The following constitutes my attempt to deal with this: I'd really be interested in reading an explanation of the "Free-Will Defense of God" that more than one Presbyterian has insisted upon. I mean, you know the question's out there: How can it be the case that humans have the ability to choose right or wrong AND that the Church is the predetermined vessel of Glory since before Creation?. I don't so much offer a direct explanation of the free-will defense as I try to explain the different ideas of what the will is and why the free will defense cannot consistently be held by Presbyterians.
Monothelitism is the doctrine that the incarnate Christ has a single will, much like any other person. It was condemned as heresy at Constantinople III, the sixth ecumenical council. Monothelitism was consistent with monophysitism, which is the doctrine that the incarnate Christ had only one nature, the human and divine having been somehow merged. The council declared that since Christ was one person in two natures, he therefore had two wills. These wills were always in perfect harmony; nevertherless, they had to be distinguished. The point to note here is what is assumed of the will on both sides. The will is a faculty of the nature.
Now, jump ahead to current discussions on the freedom of the will and, more often than not, the will is equated with the self. The implication is a readoption of monothelitism. There is no longer a conscious claim that Christ has only one nature. Supposedly, the will is something that the person of Christ does. Stop just a minute, though. What do you think a nature is? If the Logos chooses, then it follows that it is in his nature to choose. And, if both natures of the incarnate Logos are to remain intact, then each must retain its own faculty of willing. Free-will, as it is popularly understood among most Christians, is incompatible with the church's rejection of monthelitism. This view of the will is characterized by indeterminacy; i.e., the will cannot be truly free unless its actions are not determined by anything outside of itself. At the moment of decision, I must have the equal ability to choose a or non-a. This kind of free-will is seen as necessary to the existence of moral beings. An action is not truly moral, they say, unless it is free. An automaton cannot be praised or blamed for what it does because it had to do it.
But there are problems with this view of free-will greater than anything it claims to solve. If the will of a moral being must be characterized by indeterminacy, then what prevents the possibility of evil at any point in eternity? The Church could not be a predetermined vessel of Glory. Maybe in the sense of God's wishful thinking, but not in much else. Also, God is a moral being. What prevents arbitrary evil decisions on his part? One might argue that whatever he does is good by virtue of the fact that he does it. But this is hardly comforting. I, for one, do not relish the thought of standing before the judgment seat of Christ only to see him in hysterical laughter saying, "I lied" The idea is repugnant; however, we cannot eliminate it by defining the will in such a way that God cannot be free.
The Reformed/Augustinian view is compatibilism. [I have also discussed it here.] Moral beings are free to do whatever they want, but this freedom is compatible with the sovereignty of God. Although the Reformed (including the WCF IX) call this free-will, it is better understood as "free moral agency." The key is this: the will of the moral agent is not indeterminately free, but the moral agent is free to do whatever he wants. The will is not to be equated with the self, but is a faculty of the nature. Our choices are always determined by our strongest moral inclinations. God is absolutely free but he can only act in a perfectly righteous manner because he is holy. When we have been completely redeemed, we will be even more free than we are now. Free to always do what is right.
All of which leads to my baffllement at Presbyterians adopting the Free-will defence (FWD) of God. [The FWD needs to be distinguished from a free-will theodicy. The former defends God's existence, the latter defends his righteousness.] The classic objection had been, "How can an all good and all powerful God allow evil? If evil exists, then God is not all powerful or he is not all good." The next step, of course, was that, since God is defined as all powerful and all good, and since there is evil, then God must not exist. There never really has been a satisfactory rational answer to this. Until the FWD. After all, everyone agrees that free-will is a good thing and that God would have to voluntarily limit himself in order to allow it to operate.
Assuming that this view of free-will is correct, this works as a defense (note: a defense of the existence of God is not to be confused with a proof or argument for the existence of God). The problem is this: since the wrong view of the will has been assumed, then the wrong God has been defended. It is not the case that there exists a God who created moral beings capable of indeterminate choice. Instead, the Reformed claim is that God created moral beings who always act according to their natures. This claim fails to answer the classic objection to God's existence and cannot stand as a defense of that existence. Under the FWD, God's creation of moral beings necessitates the possibility of evil. This is not the case if complatibilism is true. There is, from our perspective, no defensible reason why God could not have created all moral beings impeccable, as he did with the unfallen angels.
