When I began reading Augustine’s “A Treatise on Grace and Free Will,” I expected the insights, not only of a man who had sat at the feet of Calvin, but who had developed the articulate precision of Edwards. Here was a window into the mind of the original and the definitive anti-Pelagian, a Reformer living a millennium before his time. This is not quite what I got.
Augustine’s intent is to steer a middle course between “some persons who so defend God’s grace as to deny man’s free will, or who suppose that free will is denied when grace is defended” (TGF, 1). The treatise is divided in two in order to deal with both sides. The second and best section, a defense of grace, deals with the latter group. The opening chapters are a defense of free will. Here, Augustine is not at his finest.
Who are these people who so emphasize grace at the expense of free will? I cannot tell; however, it may not be all that important to know. The occasion of the treatise seems to be the teaching of the Pelagians. This preliminary defense of free will should probably be seen as laying the groundwork for his subsequent arguments on the necessity of grace. It is in this latter context of the treatise, and in his subsequent “A Treatise on the Predestination of the Saints” that Augustine’s views on free will are best expressed. Nevertheless, it is my observation that when he is treating the subject of free will in and of itself, his argument sounds too congenial to the opposition. I am not convinced by what he has to say.
The foundation of Augustine’s defense of free will is found in an implication: God has addressed a number of precepts to man; therefore, man must have a free will. The Pelagians rejoice and say, “Precisely.” Yet, I am immediately stuck wondering why this has to be the case. The wind and waves lie silent at his command. Surely this implies no volition on their part. I must wait to see how Augustine explains his defense. But the whole time that he is considering exclusively the topic of free will, he offers no explanation. He goes into a series of sub-points, such that sinners cannot blame God for their actions or that ignorance is no excuse. However, all of these are predicated on the assumption that responsibility implies free will. Augustine has not demonstrated this.
I do see the rhetorical value of Augustine’s opening chapters. If the treatise, considered as a whole, is designed to convince the Pelagians of the necessity of grace, or to demonstrate their error to others, it helps to be conciliatory; to offer a position of common ground. But does such commonality exist?
It is not until he explains grace that Augustine’s position on free will begins to take on that distinctively Reformed flavor. He still maintains the vocabulary of free will, which is forgivable. Although I would prefer that he speak of free moral agency, the idea of which he speaks is thoroughly biblical. Furthermore, he does so in such a way that his previous categorization of free will as an implication of divine precepts is rendered unnecessary.
There is nothing in Augustine’s opening chapters to prevent one from thinking that he is not describing free will in libertarian terms; that is, free will describes no restraints on any options that may exist. His subsequent treatment of the topic makes it clear that this is not at all what he means. I can explain the existence of his opening chapters in one of two ways: 1) Augustine does not posses the ability to articulate the concept of free will when it is considered in abstraction. 2) Whether intentionally or not, Augustine is equivocating within the course of his treatise.
Let us, though, go on to Augustine’s better writings. Before anything else, his musings are theocentric. Towards the end of his treatise, he writes, “This ought to be the fixed and immoveable conviction of your heart, that there is no unrighteousness with God” (TGF, 43). Whereas the Pelagians and their half-kin would look at Augustine’s views on grace and free will and accuse him of ascribing unrighteousness to God, Augustine claims the precise opposite as his motive for holding them.
What are the Pelagian objections? Just look at what Augustine says and these should become apparent. When Augustine speaks of free will, he means that the will of a good man is free to do good and the will of an evil man is free to do evil. Already the Pelagians are backtracking from their previous agreement with Augustine (although, this is probably more his fault). The nature of the individual determines the will; not vice-versa as the Pelagians would have it. What makes it worse from their perspective is that, accompanying Augustine’s doctrine of the will is his belief in original sin. No one is good; consequently, no one can will to do good. What is more, no one can will to be good. Everyone is free to will evil. At this point, the Pelagians are objecting that the will is actually bound to do evil. I would agree with them on this point. I would, however, disagree with the corollary that Augustine has unwittingly handed them in his opening chapters, which is, that God is unrighteous in demanding that they, in turn, be righteous.
The existence of good men is due entirely to the grace of God in changing their natures so that their wills will follow. This change is entirely without merit on their part. Augustine rejects the notion that God looks into the future and bases this grace on something that they would do. They are not given the ability to will good because they would have done so anyway.
Augustine further develops the disconnection between merit and grace when he considers the baptism of infants. He believes that all unbaptized infants are damned. While I disagree with him on the issue of baptism, I do take his point that some infants are in this state. If it is wrong to think that the bestowal of grace is based on some good deed that an individual would definitely do in the future, then on what basis does God decide the fate of those who die in infancy? It is not that they were definitely going to do some good or evil thing. And Augustine will not allow that God dispenses with his grace based on hypothetical merit.
Christ himself is added to Augustine’s argument for the non-meritorious nature of grace. Consider Jesus in his humanity and the super abundance of grace that God must have bestowed upon this man in order to join him to himself. Considering then, that this occurred at the moment of his incarnation, it could not have been based on merit.
Augustine presents Jesus, who is the crowning example of God’s grace, as the chief example of free will. We are not to suppose that Christ, because he was free, could have chosen to sin, or could have chosen not to do the will of his Father. Rather, because he was so completely devoid of an evil nature, he was freer than anyone has ever been to do good.
Augustine had not always thought this way on the issue of grace of free will. But his mind was captive to the Word of God. It asked him, “What do you have that you have not received?” He was compelled to answer, “Nothing.” The inclination of his own will could be nothing less than the gift of God.