel as the history of Christ. In this case, he adds another layer by interpreting the life of Abraham as a foreshadowing of the history of Israel and, by extension, of Christ.”
Catholics recognize four layers of the Scriptures – the literal and then three allegorical. Each allegorical layer represents a reading of Scripture in the context of some aspect of Christ. The anagogical layer, for instance, concerns His eschatological aspect.
Now, the reason truly hardcore opponents of allegorical readings dislike them is because they impose a meaning on the text by interpreting them in a context which they consider foreign. Thus, a Jew would consider Paul’s allegorical readings eisegesis not because that Jew hates allegorical readings necessarily but because that Jew rejects the idea that the true context of the Old Testament is the New. Just so, Protestants hate Catholic allegorical readings not because they hate allegorical readings (even Luther, who is more strongly opposed to allegory than you seem to be, did allegorical readings, though he wouldn’t admit it), but because they reject the idea that Catholic theology is the proper context for Scripture.
Furthermore, I would argue that the grammatical/historical method is as much an allegorical reading as is, say, Origen’s. Only, where Origen sets up a metaphysical/mythical context for his readings, the historical method sets up an historical context. It is not clear at the outset why one is better or more reliable than the other. After all, Origen would likely say that his interpretation at least depends upon metaphysical truths which are everywhere and always available, while the historical method depends upon hearsay and the fallible accounts of men. It seems to me that the difference here is between one philosophical context of Scripture reading and another, not between allegorical and literal reading.
A good resource on this subject is Augustine’s “On Christian Doctrine.”
Scriptural evidence for the Assumption of Mary may be found according to sound allegorical reading. It is a natural conclusion drawn from Catholic Christology and soteriology. I.e. we will achieve bodily union with God in the Resurrection when we are purified of our sins. Mary was sinless, therefore, there was no obstacle to her bodily union with God, and she was assumed. She was clearly sinless because Christ did not inherit original sin, and the only way for that to happen… so on and so on.
I’m not going to go any further into this point because it depends so heavily on the other matters we are discussing, and we would do much better to focus on those matters instead of this one.
” Prayer is not going to work as an example of something in the church's life for which Scripture is not a prerequisite. We learn about prayer through Scripture. Even if the immediate source of our information is, say, our parents, the ultimate source of this information is still Scripture. Does anything else come to mind?”
I’m going to keep on with prayer. Considering the individual child who prays to God merely because her mother told her to do so, it seems clear to me that Scripture is not a prerequisite for that child’s prayer. The child has not read Scripture, and yet she prays just as truly as you or I. Thus, the Scriptures are not a prerequisite for each instance of prayer. Perhaps a clearer instance would be that of Enoch or Noah. They lived before Scripture and yet they prayed. Now, as for prayer generally, the conditions required for the possibility of prayer are contained in its definition, and I think a good definition of prayer is the conversation between man and God. Scripture is not in the definition and thus is not a prerequisite for prayer in general.
Now, can prayer without Scripture be complete? No. But then, neither can Scripture without prayer. And yet each can exist without the other. Again, the model of Scripture I am arguing for is one in which Scripture is a part of the Church’s life interacting with other parts of the Church’s life. Your model in which Scripture is the foundation of the other parts of the Church's life seems to me to be rather forced.
” In Presbyterian polity this can go from the session to presbytery and, finally, to general assembly. It may be that the teacher is found to be in error. If not, and if the individual cannot in all good conscience say that the disagreement is a minor thing, then he should find another church. Individualism is wrong, but Scripture does not teach corporate unity at the expense of individual responsibility.”
Up to this point in your narrative, I’m with you all the way, but I have a major problem here. While it’s true that the Scriptures do not teach corporate unity at the expense of individual responsibility, neither does it teach individual responsibility at the expense of corporate unity. Rather, one upholds the other. There is no situation in which it is acceptable to break communion with the brethren for the sake of personal responsibility. One cannot truly be personally responsible except in the context of corporate unity, and one cannot have corporate unity unless each member takes responsibility for preserving it.
