The topic is still monergism and Clifton's latest disagreement with it. He believes that it leads to monothelitism, which was condemned as heresy at Constantinople III, the sixth Ecumenical Council. I don't believe that he's made his case. Some background is in order here. For instance, what is monthelitism? Essentially, it is the belief that Christ had only one will. The orthodox doctrine is that Christ has two wills that will the same thing. It all looks rather academic on the surface, so you might wonder who cares. We need to back it up then to the issue behind this belief. Monothelitism came about as an attempted compromise between orthodox Christology and monophysitism, which was the doctrine that Christ had only one nature. Chalcedon had condemned this belief along with its opposite extreme Nestorianism. This was the belief that Christ had two natures, two hypostases, and one person. In this case, hypostases would be what we think of as persons and person would convey the idea of mere appearance. Both monophysitism and Nestorianism started within the bounds of orthodoxy. It was a matter of emphasis. Those on the one side believed that an emphasis on Christ's natures implied two persons, while those on the other believed that an emphasis on Christ's person implied one nature. Basically, this was a misunderstanding between Cyril and Nestorius, but some of their followers would actually develop the heresy that each man had feared. [For a more detailed account, I've written on the subject here.] Right now, though, the focus is on monophysitism.
There is an important principle in Patristic theology that whatever is not assumed is not healed. This idea has to do with the incarnation and it guided the formation of orthodox Christology. Consider some heresies. Docetism- Jesus only appeared to have a body. If he didn't really have a body, then our bodies cannot be healed. More to the point, our bodies cannot be saved. Adoptionism- the Christ Spirit descended onto Jesus' body at his baptism and left before his crucifixion. Again, inhabiting a body is not the same thing as assuming flesh. There were also views that Jesus became incarnate simply by taking on a human body. That is, his body was human, but, in place of the human soul was the Logos. In this case, the soul hasn't been assumed, but replaced altogether. The problem was always the same. If the Logos, retaining his full divinity, did not become human in every way, then we cannot be saved. Enter monophysitism. In this view, Jesus has neither a human nature nor a divine nature but a unique Christ nature. But if he has no human nature, then he cannot redeem human nature. Furthermore, it takes a divine nature to be able to redeem- and he didn't have this either. Christology is essential to soteriology.
In a lot of cases, monophysitism was not so much a commitment to a single nature in Christ as it was a reaction to perceived Nestorianism. Two natures would be fine but for a single hang-up: the will. It's just too easy to associate the will with the person. What I will, the choices I make, are too much a part of who I am. Consequently, to the monophysites, two wills implied two persons. Divide up all the other attributes between human and divine natures but two wills crosses the line. Or so they believed. Then a compromise was reached. The monophysites would agree that Christ had two natures if the orthodox would allow that Christ had only one will. Not all the orthodox agreed and monothelitism was subsequently condemned. Why? Because if a human will was not assumed, then our wills cannot be healed. In making this ruling Constantinople III affirmed something about the will. Contrary to the monophysites, who wanted to associate the will with person and, therefore conclude that there must be only will, the council associate the will with the nature and concluded that Christ must have had two wills. Both were logical conclusions based on the premises. Which leads me to a problem with Clifton's view. In his attempt to deny that the will is exercised according to our nature, he has affirmed that "Christ, the express image of God, exercised his will from his Person, and not from his nature..." But Clifton rejects monothelitism and asserts that Christ has two wills. Nestorians everywhere agree.
When I pointed out that his formula of two wills and two natures in one person was dangerously close to the Nestorian formula of two natures and two hypostases in one person, Clifton quoted the definition of faith as Chalcedon III. It does not support his formulation. The first part reiterates Chalcedon. Remember that monthelitism was an attempt to compromise with monophysitism. So the council talks about how Christ has two natures and in one Person. The definition goes on to say, "Defining all this we likewise declare that in him are two natural wills and two natural operations indivisibly, incontrovertibly, inseparably, inconfusedly, according to the teaching of the holy Fathers." They are not saying that he has two natures and he has two wills, too. Instead, the idea is that, based on the established teaching that Christ has two natures, it must be concluded that he has two wills, since the will is a faculty of the nature. Note that they are called natural wills. The definition goes on to answer Clifton's contention "that the exercise of Christ's wills, human and divine, was from his Person, not from either of his natures." It says, "...each nature wills and does the things proper to it and that indivisibly and inconfusedly."
A note on "two natural operations": these do not exist in disinction from the two wills. The council is clarifying how will is to taken. If the will is considerd from the perspective of what is actually done, then Christ only had one will. But this was not the question. It was, "When the incarnate Second Person of the Trinity wills, does he do so according to his divine nature or according to his human nature?" And the answer is, "Both." "Operation" is the same as what I have been calling "faculty."
Apart from what the monophysites assumed and what Clifton has asserted, is it even possible for a person to do anything in abstraction from his nature? Clifton descends into the absurd, arguing that "Personhood must necessarily exceed nature" and "God is not an essence, but is superessentially a person." Let me rephrase these, "It is in the nature of personhood to exceed nature." "God is, by nature, superessentially a person." Clifton is making assertions about personhood in general and the personhood of God. But it is not possible to make assertions about anything without saying something about its nature. A person cannot exceed its nature; nothing can. Clifton hopes to escape such logical contradictions by asserting even more of them. "God is all-good and God is not all-good, are, in fact, both true when predicated of God as Person." God's goodness "is beyond all human grasp, fallen or completely regenerated." Well, God's goodness and everything else about God may be -is- beyond human comprehension. But a contradiction is a contradiction no matter whose person you're trying to predicate it in. The argument about the antinomies of Sextus Empiricus fares no better. I responded to the same in the comment section here (3/17/05). In short, these antimonies lose their force if you define the terms according to what God has revealed about himself rather than according to some supposed universal standard.
