Morphemics

A Matter of the Will

The comments section of my penultimate post of the discussion with Clifton over Tradition and Scripture has been growing by means of a conversation with Andrew, a large part of which is about the differences between synergism and monergism. In the meantime, Clifton has taken up the same topic in this post and a follow-up contending that monergism is heresy. Clifton deserves some leeway, since he has admitted that his "understanding of the Reformation theology and Calvinism is pretty much limited to the infamous TULIP." A lot of self-styled Calvinists also limit themselves to TULIP, which can add to the confusion. However, while TULIP is a legitimate part of Reformed theology, to limit one's self to it, or even to think of it as foundational to Reformed theology is to severely misunderstand that theology. The foundation of this theology is a proper understanding of Christology. Clifton rightly criticizes a lot of people within the Reformed camp for missing this; nevertheless, his criticism does not apply to the full-orbed theology itself. Now, I'd like to respond to some of the main points.

In other words, orthodoxy rejects the necessary presupposition of monergism that man is totally depraved not merely forensically but volitionally, and that such depravity excludes free will. But if one takes away that presupposition, monergism cannot go forward in its argument.
Monergism does assert man's forensic and volitional depravity; however, this is not the necessary presupposition behind monergism. It is not merely that man won't work with God to effect his salvation, or that, if he wanted to that he would still be unable to; although, both of these are true. It is, rather, that there is no work to be done. The triune God has done it all. The Father elects and then declares righteous on the basis of Christ's work, the Son pays the penalty for our sin and redeems us, and the Spirit effectually calls, that is, regenerates us. Once these things have taken place, salvation is as good as done. Nothing can change the outcome. In a broader concept of salvation, it also includes progressive sanctification, which is a synergistic work performed in cooperation with the Spirit of God. Yet, the monergistic work having been done, we cannot fail to cooperate. This does not take away our freedom, as I will attempt to explain below. Technically speaking, the Reformed do not claim that depravity excludes free-will, or to put it another way, free moral agency. The depraved person is perfectly free to will according to his strongest inclination.

Next, Clifton argues that monergism leads to monothelitism because it assumes either that Christ's human will was non-existent or that it was practically non-existent in that it wasn't truly free. I find this interesting since I have recently made the opposite contention. Before going any further, we need to distinguish between two different views of the will, commonly known as libertarian and compatibilist. The former is, by far, the majority view, and the one that Clifton has been assuming. Here, the will is not truly free unless, for any given decision, it could have chosen otherwise; that is, a free will must be an indetermined will. The will, in this view, is virtually equated with the ego or the self. To say that my will is free is to say that I am free and vice versa. Under this view, it is only natural to see any talk of necessary cooperation in sanctification as a denial of free will, for 'necessary' must imply unable to have chosen otherwise. The compatibilist view, also known as the Augustinian view, is developed during the Reformation, but does not come to its best expression until Jonathan Edward's The Freedom of the Will. Here, we as persons are free moral agents. There is a distinction made between ourselves and our will. The will is not indetermined, but is determined by the nature of the one who wills. For any given decision, the will will always choose according to its strongest inclination at the moment of decision. This inclination can be influenced by a any number of factors: the final and strongest of these is the nature of which it is a part. In this view, the will is not to be equated with the self, but is a faculty of the nature. As to what the will is, this is what Constantinople III assumed in its condemnation of monothelitism. Because the will is a faculty of the nature, then Christ must have had two wills, both human and divine, because he had two complete natures. Considering his own understanding of how the will functions, Clifton might want to reword his formulation of the Council's teaching. "Christ has two natures and two wills in one Person" is dangerously close to the classic formulation of Nestorianism, "Two natures and two hypostases in one Person." The will is not distinct from but is a component of the nature. I argue that the Reformed view of the will does not lend itself to monothelitism but is completely in keeping with the Sixth Ecumenical Council.

