Morphemics

You wrote,
“The next two options may be expressed by the statement that has been given: a child does not need to know what knowledge is in order to know that his mother loves him. The first of these would deny the necessity of epistemology without also denying the existence of knowledge. But this would be a mere assertion. When this is weighed against the first option of the three, there is really no good reason to prefer it.”

What do you mean by "mere assertion", and why is the fact that my claim is mere assertion a problem? If you mean that I haven’t given an argument for it then I accept the charge, but so what? The claim was a premise in my argument, not a conclusion. If you refuse to accept any statement that doesn’t have an argument backing it up, then there’s no point in arguing at all, since every non-circular argument must rest on premises that have not yet been argued for. Everything is either a mere assertion or it is based on mere assertions. If, on the other hand, by “mere assertion” you meant “assertion lacking any support” then I deny that my claim is a mere assertion: it has intuitive support.

And why should we think there is no good reason to prefer it (my thesis) to the other options? There is strong intuitive support for the claim that a child can know that his mother loves him. There is no support, intuitive or otherwise, for the claim that a child cannot know that his mother loves him. The only apparent support for this claim (pre-Gettier epistemology) has been demolished.

Again, you wrote, “It may actually be the case that knowledge does not exist. And we would never know it. Indeed, between the two already mentioned options, the first appears to be the more likely, since, not making any positive assertions about knowledge, there is no need to account for a sufficient cause to knowledge. The second option does make such a positive assertion, and, therefore, does need to provide a sufficient cause for its assertion (it only needs to do this because the first option exists); however, it does not.”

This begs the question against my position. My whole point is that I do NOT need to give an account of knowledge in order to claim that this child knows that his mother loves him. On the contrary the claim that knowledge does not exist is highly unlikely. Indeed I can prove that knowledge exists:

1) I know that 2+2=4, therefore knowledge exists
2) George Bush knows that he is President of the United States, Therefore knowledge exists
3) This child knows that his mother loves him, therefore knowledge exists.

You may of course question my premises, but you can do that with any argument. These premises happen to have very strong intuitive support. Do you have any good reason not to believe them? Calling them mere assertions is not good enough.

On the contrary, your claim that "Before answering the question of whether a child may know about his mother's love regardless of his knowledge of knowledge, it is necessary to determine whether or not knowledge is possible" is the mere assertion, in that it is neither intuitively obvious nor is there a good argument backing it up.

A final clarification: I do believe that there is an account of the difference between knowledge and true belief (a true epistemology). God knows it. I don’t think anybody else does.

We both agree that "there is an account of the difference between knowledge and true belief (a true epistemology)." You go on to say, "God knows it. I don’t think anybody else does." If you're talking about a full-orbed understanding of that account, then I have no argument with you. Nevertheless, I do at least want to make the case that there are some particulars in which we need to be able to give a sufficient account between true belief and false belief. I have no problem with the idea that only God can give an account of the difference between knowledge and true belief. However, unless we are able to give an account for the difference between true and false beliefs, then we will not be able to tell the difference between knowledge and false belief. Since knowledge is inseperable from true belief, the ability to account for the veracity of a belief is also an epistemological endeavor.

Now to your opening question. I never said that your claim was a mere assertion. I did say that this claim could be interpreted in one of two different ways, the first of which would be a mere assertion. This is the assertion that states that, while there is knowledge, there is no epistemology-at all. Your own intention in the statement appears to be more in line with the third option, which is that, while there is an epistemology, the child does not have to know it. This option is only a mere assertion in the event that the epistemological account is abstracted to such a degree that no one is able to provide it. Personally, I don't see too many people doing this. As indicated in your final clarification, you don't. You claim that there is an account and that God knows what it is. This is not a mere assertion. We are both in agreement here, as far as it goes.

But I went on to draw a further distinction within the third option when I asked, "Could there be cases for which knowledge is possible, for which there is an account for the specific knowledge of that case, and for which it is necessary to provide that account?" And, by this, I meant necessary for us to provide an account- not just God.

My main difference with your post was with the idea that we don't need an epistemology. This may be true in many cases, such as that of the child and his mother. My own position is that we do need an epistemology within the confines of Creedal Christianity. In order to do this, I had to make the last distinction within the third option; and, for this, I had to make all the distinctions leading up to this option.

I have no problem with your statement as such. I have already indicated that we agree on it, as far as it goes. My argument is with the statement as it is set in the context of the question and answer, "Do we need to have an epistemology before we can know things? Clearly not." The implication within this context is that the illustration of the mother and child is exhaustive of all instances of knowledge. That is, the most we can say is that there is knowledge, there is an account of knowledge known to God, but there are no cases in which we will ever have to give that account. I agree with the first two points, but not with the third. Concerning your statement itself- I did not reject it so much because I thought that it was unsubstantiated as a premise as I did because I disagreed with the premise as it stood in relation to the previous question and answer. It is the case that "every non-circular argument must rest on premises that have not yet been argued for." However, not every premise deserves such an axiomatic privilege. Many premises are, in turn, the conclusions of other arguments. If I ignored this, I would still be able to determine if your argument were valid or not (which it is), but I would not be able to say whether or not it were true.

On intuitive support- it isn't clear to me whether you mean your intuitions about the child and his mother, or the child's intuitions about his mother. Either way, I don't see that intuitive support is all that strong an argument when the discussion is about knowledge. It's great if the question is why someone holds to certain beliefs (the child that his mother loves him, or the observer that the child's mother loves him); however, intuitive support says nothing about the actual state of affairs, which is essential to knowledge.

If intuitive support is not a strong argument for knowledge, then, all other things being equal, it is just as valid in a post-Gettier epistemology to say that there is no knowledge as to say that there is. But, barring sufficient reason to go either way, the most consistent choice is to remain agnostic about knowledge and say that there is currently no proof either way. Basically, the first option.