Clifton's response to the antinomies is, "Rather, the ancient Church's insistence on approaching kataphatic theology from the starting point of the Persons of God preserves such theology from rational antinomies (at least antinomies that derive from the rational concepts themselves) and preserves the inherent paradox and mystery of the Trinity by asserting the Personal transcendence of what we might term God's nature.'' First, I'm not at all convinced that this was the approach of the ancient Church. Second, if we're left preserving inherent paradox or, even worse, avoiding rational antinomies by fleeing rationality altogether, then any chances of coherent discussion are pretty well shot. There's really nothing meaningful left to affirm.
No one is denying that it is Christ's person that acts and wills. Natures can do nothing. The language in the definition that "each nature wills' must be taken in context. It is a way of expressing that the person wills according to each nature. But even as natures do nothing in themselves, so persons are nothing in themselves. A person must have a nature. A person can never transcend his nature, for the ability to transcend anything can only be explained according to and as a function of nature. We would have to posit a metanature, which, in the end, would just be a nature. All persons, human, angelic, and divine, act and will according to their natures. Clifton is quite right that if we predicate willing according to nature of man that we must also predicate it of the persons in the Trinity. But the only argument he has offered against the divine persons willing in this way is in the assertion of an impossible "superessential personhood." Augustinian scholaticism knew very well what it was doing to argue about God from his nature. For, even if we always have God's persons in mind, we must either speak of them according to their nature or we must say nothing at all.
Let's go to Clifton's main contention that monergism implies monothelitism. Why would this be the case? First, some more definitions. Monergism comes from the Greek and means "one work." It is the belief that salvation is solely the work of God. Synergism is the belief that salvation is the result of God and man cooperating in their work. While monergists do believe in synergistic sanctification, this takes place only after salvation has been accomplished and settled. Sanctification is never seen as a way to earn or keep salvation. Monergists believe that salvation is all of grace and "not of works, lest any man should boast." Not all monergists have the same view of the will. Arminians, for example, believe that the will is free to choose or not choose to believe. Calvinists think that this is really a form of synergism, but Arminians, at least the ones I've met, don't see it that way. Calvinsitic monergism claims that the will is bound by its sinful nature. It can't will to cooperate with salvation so the salvation itself must involve a change of nature. God has to do this by himself. There is more to it than this, but this is sufficient for the present purpose. Clifton's argument is this: if it is the case that man's will is so bound that God must act in salvation by himself, then Christ's human will must have also been bound. And if Christ's human will was bound against God, but the divine will willed for God, then the human will was effectively non-existent. Therefore, Christ only had one functioning will, which is a form of monothelitism.
Leaving aside the question of how the will actually functions, let's go to the standard Reformed reply: Jesus' took on a human nature as it was created, not as it had fallen; therefore, his human will was not bound to a fallen nature. But there is a big problem with this answer and the Orthodox are well within their rights to call us on it. It is this, "Whatever is not assumed is not healed." If falleness is the disease of our nature, then it is fallen nature that must be assumed, it is fallen nature that must be crucified, and it is fallen nature that must be ultimately healed of its falleness in the resurrection. The Reformed generally reject this notion because they equate falleness with sinfulness. And Christ cannot be sinful. But this is not necessary. Clifton defines falleness in terms of death and a disposition to sin (which is not in itself sinful). Reformed theology would do well to adopt this view and to recognize imputed guilt as a distinct concept. I suggested that human nature never fell but is prone to death and corruption by virtue of its creation. Clifton quoted some verses about death coming into the world as a result of sin; however, these are not the clear refutation that he would have us to believe. The claim that man was not intrinsically immortal before the fall cannot be equated with the claim that God would have allowed him to die before the fall. The important thing, though, is where Clifton and I are in agreement: the nature that Christ assumed is the same as that which we now have. For purposes of this discussion, I accept his view of fallen nature.
More to the point, however, is Clifton's denial of imputed guilt, which is fully consistent with his advocation of synergism. In Reformed theology justification is a declarative act. God declares us to be righteous because Christ's righteous works have been imputed to us. In the same way, we had been declared guilty because Adam's sinful works were imputed to us. Salvation has two distinct yet inseperable components: 1) the healing of corruption and 2) forensic declaration of righteousness. In a synergistic system (and here I must note that, being more familiar with it, I am using the model of Catholicism over what Orthodoxy might be) the declaration is a matter of stating what is true at the time in regards to healing. A baptized infant is cleansed of original sin and infused with righteousness. The emphasis of justification is "to make righteous" rather than "to declare righteous." Once made righteous, the declaration can follow. But it isn't so much a judicial decree as it is a statement of fact. Rome criticizes the Protestant view of being a 'legal fiction.' When the justified person sins, he is no longer righteous and, therefore, no longer justified. Grace must be restored by further application of the sacraments. Purgatory is always available for those who die in a deficit mode.
In contrast, Reformed theology ties justification to the work of Christ alone. He bears the penalty of sin on the cross. In his resurrection the disease of sin is healed and he is declared righteous. There is no legal fiction here. Our own regeneration and justification is based on our union with Christ in his death and resurrection. At whatever time he pleases, the Holy Spirit regenerates us individually from being "dead in trespasses and sins" because he has already raised us up together with Christ. We are also declared righteous because Christ was justified in his resurrection. The forensic aspect of our salvation is a done deal. Objectively, God sees us in Christ and the work of Christ settles the matter. This is all monergistic. Christ has done the work. The healing aspect of our salvation considers us subjectively. It is a process between our regeneration and our final glorification in heaven. The initial regeneration is monergistic but subsequent sanctification is synergistic. The main difference between viewing salvation as a whole in monergistic or synergistic terms is that, in monergism the declaration does not depend upon our cooperation in progressive sanctification (although our cooperation is assured) but upon our positional sanctification in Christ.