Strictly speaking, monergism does not distinguish the work of God from the work of man. It distinguishes the work of God from the work of all men who are not Christ. The work of redemption, performed by the Second Person of the Trinity, is done according to both of his natures. In this sense, salvation very much involves a synergistic cooperation between human and divine works. The point that monergism wants to get across is that Christ alone does the work. Monergism does not, in fact, apply to Jesus since, in his human nature, he is the only man who is able to cooperate with the divine work.

Under the correct premise that whatever is not assumed is not healed, Clifton observes, "And furthermore, if Jesus' human will was unfallen, it did not need to be saved. But if his human will was not saved, then it was never assumed into his Person in the first place and so neither is our human will saved." Later, he follows this up with, "A fundamental tenet of the Church with regard to salvation must be that of the Incarnate assumption of all things human, apart from sin." The Reformed response is that Christ does assume a human nature, but not a fallen human nature because "fallen" simply indicates a human nature that has sin. There is, however, a potential problem with this response. If the human nature of Christ is so separate from all other human nature such that it is not fallen but the rest are, then where is the connection? What is actually being assumed? Which is why I'm not completely satisfied with the Reformed response. But I do think that Reformed theology has all that is needed to reformulate this response. In order to do this, it needs to draw on two of its strengths: 1) the concept of the covenant and 2) our union with Christ. It also needs to consider a relatively recent emphasis in certain sectors on eschatology. Here, eschatology is not relegated to a doctrine of last things, but it primarily refers to the original intent of our creation, which was for God to unite himself to us by means of the incarnation. Eschatology precedes soteriology. The incarnation was not an afterthought of a creation gone bad but was the very purpose behind the creation.

Here is where I differ, then, with the usual understanding of Reformed theology, although, I do believe that I am being consistent with Reformed premises. The question of whether Jesus takes on a human nature as created or a human nature as fallen is moot because no change occurs in human nature as such after Adam sins. Original sin, which we all have as a result of Adam's sin, is a matter of forensic declaration due to union with our Federal Head. Period. The tendency towards corruption, which is shared by the regenerate and the totally depraved alike, is a result of our human nature as created. This is not contrary to God's declaration that man was created good, for 'tendency to corruption' is not indentical to 'guilty of sin.' This tendency is not something introduced by the fall, but is due to the simple fact that this creation is not the final and permanent eschatological creation. We were designed to be translated into that creation by means of our union with the incarnate Christ. In the meantime, this creation is, by its very nature, temporal and corruptible. What then accounts for the difference between those who are totally depraved and want nothing to do with God and those who, having been regenerated, respond in faith? The Holy Spirit, who is the agent of regeneration. Basically, I am differing with Augustine when he posits four states of humanity: pre-fall, post-fall unredeemed, post-fall redeemed, and glorified. For substance, pre-fall and post-fall redeemed are the same thing- corruptible human nature indwelt by the Holy Spirit. The difference is that our possession of the Holy Spirit is predicated upon our justification in Christ. He won't leave when we sin but will work with us toward sancitification. Back to the main point, though. Jesus assumes the same human nature that we have and is therefore able to heal it. He is tempted just like we are, yet without sin. He is not himself sinful, but he shares with us in the guilt of Adam's sin. Otherwise, it is unjust for God to punish him. Having taken the punishment for this sin, having done the work that Adam that failed to do, Christ is justified in his resurrection. By uniting with his people in their guilt and paying for that guilt, Christ remains united to his people and they are vindicated with him. The original intent of man's creation, which is that God might unite himself with man by means of the incarnation and live with him in perfect holiness, is fulfilled. I fully agree with Clifton's statement, "Christ, not Adam, is the archetype of humanity."

I started out by affirming TULIP but wanting to put it in its place, which is not as the foundation of Reformed theology. That foundation is Christ. Reformed theology is not about naked and arbitrary decrees, it is about the person and work of Christ. I have already written about the connection between Christology and Calvinism in the following two posts: Covenantal Calvinism and Sovereign Grace and Union with God.