Yet, not all things are equal. The fact of knowledge has been revealed; consequently, the first option is invalidated. On the other hand, although the second option has been provided with a sufficient account for its assertion about knowledge, this is not enough to make this option true, since a part of this option is the claim that such an account is not needed. Enter the third option. Because I am identifying your position as being in this third option, I could not have been begging the question against your position by comparing the relative merits of the first two options. If your whole point were nothing more than,"I do NOT need to give an account of knowledge in order to claim that this child knows that his mother loves him," then I would have no argument. We both agree that such an account, which is known to God, does exist. We also agree that, in the case of the mother and child, neither one of has to give this account in order to make the claim. However, as I mentioned earlier, I do not agree with the implication that the example of the mother and child is exhaustively illustrative for all cases of knowledge.

Concerning your list of premises, I agree with your conclusion that knowledge exists. I agree with all three of your premises (remember that my claim of a mere assertion did not have to do with the statement that the child knows that his mother loves him without having to give an account of that knowledge, but with the possible interpretation that there is no account to be had). I do not, however, agree that these premises qualify as proofs to your conclusion. The proof of your conclusion is already found in revelation. The premises are nothing more than examples of knowledge. Without the proof, these premises would be nothing more than examples of belief.

You go on to say that my own claim concerning the necessity of determining whether or not knowledge is possible is the mere assertion. I don't see how. For instance, right after finishing this, I am going to make myself some dinner. However, before doing this, I must have already determined the existence of food. The mere fact that this is painfully obvious and that I don't actually have to sit here and mentally work it out does not negate this determination as a logical priority. Likewise, if we agree that knowledge is just as obvious as food, this would still not negate the logical priority of making this determination. As it was, I made this claim at a point in my argument when the first option, that which claimed an agnostic view for knowledge, was still the most viable of the three. Only by addressing the existence of knowledge as a subject of revelation could I go on to eliminate the first two options and then make the necessary distinction in the third that would allow me to argue that we do need an epistemology for Creedal Christianity.

I still can't figure out what you mean by mere assertion.

Why couldn't an atheist use my argument to claim that either there is no definition of knowledge or else nobody knows it?

I think this is important because you keep saying things like: "If intuitive support is not a strong argument for knowledge, then, all other things being equal, it is just as valid in a post-Gettier epistemology to say that there is no knowledge as to say that there is." It sounds like you're saying: any time X has intuitive support but we don't have an argument for X, it is just as valid to say that there is no X as that there is. This general principle is absurd. If you don't accept the general principle I can't see why you think it holds when X=knowledge.

How do you know food exists? Isn't it because you've encountered particular instances of food? Can you prove that food exists without referring to any such particulars?

Only that the position that there is knowledge but no epistemology is not backed up by an adequate argument. If one is presented, I will retract the statement. I will say again that I do not believe this position to be yours.

As to the atheistic claims, an atheist probably could claim that there's no definition to knowledge or that no one knows it. But I've already covered both of these possibilities. The first in the second option and the second as a subsection of the third option where "the epistemological account is abstracted to such a degree that no one is able to provide it."

I am saying that if there is no argument for or against X, then it is just as valid to say that there is no X as that there is. All of which has nothing to do with intuitive support. This notion may be a chief cause of some of our differences. Intuition, as I see it, is too subjective. What may be intuition to one person is sheer nonsense to another. Consequently, I don't accept intuitive support as an argument for anything.

I would have to agree that my knowledge of the ontological status of food is due to having encountered particular instances of food. But, it is also the case that I would not recognize these particular instances as food unless I first knew what food was. Induction and deduction are mutually dependent. As to a proof in the absence of particulars, the best I could do would be to draw an analogy between biological beings and other things that require an energy source. Still, the particulars would be helpful.

Yet, I can't imagine who would require such a proof. No one is in denial about the subject. I only brought it up to illustrate the validity of understanding things in terms of genus and species. Food in general; my dinner. The same thought was behind my claim about knowledge. Before speaking of a child's knowledge of his mother's love (species), we must first determine whether or not there is knowledge (genus). Although in the case of food, it may be superflous to make this determination, in the case of knowledge, it is not. To my recollection, no one has ever denied the existence of food. But there have been people stupid enough to deny the existence of knowledge. I just like to cover all my bases.

I think you are right to identify intuitive support as the key to our differences. You treat "argument for x" and "good reason to prefer x" as if they are synonymous. When you say "I don't accept intuitive support as an argument for anything" you have commited a tautology. By definition, intuitive support is not an argument. But that's not to the point. I claim that some propositions are to be preferred to their opposites prior to any argument.

You say "if there is no argument for or against X, then it is just as valid to say that there is no X as that there is." Let's see what follows from this. Let X be basic logical principles such as the law of non-contradiction. There is no (sound, non-circular) argument for true basic logical principles (if there was they wouldn't be basic). Therefore, according to you, it is just as valid to say that there are no true basic logical principles as that there are. It is just as valid to reject the law of non-contradiction as to accept it. But as a matter of fact, you do prefer the law of non-contradiction to its opposite. Any you are right to do so. But not on the basis of argument. Why, then? What tells you to prefer it? Intuition.

Of course nobody seriously questions the existence of food. I'm not asking you to prove that food exists. I'm asking you not to hold a position which implies that there is no reason to prefer belief in the existence of food to disbelief in its existence. That is what your position implies, since there is no argument for the existence of food that does not rest on particularistic intuitions.

I'll accept your account of intuition for basic logical principles; but, as you say, "There is no (sound, non-circular) argument for true basic logical principles." There are also no concrete counter-examples to any of the basic logical principles. Despite the lack of an argument, there is no good reason not to accept them. Yet, the assertion, "A child knows that his mother loves him without knowing what knowledge is," does not qualify for intuitive support. Nor does it need any intuitive support. At least three levels of arguments can be made in favor of this statement: for knowledge in general, this specific case of knowledge, and this specific case in the absence of knowing what knowledge is.