Back to imputed Adamic guilt. The reason that we can be declared righteous on the basis of the works of another rather than on our individual works is because we have been declared unrighteous on the basis of the works of another. If Adam's sin did nothing more than to give us a disposition to unrighteousness, then Christ's atonement can do nothing more than give us a disposition to righteousness. The atonement was not merely about healing our natures (though that was a big part of it). It was the payment of a debt to God for our sins. How does a just God justify the ungodly? He doesn't if he wants to remain just himself. Forgiveness is not a matter of forgetting the former trespasses so long as arrangements can be made that they never be repeated. It is the acknowledgment of payment received. To put it another way, vengeance belongs to the Lord. When his holiness has been insulted, as is the case with sin, then his justice demands that this be made right. To answer a potential objection, I am not saying that we should withhold forgiveness until all debts are paid. Forgiveness is to be given freely as often as repentance requests it. But the reason that we can do this without offending justice is because, ultimately, all debts have already been paid in Christ. Vengeance is not ours.
But what about Scripture itself? Clifton states, "In none of these texts is guilt attributed to humans on the basis of Adam's sin." These texts would be the ones that he quoted to refute my views and to which I will limit myself. First, his premise begs the question that death merely means death. Death is a judgment for sin. Just as the resurrection of Christ entailed justification both for himself and for those in him, even so, the sentence death on Adam entailed condemnation both for himself and for all who were in him. Nor is this merely the kind of death wherein the body stops functioning for a while. It is eternal death, even as the resurrection is unto eternal life.
One might argue that my own premise, death as judgment, begs the question. Let's look at the context. Take the first passage Clifton considered, Romans 5:12-19. V. 15- "For if by the offence of the one man many died..." 'Offence' translates to paraptoma, which means, "what a person has done in transgressing the will and law of God by some false step or failure" (Luow-Nida 88.297). The word used implies that the result of death is a matter of judgment for breaking God's law. This is made explicit in v. 16, "For the judgment which came from the offense resulted in condemnation..." And even more so in v. 18, "Therefore, as through one man's offense judgment came to all men, resulting in condemnation, even so through one Man's righteous act the free gift came to all men, resulting in justification of life." Paul does not say that the offense made possible the conditions whereby judgment and condemnation might occur. Rather, the judgment came upon all men through one man's offense, not through the offense of the many in imitation thereof. This judgment resulted in condemnation. Neither judgment nor condemnation are intelligible apart from guilt. More to the point for the discussion of monergism, the free gift that results (not just makes possible) justification unto life came about through one Man's righteous act. Our eternal life, which is ours because we have been justified, is the result of the work of one Man, who is not us. This passage supports forensic declaration and cannot be used in support of synergistic salvation. One note on the "all" in v. 18. "The free gift came to 'all' men.." Keep this in context with the rest of Scripture. On the surface, this appears to be teaching universal justification. However, we know from other texts that this is not the case. I Corinthians 15:22 uses the word in the same sense, "For as in Adam all die, even so in Christ all will be made alive." That is, all who are in Adam die, and all who are in Christ are made alive. In any event, the text still does not support synergism, for a universalistic reading (which Reformed theology denies) would indicate universal monergistic salvation.
To move on, Clifton has attacked monergism based on its view of the will. However, though monergists have such a view, monergism is not ultimately predicated on the will. It is predicated on ability and what can actually be done. The question is not, "Can man want to assist in his salvation?" but, "What can man do about it?" The magnitude of an offense is according to the majesty of the one offended. Even if, for the moment, we leave off the question of Adamic guilt, we are guilty of our own sins. We have offended an infinitely holy God. What could we possibly do to pay for this? Infinite offense demands infinite retribution. This can be settled in one of two ways: 1) In a short time upon the God-man, or 2) during an eternity in hell for everyone else. You want to work for your salvation? Fulfill option two first and then God might discuss it with you. On the other hand, when Christ has taken the full brunt of God's wrath, there is nothing more to be done. Salvation has been accomplished on our behalf. It would be unjust for God to require anything else. If we keep in mind both the gravity of sin and the holiness of God, then the attempt to have something to do with our own salvation is not just the innocent activity of a child trying to "help" his parents. It is yet another offense against the character of God and the work of Christ. Can it be forgiven? Of course. But such forgiveness will result in sanctification. The non-repentance evidenced by continuing in synergistic activities can only indicate that regeneration and justification have never taken place. Synergism and monergism are contradictory modes of salvation. One of them is heretical. I have no problem if Clifton or anyone else wants to call monergism heresy. Let us then examine the reasons and appeal to the Word of God for a verdict. But, because this is a matter of salvation, neither side should be allowed to make a charge of heresy without the full measure of what that implies. My own views are evident. I can only hope that, for many who claim synergism, their artuculation does not match up with the substance of their deepest beliefs and actions.
I have replied narrowly to the Trinitarian considerations of your post here. I will reply to the more broad soteriological matters later this week (I hope).
Posted by: Clifton D. Healy at março 22, 2005 6:45 AMIt is not clear to my that the dyothelite position requires or even says that Christ in his two wills wills the same things on every occasion. The key example is Christ in the garden. He says not my will but your will. Now, it seems pretty obvious that the one subject is willing two different things with two distinct energies of operation.
We need to keep clear here the difference between will as a faculty and will in its employment by a person. Christ has two faculties of will but since there is only one person their personal employment is unified.
Asserting that it is not possible for persons to be something more than a nature is a mere claim and so far I haven’t seen an argument for this conclusion. Likewise, you claim that Clifton has made some logical contradiction but it is not clear where two mutually exclusive propositions are asserted in this claim. If we do not say that a person is something more than a nature, then we end up either with Modalism or Tri-Theism. Natures do not exhaust what it is to be a person and this is why it is not possible to explain why creation occurred by reference to God’s nature.
As to antinomies, the point is that there is a reality beyond the binary predications not that the contradictory predications are both true. The point is to maintain God’s incomprehensibility, which is a core Christian conviction. The problem is that you seem to want to subsume God to the categories of reason and hence to being. The point is not to deprecate reason but to admit a principled limit to reason. This is why Reformed theology, like Catholic theology is rationalistic, since it attempts to subsume God under the categories of being. Whats more, all types of Christian theology recognizes a via affirmative and a via negative. The question is how one metaphysically cashes it out. Moreover, Biblically we have to deal with the data that says God is seen and never seen, known and not known, heard and not heard, and to that extent the cataphatic and apophatic ways are faithful to the biblical portrait. If we limit ourselves to the way God has revealed himself in the economy of salvation, we run the risk of Modalism, among other problems.
