So far, a single question stands in the way of knowing whether or not Anselm has an orthodox theology of grace. He starts off on much better ground than Abelard, if only because of the differences between their doctrines of the atonement. To briefly summarize Abelard, he teaches that the death of Jesus was an example to make us feel love and pity for him and thereby be motivated to obedience. The emphasis ends up on our works.
Anselm, on the other hand, holds that the atonement was a satisfaction paid to God the Father by Christ on our behalf. In his Cur Deus Homo, he explains that, in the fall, Adam sinned against God and put humanity in his debt. Consequently, only a human being was legally qualified to pay this debt. There was, however, a problem: no human being was morally qualified to pay it. This was something that only God could do. The solution was for the Son of God to take on human nature in order to satisfy the debt. The atonement is something merited by Christ, yet, as far as believers are concerned, it is a matter of grace.
So far, Anselm is on track. But there is more. Justification, the grace accomplished in the atonement, has both a negative and a positive aspect. The concept of satisfaction answers to the first aspect. The penalty for sin is paid. However, it does not necessarily answer to the second aspect, which is our sanctification, or, the acquisition of holiness required to live in the presence of God. The question is whether or not Anselm believes that both of these aspects are covered under grace.
Another question, lying in back of this one, is whether or not Anselm believes that there even are two aspects. One might argue for the possibility of misunderstanding this; that is, of believing that Christ’s payment of the penalty of sin is, in itself, sufficient unto salvation. Technically, the doctrine of grace would still be intact, even if floating around in an impoverished context. There is, however, evidence that Anselm does recognize a twofold aspect. It is also found in his Cur Deus Homo.
Not only does Anselm believe that God had to become human in order to be our redeemer, but he believes that God had to be our redeemer. Evidently, once God had decided that he would create personal beings and live with them forever, there had to be just so many of them. There is a perfect number that only God knows. Anselm wonders if the angels once made up this perfect number until some of them fell. If so, then people were created to make up the difference. This, he concludes, is unseemly. It would not do for one who was saved to be happy about the fact that an angel had been eternally damned in order to make room for him. Anselm decides that, while people do make up the difference, the perfect number is higher than the number of angels created. That way, we never know. Since people were created to make up the perfect number, God could not have his plans thwarted by the fall.
The whole scenario seems just a bit far fetched. Nevertheless, I believe that Anselm is on to something. Anselm is right: it is not the case that God could have decided not to redeem anybody. It goes back to God’s original intent in creating mankind: he wanted to live with them forever. It is not, though, as Anselm supposes, a matter of replacing angels or making up a perfect number. Rather, I see this redemptive compunction as the fulfillment of a pre-creative intratrinitarian covenant. In agreement with Anselm, this necessity is not a matter of some external force compelling the will of God. He was, after all, free not to decide to create.
To bring things back into focus, Anselm believes that man was created for something beyond his original paradise. Had Adam not sinned, humanity would have been promoted to something higher. This historical paradigm suggests that Anselm does not view our justification simply in terms of a satisfaction for sin. There is a twofold aspect: redemption to our original state and progression to what had been intended. So then, does Anselm believe that this second aspect is the result of grace alone?
On the surface, he does not. In fact, Anselm has a whole treatise on the compatibility of grace with the free will of the individual. He argues that both are necessary for salvation. All of which is fine so long as free will is not confused with individual merit. The problem, however, is that it looks as though Anselm might do this. It happens in his De Concordia Praescentiae et Praedestionatis et Gratiae Dei cum Libero Arbitrio, III, 9. He is answering the question of why “in this life the penalty for sin remains in us after the sin has been blotted out.” Why, upon baptism, are we not immediately transformed into a state of incorruption? His answer is that merit would perish. He writes, “Faith and hope—without which no man who has understanding can merit the Kingdom of God—would vanish.”
Does Anselm mean to say that the grace of God found in the atonement qualifies us for our own meritorious works? Maybe not. He concludes the paragraph by saying, “In order that through merit of faith and of hope we may more gloriously obtain the happiness we desire, we remain—for as long as we are in this life—in this state.” The key is in the words “more gloriously.” I am willing to accept the suggestion that Anselm is not talking about the merit of justification, but of the merit which results in the rewards of sanctification. Still, if this is the case, I would prefer that he use different words.
Anselm’s definition of a free will fits, for the most part, with an orthodox conception of grace. He does not take a libertarian view. The will follows its own nature. God’s will, though free, is not able to sin. Apart from the grace of God, the will of fallen man is not able to follow God. Anselm argues that not everyone is given this grace. He does not, then, follow the semi-Pelagian/Arminian notion of a blanket application of prevenient grace, which neutralizes the biblical declarations of being dead in sins. The dispensation of grace is according to the will of God.
And then, Anselm complicates the picture. He talks about degrees of grace and of the possibility of overcoming grace by an act of the will. There is no question that, in Anselm, grace is necessary unto salvation. But then, the same thing can be said for Roman Catholicism. Furthermore, there is nothing wrong with positing a level of grace that can be overcome by an even more corrupt will. That is, as long as it is understood that God had no intention for this grace to be salvific. What I have yet to find in Anselm is a statement to the effect that there exist those degrees of grace that necessarily stronger than any opposing act of the will.
Does Anselm believe in irresistible grace? If not, then no matter how much grace has been given, the determining factor in the salvation of one person over another is that some quality of his own, above and beyond the grace of God, was better than that in someone else. It is not sufficient to go back to Anselm’s reasons for the incarnation and the atonement to answer this. He does believe that God had every intention to spend eternity with people. Furthermore, he believes that God was able to bring about what he intended. However, because he ties this, not to individual election, but to the filling up of a perfect number, there is no need for God to guarantee the salvation of any specific individual. If one resists, another would eventually take his place.
For now, the question remains unanswered, especially with Anselm’s talk of meritorious faith and grace that can be overcome by the will. If it is the case that Anselm would subscribe to irresistible grace, I can accept his view of grace as a whole. If it is God’s will that his grace not be resisted, then this grace is sufficient to my justification. Even though Anselm wants to label them as “merits,” he would see faith and hope as the fruit of grace. Faith would then be seen as the instrument of justification and not another ground thereof.
Posted by kcourter at março 17, 2005 10:08 PM