The conclusion, "some children know that their mothers love them without knowing what knowledge is," is both valid and true. The same thing does not apply if this is universalized into "all children." There are some children whose mothers do not love them. Sometimes the child knows this and sometimes he clings to a false belief. The presence of both arguments and of concrete counter-examples to your example disqualifies it for intuitive support.

As to the example itself, I still maintain that it is insufficient to support the claim that we do not need to have an epistemology before we can know things. It fails to take into account the possibility that there may be other types of knowledge for which an epistemology is required; and it fails to take into account the fact that there are arguments, known by the child, for his mother's love. "My mother loves me because she does x." It isn't a full blown epistemology, but it is, at least, an account for this specific instance of knowledge.

A 'counterexample' is a particular instance that contradicts a universal claim. There cannot be a counterexample to the particular claim: "A child knows that his mother loves him." It is this particular claim that has intuitive support and which I say should be accepted on that basis. "Every child ..." is a different proposition--one I never claimed was true or intuitive. The fact that it is both false and counterintutive has no bearing on my claim. (Were you implicitly assuming that only universal claims can have intuitive support? But why think that?)

We can use the example a different way: "my mother loves me" has intuitive support for the child. You say that the child has arguments for this conclusion. I disagree. Do most children have to go through a process of ratiocination before they realize that their mothers love them? I don't think so. Rather, they accept the proposition prior to any argument. I think they are right to do so.

Furthermore, you cannot get the proposition that my mother loves me from universal laws of logic alone. Any valid argument to the conclusion that my mother loves me must contain premises that are themselves particular claims based on intuition. An argument is only as good as its weakest premise. So if intuition is no good, then neither is any argument with a premise whose sole support is intuitive. So on your view, no child should believe that his mother loves him. I think this is a problem for your view.

This can be extended to all putative historical fact. No one should believe that Caesar crossed the Rubicon, since all arguments to that conclusion are based on claims that have only intuitive support. This includes such claims as "Jesus was crucified". Whatever argument there is for this claim is based on particular claims such as "I looked it up in the Bible and it said there that Jesus was crucified." How do you know that the Bible says that? (This relates to Mavrodes's criticism of Clark, referenced on my blog.)

If only universal claims can be supported by intuition, then no particular historical or ordinary-experience claim can have any support. But I doubt that you really believe this. If you look out of your window and see a tree, don't you just automatically form the belief that there is a tree outside your window? Surely you don't produce an argument for this proposition before you accept it.

I brought up a counterexample because I thought your claim about the child and his mother was intended as a universal statement. It was originally given in support of a question and answer. You had written, "Do we need to have an epistemology before we can know things? Clearly not. A child may know that his mother loves him without knowing what knowledge is."

The question itself can be read, "Do we ever need to have an epistemology before we can know things?" or, "Do we always need to have an epistemology before we can know things?" These can be formulated into statements, "Sometimes we need...," and "We always need..." Whichever way it is to be taken, the statement is denied, "Clearly not."

A negative answer to the first statement, which is particular, calls for a universal claim. The result is, "We never need..." A negative answer to the second statement, which is universal, can be supported by a particular claim, that is, a counterexample. The result is, "Sometimes we do not need..."

As I have indicated, I thought that your intention was to say, "We never need..." If it was, then the example you provided must be universal, not only for all mothers and children, but for any case of knowledge. However, by saying that this example was only meant to be particular, your intention appears to have been, "Sometimes we do not need..." In which case your original post is not questioning the validity of epistemology in itself, or even the necessity of our employing epistemology for some (whether few or most) cases of knowledge. Rather, it is questioning the contention that every single case of knowlede requires our use of epistemology. If this is the case, I have no objections. You haven't denied the existence of epistemology for those things that I think require an epistemology.

Now to the matter of intuitive support for particular claims. It's possible that we're dealing with semantics here. It looks like your concept of intuitive support is broader than mine and my concept of argument is broader than yours. There seems to be some overlap. Accepting your concept of intuitive support, I don't think you would claim that this takes place within a vacuum. "My mother loves me" has intuitive support for the child because of the actions of the mother. I agree that "children [do not] have to go through a process of ratiocination before they realize that their mothers love them." Then again, I haven't been limiting my concept of argument to "a process of ratiocination" (whether or not I am technically correct in doing this is another matter). In any event, it seems that what you are calling particular intuition, I am calling argument. Consequently, I do believe that, in most cases, a child is right to believe that his mother loves him.

I would also extend this idea of particular intuition/argument to putative historical fact and ordinary experience claims. When I look out the window and see a tree, I do not consciously form a syllogism to support the proposition, "I believe and know that there is a tree out there." Nevertheless, the tree's continued presentation of itself to my eyes while I am looking at it (or to any other sense if I go out to see how the tree is doing) constitutes an argument for its existence.

So, if we go back to the claim, "Sometimes we do not need to have an epistemology before we can know things," I would still have to disagree, even though, in one sense, I have claimed to have no problem with it. Actually, it isn't so much that epistemology is required before knowledge as it is that epistemology is inherent within knowledge.

Although there may be cases, such as factual disputes, in which epistemology must be formulated into a set of propositions, epistemology, at its core, has more to do with the nature of knoweldge. It is, perhaps, a metaphysical account of knowledge. It exists whether or not the person who is knowing performs a mental formulation. I know that the tree is there because, when I look at it, the tree stimulates my senses. I have no reason to doubt this.

Incidentally, I have no problem with the idea that we do not need an epistemology to answer the question, "How do I know that I know?" I think the question itself is superfluous. I just didn't like the apparent assertion that epistemology was unnecessary for any knowledge claim, since the lack of an epistemological foundation would seem to gut the possiblity of arguing for the truth of a belief that has come under attack.