If persons are nothing in themselves one wonders what the Persons of the Trinity are. Following Reformed assertions, isn’t the point of the Trinity that neither unity nor plurality are ultimate both that both are equally ultimate? If you claim that the persons are nothing in themselves but only secondary to the essence in some way then you wreck the claim of equal ultimacy in the Trinity. Moreover, such thinking smacks of Modalism, where the Persons are just emanations or effects of the one essence. The idea that a person must have an essence isn’t the same idea that a person is determined by their essence. Nor is it the idea or does it imply that a person just is an instance of an essence. In fact the etymology of the term hypostasis is that of concentrated subsisting entity within an essence. The term originally came from wine making where the dregs or heavier parts of the wine sank to the bottom. It may be true that a person must have a nature, but this doesn’t imply that a person is nothing in itself, but only that there is a difference between personal and essential existence. Acting according to their nature doesn’t imply that their natures determine their actions. To think that natures determine persons is just to obliterate the distinction between person and nature, thereby making say the act of creation or redemption necessary. In which case grace will be identified with nature which logically results in Pelagianism.
Monergists assume that an act that has merit before God must either be wholly mine or wholly God’s but it cannot be both. The irony is that in the scholastic period the question was, how can God’s acts be mine, but it switched in the Reformation period to, how can my acts be God’s? The problem is generated by a faulty Christology which fails to identify a unity so that two participants bring about one and the same act. In Christ there is one subject who acts according to the faculties of his respective natures. The Reformed position is predicated on a shared Eutychian/Nestorian view of persons/natures. Persons just are instances of natures in self relation so that either it is the case that each does his part (the divine and the human) but neither wholly perform the act (Nestorianism). Seeing that the human can’t do any of his own part, it must be completely a divine act.
It is hard for me to see how there can be strictly speaking anything like a sinful nature given that God is the creator and sustainer of every nature. Moreover, sin is personal and not natural and corruption is natural and not personal. This is why ascriptions of praise and blame are attributable to persons and not natures, which is why there cannot be a “sinful” nature.
The corruption of man’s nature and his inability to please God on his own doesn’t imply that he cannot please God with God’s antecedent help. It only implies that God’s help has the primacy, but this isn’t monergism. This is why Augustine wasn’t a monergist because he clearly argues that we contribute to our justification with God’s help. At its core the Reformed position then is not Augustinian.
The question is does the divine will in Christ determine his human will? The statements in the garden seem to prove otherwise. And Christ’s willing contrary to the divine will with respect to the Crucifixion doesn’t imply that that was a sinful or defective volition on Christ’s part since the preservation of human life is also something God wills over against the murderer the devil. If the divine will determines the human will in Christ, then this is a form of monothelitism since there is one and only one genuine operation or energy in Christ. The will cannot be determined and we learn this from the Trinity, since God wills creation indicating that an act of will is by its very nature free from determinism. On the other side, if natures did determine agents then we would have to render the fall of humans and the devil inexplicable or it would be possible for morally perfect beings to sin, in which case it would then be possible for people in heaven to sin as well as God, which is a most unwelcome consequence.
As to Jesus taking on human nature, here is one of the fundamental problems. Christ does not take on **A** human nature, but he takes on all human nature, which is why he has to assume every property essential to being human, because he heals human nature in the incarnation for everyone, which is why everyone gets resurrected, wicked and just. Christ’s humanity at the incarnation was not perfect (apthartodocetistic heresy) and neither was it corrupted or mortal, but it was capable of being mortal. Human nature whole and entire is healed from corruption (the road to annihilation) in the act of uniting human nature to the divine person of Christ thus guaranteeing its eternality and vindicating God’s claims to be God over against the devil. Because Christ takes on human nature whole and entire, the Reformed view of original sin has to go in order to be consistent with Chalcedonian theology since Christ is fully divine and fully human and “fully” means the same thing in both instances.
The question is not if justification is declarative but first what grounds the declaration and second who is the first and foremost being justified or vindicated? For the Orthodox the latter question is answered by saying that God is primarily vindicated against the devil’s claims. Justification then in Orthodox theology has a plurality of senses and persons to whom it is predicated. The fundamental question though is what is grace? Is grace created or uncreated? Catholics and Protestants affirm that grace is created-either a created effect in the soul or a contingent relation established between God and the individual. In either case, such a reading of what constitutes grace renders union with God and partaking of God’s nature impossible. Such a consequence is in direct contradiction to the Biblical witness. (2 pet 1:4)
Moreover, your gloss on Catholicism doesn’t seem right, since in Catholicism the sacraments and such are the works of Christ as well as the works of the individual, they are the same work. In Reformed theology, it is hard to see what constitutes the union other than a nominal and arbitrary relation grounded in a voluntaristic view of God. But this voluntarism is unargued for and so the system predicated on it seems unargued for as well. It is the pre-exegetical commitments that are driving the exegesis and the construction of the theology, despite protests to the contrary. It is hard to see how this “union” maps on to the biblical witness of being made partakers, not nominally or legally related to, the divine nature. And it is hard to see how any of the system is synergistic in any significant or meaningful way since the end is determined.
It doesn’t follow that if Adam’s sin only brings about an inherited disordered nature that Christ’s atonement can only give us properly ordered nature. First we need to think of the atonement with respect to the distinction between person and nature. There is the Pauline maxim that grace outdoes sin which seems to cut against your comparison. Second, there is what Christ’s redemptive work from the incarnation to the atonement does for us with respect to nature and what it does for us with respect to person. To see in the atonement a payment of debt to God is to foist an unargued for theory of the atonement onto the discussion, namely the penal theory, which is quite distinct from the earlier scholastic satisfaction theory and the even earlier Christus Victor model. God desires mercy, not sacrifice. The notion of a debt paid to God has more to do with late European feudal relations and Scotistic voluntarism and Okhamistic Nominalism than it does the Biblical portrait. The penal theory is generally an artifact of the period in which it arose and certainly isn’t traceable to the first century or earlier.