Honestly, I haven't heard any Presbyterians market the free-will–defense theodicy. I'm sure some believe it, having not considered the ramifications, but more often than not, theodicies don't seem to interest the Presbyterians I know. The most common answer to the existence of evil is that it exist for God's glory in a way that for the time being must remain a mystery to the mortal man. And, really, i think i'm satisfied with that. In fact, even Christ, having perfect opportunity to answer the question for all time (cf. Luke 13), simply skips offering any theodicy and focuses on the fact that suffering doesn't necessarily spring from personal sin.
Also, you're understanding of the freedom of the will doesn't seem much different from Edwards's in, what else, The Freedom of the Will. Is it?
Posted by: The Dane at fevereiro 14, 2005 3:09 PMI agree with everything you've said here, especially about the tower in Siloam. Scripture's consistent reply to the question, "Why does God allow evil?" is "Shut up and repent." This is one of those things that requires humble submission. But there is another kind of theodicy in scripture that we are encouraged to investigate- "How can a just God justify sinners?" This kind of inquiry leads to a deeper understanding of the gospel.
As far as this post, though, I wasn't talking about theodicies. Note the statement that I had put in brackets, "The FWD needs to be distinguished from a free-will theodicy. The former defends God's existence, the latter defends his righteousness." The FWD was stated by someone who, though not Presbyterian, is at least somewhat Reformed- Plantinga.
You noticed- my understanding of the will isn't that different at all from Edwards. It has been several years since I've read The Freedom of the Will, and I no longer have a copy, so I can't say for sure that there aren't specific points with which I might disagree. Still, it is, in my opinion, the best and most comprehensive work to date on the subject of the will.
I am a Presbyterian, and yet I have incompatiblist leanings.
The incompatiblist position (or rather there are many positions in this camp) is far more varied than simply that the will is indetermined (i.e., random). There are some who hold this position, but there are other ways of thinking about incompatiblism.
I suggest you see the SEP entry on incompatiblist theories of free will.
Posted by: Alex at fevereiro 17, 2005 6:52 AMAlex, welcome. The article to which you linked states in its third paragraph, "Further variations among [incompatibilist] accounts concern where in the processes leading to actions they require indeterminism and what other conditions besides indeterminism they require." While there may be more to the various incompatibilist accounts than indeterminism, there is certainly nothing less.
The concluding paragraph of the same article begins, "In sum, we do not have good evidence that any incompatibilist account is true." There remains, however, the belief that some incompatibilist account must be true because there is an a priori assumption that determinism cannot be true. Determinism, it is argued, contradicts our ability to act freely. But there is no good reason to believe this. It is, in fact, incoherent to think so. One cannot say that determinism contradicts freedom unless he has first demonstrated that indeterminism establishes freedom. So far, there is no good evidence that this has happened.
This last paragraph goes on to claim that moral responsibility requires free will and that free will requires indeterminism. Bu this is a non sequitor. Moral responsibility cannot be predicated of an automaton; however, the condition against this is satisfied by a free moral agent, which is not the same thing as someone with an indetermined free will.
When I wrote that the Presbyterians could not consistently hold to a free-will defense, I was including within Presbyterianism certain traditions of our doctrinal heritage. I had in mind the decrees and providence of God whereby he has "foreordained whatsoever comes to pass." If God is sovereign, then nothing is indetermined, including the wills and actions of moral agents. If there are moral agents, then this moral agency must be free in order for moral responsibility to exist. Within the parameters of Reformed doctrine, both of these must be maintained in their full integrity. The compatibilism is between the sovereignty of God, by which all things are determined, and the moral responsibility of free agents. If freedom is undetermined by definition, then one of these sides will have to go. Either we are robots, or God is not sovereign. Very few incompatibilists choose option A.
Since you have described yourself as a Presbyterian with incompatibilist leanings, I must conclude one or both of two things: 1) You do not hold to one or both of the doctrines of God's sovereignty and man's responsibility. 2) You have misunderstood compatibilism.
Posted by: Kevin at fevereiro 18, 2005 1:35 AMPerhaps we should ask this question: what are the conditions for an agent being morally responsible for some act? I would say that for an agent to be morally responsible, she must somehow "own" the act. But the compatiblist says that all of the act's antecedent conditions are sufficient to determine the act, such that if you were to replace the agent with a numerically-different but essentially identical agent-copy, the same act would have been performed. In that sense, it isn't the agent's act. In that sense we don't even have an agent.