"Because" is ambiguous. One billiard ball moves because another hits it. The world exists because God created it. These are instances of efficient causation. We don't say that the motion of the second billiard ball is the conclusion of an argument. A child's knowledge that his mother loves him is because of his mothers behavior in exactly this sense: the mothers behavior efficiently causes knowledge in the child. Your belief that there is a tree outside your window is efficiently caused by your sensuous experience. To call this an argument seems as obscene to me as saying that the existence of the world is the result of an argument.

Officially my claim was that there is no general rule that says we need an epistemology in order to justifiably make knowledge claims. There are trivial exceptions: if you claim to know what knowledge is in general, if that's your knowledge claim then you need an epistemology. But I can't think of any non-trivial exceptions. So, no, I'm not convinced by your argument that credal Christianity needs an episemology, but I didn't want to go there, and I still don't want to go there because I see in your writings a much more expansive and much more important claim that I don't want to be distracted from. You say, "the lack of an epistemological foundation would seem to gut the possiblity of arguing for the truth of a belief that has come under attack." Why? Can't we argue for some conclusion without even mentioning "knowledge" (let alone "epistemology") in the premises? Don't we do this all the time? Does the lack of epistemology somehow make an otherwise sound argument unsound?

In each of your examples, there is more than efficient causation. If I see a billiard ball move towards another free standing billiard ball and hit it, and then close my eyes in time not to see the motion of the second ball, I still know that the second ball moved. The action of the first ball striking it was an argument to this effect. The existence of a Creator argues for the existence of a creation. Or, to put it in terms that we're more likely to accept, the existence of the world argues for the existence of God. To paraphrase the Psalm (with the hopes of not taking it too far out of context), "The heavens argue for the glory of God."

The mother's actions are only the efficient cause of the child's knowledge abstractly considered. But these same actions argue for the content of that child's knowledge, which is that his mother loves him. Likewise, the combination of my sensuous experience and an actual tree outside my window is the efficient cause to my act of believing. But this same combination of sensuous experience and actual tree argue that the content of my belief is true, which is that there really is a tree outside of my window.

The analogy to "saying that the existence of the world is the result of an argument" is false. I did not say that the tree itself, but that my knowledge of the tree was the result of an argument. Besides, how is this any less obscene than calling it the result of intuition?

I don't mind if you want to stay away from the subject of Creedal Christianity, since the point of these comments is the necessity of an epistemology for justifiable knowledge claims. I will only bring it up, if needed, in support of my position.

I'm not convinced that we're thinking of epistemology in the same way. As I've already said, I'm not interested in "how do I know that I know" questions. I'm only considering epistemology as the account of the content of a knowledge claim. It answers the question, "How do I know?" Furthermore, the account is there whether or not I am asking the question. So yes, we can "argue for some conclusion without even mentioning "knowledge" (let alone "epistemology") in the premises." In many cases, we do not need to know a thing about epistemology in order to make a sound argument. But this does not mean that there must not be an epistemology in order for there to be a sound argument. Insofar as epistemology is the account for the content of a knowledge claim, it relates that content to the real world. While the tree is part of the efficient cause for my act of believing and is an argument for the content of my belief, none of these would be possible if the tree did not actually exist. Even though we do not always need to be aware of all three of these in order to make a justified knowledge claim, reality, the knowledge of reality, and an account of that knowledge are inseperable. It is this third item, the account, that connects the first two. Knowledge of reality cannot exist without epistemology.

Often, we can get by with no reference to epistemology. However, in some cases, when a belief is in question, it is not unreasonable to bring epistemology into the foreground in order to provide an account for that belief. Sometimes, it may even be necessary, since epistemology, providing the connection between belief and the thing believed, is able to justify holding this belief as knowledge.

If your conception of epistemology is something along Cartesian lines, then, by all means, I'll help you deliver the eulogy. But the demise of this particular brand does nothing to epistemology as such. As I understand it, epistemology is, by definition, the justification of knowledge claims. So when I read your official claim, I hear, "Our knowledge claims do not need to be justified in order for us to make justified knowledge claims."

Perhaps it can be demonstrated that my understanding of the nature of epistemology is in error. But unless I can be shown that I'm wrong in the basic definition, i.e., that it is the justification of knowledge claims, I will continue to believe in it. Either that, or deny the possibility of justifying knowledge claims.

The action of the first ball would cause the second to move whether or not anyone is looking at it or thinking about it. Hence the motion of the second ball is not the result of an argument. Now, if you see the first ball moving, and then close your eyes, you can produce the argument "ball 1 hit ball 2. Whenever that sort of thing happens, ball 2 moves. Therefore ball 2 will be moving now." This is a good argument, but its conclusion is not the motion of a billiard ball, but rather a proposition or belief about that motion.

There are two ways to cause a belief: rationally and efficiently. When your belief in the motion of the second ball is caused by an argument, it has a rational cause. When it is cause by an evil scientist poking your brain, it has an efficient cause. When it is cause by sense-experience, it has an efficient cause. Sense-experience is far more reliable than the whims of an evil scientist. But the mode of causation involved is the same.

I would agree that the heavens argue for the glory of God, but I would interpret it like this: When I look at the heavens, I have a sense-experience that causes (efficiently) in me the belief that 1) "that there is the sky, and it sure is beautiful." It seems close to intuitively obvious that 2) "such beauty could not exist unless it were created by a glorious God." These two propositions together form an argument to the conclusion "the heavens were created by a glorious God." I can of course skip the deduction all together: I look at the heavens and this immediately causes in me the belief that the heavens were created by a glorious God. In this case there is no longer an argument, but we might want to call it an argument in an analogous sense, as long as the context is one in which the difference between efficient and rational causation is not relevant. As soon as you say something like "if there is no argument for X then it is just as valid to accept X as to reject it" then the difference between efficient and rational causation becomes very relevant. You can't mean "if there is no efficient cause for X then ..." because this is trivial. So I assumed you meant "if there is no (sound) rational cause ..." Maybe you meant "if there is no reliable efficient cause ..." This I agree with, but it's not to the point. If you think it is, you're probably confusing it with the similar proposition "if we cannot give some indication for how/why X is produced by a reliable efficient cause then it is just as valid to reject X as to accept it." This, I claim, is false.