Death is the wages or consequence of sin and death here means annihilation. Christ rescures everyone, even those who deny him (2 pet 2:1) from annihilation, which is why everyone is resurrected and receives a measure of eternal life. Satan is the murderer and author of death (annihilation) by which he sought to show his equality with God by frustrating God’s eternal will with respect to the eternal existence of human nature. In Romans 5:18, how are we to understand that justification to life came to all men if not in the preceding way? Paul does not say that it was made possible for all men or that it was made possible for all types of men, he says it came to all men. (cf Jn 1:9) Christ is the source of life for all in his redemptive work and not just for some. (1 Tim 4:10) Retreating to what “the rest” of Scripture says first begs the question since the same theology will be at issue in the other verses. Second, it is neglecting the task of exegesis. You can’t just run to every other passage every time you find a difficult passage for your theology. A verse must be exegeted on its own merits and not on what “Scripture” says everywhere else. What is really happening here is that a problematic piece of data is being interpreted according to prior theoretical commitments when we are being told that it is being interpreted on the merits of exegesis. Here the slight of hand is obvious.
It is not clear at all that Romans 5 is talking in legal terms instead of say consequential terms. This happens as a result or consequence of that, and this seems to make better sense of the passage. The reason why the obvious universalistic sense of the passage is denied because the Reformed, like their Universalist counter parts can’t seem to consistently distinguish person from nature. The scope of the redemptive work of Christ is universal with respect to nature, but not necessarily with respect to person. This is because the Reformed are anthropocentric rather than Christocentric. Their entire theology is consctructed on the need to get guilty humans off the hook rather than seeing Christ as the fulcrum and center of every biblical teaching.
If synergism is heretical, then people like Augustine and Athanasius are heretics since they were clearly synergists. The root problem here is a fundamentally Pelagian notion of nature/grace which is motivated by a Scotistic voluntarism and then supplemented with an Augustinian emphasis on the primacy of God’s action in salvation. How is this Pelagian? It is so because the underlying concept of nature just is that of grace so that when grace is lost, nature is totally corrupted and lacks any good or integrity of its own. The entire scheme of reaching up and laying hold of the merits of Christ is an essentially Pelagian or at least semi-Pelagian mechanic of salvation, even if it is supplanted by an Augustinian view of divine preemption. This is why any kind of sinfulness indicates for the Reformed that there is no justice present-it is an all or nothing deal because nature is identified with grace.
Kevin, my reply is here.
Posted by: Clifton D. Healy at março 24, 2005 7:05 PMPerry- I have responded up here.
Posted by: Kevin at março 26, 2005 3:06 AMGreat post! I do take issue with this however:
"But there is a big problem with this answer and the Orthodox are well within their rights to call us on it."
You admit that from the beginning Reformed theology has contained a major Christological error, isn't that a good enough reason to leave it as there could be?
Posted by: William at agosto 3, 2006 3:59 PMReformed Christological confessions are in line with both Nicea and Chalcedon. It is only the juxtaposition of the view of the sinfulness of corrupt human nature after the fall with the belief about Christ that causes a problem. However, it is not sufficient to a charge of heresy that it can be inferred from other beliefs that a person may hold. Lack of logic is a human weakness, not a sin. Presented with the position that I have stated, a Reformed person has two honest options if he wants to continue holding his view on corrupt human nature. He will either not agree with my conclusion or he will deny the premise that whatever is not assumed is not healed. Unless my church were to officially adopt the second option, I would not have a good reason to leave it.
Posted by: Kevin at agosto 3, 2006 7:38 PMIf X entails a heresy or Christological error and X is a critical component of the theological system, then why shouldn't X be rejected or its claim to being revealed truth reconsidered? The fact that the logic of the theological system leads to errors and heresies would seem indicative of the fact that [a] that part of the system is a man-made and not a revealed truth and [b] the system as a whole is a man-made and not a revealed truth. You already admitted to [a] by accepting Clifton's point on Christ's assumption of fallen nature which clearly contradicts the whole Reformed tradition.
CALVIN: "Hence, it is not strange that Christ, by whom our integrity was to be restored, was exempted from the common corruption." [Book II, Chapter 13, 4]
The fact that Calvinism is not compatible with Athanasian Christology casts doubt on its claim to be fully compatible with Nicean Christology.
Athanasias makes it clear that Christ's redemptive work extents to all. The Atonement is universal according to nature, but not all persons will receive its fullness depending on the orientation of their wills. Farrell explains:
"Ever since the time of Origen, the doctrine of the recapitulation of all things in Christ and that of their inevitable and universal restoration and salvation in God have always been intimately connected. Indeed, the very fact of Christ's human nature which is cosubstantial with all men implies an apokastasis, for if in Adam all have died, in Christ there is a certain predetermination that all shall be made alive. This interrelationship between the apokastasis and the recapitulation highlights once again the fact that the latter doctrine is a christological way of understanding the doctrine of predestination.
The doctrine of recapitulation strikes at the heart of any doctrine of Limited Atonement, i.e., at any doctrine which would limit the efficacy of Christ's redemptive work to a number of elected and predestined individuals who are predestined prior to and apart from consideration of that work. If Christ's redemptive work is limited in this fashion, then His humanity will also be cosubstantial only with that predetermined number of elected individuals. But since Christ is the Second Adam, this implies that there are some individuals who, not being in the Second, will neither be found in the First, Adam. Not being in the First Adam, they will not be subject to ancestral sin, and will therefore have no need of Christ.[Farrell, Joseph "Disputation with Pyrrhus", xxviii-xxix]
"For since by a man came death, by a man also came the resurrection of the dead. For as in Adam all die, so also in Christ all will be made alive." [1 Cor 15:21-22]
"Therefore as by the offence of one judgment came upon all men to condemnation; even so by the righteousness of one the free gift came upon all men unto justification of life." [Romans 5:18]
"Through this union of the immortal Son of God with our human nature, ALL men were clothed with incorruption in the promise of the resurrection. For the solidarity of mankind is such that, by virtue of the Word's indwelling in a single human body, the corruption which goes with death has lost its power over ALL."