My position isn't that freedom is undetermined or indetermined. It is self-determined. So an agent's action is underdetermined up to the point in time when that agent is deliberating on action, and then the agent chooses according to freedom.
Another question. Is God free in the compatiblist or incompatiblist sense? If one or the other, what are the reasons why? And a related question: in thinking on God's sovereignty, are we to assume that at some time t, God foreordained everything to happen? That is, are we to understand His foreordaining in temporal terms or perhaps in some other way?
Posted by: Alex at fevereiro 18, 2005 11:44 AMAs a criterion, "she must somehow 'own' the act" is rather vague. The only condtion required for an agent being morally responsible for some act is that, of all the options offered, he must want the option chosen more than any of the others at the moment of decision. I see no problem in saying that this constitutes owning the act, if that's what it needs to be called.
If you hold to any kind of determinism of the will, then you are a compatibilist. The question, in determining if you actually do, is what you mean by 'self-determined.' If you mean agent-determined, then, on the surface at least, we agree. But this is not the case if you equate 'agent' and 'will' such that the will determines itself or is the self that does the determining. If so, then what accounts for the choices made? If all you can answer is "self-determination," this is no different for substance than nondetermination. Or, it is possible that the agent is the self and that the will is a faculty of the agent/self. Which is the position that I have advocated. The will is determined by the agent according to the strongest inclination of the agent at the moment of decision. This means that the inclination of the agent is not a function of the agent's will; it results, rather, from the nature of the agent. The important point for freedom and moral responsibility is that the choice be made according to the inclinatuion of the agent. In this sense, the will is self-determined: it is determined, not by itself, but by the self to whom it belongs.
Concerning agent-copies. The change needs to be made a the exact moment of decision. Otherwise, it would be its own agent in its own circumstances. There is also the question of whether an agent-copy could be essentially identical if it had not actually experienced the antecedent conditions. Implanted memory of the conditions may not have the same effect, in which case, the agent-copy would not be identical and the experiment would be spoiled. Say, however, that the identity is perfect. Compatibilism would indeed expect the copy to act in a manner identical to the original. To say otherwise would constitute the insertion of indeterminism at the moment of decision. The will, however, is determined by something; namely and most immediately, by the nature of the agent. If the act turns out to be different for the agent copy than for the original, it is proof, not against compatibilism, but of an imperfect copy.
God is free in the compatibilist/deterministic sense. His freedom is compatible with God's sovereignty, which, in this case, is his own. More importantly, his will is determined by his nature. The freedom of God, even when considered along with his omnipotence, is not such that at any point he could have done otherwise. Scripture testifies that God cannot lie. He can choose not to speak at all; however, once having decided that he will speak, his nature requires that he tell the truth. Nevertheless, because it is his inclination and desire to tell the truth, he is acting according to freedom. He is morally responsibile for telling the truth and is worthy of all praise when he does. If human agents require libertarian freedom in order to be morally responsible, the same must apply to God as a divine agent. If incompatibilism is true, either God is not free and he cannot be praised, or he is free and he does, in fact, make a habit of lying (the odds against such a thing, if his will is not determined by his nature, being on the order of the impossible).
God did foreordain everything to happen. From our perspective, this is a temporal event. The language won't let us get away from it. "God did," past tense. Even the word "foreordain" implies events future to itself. I believe that it is acceptable to say that God foreordained everything at some time t, if only because it is terribly difficult for us to think in other terms. Acceptable, but not, in my opinion, preferable. If God's foreordination does occurr at t, then there can be no t-1. Otherwise, we have the prospect of God having a new idea. This contradicts the doctrine of God's omniscience whereby, not only does he know everything, but he has always known what he will always know. Because our language is tensed according to time, it is very difficult to express atemporality. We say that God existed in eternity past before creation. In a sense, this is the only way to express the idea. But, if time itself is a part of creation, how can there be a 'before'? If it is not a part of creation, what are we doing here? Either it would have to be substantially different before the creation, in which case it would not really be time, or, being the chronological measure of an eternity, God would still be waiting to create anything. God is infinite, limited neither by time nor space. His decrees are as coextensive as he is. Whenever God does act in time, it is as an accomodation to created beings. We are time bound because we are finite. Even in eternity, we will still be finite. We will live for an infinite amount of time, but this does not imply that we will be able to take eternity in one dose. [What did this question have to do with God's sovereignty as it relates to the will?]