Giving such an indication would be part of an epistemology, which I define as the attempt to give a general account of the difference between knowledge and mere true belief. It used to be thought that this was justification. Since you mentioned Gettier favorably, I assume you understand that this is incorrect. But now you say that epistemology is the justification of knowledge claims. How does this square?

The question, "how do you know" is often used not to request an account of which epistemic faculties produced a certain belief and how they did this. Rather "how do you know" is a request for support. If someone asks me "how do you know that children of believers are to be baptized." The proper response is not to start talking about my epistemic faculties, but rather to give an argument: "these scriptural passages say this, therefore etc." Making a scriptural case for child baptism is not engaging in epistemology.

Descartes claimed that no such argument, regardless of the subject matter, could be acceptable until the skeptical hypothesis had been dealt with. He thought we have to give indubitable proof that we can know anything at all before we can be justified in claiming to know anything. His account of knowledge was thus the pre-Gettier kind: knowledge = justified true belief. And his account of justification was indubitability. I hope it's clear by now that I reject both of these. On the contrary, I think we can be justified in accepting a knowledge claim even if we can't give an account of how we are justified.

Once Abraham had a sense experience: he heard a voice telling him to kill his son. It seemed intuitively obvious to him that this was the voice of God. He had no argument for that conclusion. Indeed there were some very good arguments to the opposite conclusion. He had no way to step outside his experience to see if what produced his belief was reliable. He had no general account of the difference between knowledge and mere true belief. Had you asked him "how do you know it was the voice of God" he would not have had much to say besides "I just know" or "it just seems intuitively obvious to me." On the basis of his belief, he was prepared to kill someone. In spite of all this, his belief was justified.

The action of the first ball serves a double function. It is both the efficient cause for the motion of the second ball and the argument for the conclusion that the second ball has moved. When I am aware of the argument, I know the conclusion.

I'll agree to the distinction that you draw between rational and efficient causation for beliefs; however, I don't see this as either/or, but as both/and. To be sure, a belief may be caused by either one or the other, but such a belief would be unreliable. You've already mentioned the brain poking of the evil scientist. The resultant belief would be entirely from an efficient cause. It may even be a true belief, but it could not qualify as knowledge. The reason for this failure is a matter for epistemology.

Let's say that the belief produced is that the second ball has moved. I am in the evil scientist's laboratory and, unknown to me, there is a table of billiard balls in an adjacent room. My brain is poked and I come to believe that, on a table in an adjacent room, the second billiard ball has moved. Coincidentally, there are people playing in that room and the second billiard ball has, indeed, moved. True belief? Yes. Knowledge? No.

What is the difference? It is this: the efficient cause of the motion of the billiard ball was separate and unrelated to the efficient cause of my belief in the billiard ball's motion. In order for there to be knowledge, there must be a connection between true belief and reality. This is found in the aforementioned double function of the first ball. Unless the reality of a situation and the belief in that situation have a common cause, there can be no knowledge of the situation. This is an epistemological account for knowledge.

Some possible objections: I am sitting in a room, unaware of the table of billiard ball in the room next to me. A reliable person walks in and tells me that the second billiard ball in the next room has just moved. Knowledge or just true belief? This time, it wasn't a brain poking that caused my belief. But it also wasn't the motion of the first ball arguing for my belief in the motion of the second. The cause of my belief is the word of the reliable person. Nevertheless, I maintain that this is knowledge. It is not necessary that the proximate cause of my belief be the same as the efficient cause of the reality, only that it can be traced to it. What caused the reliable person to believe in the motion of the second ball?

Suppose, however, that the reliable person did not see the motion of the first ball; he only saw the second ball moving. Now the cause of the second ball's motion cannot be the same as the ultimate cause of my belief in this motion. But this is not a problem. The question has been pushed back a step. Now the ultimate cause of my belief in this motion is the motion itself of the second ball. But this is no different than my belief in the motion of the first ball under the previous scenario. The point is that the reality of the situation is inseparable from the cause of my belief in the situation.

At the same time, the reality of a situation is not sufficient to be the cause of my belief or anyone's belief for that matter. Suppose that there is a room in the basement with a table of billiard balls. The room has been sealed off and no living person recalls that it exists. In this room, there is a stick hovering over the first ball as if ready to strike it. It is held in place by a wire. In order to eliminate also the connection to knowledge of a future event, let's say that the now dead designers had every reason to believe that the wire was permanent. Unknown to anyone, a wire dissolving agent got into the room's atmosphere. In time, the wire dissolves, the stick drops, the first ball moves and strikes the second ball, and the second billiard ball moves. There is no knowledge of this event because an important epistemological factor is missing; namely, sensory perception. There must be a reliable means for the events in reality to imprint themselves on the mind in order for knowledge to take place.

And now, what about rational causation alone for belief. I would have to say that this could never amount to knowledge. Suppose that I had never heard of billiard balls. I am sitting in a room and I begin to imagine a game. This game is in every way identical to billiard balls but is, nevertheless, only the product of my own imagination. I imagine a first ball moving and striking a second ball. From there, I use my rational abilities to determine what would happen to the second ball in just such a circumstance. I conclude that, while thinking about this, the second ball in my imaginary game has moved. Add to this the fact that I'm delusional. I don't think that this game is the product of my imagination. Instead, I beleive that I have extra-sensory perception concerning an adjacent room. [This delusion does not otherwise affect my ability to think rationally.] When I rationally conclude that the second ball has moved, I also believe that this has really happened. Meanwhile, unknown to me, there really is a table of billiard balls in the next room. The second ball has moved. Consequently, my belief in the motion of the second ball is true. But it is not knowledge. Rationality can lead us to say "if x then y," yet, it cannot give us any knowledge of x. There must be a connection of at least one of the premises to the real world. This has an efficient cause, i.e., the sensory perception of reality.