"For by the sacrifice of His own body, He both put an end to the law which was against us, and made a new beginning of life for us, by the hope of resurrection which He has given us. For since from man it was that death prevailed over men, for this cause conversely, by the Word of God being made man has come about the destruction of death and the resurrection of life; as the man which bore Christ saith: For since by man came death, by man came also the resurrection of the dead. For as in Adam all die, so also in Christ shall all be made alive :" and so forth. For no longer now do we die as subject to condemnation; but as men who rise from the dead we await the general resurrection of all, "which in its own times He shall show," even God, Who has also wrought it, and bestowed it upon us." [OTI, X, V]
Posted by: William at agosto 4, 2006 1:33 PM"I suggested that HUMAN NATURE NEVER FELL but is prone to death and corruption by virtue of its creation."
Now that IS Pelagianism.
ATHANASIAS:
5. For God has not only made us out of nothing; but He gave us freely, by the Grace of the Word, a life in correspondence with God. But men, having rejected things eternal, and, by counsel of the devil, turned to the things of corruption, became the cause[9] of their own corruption in death, being, as I said before, by nature corruptible, but destined, by the grace following from partaking of the Word, to have escaped their natural state, had they remained good. 2. For because of the Word dwelling with them, even their natural corruption did not come near them, as Wisdom also says[1]: "God made man for incorruption, and as an image of His own eternity; but by envy of the devil death came into the world." But when this was come to pass, men began to die, while corruption thence-forward prevailed against them, gaining even more than its natural power over the whole race, inasmuch as it had, owing to the transgression of the commandment, the threat of the Deity as a further advantage against them.
Posted by: William at agosto 4, 2006 1:39 PMI’ll take your second comment first. Your charge of Pelagianism would be much more believable had you not backed it up with a quote from Athanasius that agrees with what I said. Athanasius is speaking of man’s condition before the fall. Notice his description- “by nature corruptible, but destined, by the grace following from partaking of the Word, to have escaped their natural state, had they remained good.” Nothing that I have said denies the reality of the fall. My point is that the fall did not consist of human nature moving from an incorruptible state to a state of corruption. And, even though I suggested that human nature before the fall was corruptible (otherwise corruption would not have been possible), I did not imply that it was already corrupt. I agree with Athanasius that men became the cause of their own corruption. Before the fall, man was in a corruptible state, although not actually corrupt. He had the ability to escape to a natural state of incorruptibility had he not sinned.
As to your first comment, X is not a critical component of the theological system; consequently, the claim that the logic of the system leads to heresy is premature. I do believe that a particular interpretation of the fall in which human nature substantially changes as a result can lead to heresy if taken to its logical conclusion. However, this implies neither that those holding such an interpretation have taken it this far, nor that the system itself is the necessary source of the interpretation.
The most that I can argue against Reformed theology (and this may only be a difference with the Westminster Confession) is that it allows for this interpretation. Reformed theology does speak of a corruption of nature; nevertheless, if the idea is traced further back, it is evident that this is accidental and not a substantial change. If considered in context, the excerpt that you quote from Calvin demonstrates this. Calvin claims that Christ was exempted from the common corruption. His statement is nothing more than an affirmation of Hebrews 2:26,17 and 4:15. Jesus is just like us in every respect except that he does not sin. In this particular section of the Institutes, Calvin is not arguing this point, since no one would claim that Christ does sin. Instead, he is arguing against a particular explanation of Christ’s sinlessness whereby the corruption of human nature is said to pass through the male and not the female. According to this idea, it was Jesus’ lack of a human father that prevented his own corruption. Calvin responds, “We do not hold Christ to be free from all taint, merely because he was born of a woman unconnected with a man, but because he was sanctified by the Spirit, so that the generation was pure and spotless, such as it would have been before Adam’s fall.” Calvin attributes the sinlessness of Christ, not to a different kind of human nature, but to the same nature as sanctified by the Holy Spirit. Your jump from Calvin’s statement to the conclusion that “Calvinism is not compatible with Athanasian Christology” strikes me as a deliberate attempt to look for the worst interpretation possible. Of course, it could be sheer ignorance, in which case it might be in your best interest to study a theological system before leveling such ridiculous charges.
Now for a few pointers on arguing against limited atonement. First, get it right. There is no sense in which it is prior to and apart from any consideration of Christ’s redemptive work. If this is what Farrell is arguing against, you may want to find someone else to make your point for you because it isn’t what we believe. Second, deal directly with our interpretation of what it means for all to die in Adam and for all to be made alive in Christ. “All” in each case is limited to those who are actually in Adam or Christ. There is no requirement that the sets be identical. You have failed to present a valid argument to the effect that your views are right or that ours are wrong, only that they differ from one another.
Posted by: Kevin at agosto 5, 2006 1:36 AMThe reason that everyone, righteous or wicked, is resurrected is because Christ's took on our human nature. It is the orientation of our wills that determines the type of existence that we will enjoy [whether ill or blessed], but because of the Incarnation our eternal existence is made possible and ensured. God irresistibly wills that all men exist forever, but how they spend it up is up to them. Natural union with Christ is independent of our choice which is why all are resurrected; personal orientation is within are power which is why some are in heaven and others in hell.
Adam's fall brought death to everyone and Christ's incarnation brings life to everyone. Denial of the latter is denial of the first. Everyone is united to Adam and Christ by nature, by not all align their wills to Christ which is why they exist eternally in hell but the fact of their eternal existence is beyond their choice just as the death in Adam was.
"For as in Adam all die, so also in Christ all will be made alive."
