In response to an observed inconsistency between Baptist views of tithing and baptism, I had written, "In defense of the Baptists, giving is plainly evident in the NT without recourse to the OT. Having seen it in the NT, it is then possible to go to the OT and learn more about it. Infant baptism is not plainly evident in the NT unless one approaches it through the OT. The problem is not in an arbitrary inconsistency, but in the idea that the NT can stand on its own when it comes to any given doctrine. The whole of scripture needs to be considered for every doctrine, not just those that are obvious." Whereupon I have been asked to explain the hermenuetic "if it's not mentioned in the NT then it doesn't cross over." I assume that this means it doesn't cross over from the OT.
When it comes to infant baptism, many Baptists might object to the notion that they are not allowing something to cross over. This kind of baptism is not explicitly mentioned in any testament. But in this case, it isn't the narrower point of baptizing infants, but that of applying the covenant sign to infants. The NT has no explicit command to apply the sign of the covenant to infants. So then, why this reluctance to look to the OT? Essentially, there is a default position that the old covenant and thus the OT is abrogated as any kind of a normative standard unless there is good reason to make an exception. This is just a restatement of the basic hermeneutic, though. Why hold to this position?
I suggest that it is the result of falling head long into a ditch. An ugly ditch, as Gotthold Lessing described his maxim: "Accidental truths of history can never become the proof of necessary truths of reason." A necessary truth of reason is a timeless and universal moral principle. It is something that all thinking people, in all times and places, know is right. There is no need to hear a story about it or to know that someone else did it; it's just reasonable that it's the right thing to do. This consensus crosses all cultural and religious barriers. Truths of reason are the way things should be. Truths of history, on the other hand, are the way things have actually been. Because they are accidental, they could just as well have been otherwise. Consequently, it is not possible to look at a truth of history and say that things should have been this way. You can't get an 'ought' from an 'is,' or, in this case, from a 'was.' Accidental truths cannot prove necessary truths, nor, for that matter, do necessary truths require any proof.
Now, apply this to the present example. A covenant, along with its sign, is not a necessary truth of reason. It is not the case that people across all cultures and religions think that it's just not right to lack such a thing. Some cultures have had covenant signs, many more have not. Israel just happened to have one. But this is an accidental truth of history at a specific time and place. The fact that it was this way provides no imperative for what ought to be done. When it comes to the parameters of the NT covenant sign, we must be informed by what the NT says to do and not by the historical features of another covenant.
Another side of this same hermeneutic is seen in the linked article on tithing. The historical connection between the old covenant and the new covenant is broken. What happened to be true under the OC is not binding on us now. But then the article quotes from both testaments in order to present its position on giving. These are prefaced with, "Note however, that while tithing is no longer required, giving is still a principle of God." What's going on here? The scriptural texts are not being used as the binding Word of God. Instead, being charitable, i.e., giving as "a principle of God," is recognized as a timeless moral principle. The force of the argument lies here and not in the particular texts gleaned to illustrated a preconceived idea. Yet, if this is the case, if the principle is timeless, why use scripture at all? Any illustration will do.
Now, it is not always the case, especially among those who believe in the inspiration of scripture, that the Bible entire is reduced to illustrations of moral principles. God does issue commands that are not timeless truths of reason. Lessing's ditch is far too ugly, and so it's been landscaped. The covenant life of ancient Israel can never be the proof of the commands of the NT. However, this brings us back to the point that something must either be mentioned in the NT, or be a necessary truth of reason. And so the OT is used, but not under its own authority. Instead, it provides the material for Sunday School stories/Aesop's fables. The same thing seeps over into NT historical narrative.
I also would argue that this approach is behind the almost universal fascination within the evangelical church with exemplaristic preaching. Read the biblical narrative and then subject it to practical application. That is, determine which necessary truth has been illustrated by the text and then explain how to put this imperative of reason into practice. Why bother with the first step then? Perhaps as a psychological preparation for the second. But if this is the case, why not expand the repertoire? It wouldn't even have to be historically accurate. Just make it up. The same Bible stories again and again do get awfully boring.
In the end, a hermeneutic that assumes the existence of Lessing's ditch leaves us with no way to defend the existence of a unique and uniquely relevant revelation from God. And it is no wonder. It isn't just that Lessing is mistaken about the relationship between these two truths. Rather, if the triune God of the covenant exists, then there are no accidental truths of history and there are no necessary truths of reason. He is the sovereign Lord of history who reveals his truth by means of that history to whomever he will. Not only is the ditch a figment of the collective evangelical imagination, so is the surrounding territory.
Posted by kcourter at fevereiro 17, 2005 9:07 PM