Efficient and rational causation for a belief are inseperable. As you have correctly surmised, when I say, "if there is no argument for X...," I do not mean, "if there is no efficient cause for X..." Nor am I limiting the concept of argument to something that is sound and rational. I have been using the term to encompass the efficient/rational causation for a belief. Hence, my contention that the tree outside my window argues for my belief in its existence.

There is a distinction to be made between the efficient cause of the object of a belief (such as the motion of the first ball causing the motion of the second) and the efficient cause of the belief itself (my senses registering the motion of the first and/or second ball). I agree with you then that the proposition, "if we cannot give some indication for how/why X is produced by a reliable efficient cause then it is just as valid to reject X as to accept it," is false. But here, X is the object itself. If I see a billiard ball moving, I do not have to give some indication for how/why this is happening in order to know that it is, in fact, happening. My knowledge of the ball's motion is based upon my sensory perception of that motion. The argument for my belief in the ball's motion is intact, as is the argument for my belief that the ball exists. I just don't know how or why it exists. But I don't have to.

"Justification" is probably not the best word I could have chosen. It does carry too much baggage from pre-Gettier days. Perhaps "warrant" would be better. [You may have noticed a similarity between some of my views and those of Plantinga in "Warrant and Proper Function." It's been a few years since I've read it and I haven't had it opened in front of me. It is, in fact, entirely possible that I have missed his point entirely. Any differences are my fault alone. But, for all of those that want to put credit where it's due, this book was responsible for moving me in this direction. Back to the comment.] Epistemology is, as you claim, "the attempt to give a general account of the difference between knowledge and mere true belief." This account can be the pre-Gettier justified true belief, which asks, "How do I know that I know?" Or it can be a simple account of the mechanics of knowledge: object, sensory perception, and mind. Unlike justified true belief, no one has to be thinking about the mechanics of knowledge in order for it to be the case. With all of this in mind, I do think that, as long as we are going to talk about justifiable knowledge claims, it is appropriate to think of epistemology as the ultimate justification for knowledge claims. The word is obviously not being used in a pre-Gettier sense.

I agree with you on the question "How do you know." Again, this is another case of linguistic ambiguity. When "how do you know" is used to request an argument, it actually means, "Why do you believe this?" When I said, "how do you know," I meant just that: what is the process by which knowledge is made possible?

Although making a scriptural case for child baptism may not in itself constitute engaging in epistemology, it still depends upon epistemology. I'm not saying that we have to start with a case of epistemic faculties. My Baptist friend and I can go straight to scripture since we both beleive that it is true. Perhaps I can turn to a verse he's never noticed before and convince him. No need at all for epistemology. But it's more likley that there will be an impass. In this case, we need to push further back into our presuppostions.

Christianity distinguishes itself from many other religions in that it depends upon the historical accuracy of its scriptural narrative. If the events recorded in scripture did not happen, then Christianity cannot be true. Most Baptists will admit that the events recorded in scripture actually happened, because scripture says they did. But, the virgin birth, passion, and resurrection of Christ excepted, they don't see how the reality of the historical events has any bearing on whether or not Christianity is true. Many times, but not always, this is reflected in their Dispensationalism. There is no overarching covenant for all of God's people. The only relevance for a historical Israel is that it set the stage for the coming of Christ. What they believed or practiced has no necessary relevance to our own beliefs. And because this historical bond is broken, the OT becomes a collection of moral lessons with nothing to distinguish it from any other ahistorical narrative. Now, while many Baptists may hold to the singular truth of their religion out of sheer tenacity, they really have no valid argument for it. There are any number of non-Christian religions of an equal moral caliber. Hence, the practical credo of so many people today: Why settle for truth when you can have morality?

But now, put the covenant back in its proper place. It controls all of God's people such that the historical events of the life of Israel have a direct bearing upon the truth of Christianity. We are then able to make our argument for child baptism on the basis of the continuing validity of the covenantal sign. The case for child baptism can be settled right here with no appeal to epistemology. Nevertheless, once we have made an historical argument, the epistemology of biblical knowledge has been presupposed. At some point, an actual, historical event was made the object of someone's knowledge by means of sensory perception. This individual then wrote it down; not unlike the reliable person who tells me about the motion of the second billiard ball.

Although it may never prove necessary to give an epistemological account for our faith, only faith which has an epistemological account can be true. The Koran or the Book of Mormon cannot claim such an account because they do not have one. The Dispensationalist does have such an account but, because he cannot see it, he will not claim it. The presence of such an account means that his true Christian beliefs are knowledge; however, his practical denial of biblical history, and, consequently, of this account, make it impossible for him to defend his knowledge.

I agree with your views on Descartes and with the statement, "we can be justified in accepting a knowledge claim even if we can't give an account of how we are justified." I would add, though, that it is the account itself, not our ability to articulate it, that provides the justification, or warrant, for a knowledge claim.

Concerning Abraham: I believe that he had more to go on to identify the voice than intuition. He had heard and seen God before and had been on the receiving end of God's covenant promises. He had every reason to believe in the trustworthiness of God and that this was actually God speaking. If it had been just a case of Abraham hearing a voice for the first time out of the blue and then just "intuiting" that it was God, his belief would not have been justified. Whether or not this belief were true would be irrelevant. If there really is a secret billiard ball room in the basement, I have no justification for believing this to be the case.

If you insist on calling the movement of the first ball an argument, the only thing I can say is that this is very misleading.