If nature and person are not kept distinct, then "all dying and living in Christ" will lead to universalism. You take the first [in Adam] set as referring to both nature and personal orientation, whereas the latter [in Christ] you understand only in terms of personal orientation. If the person/nature distinction is maintained, then the problems disappear.
Your explanation of the Calvin quote equivocates sinfulness and falleneness which leads to numerous Christological difficulties. Natures can't sin. Sin is personal and unnatural, therefore conceptually tying together Christ's sinlessness [which refers to the personal use of his natural faculties] with the unfallen/fallen state of his humanity will lead to Christological error and confusion and violate the assumptive principle.
The purpose of the Calvin quote was to demonstrate that his confusion of person and nature [sinfulness & fallenness] led him into error. If fallenness and sinfulness are not kept distinct, we cannot allow Christ's to take on the former because that would entail the latter which both parties affirm is an erroneous concept.
Posted by: William at agosto 5, 2006 9:21 AMAlthough Scripture does speak of the resurrection of both the just and the unjust, this is the least common way for the term to be used. It is a lowest common denominator that refers to nothing more than eternal resuscitation of the physical body. More often, and including Paul’s use in I Corinthians 15, resurrection refers to our translation into the incorruptible life of heaven where we will be in union with God. It is a much fuller concept that requires the incarnation to be fulfilled. The destiny of those who will be resurrected is the destiny of the resurrected Christ. If God simply wants to keep personal bodies alive, he can do that with a mere decree. He needn’t bother with becoming one of us. Those who are united to Christ will spend eternity in heaven with him. It is our union with Christ in his resurrection that determines the orientation of our wills. Regeneration precedes faith.
Adam’s fall brought death to all that were actually in Adam, which, by the will of God, just happens to include all of humanity. A common human nature makes it possible to be in Adam, but it does not make it necessary. In Adam, God offers heaven to all of humanity. When Adam fell, God was under no legal obligation to provide a second chance. When he did provide this chance, he was under no obligation to offer it to everyone that had been in the first Adam. There is no compelling reason to suppose that everyone represented in Adam must also be represented in Christ. Consequently, denial of the universality of resurrection in Christ is not a denial of the universality of death in Adam.
The reason that “all dying and living in Christ” does not lead to universalism has nothing to do with a failure to keep person and nature distinct. In fact, your own explanation goes beyond keeping these distinct to proposing total separation. If an individual’s will is oriented in a particular direction, it will be possible for his nature to be in union with Christ while his person is in hell. I do not believe that “in Adam” refers to both nature and personal orientation while “in Christ” refers only to personal orientation. Both are personal unions made possible by common human natures. Whether the union actually takes place depends on the will of God and not on any necessity imposed by nature.
Since you have already noticed and commented on my statement that human nature never fell, you may want to rethink the charge that my explanation of Calvin equivocates sinfulness and fallenness. You may connect the fall to human nature; however, I do not. Consequently, by moving back and forth between person and nature, I am not also moving between sinfulness and fallenness. In fact, fallenness was never a part of the equation. The fall is not a change in nature but a legal change in personal standing. Adam sinned and all those who are in him share in the guilt of that sin.
I agree that Christ must remain personally sinless and that, to avoid violating the assumptive principle, he must take on human nature as it is. If I equated the fall with the current condition of human nature, it would follow that Christ took on a fallen nature. But I do not; instead, I preserve the assumptive principle by allowing no change in human nature itself after the fall. We possess the exact same nature with which we were created. So did Christ. [I use the past tense here because there is a change in human nature after the resurrection. Christ became what we are in order that we might become what he is.]
Sin is personal and so natures cannot sin. On the other hand, persons with perfect natures cannot sin either. The ability to commit personal sin requires an imperfect or corruptible nature. Christ’s own sinlessness was not a result of having a different nature than us, but of having the same human nature, which, though imperfect in itself, was perfectly sanctified through the power of the Holy Spirit. While avoiding personal sin by taking on a different nature than us does violate the assumptive principle, taking on the same nature but avoiding sin through supernatural intervention does not.
Posted by: Kevin at agosto 5, 2006 12:42 PMThe proposal that after the fall there was no change in nature is Pelagianism. Both Adam and Christ had bodies CAPABLE of death as a potentiality but not as an inevitable consequence as we do.
Posted by: William at agosto 5, 2006 8:26 PMYou really need to learn the difference between a proposal that is necessary for a belief system and proposals that are sufficient for a belief system. In the meantime, Pelagianism 101.
1- Even if Adam had not sinned, he would have died.
I really can’t say. There would certainly be no eternal death for anyone, but whether there would be a period of physical death is impossible to tell. My guess is no.
2-Adam’s sin harmed only himself, not the human race.
False. The guilt of Adam’s sin was imputed to every human ever born.
3-Children just born are in the same state as Adam before his fall.
False. Children just born, having the guilt of Adam’s sin imputed to them, are already condemned to eternal death.
4-The whole human race neither dies through Adam’s sin or death, nor rises again through the resurrection of Christ.
False. The whole human race does die through Adam’s sin and only those whom God has elected are raised with Christ.
5- The (Mosaic Law) is as good a guide to heaven as the Gospel.
False. The Law convicts everyone who of sin; only the Gospel has power to remove sin.
6-Even before the advent of Christ there were men who were without sin.
False. Not only were they born with original sin, but, not having the assistance of the Holy Spirit to overcome their natural inclinations, all of them became guilty of personal sin.
I don’t see how any self respecting Pelagian would have me.
Your second statement completely misses the point that whatever is not assumed is not redeemed. The incarnation must have been the assumption of human nature as it is. This is only possible in one of two ways. Either there is a change brought on by the fall and post-fall human nature is assumed, or there is no change and human nature as created is assumed. Your proposal, since it puts Adam and Christ in one category and everyone else in another will not work. Christ assumes a nature that we do not posses. Moreover, the difference between bodies capable of death as a potentiality and those that will die as an inevitable consequence is not found in their respective natures but in the providence of God. [Of course, these criticisms are moot if your second sentence has nothing to do with your first.] And, while we’re on the subject of inevitable death, given the fact of the fall and God’s desire to redeem a people for himself, how much more inevitable could the death of Christ have been? As to the rest of us, the inevitable death of our bodies simply is not true. Besides the two OT saints who never died, no one alive when Christ returns will suffer physical death.