The church order you describe seems to me to be one in which an individual forms his own conscience and then either validates or repudiates the teachings of his pastor. It is as if the individual is seen as a functional whole who can, on his own, correctly judge the meaning of the Scriptures, correctly judge the teachings of his pastor, and justly and coherently split with the brethren. But the image of the Church we see in the Scriptures is that of a Body in which one member cannot function without the others. No individual is a functional whole, but merely a member of the functional whole which is the Church. We each bring talents to the table, and we each bring interpretations of the Scripture, but no one can pretend that the exercise of his talents does not depend on the exercise of other talents or that they have any meaning except in the context of the operation of the whole Church. Why should it be any different for Scriptural interpretation?
Perry- I never said that synergism could make a system of theology Pelagian. If anything, this goes against Pelagianism, which is a monergistic heresy. I said, "a 'moment of monergistic action' [in context, action by God] does make it non-Pelagian." A non-Pelagian soteriology covers all forms of synergism as well as divine monergism. As to Augustine clearly holding to synergism "at every stage of the ordo salutis," I'm not convinced. At least, not until you can make your argument with a bit more precision than a list of names.
Jon- I had Deuteronomy 29:29 in mind, "The secret things belong to the LORD our God, but the things that are revealed belong to us and to our children forever, that we may do all the words of this law." It's not about the obscure recesses of Christian doctrine. This is just a matter of taking what has been revealed in Scripture and wringing every last drop of implication out of it. I'm all for reason; however, reasoning is the process of inferring valid conclusions from premises. All the reason in the world is not going to create a premise. And this is what is missing. Scripture does not explicitly state, nor does it give us any material from which to infer, why God chooses person A over person B. And when it comes to why God does anything, Scripture is the only legitimate source from which to derive our premises. Anything else would be pure speculation.
Jon- The question is not whether the Bible gives ample evidence for believing in election, nor is it whether the Bible teaches that the deciding factor in election unto salvation is not found in the ones who are elected. The doctrine of unconditional election is revealed in Scripture, but I wasn't talking about the doctrine itself. Remember that I said, "What God has not chosen to reveal, we may not investigate." Your response, by giving possible avenues of investigation from Scripture, does not address the validity of the statement itself. At most, it suggests that it may not apply in this situation because God has revealed the answer concerning why he elects the ones that he does. We can use the passages on election to determine whether election is conditional or unconditional. If it is established that God does not elect individuals based on anything that they have done, the next question is, "Then what reason does God have for electing whom he elects?" And, of course, anyone's free to try to search the Bible for an answer. So far, no one has found one. On the other hand, if it turns out that election is conditioned on the elect, then the question that the Reformed can't seem to find an answer to is moot- we've been asking it based on a faulty premise. This is not a case of a doctrine being immune from reason. We do have reasons for believing in unconditional election. Beyond that, it's a matter of admitting ignorance as what hasn't been revealed and then refusing to speculate beyond the evidence.
Incidentally, the concept of inscripturation can be traced back to Geehardus Vos' Biblical Theology (I am presently unaware if he coined the word himself or if it was already in usage at the time). Here it is in context, "Where an ever-flowing stream of revelation was always accessible, there existed no need of providing for the future rememberance of past intercourse. But a necessity is created for this in the looser, more easily interrupted, only in principle restored, fellowship under the present enjoyment of redemption. Hence the essential content of the new redemptive revelation is given a permanent form, first through tradition, then through its inscripturation in sacred, inspired writings. Neither for this objectivity of the content, nor for this stablility of the form will there be any further need in the perfected state of things at the end" (Chapter 2-'The Mapping out of the Field of Revelation" p.21). Vos could just as easily have substituted "being recorded" for "inscripturation." However, by coining this word (if, indeed, he did), he doesn't have to keep repeating the entire sentence. "Inscripturation" means putting what God has revealed by means of spoken words or actions into permanent written form such that this written record is just as much revelation as the original event.
Andrew- I have responded up here.
Posted by: Kevin at abril 17, 2005 6:07 PM