If you had simply said "if belief in X is not warranted, then it is just as valid to believe the opposite" then I would agree with you. But you went on to give an account of warrant in terms of reliable causal connections. You are in fact engaging in particularist epistemology, which is what I argued against in my post. It's not that I disagree with any of your particular examples; rather I think you and I both are going to be wrong about some of our beliefs concerning those particulars. Hence the definition we get out is likely to be wrong too.

You say, "it is the account itself, not our ability to articulate it, that provides the justification, or warrant, for a knowledge claim" But an account is something in someone's mind. Warrant itself is something external. Warrant could be what it is even if no-one knows it. You admit that someone could be warranted even if that person has no account of warrant. I say that someone could be warranted even if NO ONE has an account of warrant. There may be no such account, epistemology may be unknowable, and yet prophets and apostles and ordinary people could still know things about history etc. My belief in the motion of billiard ball 2 could be warranted (i.e. assuming you're right about warrant: it could be caused by a reliable mechanism in causal connection with the motion of the first ball) even if no one knew that your account of warrant was correct. Even if no one COULD know that that or any account was correct.

What you said about the dispensational Baptist is really baffling to me. Whether I'm right or wrong about epistemology it seems you and the Baptist are in the same boat. If I'm right, then although both of you are warranted in you faith, neither of you can give an account of what warrant is or why you are warranted. If you're right, then you can say, "I am warranted because of the historicity of the OT," and the baptist can say "I am warranted because of the historicity of the NT." You've got a bigger book and a longer history than he, but so what? You're both basing your beliefs on the same sort of thing: historical testimony.

At any rate, you don't need to presuppose epistemology (an account of warrant) to base a knowledge claim on a historical argument. Epistemology might not exist. All that is required is that beliefs based on historical testimony are in fact warranted. Presupposition is once again something that happens inside a mind. You seem to be systematically confusing things that go on inside a mind (presuppositions, arguments, justification, epistemology, accounts) with things that go on outside the mind (motion, efficient causation, warrant).

I mentioned before that I thought there were some semantical issues here: we may be talking past each other. And, I guess I can take responsibility for having the more creative approach to language. Sorry.

Account: You can have this one. I was just having trouble coming up with the right word. "Warrant" will do. Nevertheless, if this warrant for knowledge is ever able to be articulated, and I believe that it is, then this articulation is an account of knowledge and, consequently, an epistemology.

Argument: My use of the term is not unprecedented, though it may not be in keeping with current popular usage. The second definition of "argue" in Webster's 1828 edition says- "To prove or evince; to manifest by inference or deduction; or to show reasons for; as, the order visible in the universe argues a divine cause." The key word here is "evince," which means- "to show in a clear manner." I have always used the term in this manner and was a bit surprised when I didn't find it in our more recent dictionary. I now have a linguistic cause. Incidently, in the present discussion, I am just as content saying, "if belief in X is not warranted...," as I am saying, "if there is no argument for X..." And I agree with everything you said in your third paragraph about warrant.

Efficient causation: The only way I can think of that I have used this for an activity in the mind is with sensory experience as efficient cause for belief. But you suggested it first.

Epistemology: Technically, this should be equated with an account of warrant; however, since I believe that such an account is always possible, even if often unnecessary, I have been equating epistemology with warrant itself.

Justification: I've already admitted to some problems with this one. I have only used this as something outside of the mind insofar as I failed to distinguish between warrant and an account for warrant. I've been assuming that there was an account for warrant whether or not this account is actually given. Consequently, I have been writing as though warrant itself justifes. Now that you have pointed out the distinction, I shall discontinue forthwith.

Motion: There is a difference between motion itself, which is outside of the mind, and and the perception of motion, which is in the mind. I have always had this distinction in mind. The lack of clarity here is probably due to my use of "argue."

Presupposition: While this may go on in the mind, it does not have to. Webster's 1828 says of "presuppose," "To suppose as previous [admittedly in the mind]; to imply as antecedent. The existence of created things presupposes the existence of a creator." Note that his example does not speak of an activity in the mind but of the things in themselves. Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary Tenth Edition also allows for this extra-mental usage. It's second definition of "presuppose" reads, "to require as an antecedent in logic or fact." So, although I "don't need to presuppose epistemology (an account of warrant) to base a knowledge claim on a historical argument," the knowledge claim itself, if it is true, does presuppose warrant.

Warrant: I never did intend to use this word to describe an activity. The problem was in the use of inadequate substitutes as long as I couldn't think of the word.

I wasn't sure what you meant by "particularist epistemology." Now I know. I don't see the problem with sometimes being wrong in our beliefs concerning the particulars. Granted, we will be wrong; however, our error is not the result of any failure in the particularist epistemology. It results because the conditions for warrant have not been met. Perhaps there's someone outside my window who's been standing there for a very long time in a tree suit. Or maybe I am unaware that my eyes are substandard (I do, in fact, know that this is the case; however, when I'm not wearing my glasses, I know better than to trust my senses). Perhaps I have a mental defect and am incapable of rational thought. Warrant depends upon the proper functioning of all the relevent parts. If there is nothing wrong or deceptive in the objective reality, if our senses are in good working order, if we are consistently rational in our thought, then we are not going to be wrong in our beliefs about the particulars. That we can be wrong only serves to demonstrate a failure to meet one or more of these conditions. It says nothing about this account of warrant as an inadequate epistemology.

You state in your original post, "Once we have a definition [of knowledge] such that we can't find any counterexamples, we have our epistemology." I hadn't really thought about defining knowledge, but what about this? --Where a is objective reality and b is true belief, knowledge is the final status of b iff there is a relationship between a and b such that there is a causal link from a to b, and b corresponds, though not necessarily comprehensively, to a.