Posted by: Kevin at agosto 5, 2006 11:55 PM
"If God simply wants to keep personal bodies alive, he can do that with a mere decree. He needn’t bother with becoming one of us."
If God simply wants to forgive sin, he can do that by merely choosing to do so, he needn't bother becoming one of us.
Simply asserting God could have done it another way does little explanatory or polemical work. Calvin believed God could have saved us by a mere decree, but He did it the way he did it because it pleased him to do so. From the voluntarist standpoint, virtuous acts have no intrinsic value and so Christ's good works and sacrifice have no value in themselves but only do because the Father chose to accept them. {I find this way of thinking adoptionistic.]
I think you know that my distinction of person and nature doesn't lead to a complete "separation" of them anymore than the distinction necessarily entails Tri-theism in the Godhead. The distinction between person and nature is essential for Triadology and Christology, blurring of the distinctions results in numerous errors not only in those areas of theology proper but in soteriology as well.
If synergism is heresy, then you will have to consign obvious Christian teachers to the category of heretics. Was Athanasius a heretic? Augustine? Basil? Gregory of Nyssa? Maximus the Confessor? These are men whose teachings were upheld by Ecumenical Councils universally accepted in their dogmatic formulations even in the Reformation traditions. I would consider the implications of such an asssertion before biting the bullet.
Is penal substitution theory a mere theory or an indispensible, essential component of the gospel itself? Due to its conspicuous absence for the first millenium of Christian history, an affirmative answer to the question would have sobering implications.
I'm glad we can agree that sin is always personal and unnatural, consequently the concept of a "sinful" nature is Manicheanism at best. Human nature is still intrinsically good because God has irresistibly willed human nature to be a certain way and humans are unable to alter God’s irresistible will. If human persons could alter their nature intrinsically, then human nature would change innumerable times and there would be no common nature. Guilt and sin are attached to persons with, misusing and abusing their natures, not in or predicated of the natures themselves.
Nature is not evil, but it is insufficient. Sin is missing the mark, not the inability to make the shot. Augustine believes that apart from grace men can perform truly good and virtuous acts [Ghandi], but apart from Grace and the Spirit those acts will not please God. Nature apart from Grace does not cease to be good [because God's created it and wills it to be a certain way]; it simply is not sufficient.
I do wonder if the will is determined by the strongest inclination how Adam before the fall was able to sin at all, but that's for another time.
The assertion that the difference between death as a mere potentiality instead of an inevitable consequence has nothing to do with change in the nature's condition strikes me as a completely bare assertion. The point is that Christ chose to die VOLUNATARILY and that if Christ did not willingly/voluntary choose to die on the cross, he would have kept on living. Adam before the fall and the Incarnate Christ COULD die, but they were not dying. Christ and Adam do not have a different nature than we do. Adam had death as a potentiality because he hadn't fallen and Christ because his humanity was wholly deified by Grace and/or by virute of the hypostatic union. He takes on what is essential to our nature and voluntarily undergoes what is accidental.
If Christ's human will and our will are the same, then did the fact that his will was led by the Spirit or by Grace eliminate the freedom of his human will, if not, why wouldn't the same apply to us? [Gethasemane for instance.] If Christ's human will and divine will had two different objects, did the divine will overpower or compromise the freedom of the human will? Affirming that or denying that divine works can also be human works or vice versa leads to an obviously defective Christology.
Posted by: William at agosto 6, 2006 1:48 PMPlease don't feel obligated to reply to ALL that I've written. I was primarily concerned with two things:
[1] "Lack of logic is a human weakness, not a sin." I simply felt that this was a cop-out, and revealed the determination to accept and defend one's theological position no matter what.
[2]"If synergism is heresy, then you will have to consign obvious Christian teachers to the category of heretics. Was Athanasius a heretic? Augustine? Basil? Gregory of Nyssa? Maximus the Confessor? These are men whose teachings were upheld by Ecumenical Councils universally accepted in their dogmatic formulations even in the Reformation traditions. I would consider the implications of such an asssertion before biting the bullet.
Is penal substitution theory a mere theory or an indispensible, essential component of the gospel itself? Due to its conspicuous absence for the first millenium of Christian history, an affirmative answer to the question would have sobering implications."
Posted by: William at agosto 8, 2006 7:21 PMWilliam- Just to be clear, I was not referring to my own acceptance of a theological position even though I know it to be illogical. This should be evident from the fact that I have presented an alternative to the point that I was criticizing. Furthermore, what I did present is hardly original but is drawn from elements already present within Reformed theology; namely, the imputation of original sin and the sanctifying work of the Holy Spirit. If there really were a belief that was a critical component of Reformed theology and that logically entailed a major Christological error then I would abandon the theology. Until then, your feeling that I am determined “to accept and defend [my] theological position no matter what” is premature. In order for your claim to be valid, you need to show that Reformed theology collapses without the belief that Christ took on a human nature that is intrinsically different from human nature as it exists after the fall.
You need to do more than list some of the Church Fathers and claim them for the cause of synergism. Instead, provide examples of their teaching that contradict a Reformed understanding of monergism. There may, indeed, be a sense in which they do believe in synergism; however, there is also a sense in which Reformed theology affirms synergism. Make sure you know the difference before setting up a possible anachronism.
Your claim that the penal substitution view of the atonement is absent for the first millennium of Christian history is an argument from silence. There are other aspects of the atonement besides Christ taking the wrath of the Father in our place; consequently, it isn’t enough to show that these were emphasized and that penal substitution was not. You need to show either that the views of the atonement presented are contrary to penal substitution or that it was actually denied. As it stands, the denial of this substitutionary aspect of the atonement is only possible by selectively ignoring key portions of Scripture.
Posted by: Kevin at agosto 17, 2006 6:46 PM