The differences between me and a dispensationalist Baptist are more than the size of my book and the length of my history. Before going any further, I need to preface my remarks. I don't want to paint with too big a brush. First, not all Baptists are dispensationalists. There are Reformed Baptists, but, personally, I have never been able to figure out how they pull this off. Second, with the exception of a significant minority (of which I was a part while growing up), many dispensationalists are moving away from the excesses of Scofield and Darby. There may even be a continuum into covenantal theology. Third, the larger problem is found with fundamentalism, and with it, its anti-intellectual tendencies. [This is not non-intellectual. I'm not saying that someone has to be intelligent in order to be a deeply spiritual Christian. An anti-intellectual is actually someone who would say just the opposite.] When combined with dispensationalism, it gets even worse. So I'm not speaking about all Baptists, nor am I speaking about all Dispensationalists, or even about all Fundamentalists. I'm talking about FADs. Fundamentalist, Anti-Intellectual, Dispensationalists. I've walked among them: I know they exist and I know how they think.

FADs are genuine Christians. They believe in the historicity of the life and work of Christ. Furthermore, they believe that this historicity is necessary to their salvation. And they are right. Beyond this, however, their doctrine is shallow. They believe in the historicity of both OT and NT, but they claim warrant for their faith from neither. The Bible is a collection of morals in stories that just happen to be factual.

The practical side of this is that they do not believe many key doctrines. There is no covenant for the church and no paedobaptism. Neither the sacraments nor the preaching of the Word are means of grace. The sacraments have a strictly professional or memorial status. And, although they may acknowledge the necessity of the Holy Spirit's work with the preaching of the Word, they deliver their sermons after the manner of a psychological persuasion. The individual is emphasized to the detriment of the catholic Church. While there are exceptions (I offer myself as an example), they tend to be Arminian in their sotereology. Despite this generally Arminian sotereology, many believe in eternal security. However, in this combination, it is not a case of perseverence of the saints, but of easy-believism. Say a prayer and then do what you want: they'd rather you didn't take advantage of this loophole, but you'll still go to heaven.

Other than as a list of practical advise, the Decalogue was meant for Israel, not for the church. Ironically, many of the churches that draw this distinction too sharply end up creating their own rules and becoming legalistic. And why not? They see the Decalogue as a list of regulations relevant to Israel but abstracted from its history. They don't see the significance of the prologue, "I am the LORD your God who brought you out of the land of Egypt." The lesson is not, "We will obey these commandments because God has redeemed us." It is, "Rules are good. We need to think of some rules to fit our situation."

I could go on. But all of these beliefs can be traced back to their failure to recognize the historicity of the scripture entire as necessary to the existence and content of the catholic Faith. They are saved, and that is all, because they have put their faith in the person and work of Jesus Christ. Furthermore, such salvation is an aberration. Liberalism and much of neo-Orthodoxy are much more consistent in this regard. It does not matter to them if Christ ever lived, much less if he died for our sins and was raised from the dead. The important point is that the power of the story be allowed to transform us. The alarming thing to me is that FADs implicity believe this moral-story heremeneutic when it comes to any other scriptural narrative (yes, these stories just happen to be true, but, in the end, it wouldn't have mattered if they were- the practical results are the same). However, when it comes to the historicity of Christ's life and work, there is absolutley nothing in the FADs' belief system to explain why they should make this necessary to their own faith.

All by way of answering your question, "but so what?" I am convinced that the beleif in the historicity of the entire Bible, and not just an incidental historicity or one that only involves the work of Christ, is vitaly important to the Christian life of the Church.

Thank you. I can see now that what I was most worried about is not the case: you are not thinking like an internalist. So the only thing I'm sure we disagree about is (1) the possibility of a successful particularist epistemology. And I think you also are claiming that (2) someone must have an account of warrant in order for anyone to be warranted (Are you?). Whereas I say that people could be warranted even if no one had such an account (although as a matter of fact, it just so happens that someone does has an account: God---but that's not relevant).

(1) I think you've misunderstood my objection to the program of particularist epistemology. When I say "we could be wrong" I'm not claiming that the particular examples might be misdescribed. Rather I'm assuming the example is correctly described: assuming that there really is a tree out there, and it really is causing your sense-experience which in turn causes your belief that there is a tree there. Given that all of that is correctly described, we could be wrong in our claim that this counts as knowledge. I don't think we are wrong. It seems very unlikely that we are wrong in that case. But in order for the particularist program to succeed, it must be unlikely that we are ever wrong in believing that "belief in a situation like this ... counts as knowledge". But it is likely that some of our beliefs that have this form are wrong. Hence the particularist program cannot succeed.

(2) I won't try to support my second claim until I'm sure you disagree with it.

Everyone would be warranted in what they actually do believe even if no one was able to provide an account of this warrant. I just happen to think that there is an account for warrant and that it can be provided. Thus, my belief that that the particularist program can succeed. I don't understand what you mean by, "But it is likely that some of our beliefs that have this form are wrong." It seems to me that the precise opposite would be the case. Any wrong belief would have to be the result of the form not being followed. I'd be willing to concede with a valid counter-example.

My support of the possibility of epistemology is not found in its necessity to give warrant, but in its apologetical value for settling competing knowledge claims. Of two contradictory knowledge claims, only one of them is warranted. And I do realize an inherent weakness in this project. I've been using religious knowledge claims as an example. It is my contention that the validity, and consequently, the truth of scripture rests on its historicity (I am not, hereby, denying the necessity of the truthfulness of God himself to a true Word of God). Once we get back to actual, historical events, the next logical step would entail an account of warrant. Even if no one were able to provide it. I have been considering the threshold of an epistemological argument to be that point in which an account of warrant, if possible, is logically entailed. The problem is that it's not always possible to get that far. If I am debating with a theological Liberal, he will deny the historicity of scripture: so much for the next logical step. Which, incidentally, is what I see as the problem with polemical apologetics. You can never get the other guy to cooperate.